Major anti-gang protests in Haiti likely reflect a deteriorating humanitarian situation, which the gangs are likely attempting to exploit to increase the population’s dependence on them.

The Colombian government’s unilateral end to peace talks with the ELN almost certainly indicates an end to “total peace” and marks a significant shift in its policy towards rebel and criminal groups.  

The sentencing of far-right leader Marine Le Pen almost certainly deepens political tensions in France and is likely to increase the risk of political violence and unrest.

It is highly likely that Russia is exploiting poorly defined ceasefire terms and is delaying negotiations to pursue further territorial advances in Ukraine.

There is a realistic possibility that an Israeli strike on a Hezbollah external attack planner in Lebanon indicates a shift in Hezbollah’s strategy to target Israeli and Jewish interests abroad.

The Israeli establishment of a new operational corridor in Gaza is highly likely meant to isolate the remaining Hamas units. There is a realistic possibility of a growing consensus in Tel Aviv regarding annexing parts of Gaza.

It is likely that, due to its vulnerable position, Tehran will pursue a relatively cautious approach after Trump’s threats to bomb Iran. However, military escalation would likely force retaliation, threatening a regional conflict.

There is a realistic possibility that Uganda will support the newly formed Convention for the Popular Revolution (CPR) in the DRC’s Ituri province, highly likely exacerbating humanitarian issues in the region.

Worst-case scenarios for an anticipated Nankai Trough megaquake in Japan predict mass casualties and the loss of almost half the country’s total GDP, almost certainly reaffirming the need for disaster planning.

Large-scale Chinese military drills around Taiwan are highly likely rehearsing a blockade of the island and almost certainly demonstrate the coordination of multiple PLA branches to conduct multi-domain operations.

On 2 April, thousands of Haitians protested in the capital, Port-au-Prince, to denounce a surge in gang violence. Protestors demonstrated outside of government buildings and demanded that the government do more to keep them safe.  Gunfire was exchanged between armed protesters and the police outside the offices of the prime minister and the transitional presidential council, resulting in many protestors fleeing the area.

The protests follow an increase in gang activity, which has involved gangs like the Viv Ansanm gang coalition attempting to move into new parts of the capital, where gangs are estimated to control 85 per cent. Recent gang activity has forced more than 60,000 people to flee their homes in one month alone, according to the UN’s International Organization for Migration.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Recent developments indicate that the gangs are attempting to expand their control and move out of their traditional areas of operations.  Increased attacks in the capital likely suggest that the gangs are attempting to secure the remaining 15 per cent of Port-au-Prince and isolate the government to just a few areas of the city.

The 2 April protests followed a gang attack on the central Haitian commune of Mirebalais on 31 March. During the Mirebalais attack, which has been linked to the Viv Ansanm gang coalition, a prison was targeted, and over 500 inmates were released, many of whom were likely immediately recruited by the gangs.

The attack in Mirebalais, approximately 60 kilometres northeast of the capital, may indicate that the gangs are attempting to assert control and expand their territory outside of Port-au-Prince. This strategy would likely provide several benefits for the gangs.

Attacks outside of the capital will almost certainly help to further undermine both the government and the Kenyan-led international task force, which is already reporting increased casualties. Significant attacks outside the capital will likely act as a demonstration of strength for the gangs, bolstering their recruitment efforts.

If sustained, such actions could also pressure the government and international forces to divert resources from the capital, further overstretching their forces to the advantage of the gangs. Most importantly, if the gangs take control and expand their influence in central Haiti, this will likely enable them to assert greater influence in the capital.

The gangs have systematically targeted key elements of Haiti’s infrastructure, including aid distribution points and convoys, hospitals and healthcare facilities, and vital infrastructure such as the international airport, roads, and transport hubs. They have also attacked educational institutions and other critical services. These attacks have likely been conducted to disrupt the delivery of humanitarian aid, increase the population’s dependency on the gangs, and undermine the government’s inability to provide essential services.

Control of central Haiti will likely exacerbate these trends. Mirebalias is on the intersection of Route 305 and National Road 3 (Route Nationale 3), the main supply route that connects the capital to Cap-Haïtien. Gang attacks on Toussaint Louverture International Airport (PAP) and on aircraft have effectively rendered the airport non-operational, and the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has banned flights to the airport until September 2025. This has led to Cap-Haïtien becoming an increasingly critical hub for both humanitarian aid and international support.

The gangs will likely continue to attack and attempt to assert control in central Haiti to cut off Port-au-Prince from humanitarian aid and international relief. As their territorial expansion increases, the humanitarian situation will almost certainly continue to deteriorate, likely further entrenching gang dominance, increasing internal displacement and migration flows, increasing unrest, and increasing the need for a coordinated international intervention.

Colombian President Gustavo Petro has announced the unilateral termination of peace talks with the left-wing guerrilla group, the National Liberation Army (ELN), following sustained fighting, which has primarily affected regions like Arauca and Norte de Santander on the Venezuelan border. President Petro also denounced the ELN as an “occupying army of foreign origin.”

Petro’s comments were reinforced by incumbent Colombian Defence Minister Pedro Sánchez, who condemned the ELN, labelling it as a “purely criminal group” responsible for a wide range of human rights abuses, including the mass displacement of 56,000 people, the forced confinement of 23,000, murder and kidnap.

Recent government operations have neutralised hundreds of ELN fighters, and awards amounting to approximately USD 400,000 have been offered that lead to the arrest of ELN leaders. ELN leaders have responded by declaring Petro’s “total peace” policy a failure and betrayal of the Colombian people. The group also justified the killing of Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) dissidents, accusing them of collaboration with the government.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Recent government statements and operations indicate a complete shift in the Petro administration’s strategy towards the ELN and other guerilla and criminal groups, which will highly likely result in a worsening of the conflict near the border with Venezuela and the humanitarian situation.

However, the effective dismantling of the ELN will likely prove to be a significant challenge. The group maintains a decentralised structure and is well entrenched in the rural and border regions of Colombia. The ELN has traditionally survived the killing or capturing of its leadership by quickly replacing them and operating through a network of decentralised cells.

Petro’s comments that the ELN is an occupying army of foreign origin is almost certainly a reference to how the group has developed ties with Venezuela, with widespread reports that the Maduro administration is directly profiting from the ELN’s illicit activities. These ties will help ELN sustain itself militarily and enable it to establish safe havens outside of Colombia.

Moreover, cross-border operations will complicate Colombian counter-insurgency efforts, limiting its ability to target ELN high-value targets within Venezuela without risking a diplomatic crisis or broader conflict.  These challenges likely indicate that the conflict will last for the foreseeable future following the mutual acceptance of the failure of “total peace”.

It is estimated that the ELN operates in at least 231 municipalities across 19 departments in Colombia and in eight of Venezuela’s 24 states. In Colombia, the ELN’s main strongholds are in the departments of Chocó, Norte de Santander, and Arauca. However, the group also has a strategic presence in the departments of Antioquia, Bolívar, Cauca, Valle del Cauca, Nariño, and Vichada, where it engages in illicit activities such as drug trafficking, illegal mining, and extortion to sustain its operations.

The ELN’s widespread territorial control and illicit networks likely make it highly resilient to military pressure. This also puts the group in an advantageous position to escalate violence across the country, and there is a realistic possibility that sustained government operations against the ELN near the Venezuelan border will result in a migration of violence to other parts of Colombia.

US administration announces “Liberation Day” tariffs

On 2 April, Washington highlighted the Trump administration’s plans to impose sweeping tariffs on its international trade partners. President Trump has held a long-standing belief that a comprehensive tariff regime will bolster the American economy by reducing the impact of “unfair” international trade practices.

The move is likely to drive anti-American sentiment abroad, particularly in the most severely hit states or regions, including the European Union, China, Cambodia, and Vietnam. In Europe, there is a realistic possibility that an increase in the perceived hostility of the US administration will contribute to drive further cases of vandalism of American assets and businesses.

Violent unrest in the Dominican Republic during anti-Haitian protests

On 30 March, an anti-Haitian protest in the Dominican Republic turned violent as the nationalist group Antigua Orden Dominicana (AOD) called for the expulsion of Haitian migrants. Violent unrest resulted in the police using tear gas and water cannons, and several arrests were made.

Protestors claimed that Haitians are responsible for an increase in crime in the country, demanded that mass deportations be conducted, and broke past barricades to enter Haitian communities in Hoyo de Friusa, Bavaro, close to the tourist resort of Punta Cana.

Due to the endemic violence and continued destabilisation in Haiti and its associated migrant flow into the Dominican Republic, future protests and unrest are likely to continue, with the AOD attempting to organise further demonstrations in April.

New Mexico Republican HQ firebombed

On 30 March, the Republican Party state offices were set on fire, and slogans like “ICE=KKK” were spray-painted on the building. The damage to the premises was reportedly contained by responding firefighters, and as the attack occurred overnight, no injuries were reported.

The firebombing is almost certainly in response to the Trump administration’s drive to carry out mass deportation of undocumented migrants in the US. While available data suggests that the actual number of expulsions is similar to that recorded during the Democrat Biden administration, the Trump White House has strongly invested in public messaging on its migration policies, often highlighting and glorifying their most controversial aspects, such as the deportation of alleged gang members to prisons in El Salvador.

The high-visibility of the current administration’s policies is likely to drive further acts of vandalism, and possibly political violence, in the medium term.

Floods result in evacuations in northeast Paraguay

Severe floods have affected the Alto Paraguay region since 1 April, following severe precipitation. The severe weather events have resulted in the evacuation of local towns and major traffic disruptions, and authorities have issued a state of emergency for the area. The Alto Paraguay department is sparsely populated and lacks comprehensive infrastructure, with few key roadways, like the PY16. Consequently, even localised floods can result in smaller towns being effectively cut off from receiving emergency help.

On 1 April, a French court sentenced Marine Le Pen, the leader of the far-right National Rally (RN) and favourite in early polls for the 2027 presidential race, to four years in prison (two suspended, two on house arrest) over charges of embezzlement of EU funds. The court, which also sentenced other prominent RN officials, also barred Le Pen from running for office for five years, meaning that the sentence prevents her from partaking in the 2027 vote.

The sentence was met by the opposition of prominent international right-wing figures, including in Italy, Hungary, and the US. Jordan Bardella, RN’s party president, and other leaders called for a peaceful mobilisation in support of Le Pen, including a rally at 15:00 local time in Paris on 6 April.

Le Pen has appealed the verdict, and, on 2 April, court officials stated they plan to hold the appeal trial before the 2027 electoral campaign.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The verdict is almost certainly a severe blow to RN. The party’s political appeal has been tied to the Le Pen family for generations, and if Marine Le Pen was unable to run, there is a realistic possibility that it would struggle to gain traction by fielding Bardella or another alternative candidate.

It is highly likely that RN supporters will stage demonstrations following the verdict, particularly on 4-6 April. Counterdemonstrations by anti-RN activists will highly likely take place in response, with a realistic possibility of violent clashes and police intervention.

There is likewise a realistic possibility that the sentencing will embolden radical groups and movements that share some ideological affiliation with RM’s platform to increase recruitment and messaging to RN’s voter base. It may be notable that RN won around 30 per cent of the youth vote at the last elections, matching a shift also seen elsewhere in Europe.

Finally, the judicial closing of a political path for RN to take power is likely to be exploited by extremists to increase calls to violence against public officials and left-wing politicians in France, possibly increasing the risk of lone wolf terrorism.

Officials within the Trump administration have acknowledged that securing a peace deal in Ukraine within the next few months is unlikely. The officials stated that while the original intent was to secure a full ceasefire by April-May, both Ukrainian and Russian resistance to key elements proposed by the Trump administration are delaying efforts, leading to increasing frustration within the White House over President Putin’s refusal to compromise on his maximalist demands.

Washington has discussed renewed measures to coerce Moscow into accepting its proposals, which include secondary tariffs of 25-50 per cent on Russian oil buyers.

President Putin has continued to criticise US peace proposals through his chief negotiator Sergei Ryabkov, demanding several core demands that the Kremlin insists must be met to secure any potential ceasefire agreement.

These include Ukrainian recognition of the annexation of Crimea and the four partially occupied regions in southeastern Ukraine of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson; a Ukrainian pledge to never join NATO or any other Western military alliance; a demilitarisation of Ukraine; the removal of President Volodymyr Zelensky; a suspension of US lethal aid and intelligence; and an easing of European sanctions, which the EU has rejected.

Solace Global Assessment: 

By refusing to accept current ceasefire proposals advanced by the US or renege on its maximalist demands, it is highly likely that the Kremlin is delaying the ceasefire proposal in order to seize further Ukrainian territory, which will ultimately improve its bargaining power in future negotiation talks.

Moreover, Russia is unlikely to accept any meaningful ceasefire agreement while Ukraine retains forces in Russia’s Kursk Oblast. Ukraine’s Kursk offensive was a symbolic and operational success that buoyed Ukrainian morale, forced Russia to divert resources from other sectors of the line of contact and most importantly, placed Ukraine in a more advantageous position for future negotiations.

Recent reporting indicates that Russian ground forces are close to reclaiming the entirety of the Kursk Oblast after seizing the city of Sudzha in mid-March, Ukraine’s main defensive position. However, Moscow is unlikely to pursue ceasefire negotiations once it has fully reclaimed Kursk, as it has seized the momentum on multiple fronts.

Once the Kursk Oblast has been recaptured, Russia will likely stabilise its lines on this axis and laterally redeploy forces to parts of eastern Ukraine, in order to further consolidate territorial gains, improve its leverage, and maximise its chances of securing concessions from both Ukraine and the West.

Moscow is highly likely to accept poorly defined steps towards a ceasefire or limited ceasefires in order to project a willingness to pursue overall peace, a strategy that will continue to delay the conflict and may help to placate the Trump administration, which is under pressure to secure a resolution to the conflict.

By agreeing to vague, poorly defined or incomplete ceasefire proposals, Moscow can claim it is acting in good faith while exploiting the lack of clarity to continue military operations or adapt them to appear as if it is complying.

One example of this strategy currently in place is Russia’s interpretation of the moratorium on attacks on Ukraine’s energy-related critical national infrastructure (CNI). Russia has refrained from attacking these targets with long-range missiles and drones in accordance with the vaguely defined terms of the ceasefire. However, it has increased its targeting of energy infrastructure with shorter-range artillery, as it is unclear as to whether this is covered in the yet-to-be formalised ceasefire terms, which may only apply to long-range fires.

One of the objectives of this strategy is likely to provoke Ukraine into retaliatory actions, then exploit the ambiguity of the ceasefire terms to shift blame onto Kyiv for violating the ceasefire. Ultimately, this strategy will help Russia control the narrative, undermine Ukraine’s commitment to ongoing peace negotiations, help extend the conflict whilst Russia maintains the upper hand on the battlefield, and most importantly, help to foster division within the West, one of Russia’s primary strategic objectives.

On 1 April, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted an airstrike in the Hezbollah stronghold of the Dahieh area in southern Beirut, targeting Hassan Ali Mahmoud Bdeir. Israeli intelligence claims that Bdier was a senior Hezbollah commander who served in the militant group’s Unit 3900, which is responsible for external operations beyond Lebanon’s borders.

Bdeir was also responsible for the coordination between Hezbollah, Hamas and Iran’s Quds Force. According to Israeli sources, Bdier was planning a major attack on Jewish and Israeli targets overseas and had been monitored for months by the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet), working in conjunction with Israel’s military intelligence and cyber surveillance units.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Israeli defence sources claim that Bdeir was overseeing the recruitment of suicide operatives, logistic chains for weapons and explosives, the funnelling of funds through covert Iranian channels, and was responsible for target selection against Israeli diplomatic missions, Jewish community centres and other potential civilian targets.

If the foiled attack was credible, it may indicate a shift in Hezbollah’s strategy against Israel. Hezbollash has established a network of operatives across the globe and has previously demonstrated its ability to attack Israeli and Jewish interests outside of the Middle East. For example, in 1994, 85 people were killed after a vehicle-borne improved explosive device (VBIED) detonated outside of the Argentine Jewish Mutual Association (AMIA) building in Buenos Aires, an attack that has been linked to Hezbollah with Iranian backing.

There is a realistic possibility that Hezbollah may be seeking to adopt a strategy of external attacks to increase pressure on Israel and the US while achieving a high degree of plausible deniability. Such a strategy would also enable Hezbollah to target Israeli interests without directly engaging Israeli forces, with any Israeli response in Lebanon likely to provoke international condemnation.

However, the strike follows a series of expanded Israeli strikes in Lebanon, which have not been confined to the southern parts of Lebanon. Hezbollah is in a weakened position after Israel’s ground offensive and strikes on the group, and it has lost its critical supply lines from Iran through Syria since the fall of the Assad regime. However, the group still maintains thousands of fighters and a credible arsenal of missiles and rockets.

While Hezbollah likely has some tolerance for attacks on rank-and-file fighters and military equipment, Israeli strikes on senior leadership and within Beirut could force Hezbollah into resuming hostilities if sustained. Any major kinetic response from Hezbollah will likely result in a definitive end to the increasingly fragile ceasefire agreement and would likely lead to increased Israeli strikes in Lebanon and potentially a renewed ground offensive in southern Lebanon.

Given the current geopolitical climate, there is a realistic possibility that Israel may be seeking to capitalise on Hezbollah’s degradation, a weakened Iran, and the support of an increasingly pro-Israel, anti-Iran Trump administration to further its strategic goals.

The Israel Defence Forces (IDF) have continued offensive operations in the Gaza Strip, with the aim of maximising pressure on Hamas and securing the release of the remaining Israeli hostages still in captivity. On 2-3 April, IDF channels issued evacuation orders for much of the southern city of Rafah, while Israel Katz, the minister of defence, stated that IDF operations are aimed at seizing territory for long-term occupation. This echoed Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s statements on 30 March that Israel is now seeking to implement Trump’s plan for the “voluntary migration” of Gazans from the Gaza Strip.

On 3 April, Netanyahu announced that IDF units have established the Morag Corridor, named after a former Israeli settlement in Gaza, between Rafah and Khan Yunis, calling it a “second Philadelphi”. Over 1,150 Palestinians are estimated to have been killed since hostilities resumed on 18 March.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The establishment of the Morag Corridor almost certainly seeks to isolate Rafah from the rest of Gaza. The southern city was considered to be the key stronghold from Hamas forces and benefited from the proximity of the Gaza-Egypt corridor, through which the armed group received most of its equipment and resources.

IDF operations are likely aimed at “strangling” the remaining Hamas units by sectioning Gaza. It is highly likely that IDF units in the Morag area will immediately seek to identify and destroy the remaining tunnels linking Rafah and Khan Yunis, aiming to sever Hamas’ ground lines of communications and forcing it into more direct and costly confrontations.

The establishment of the new corridor, combined with the evacuation orders for Rafah, highly likely shows that the aid blockade will continue, which will in turn almost certainly worsen the humanitarian situation in southern Gaza.

Katz and Netanyahu’s statements are highly likely the clearest indications of a growing interest in the Israeli annexation of parts of the Gaza Strip. The far-right parties that support Netanyahu’s government have long considered the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza in 2005 a historic mistake and are likely interested in returning to some of the previous settlements in the area.

A more tangible set of measures to expel Gazans from the area would almost certainly precipitate tensions in the region, bringing both Tel Aviv and Washington at odds with regional powers like Saudi Arabia and Turkey, who see the removal of Gazans as an unacceptable “red line”.

Moreover, it would almost certainly result in severe civil unrest in Jordan and, especially, Egypt, who would be the likeliest destinations for displaced Gazans.

While likely still the main political force in Gaza, there are notable indications that Hamas has lost much of its administrative capacity and support. In the past month, there have been multiple cases of protests against the war in Gaza, some openly criticising Hamas’ policies in the war.

In addition, on 2 April, members of the Abu Samra clan, based in Deir al-Balah, carried out a public execution of a Hamas member who had allegedly killed one of their relatives. The execution, which was filmed and posted online, is almost certainly an open act of defiance against Hamas, and highly likely reflects a wider belief in Hamas’ relative weakness.

On 30 March, US President Donald Trump stated that if Iran does not agree to a deal on their nuclear program, ‘there will be bombing’, ‘the likes of which they have never seen before’. Trump additionally threatened secondary tariffs on countries that trade with Iran, giving an approximate timeline of ‘a couple of weeks’ for progress in nuclear talks until the tariffs would be imposed.

On 31 March, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei responded, stating that he did not believe the threats but that the US would ‘certainly receive a heavy blow in return’. A senior Iranian adviser also stated that US or Israeli strikes would ‘force’ Tehran to develop nuclear weapons, and Iranian media and senior military commanders threatened retaliation against US military facilities across the region (including a direct threat against the US base on Diego Garcia Island south of the Maldives) and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz.

Furthermore, on 3 April, the Telegraph reported that a senior Iranian official source briefed that Tehran had ordered a withdrawal of military personnel from Yemen, as part of a reorientation away from a strategy of supporting its network of regional proxies, the “axis of resistance”, to focus instead on direct threats from the US.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The increase in rhetoric comes amidst a return to Trump’s “maximum pressure” approach to Iran, with Trump’s threats following Tehran formally responding to a 5 March letter Trump sent to Khamenei. In the letter, Trump set a two-month deadline to reach a nuclear deal, although it is unclear whether this countdown begins from the letter’s delivery or when negotiations hypothetically begin. Tehran’s rejection of Trump’s demands for direct negotiations, instead proposing indirect talks mediated by Oman, highly likely conditioned Trump’s direct threats of military force.

Iran has been classified as a “nuclear threshold state”, with estimates suggesting that it could take less than a week for Iran to enrich enough weapons-grade uranium to produce a nuclear weapon. Following the severe degradation of Lebanon’s Hezbollah and the October 2024 aerial strikes by Israel that highly likely heavily degraded Iran’s air defence network, Iranian deterrence in the region has almost certainly been significantly diminished.

Tehran, therefore, is highly likely to have far more incentive to develop a nuclear deterrent. There is likely considerable internal debate within the Iranian establishment, with a clear split between President Masoud Pezeshkian, who was elected on a mandate of reopening nuclear negotiations to enable the removal of sanctions that have crippled Iran’s economy, and hardliners who reject the possibility of any concessions to Washington.

Whilst the briefed withdrawal from Houthi-controlled Yemen may indicate a substantial shift in Tehran’s strategy, it is unlikely that they will fully abandon the Houthis, as the Yemeni group remains one of Iran’s most powerful and strategically positioned proxy forces.

Considerable escalation to open conflict between Iran and the US (with almost certain Israeli support), would highly likely increase the threat to US-aligned states across the region, notably Gulf states such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, with Iranian-backed proxy forces having previously threatened attacks against US energy interests during periods of increased tensions.

It is likely that Tehran, due to Iran’s assessed highly vulnerable position, will pursue a cautious approach and is likely particularly susceptible currently to Trump’s coercive rhetoric. Nonetheless, Khamenei will likely be highly reluctant to overtly concede to US pressure and military escalation by Washington would likely force retaliation by Tehran.

On 31 March, Ituri native Thomas Lubanga announced the creation of the Convention for the Popular Revolution (CPR), which aims to topple the government in the Ituri province. Lubanga, currently based in Uganda, claims that the group has political and military wings, with armed forces present in three areas of Ituri.

Lubanga was sentenced to 14 years in prison by the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2012 for ‘enlisting and conscripting children under the age of 15 years and using them to participate actively in hostilities.’ Congolese President Felix Tshisekedi appointed him after his release in 2020 as part of a task force to restore peace in Ituri. However, after being taken hostage for two months by a rebel group in 2022, he blamed the government, severing ties with Tshisekedi.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The CPR is the second rebel movement led by Lubanga, following the Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC), a rebel group involved in the Ituri conflict. While the conflict mainly occurred between 1999 and 2003 following the Second Congo War, it has continued at a lower intensity between the agriculturalist Lendu and pastoralist Hema ethnic groups.

The UPC, under the command of Lubanga, primarily supported the Hema ethnic group, and will almost certainly continue to do so under the new banner of CPR. Given that rebels under Lubanga’s command have previously been accused of human rights violations including ethnic massacres, murder, torture, rape, mutilation, and the forcible conscription of child soldiers, it is highly likely that CPR will engage in similar tactics, exacerbating humanitarian issues in the region, which has seen over 50,000 killed and 500,000 displaced. It is likely that aid workers will not be targeted, with Lubanga previously pledging security for humanitarian workers.

The UPC operated with the support of Ugandan forces, who are currently active in the Ituri region under Operation Shujaa, a joint offensive against insurgent forces in the Ituri province. In August 2002, the UPC captured Bunia with the assistance of the Ugandan military and subsequently began to receive support from Rwanda.

Uganda currently has a military presence in Bunia due to counterinsurgency efforts against the Islamic State-affiliated Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). Uganda also has an active interest in exploiting the abundant mineral resources in eastern DRC; in 2019, 95 per cent of its gold exports were highly likely sourced from the DRC.

There is a realistic possibility that Uganda will renew its ties with Lubanga, which would highly likely expand Ugandan access to mineral wealth attained by the rebel group, likely in exchange for military support from the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF). Forming an alliance with CPR would also likely expand Ugandan influence in the region, counterbalancing Rwanda’s expanding influence in Kivu through AFC/M23.

The formation of the CPR will highly likely further stretch the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC), who are currently attempting to prevent an ongoing offensive by the AFC/M23 militia. This will likely also indirectly increase pressure on Congolese President Felix Tshisekedi, who is currently facing significant opposition regarding his perceived handling of the conflicts in eastern DRC.

Lubanga has an indirect link to the AFC/M23 through Bosco Ntaganda, founding member of M23 and former Chief of Military Operations in the UPC. The UN accused Lubanga last year of mobilising fighters to support AFC/M23. AFC/M23 are currently approaching the Ituri province in an ongoing offensive in North Kivu; currently in Lubero, they almost certainly aim to continue north into Ituri. The formation of CPR will highly likely facilitate this northern expansion.

Workers at London Heathrow Airport (LHR) to strike from 5 to 9 April

The strikes have been announced by Unite the Union and will be conducted by approximately 500 Heathrow workers who assist passengers with limited mobility. The dispute stems from the wage difference between staff performing the same role at London Gatwick Airport (LGR), despite being employed by the same company, Wilson James.

Further strike dates will reportedly be announced if an agreement is not reached. Travel disruptions are likely over the Easter period, potentially disrupting holiday flights. The strike announcement comes amid increasing pressure from airlines over the temporary airport closure due to a power outage caused by a substation fire nearby, which affected approximately 200,000 passengers.

There is a realistic possibility that airline pressure, combined with threats of further strike action, will mean that the workers succeed in attaining a pay increase and call off strike action.

More than 250 migrants displaced for the second time in weeks in Paris

On 1 April, French police removed a migrant encampment in central Paris on the Seine quays. Many of the displaced individuals had reportedly previously occupied the Gaite Lyrique theatre, also in central Paris, which had been raided by authorities on 18 March following months of occupation. There is a realistic possibility of civil unrest by left-wing groups following the second displacement in two weeks.

General strike grounds flights in Belgium

On 31 March, a general strike among both public and private sector workers took place in Belgium in protest of planned government austerity measures. The strikes severely disrupted public services and transport, grounding 244 flights across the country. The national railway operated a minimal service of fewer than half its trains running and several schools and public services have stopped. Eurostar was unaffected.

This is the second such nationwide strike and reflects a growing discontent with the newly formed “Arizona coalition”. In February, tens of thousands of people engaged in a multi-day strike in protest against pension reforms. The government’s measures are set to cut funding for pensions, healthcare, unemployment support, and social services. Given the widespread hostility of the country’s unions towards these measures, further strikes and demonstrations are highly likely.

Germany tries to deport four pro-Palestine activists

Three of the four individuals reportedly hold EU citizenship, and the fourth is American. None have been convicted or charged for a criminal offence, although this is not technically needed for the issuing of a deportation order under German law. The four are, however, accused of  taking part in direct protest action in support of Palestine, including university and roadway blockades. The timing of the case will likely result in its association with similar efforts to deport pro-Palestine activists from the United States. It is highly likely that, if the planned deportations progress, these will result in anti-government protests in Berlin, particularly at local universities.

Alternative for Germany (AfD) dissolves youth wing

The termination of the “Young Alternative”, which had been classified as an extremist group in 2023, is likely meant to reduce the risk of legal challenges to the party, which is now the second strongest force in the German parliament. AfD has, at the latest elections, made some important gains in terms of the youth vote, so the party would be positioned to benefit from having a youth wing to capitalise on its new supporters. Likely, AfD will now launch a new formation to replace the Young Alternative. However, in the interval, there is a realistic possibility that other far-right youth groups who are not aligned with the party, such as the resurgent German chapter of Generation Identity (GI) will seek to recruit AfD supporters into their ranks.

Slovakia proposes draft of “anti-lobbyists” bill targeting NGOs

The law, which is supported by the Fico government, classifies NGOs that “directly or indirectly” influence politicians as “lobbies”, thus imposing more significant restrictions on their operations. As the definition of “influence” is vague, critics of the bill argue that it is effectively an attempt to curtail NGO operations in a manner similar to that seen in Russia or Georgia. Protests have occurred in Bratislava and other large cities in the aftermath of the law’s proposal. These protests are likely to continue next week, when the draft law is set to have its final vote.

Protests in Hungary over Pride ban

Large-scale demonstrations, resulting in widespread traffic disruptions, have erupted in Budapest following the Orban government’s new legislation, which bans Pride parades and authorises police to use facial recognition software to identify participants. The law is scheduled to come into effect in mid-April, in time for Pride month in June. Notably, 2025 is also the 30^th anniversary of the first Pride parade in Budapest. The unrest is likely to continue on 4-6 April, and there is a realistic possibility of its increase in the short term. If the ban remains in place, a further wave of unrest is highly likely to occur in June.

National strike planned in Greece for 9 April

Several public sector unions in Greece have announced that they will participate in a 24-hour general strike beginning on 9 April. The strike is expected to cause widespread disruption, especially within the transport sector. All flights in Greece will be cancelled due to the participation of air traffic controllers in the strike, severely affecting domestic and international travel. Maritime industry unions have also announced their intent to participate, which will halt all shipping in the country, which may impact the country’s supply chains, tourism, and commerce. There is a realistic possibility of strike-related protests in major cities like Athens and Thessaloniki resulting in violent interactions with the police force.

UK sanctions pro-Russian group over Moldovan election interference

On 2 April, the UK government imposed sanctions on the pro-Russian group Evrazia, linked to Russian oligarch Ilan Shor, for attempting to rig Moldova’s October 2024 presidential election and its referendum on joining the European Union. The sanctions, which include asset freezes and travel bans on the group’s leaders, are likely part of a broader UK effort to counter Russian influence, combat corruption and safeguard democratic institutions in Europe, and will likely expand in response to Russian efforts to influence upcoming European elections, such as the Romanian presidential election in May.

Guinea’s junta sets September as a date for constitutional referendum

On 2 April Guinea’s military junta announced 21 September 2025 as the date for a constitutional referendum. This marks a significant step in the transition towards democracy after Mamady Doumbouya took power in a coup in September 2021. The military has so far missed the deadlines it set for a transition to civilian rule, having initially proposed a two-year transition period, which lapsed after 31 December 2024. The junta has engaged in significant political repression since gaining power, allegedly disappearing two prominent opposition figures in July 2024 and a journalist in December. The proposed constitution would introduce a two five-year term presidential limit but may enable Doumbouya to run for office, something forbidden in the transitional charter. It is highly likely that the constitution is engineered to enable Doumbouya to attain power legitimately.

Burkina Faso accelerates media crackdown

On 1 April, the security minister of Burkina Faso released a list of individuals who are wanted for “criminal association” and “terrorism”. Many of the figures listed are the heads or high-ranking members of Islamist terror groups operating in the country. However, alongside them, the junta listed prominent journalists and civil society opposition figures, many of whom are currently in exile. The crackdown on media figures has likely intensified following the reported massacre of civilians by Burkinabe forces in Solenzo on 11 March, and the publication of the lists likely represents an effort to systematise the efforts to silence opposition voices. In addition to this recent development, there is a high likelihood that Burkinabe security forces have been deployed to “disappear” critics still present in the country. For instance, local sources have reported that, on 30 March, security forces arbitrarily arrested the head of a civil society group based in Ouagadougou. No reports about the detainee’s location or state have been released since the arrest.

Approximately 95 arrested in demonstrations against Zimbabwe President Emmerson Mnangagwa

On 31 March, a muted planned protest demanding Mnangagwa’s resignation took place amid heavy security presence. Few people participated in the protests, likely due to fears of potential violent unrest, opting to stay home. The fear led to widespread closures of businesses, offices, and schools in Harare and Bulawayo. Security forces used tear gas to disperse protesters, and the demonstrators, identified through social media posts, were arrested on charges of “promoting public violence” and “breaching the peace”. The demonstrations were organised by Blessed Geza, a member of the ruling Zanu-PF party and part of a faction calling for Vice-President Constantine Chiwenga to replace Mnangagwa.

Zimbabweans have been calling for Mnangagwa’s resignation since a Zanu-PF announcement in January, which declared that he would be in office until 2030, despite the constitutional limit of two five-year terms, which would limit his rule to 2028. The calls for protests come amid hyperinflation, high unemployment, and widespread corruption, despite Mnangagwa’s early promises of political and economic reforms. While the population is generally wary of destabilising an already fragile country, it is highly likely that calls for Mnangagwa’s resignation will increase over the coming weeks and embolden currently wary opponents, potentially sparking widespread nationwide unrest.

Man sets vehicle on fire in central Amsterdam, Netherlands, in possible failed car bomb attack

On 2 April, a man drove a vehicle to the centre of Dam Square and reportedly attempted to detonate it. This resulted in a fire that injured the driver but caused no casualties. As of the time of writing, the identity and motive of the individual remain unclear. However, there is a realistic possibility that the incident is linked to the recent lone wolf stabbing attack that occurred at the same location.

From the episode’s dynamic, it appears highly likely that the driver sought to achieve maximum visibility for his action, but it is still unclear whether the detonation was a failed terror attack attempt or whether it was carried out as a form of high-visibility suicide. Over the past year, there have been several cases of self-immolation carried out for political messaging. These included a man detonating a Tesla vehicle outside the Las Vegas Trump Hotel in January 2025, in an apparent protest of the incoming Trump administration.

Multiple Teslas torched in Rome

On 31 March, 17 vehicles manufactured by US billionaire Elon Musk’s company were burned at a dealership in the periphery of the Italian capital. The act of vandalism is highly likely the most severe incident targeting Tesla in Italy so far, and is highly likely linked to the string of attacks on the US automakers that have occurred in Europe in the last months. Tesla is a preferred target for anarchist groups, who retain a heavy presence in Italy, due to its high visibility and its association with the Trump administration.

In addition to Tesla, the is a realistic possibility that as US tensions with Europe increase, other high-visibility American companies could be targeted for vandalism. Moreover, the targeting of US assets in Italy could increase following the possible announcement of a visit by US Vice-President JD Vance to Rome for Easter, which appears likely to be announced following repeated contacts between the Italian government and the American embassy in Rome.

Israel intensifies strikes on Syria

On 2 April, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) escalated its strikes in Syria, targeting air bases and military infrastructure near Damascus and in several other parts of the country, resulting in the near-total destruction of Hama Air Base and the Tiyas (T4) Air Base near Homs.  The strikes also coincided with an IDF ground operation in southwestern Syria, where IDF forces clashed with militants.

The strikes were likely intended to send a strategic message to Syria’s new Islamist-led transitional government that Israel will not accept hostile forces establishing a presence on its borders. Israel also raised concerns over Turkey’s increasing influence in Syria, with Foreign Minister Gideon Saar accusing Ankara of attempting to turn Syria into a “Turkish protectorate.” Turkey has made attempts to secure the T4 Air Base, with reports circulating that it will deploy air defence to secure the base. Israel’s repeated targeting of T4 in recent weeks likely suggests a deliberate effort to degrade its operational capacity before Turkish forces can establish a presence.

Armed attack kills several dozen soldiers in Burkina Faso

On 31 March, “several dozen” soldiers and Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP) members were killed by suspected jihadists in a military camp in Diapaga, eastern Burkina Faso close to the borders with Niger and Benin. Approximately 30 wounded security personnel were evacuated to a hospital. During the attack, militants set fire to shops and homes. The military retaliated, launching a sweep of the area and killing several militants.

Burkinabe authorities have not released a statement regarding the attack. Burkina Faso’s security forces have been battling insurgencies, primarily by the al-Qaeda linked Jama’at Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) and Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP). Based on the respective operating and attack zones, it is likely that the attack was conducted by JNIM, who typically operate along the border regions with Niger and Benin.

Volcanic eruption in Iceland

On 1 April, a volcanic fissure opened north of Grindavik, causing the evacuation of the town and nearby Blue Lagoon. The fissure initially reached 500 metres; by midday, it had grown to 1,200 metres, moving southward toward Grindavik. Despite the dramatic initial activity, Icelandic authorities have recently observed a decrease in volcanic activity. On 2 April, local media reported no significant activity at the fissure site. An Icelandic meteorological official stated that the eruption is ‘more or less over,’ although they cautioned that future magma intrusions could occur. In the meantime, approximately six hundred earthquakes have been recorded in the magma chamber since April 3, but no new volcanic activity has been observed since the fissure opened.

Storm Nuria hits Iberian Peninsula

Storm Nuria continues to affect the Iberian Peninsula with heavy rain and winds, although no orange or red alerts have been issued in Spain as of the time of writing. In the Canary Islands, classes have resumed following the end of the wind alert. Previously, La Palma Airport remained closed, and flights at Tenerife North Airport were cancelled due to the storm. The storm had also caused landslides and road closures in Las Palmas, and injured individuals in Puerto de la Cruz. Additionally, a power outage affected 3,000 people in Fuencaliente, La Palma. The Spanish meteorology office had activated a yellow alert for Cádiz province due to forecasts of wind, rain, and storm surges.

Greek islands declare emergency due to flooding

Both Mykonos and Paros, two of the most visited islands in the Aegean Sea, announced a state of emergency following the storm that hit the Cyclades on 31 March. The weather system caused widespread flooding and severe traffic disruptions across the islands, with two months’ worth of rain falling on Paros in two hours on 31 March. The state of emergency will be in place for one month.

Nigeria warns of rising nationwide Lassa fever cases

According to the Nigerian Centre for Disease Control (NCDC), at least 118 people have been killed in Nigeria in the first quarter of 2025 due to an outbreak of Lassa fever, with 645 confirmed cases recorded and a current fatality rate of 18.3 per cent. The disease, which is spread primarily by rodents, is most prevalent in rural areas due to poor sanitation, resulting in the contamination of food and living spaces. The outbreak has likely been exacerbated by inadequate healthcare facilities and staffing shortages in rural areas, as well as the overreliance on traditional medication. Symptoms of Lassa fever appear 6 to 21 days after exposure and typically include fever, weakness, headache, muscle pain, sore throat, chest pain, abdominal pain, nausea, vomiting, and diarrhoea, with severe cases potentially leading to internal bleeding, facial swelling, low blood pressure, shock, and organ failure.

Japan’s Cabinet Office released a report on 31 March regarding the potential impact of a Nankai Trough “megaquake”, which typically refers to an earthquake of magnitude 8.0 and above, and the subsequent tsunami caused by such an earthquake. The megaquake is estimated to have an 80 per cent chance of occurring within the next 30 years, with the new estimates projecting potentially severe devastation.

In modelled worst-case scenarios, there could be approximately 300,000 fatalities, over 1.2 million evacuees, 2.35 million structures destroyed, and USD 1.81 trillion in economic losses, which is almost half of the country’s total gross domestic product (GDP). The worst-case scenarios involve a magnitude 9.0 and above earthquake occurring late at night in winter.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The Nankai Trough, situated south of Japan, contains the prominent Nankai megathrust fault. Megathrust earthquakes, such as the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake (magnitude 9.1), which resulted in the Fukushima nuclear disaster, are the planet’s most powerful earthquakes. The most at-risk areas from a Nankai Trough megaquake are on Japan’s southern Pacific coast, particularly the prefectures of Miyazaki, Kochi, Tokushima, Wakayama, Mie, Aichi, and Shizuoka.

In August 2024, authorities issued a rare megaquake warning due to an assessment that the probability of a Nankai Trough megaquake was several times higher than usual following a magnitude 7.1 earthquake off the coast of Kyushu. Authorities then urged residents on Japan’s Pacific coast to reaffirm their preparedness and take precautions over the following week.

With Japan being so seismically active, the country has world-leading earthquake resiliency. The use of advanced earthquake-resistant technologies, infrastructure resilience, stringent building codes, and thorough disaster response plans all contribute towards making Japan highly resistant to the impact of earthquakes. However, extremely powerful earthquakes such as the 2011 earthquake are still capable of causing widespread damage and large numbers of fatalities.

A Nankai Trough megaquake would likely push Japan’s earthquake resilience to its absolute limits, and the latest projected figures will almost certainly reaffirm the need for companies and employees in at-risk areas to review business continuity plans, risk assessments, and crisis communications protocols and conduct drills.

On 1 and 2 April, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Eastern Theatre Command conducted two days of large-scale military drills around Taiwan, including live-fire exercises. A PLA spokesperson stated that the drills were held as a ‘severe warning and forceful containment against Taiwan independence’, aimed at ‘testing the troops’ capabilities to carry out integrated operations, seizure of operational control and multi-directional precision strikes. 

Named ‘Strait Thunder-2025A’, the exercises involved personnel from the PLA, the PLA Air Force (PLAAF), the PLA Navy (PLAN), the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF), and the China Coast Guard (CCG). Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defence (MND) stated that on 1 April, 76 PLA aircraft, 15 PLAN vessels and 4 “official ships” were detected operating around Taiwan, with 37 sorties crossing the median line and entering Taiwan’s Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ). On 2 April, they detected 53 PLA aircraft, 23 PLAN vessels and 8 official ships, with 31 sorties crossing the median line. The PLAN vessels detected included a CNS Shandong aircraft carrier group.

Additionally, the PLA conducted live-fire exercises, which included rocket strikes targeting a static object which resembles the Yongan Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Terminal in Kaohsiung, Taiwan. In propaganda released by the PLA to publicise the exercises, Taiwan’s staunchly pro-independence president, Lai Ching-te, was depicted as a parasite and labelled a separatist.

Solace Global Assessment: 

While incursions into Taiwan’s ADIZ by PLA forces are an almost daily occurrence, the Strait Thunder-2025A exercises are particularly large-scale and almost certainly demonstrate the coordination of multiple different branches of China’s military to conduct multi-domain operations. In May and October 2024, the Joint Sword-2024 exercises were similar in scale but did not involve live-fire exercises.

The Strait Thunder exercises were more coordinated than usual and were almost certainly designed to enhance interoperability between different military branches for joint operations. They also likely aimed to integrate operations across multiple domains, including unconventional elements like information warfare, as evidenced by the simultaneous PLA propaganda campaign.

The exercises were highly likely a rehearsal for a blockade of Taiwan, which is assessed to be more likely in the coming years than a full-scale amphibious invasion as a means to compel the unification of Taiwan with mainland China.

The scale, frequency, coordination and use of live fire in Chinese exercises are likely part of a deliberate effort to normalise large-scale military activity in the region. This will almost certainly make it more challenging to identify clear indicators and warnings of a genuine military operation. Such a strategy will likely complicate decision-making and delay response times for Taiwan and its allies, allowing China to achieve strategic surprise.

A full-scale amphibious invasion of Taiwan, however, would highly likely require an operation that would dwarf WWII’s Normandy landings in scale and complexity, with a highly observable military and logistical build-up. A blockade may nonetheless be accompanied by more limited operations to seize the Taiwan-controlled Kinmen islands that are just three kilometres away from mainland China, which could be achieved with far fewer observable indicators and warnings.

Any significant escalation by Beijing is likely to cause a considerable pan-regional impact, in addition to a global economic crisis, with the head of the Philippines’ military stating on 1 April that the country would ‘inevitably’ be involved.

In US defence circles, the “Davison window” refers to Admiral Phil Davison’s comments to the US Congress that China could be capable of pursuing the seizure of Taiwan by 2027, with US intelligence reportedly believing that China’s leader Xi Jinping has given the PLA a 2027 deadline to reach capability for a full-scale invasion.

Some analysts assess that as the US nears semiconductor sovereignty, likely around 2030, Taiwan will lose strategic importance (due to its monopoly on advanced semiconductor manufacturing) and, therefore, Beijing will be less incentivised to take the risks involved to invade or blockade Taiwan. Alternatively, it is likely that US semiconductor sovereignty would dramatically lower the incentives for Washington to provide defence guarantees for Taiwan and would, therefore, increase the likelihood of Chinese military aggression. PLA exercises around Taiwan are almost certain to continue, with large-scale drills likely to be prompted by international and political developments, as well as important dates such as anniversaries of President Lai’s inauguration on 20 May or Taiwan’s National Day on 10 October.

Indian land management bill likely to cause civil unrest

On 3 April, the Indian parliament passed a bill, presented by the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) one day prior, which entails significant changes to the administration of “waqf” lands. The term refers to land which is donated by Muslims for religious and charitable uses by other Muslims. These lands are usually administered by all-Muslim funds or boards.

The law would allow non-Muslims to enter these and would increase the government’s authority to resolve disputes involving waqf lands. Opponents of the law have accused the BJP of encroaching on Muslim minority rights. It is likely that, as it begins to be implemented, the bill will drive significant unrest. Past disputes over land have caused notable cases of sectarian violence, including mob violence involving Muslim and Hindu communities.

Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) sabre-rattling showcases interim government’s fragility

The leaders of the (former) main opposition party in the country have warned that if the interim government fails to hold elections in 2025, this will result in “instability” and “strong resentment with the people”. Muhammed Yunus, who heads the government following the ousting of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in August 2024, has maintained that, due to ongoing instability, the vote could instead be held in early 2026.

The BNP’s remarks likely amount to a thinly veiled threat: following Hasina’s removal, the political vacuum left by her party – the Awami League (AL) – has resulted in violent competition between smaller groups and opposition parties, with mob violence now a regular occurrence. With AL still reeling from its loss of power, BNP is now the strongest political force in Bangladesh and therefore seeks to capitalise on an early vote. There is a realistic possibility of the BNP increasingly adopting a more aggressive messaging in the medium term, driving unrest or political violence.

Thai court issues arrest warrant for US academic

A Thai court has issued an arrest warrant for American academic Paul Chambers, a lecturer at Naresuan University, on charges of insulting the monarchy and violating the Computer Crimes Act. The charges were filed by the Thai military and relate to an article Chambers posted online last year, although the specific details have not been disclosed. The charges fall under Thailand’s stringent “lese majeste” laws, which are often used arbitrarily to repress the opposition or supress dissent. The laws are some of the harshest anti-monarchy laws in the world and can carry prison sentences of up to 15 years. Since the 2020 pro-democracy protests, almost 300 individuals have been charged under the law, reflecting its increasing application against critics.

South Korean Constitutional Court ruling

South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol was removed from office on 4 April after the Constitutional Court upheld his impeachment over his December 2024 martial law declaration. The court ruled unanimously that Yoon violated his constitutional powers, with Acting Chief Justice Moon Hyung-bae condemning his actions as a “serious challenge to democracy” that resulted in both domestic and foreign instability.

The trial has been incredibly divisive, leading to protests both in support of and against the former president. Protests in reaction to the verdict are likely; however, they have so far remained localised and non-violent, leading to minimal disruption despite increased security measures. A snap presidential election must now be held within 60 days, likely leading to a period of political uncertainty.

The deepening divide between Yoon’s supporters and opponents, coupled with the urgent need to restore stability, will likely complicate governance in the short term and impact South Korea’s economic and foreign policy decisions, especially as it attempts to adapt to the 25 per cent tariff rates imposed on them by the Trump administration.

Afghan anti-Taliban group releases overview of Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) structure.

The National Mobilization Front (NMF) is a small anti-Taliban group that has claimed multiple attacks on Taliban officials and, notably, Chinese citizens in Afghanistan. On 3 April, NMF channels released information allegedly detailing major efforts by ISKP to restructure some key departments and purge the group from alleged “spies” or “moles”.

While it is currently difficult to assess the credibility of the claims made by NMF – which styles itself as a pro-Western and secular force opposed to both the Taliban and ISKP – the hypothesis of an internal reshuffle could provide an explanation for the recent lull in ISKP operations in Afghanistan and abroad.

Myanmar junta declares a ceasefire until 22 April

On 2 April, Myanmar’s ruling military junta declared a temporary ceasefire to enable relief efforts following the 28 March 7.7 magnitude earthquake, which killed at least 3,000. The decision followed unilateral ceasefires from rebel groups, including the People’s Defence Force and the Three Brotherhood Alliance, which are engaged in a civil war with the government.

While the ceasefire may provide an opportunity for further peace-making, it is unlikely to hold until 22 April. Despite the declaration, there were already reports of ceasefire violations on 3 April, with rebels accusing junta forces of conducting airstrikes in Bhamo and continuing attacks on Waingmaw and Indawgyi. Further reports list strikes in multiple villages of Homalin township on the same day and shootings in Shwegyin and Mone townships on 3 and 4 April.

For the ceasefire to contribute to broader peace efforts, it would likely require long-term measures, including safe zones and humanitarian corridors for aid, on top of a complete cessation of hostilities, something the military junta appears unwilling to accept.

7.1 magnitude earthquake off the coast of Tonga

A magnitude 7.1 earthquake was recorded off the east coast of Tonga in the South Pacific on 30 March, triggering a tsunami warning for the region. The US Geological Survey initially reported a preliminary magnitude of 7.3 before downgrading it to 7.1. Tsunami waves between 0.3 to 1 metre above tide level were considered possible on the coasts of Niue and Tonga.

As a precaution, Tonga authorities activated tsunami sirens and advised coastal residents to move inland. However, the tsunami warning was lifted, and there are no immediate reports of injuries or damage in Tonga. There were also no tsunami threats to Japan, Chile, Guam, or Hawaii. No damage was caused by the earthquake. Several aftershocks have taken place and more are highly likely over the coming days and weeks.

Gas pipeline fire in Malaysia

A large fire broke out on 1 April at a gas pipeline in the Kampung Tengah Puchong area, south of Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Authorities have reported that 145 people were injured, though all are in stable condition. The fire, which started at a pipeline owned by Petronas, significantly diminished as gas pressure decreased. The possibility of a second explosion is considered very low, as no gas leaks have been detected after the closure of pipeline valves. An investigation involving up to 20 agencies is set to take place to determine the cause of the fire.

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