Week 05: 24 – 31 January

Global Intelligence Summary

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The new Trump administration’s crackdown on migration and other controversial policies is almost certain to result in protests across the United States.

In Colombia, Venezuela’s alleged support of the ELN offensive is likely to sustain the guerilla group’s operations and lead to a deterioration in the security environment.


Alternative For Germany (AfD) support for Christian Democratic Union (CDU) proposals in the Bundestag is almost certain to trigger unrest in Germany in the run-up to elections.

The resignation of the Serbian PM and mayor of Novi Sad are unlikely to curb current demonstrations, with protestors driven by broader concerns over corruption and government accountability.

Russia’s current main effort in Ukraine is almost certainly Pokrovsk, the capture of which will set the conditions for advances north and west and provide Moscow with more bargaining power.

A thwarted terror attack in Morocco likely indicates the growing ability of Islamic State affiliates to project influence across the continent.

Further unrest in Democratic Republic of the Congo capital Kinshasa in highly likely as M23 militia capture Goma and attempt to expand into South Kivu.


The discovery of large quantities of explosives near Sydney, Australia is almost certainly linked to growing cases of extremism, self-radicalisation, and antisemitic hate in the country.

Pakistan’s new amendment to the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (PECA) bill will almost certainly be exploited to curb dissent and suppress the opposition.


President Donald Trump has vowed to take an extremely restrictive line on migration. On day one of his presidency, Trump signed multiple executive orders targeting the US-Mexico border, including declaring a “national emergency” and ceasing some of the previous administration’s policies meant to allow migrants opportunities to more easily claim asylum in the US.

Trump also signed orders expanding the powers of the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to detain undocumented migrants. On 29 January, Trump achieved the first legislative victory of his administration, with the approval of a law that allows ICE agents to detain migrants charged with an offence regardless of their immigration status.

In response to the administration’s policies, multiple protests have already occurred in large US urban areas, especially in southern states. Protests are likewise scheduled to occur on 1 and 2 February in multiple locations in Texas, including Arlington, Dallas and Houston, as well as in others states including Arizona, Oklahoma, California, Kansas, and New York.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The protests scheduled for the weekend of 1-2 February are likely to represent the first major wave of unrest in the US since the inauguration. These protests are likely to be peaceful overall, although there is a realistic possibility of gatherings resulting in episodes of violence and vandalism, especially if co-opted by other protest movements such as the pro-Palestine movement.

The high visibility of Trump and some of his political allies, as well as some of the controversial policies enacted by the administration, are highly likely to be major drivers of unrest in the medium-to-long term.

In the United States, threats of “mass deportations” are likely to be met with considerable activism, including possible protests targeting transportation hubs such as airports. Other contentious policies not directly aimed at the southern border are likewise highly likely to draw unrest.

For instance, Trump signed an executive order on 29 January pledging to combat antisemitism, including by deporting foreign nationals deemed to have endorsed proscribed terrorist organisations. Pro-Palestinian groups in the United States have stated that the order is an attempt to silence their criticism of Israel’s policies in Gaza and the West Bank. If this order is implemented, there is a realistic possibility of it resulting in increased civil unrest, especially at large and politically active university campuses.


Diplomatic tensions between Bogota and Caracas have deteriorated in response to Colombian accusations that the Maduro regime sponsored the recent National Liberation Army (ELN) in northeast Colombia.

The ELN launched an offensive in mid-January in the Catatumbo region against rival guerilla factions of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and organised crime groups to secure control of lucrative narcotic production and smuggling routes. The offensive has involved attacks of rival factions and civilians, has killed an assessed 100 people, displaced around 50,000 and has overwhelmed local morgues and healthcare facilities.

The Colombian government has suggested that Maduro, who was recently re-inaugurated for his third term, either green-lit the operation or played an active role in planning it to establish indirect control of the cocaine-producing region.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The ELN has operated within Venezuela for decades, originally in exchange for cocaine profits. However, the recent accusations imply that the Maduro regime is now using the ELN as a proxy force to establish control of the region.

Venezuela has also deployed around 2,000 troops to the border, ostensibly to aid displaced Colombians but critics have suggested the troops are supporting the ELN and securing drug trafficking routes. If true, Venezuelan support could help sustain ELN operations with funds and arms, increasing the likelihood of a protracted conflict.

President Petro has already declared a state of emergency for the Catatumbo region and multiple other municipalities, and has deployed government forces to combat the ELN- moves that have almost certainly jeopardised his previous plans for “total peace” through dialogue and negotiations.

The Petro administration has also offered a USD 700,000 reward for information on ELN leaders, signalling a shift towards a more aggressive security policy. However, given the ELN’s entrenched presence in the jungle and potential Venezuelan backing, military efforts are unlikely to dismantle the group’s operations. Conversely, the government’s strategy could trigger a wave of reprisal attacks across Colombia.

The government is engaged with the ELN in other parts of the country and there have been a series of improvised explosive device (IED) detonations throughout Colombia. Although attributing these attacks directly to the ELN is challenging, many have taken place in areas where the group has a well-established presence. If a ceasefire remains elusive, Colombia is likely to achieve its worst year for violence since the 2016 ceasefire agreement, with January 2025 already being marked as the worst month for violence since Petro assumed office.

Escalating violence is likely to result in the displacement of thousands more people, indiscriminate attacks on civilians, a rise in assaults on aid workers and healthcare professionals, a worsening humanitarian crisis, and the overstretching of local services. The ELN and other armed groups may also increase the kidnapping of foreign workers and tourists to raise funds, a tactic employed extensively in the past.


US pauses foreign aid programs for 90 days

The US State Department issued a “stop-work” order for all existing foreign assistance programs and paused new aid, following directives of one of President Donald Trump’s day-one executive orders. Waivers were issued for military financing to Israel and Egypt.

The pausing of aid is likely part of the new White House’s foreign policy that is characterised by transactional diplomacy, with the withdrawal of aid, or the imposition of sanctions, used to renegotiate international partnerships or to coerce compliance.

The aid freeze will likely have short-term implications in countries that rely on US shipments of medicine, food, or other humanitarian aid. This may allow China and other international competitors to bolster their relations with key partners in strategic regions.


Protests break out in Culiacan, Mexico, after children killed in attempted carjacking

Large-scale civil unrest erupted in the capital of Sinaloa state on 23 January and has continued, following the killing of two children and their father during an attempted carjacking. The recent incident has likely become a catalyst for local resentment against increasing cartel crime, and for authorities’ lack of success in fighting it.

Protesters in Sinaloa have particularly targeted Governor Rocha Moya, who has pledged not to resign. Increasing cartel violence, which is especially severe in states like Sinaloa, continues to be a major issue for the Mexican government.

With the US increasing diplomatic pressure, including via threats of coercive military and economic measures, on Mexico to deal with the cartels, there is a realistic possibility of President Claudia Sheinbaum choosing to move towards a harsher policing approach than her predecessor Lopez Obrador’s “hugs not bullets” policy.

Security, Armed Conflict and Terror

Wave of copycat threats at US schools following Antioch Shooting

The shooting occurred on 22 January and resulted in one death. The perpetrator had published material online prior to the shooting praising various mass killers and espousing far right and white supremacist ideology and attempted to livestream the attack.

According to local media, at least eight other students, some as young as 12, have been arrested since the 22 January shooting for threatening to carry out copycat attacks. The shooting likely represents a notable incident as it highlights perpetrators’ symbiotic relationship with social media as well as the use of paradoxical and self-contradictory violent ideology; the attacker, a black student, repeatedly used white supremacist and Neo-Nazi imagery.


Kenyan police launches operation in Port-au-Prince, Haiti

Clashes between the international UN-mandated police force and gang members broke out on 27 January in the peripheral area of Kenscoff, located outside of Port-au-Prince at the foothills of the Chaine de la Selle mountain range. The operation was reportedly launched in response to an offensive from gangs originally from Carrefour, a town approximately 10 kilometres south of Port-au-Prince.

Local media reported that at least 20 gang members were killed. The attack in Kenscoff is notable as the area occupies a strategic position controlling the southern approach to Port-au-Prince, and as a link between the West and Southeast departments. Moreover, local media reported that the route via Kenscoff has become more important as it is an alternative to the gang-controlled National Road 2.

Environment, Health and Miscellaneous

Two separate wildfires broke out near La Jolla, northwest of San Diego, on 23-24 January. The fires were fuelled by strong winds. While the La Jolla fires were contained relatively quickly, other blazes erupted in the following days, with one (the “Border 2” fire), adjacent to the US-Mexico border, burning more than 500 acres.

The White House and the state government of California continued to clash over responsibility for the fires’ severe damage. President Trump signed an executive order on 24 January to direct federal agencies to “override” California water management rules in order to combat wildfires. Critics of the executive order, including environmentalist groups, have accused the administration of trying to secure greater control over water resources in north California to benefit the agricultural industry in the area.


Winter storm causes widespread disruption in Hawaii, US

The winter storm that began impacting Hawaii on 29 January has caused significant disruptions across the state. The National Weather Service (NWS) has issued flash flood warnings for several islands, including Maui, Molokai, and Oahu, affecting over one million residents. The flash flood warning for Maui has been extended until 00:30 local time.

Severe thunderstorms and strong winds have resulted in widespread power outages, with over 54,000 Hawaiian Electric customers without power on Oahu, Hawaii Island, and in Maui County. Restoration efforts are ongoing, but Hawaiian Electric has urged customers to prepare for the possibility of extended outages.

In response to the severe weather conditions, several schools in Maui County will be closed on Friday ahead of the predicted peak of the storm. Meanwhile, on Kauai Island, the Kauai Island Utility Cooperative has reported that customers in Wainiha and Haena will remain without power until at least Friday morning due to limited access to transmission towers caused by the weather.

Residents are advised to remain vigilant and adhere to safety advisories as the storm continues to impact the region.


The German parliament is set to vote on 31 January on a new and highly contentious immigration law known as the “influx limitation law”. The law has been advanced by the centre-right and conservative Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU) and the Christian Social Union in Bavaria (CSU) bloc.

The law could pass through the Bundestag if supported by the controversial far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party. The bill follows a recent controversial motion that passed recently which was advanced by the CDU/CSU bloc and passed with the support of the AfD. This motion was non-binding and proposed establishing permanent border controls and immediately detaining individuals who are required to leave Germany.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The passing of the CDU/CSU motion with AfD support marks a major shift in the political landscape in Germany. It marked the first time that a motion in Germany’s Bundestag was passed with the backing of the AfD. This represents a break from the longstanding strategy of establishing a “firewall” against AfD collaboration and has resulted in significant criticism of current CDU leader Friedrich Merz, especially from the left-wing Social Democrats (SPD) and the Greens.

Should the CDU/CSU law pass with AfD support, it will almost certainly provoke fears that the AfD is gradually being normalised within German politics, a trend that will almost certainly trigger large-scale demonstrations across Germany before the country’s general elections on 23 February.

The CDU strategy has likely been to move further right to counter the AfD, with current polls indicating that the far-right party is set to achieve a record 20-21 per cent of the national vote. However, this strategy has potentially backfired, as it has alienated many Germans, including within the CDU’s traditional base, already leading to protests across Germany.

The CDU’s drift to the right and greater participation of the AfD, is also likely to increase the threat of political violence and terrorism. The far-right are likely to feel emboldened by these trends and may interpret it as a legitimisation of their views. Furthermore, the increased measures and rhetoric aimed at migrants are likely to increase the risk of terrorism in Germany, with a series of recent attacks linked to the cancellation of asylum statuses or threats of deportation.


On 28 January, Serbian Prime Minister Milos Vucevic resigned after months of student and civic protests that have gradually increased in size after originally being triggered by the November 2024 collapse of the Novi Sad railway station canopy, which killed 15 people. Alongside Vucevic, the Mayor of Novi Sad, Milan Djuric, also resigned, citing the desire to prevent further unrest and division within society.

At the protest’s height, an estimated 55,000 protestors amassed in the capital Belgrade, with students establishing a blockade on the Autokomanda junction, a major intersection that links several key roads and motorways in the capital.

Human rights groups have warned of the government’s use of repression, indiscriminate force and mass arrests in response to the protests.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The protests, initially sparked by the Novi Sad incident, almost certainly expanded into a broader movement condemning widespread corruption in Serbia. This movement gained support from students, universities, civil society groups, and various other segments of the population. Some estimates suggest that over 60 per cent of Serbians have endorsed the protests, which has likely increased in reaction to the government’s use of force.

The resignations of the prime minister and the mayor of Novi Sad were likely designed to curb the protest movement and were probably ordered by President Aleksandar Vucic; however, it is unlikely that the protests will subside in the near future. President Vucic has maintained an iron grip on power since assuming office in 2017 and has been accused of decreasing civil liberties and freedom of the press, and of fostering an illiberal regime.

The grassroots protest movement likely holds him partially accountable and views the current resignations as insufficient, with many demanding a complete change of government. President Vucic could call early elections to arrest the development of further protests. However, these will likely be boycotted by the opposition, a move that would undermine the legitimacy of his government.

In the short term, President Vucic will likely appoint a new prime minister, a move that is unlikely to quell the protests or address the broader dissatisfaction with his leadership.


Russian ground forces in Donetsk Oblast are setting the conditions for an encirclement and the ultimate capture of the strategic city of Pokrovsk. Russian strategy has shifted away from costly frontal assaults to a gradual encirclement of Pokrovsk from the west, after bypassing Ukrainian defences.

On 30 January alone, Ukrainian forces claim to have repelled over 70 attacks in the Pokrovsk direction, with Ukrainian commanders complaining about insufficient manpower to defend the front lines, despite conducting a series of counterattacks.

Russian forces have also initiated smaller-scale attacks across multiple frontline sectors, including near Kharkiv, Chasiv Yar and in Zaporizhia Oblast.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Current battlefield observations suggest that Russia’s current main effort is to seize Pokrovsk prior to any proposed negotiations. Pokrovsk is a major logistics node, the capture of which would almost certainly set the conditions for future Russian advances north towards Kramatorsk and Sloviansk, two of Ukraine’s major strongholds remaining in the Donbas.

Kramatorsk and Sloviansk are major industrial cities that both hold military and logistical significance. Both cities serve as critical logistics centres for Ukrainian forces defending the Donbas, both cities form part of Ukraine’s defensive lines, and Kramatorsk currently serves as the administrative centre of the Donetsk Oblast.

The fall of these cities would be a major blow to Ukrainian morale, would hugely disrupt Ukrainian defensive operations and would enable Russia to consolidate control over the Donbas.  The capture of Pokrovsk would also enable future Russian advances west into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, where Ukraine has rushed to improve its defences.

Dnipropetrovsk Oblast is not one of the oblasts currently claimed by Russia. However, future Russian advances on this axis could ultimately help lead to Russia advancing towards the River Dnieper, a natural defensive barrier. This could help sever Ukraine in two and is likely one of the initial strategic objectives of the Kremlin.

The collective threat to Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, Kramatorsk, and Sloviansk, combined with the lack of assurances from the Trump administration, is almost certain to intensify pressure on the Zelensky administration to pursue negotiations, particularly as Ukraine continues to face manpower shortages and dwindling Western military aid.

Any further Russian territorial gains would significantly strengthen Moscow’s bargaining position, allowing it to dictate terms in future negotiations and potentially press for broader territorial concessions from Kyiv. Ukraine will likely be forced to divert considerable resources to the defence of Pokrovsk. However, as already demonstrated, Russian forces are likely to increase pressure across the line of contact, launching intensified attacks on multiple sectors. This strategy is aimed at overstretching Ukrainian forces, exploiting their manpower shortages, and preventing them from effectively consolidating their defensive positions.


On 26 January, Morocco’s Central Bureau of Judicial Investigations (BCIJ) announced the arrests of four individuals in Had Soualem, a town in the Casablanca-Settat region, who had reportedly been planning to carry out an attack in Casablanca. According to authorities, the four had pledged allegiance to IS and had carried out advanced preparations for a coordinated attack at multiple locations, including scouting possible sites and obtaining material that could be used to make explosives. Moreover, authorities claim that the group was planning to travel to the Sahel to receive further training.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Moroccan security has carried out multiple operations targeting Islamist extremist cells in the country in recent years. In August 2024, 50 suspected extremists were arrested in a joint operation across multiple cities.

The recent arrests are notable as the suspects seem to not have only been inspired by IS but have purportedly received online training from the Islamic State’s Sahel Province (ISSP)- a group they could have joined post the attack. The growing use of Morocco as a gateway to IS affiliates further south is likely further evidenced by the recent arrest of a US citizen, who had intended to travel to Morocco via France before heading south to join ISSP.

Morocco likely remains a desirable target for IS terrorists. The country has strong relations with neighbouring European states and is an important destination for Mediterranean tourism and business. Moreover, it has considerably improved its relations with Israel in recent years and has gradually liberalised, resulting in a considerable disenfranchised and conservative population receptive to radicalisation.

Finally, Morocco is strategically located on the northwest African coast with access to both the Mediterranean and the Atlantic and acts as the key transit point in the western Mediterranean migration route to Spain and onwards to other parts of Europe. ISSP’s alleged involvement in the failed attack likely indicates a strategy of projecting IS’ influence outside of its current main area of operations in West Africa and the Sahel.

Transregional attacks are likely to increase IS propaganda campaigns, helping it attract recruits and funds in areas both under its influence and areas where it has little influence via online channels. IS’ long-term objective may also be to force countries like Morocco to focus counterterrorist operations internally, a strategy that could help it consolidate power and influence in the heavily destabilised Sahelian and West African states.


Following days of fighting after the Rwanda-backed M23 militia’s advance into Goma on 27 January, relative calm returned to the city on 29 January. Hundreds have been killed and over 400,000 displaced in North Kivu since the beginning of 2025, according to the United Nations (UN). The UN has evacuated its non-essential and civilian staff from Goma to Kampala, Uganda. M23 militants began advancing from the town of Minova, captured on 21 January, towards South Kivu on 29 January. On 30 January, violent clashes occurred in Kalangala in South Kivu.

On 28 and 29 January, violent protests broke out in Kinshasa. Protesters engaged in looting and targeted several embassies including those belonging to the United States, France, Belgium, Rwanda, Kenya, and Japan. Security forces used tear gas to disperse protesters, and unconfirmed reports indicate that live ammunition was used. In response to violent protests breaking out in Kinshasa, the Congolese government has banned protests from 29 January. The US Department of State has updated their Travel Advisory Level from three to four, issuing a “do not travel” warning. Similarly, Belgium’s government has advised its citizens against travelling to the DRC.

While the border with Rwanda is officially open, unannounced border closures are likely. The Australian government has warned citizens of possible cross-border fire and advised against travel to the Rubavu district of Rwanda close to the border. Rwanda has claimed that at least nine citizens were killed in the cross-border fire.

Solace Global Assessment: 

It is highly likely that M23 are attempting to push on to Kavumu, where Bukavu’s airport is located, in the coming days. More broadly, they are almost certainly aiming to capture Bukavu itself, South Kivu’s provincial capital. The quick advance is almost certainly aiming to take advantage of the current weakness of Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC), who have so far failed to prevent M23 advances in previous months.

On 30 January, M23 rebel leaders livestreamed a press statement stating that the group plans to remain in Goma and expand its offensive. South Kivu’s governor, Jean-Jacques Purusi Sadiki, has banned all forms of navigation on Lake Kivu on 29 January. This is almost certainly an attempt to protect Bukavu’s northeastern flank from an amphibious M23 approach.

The M23’s capture of Goma and further expansion threatens major regional escalation. Burundian forces have reportedly been sent to South Kivu to help the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) defend Bukavu. Burundi and Rwanda generally have hostile relations, with each government accusing each other of supporting their respective opponents. There is a high risk of Rwanda-backed M23 clashing with Burundian troops, which would almost certainly increase tensions and raise the risk of regional conflict.

Rwanda’s foreign minister has stated that the country backs a possible ceasefire agreement between M23 and the DRC government, while reaffirming that Rwandan forces were not directly involved in the capture of Goma. UN peacekeeping chief Jean-Pierre Lacroix has asserted that there is “no question” of Rwandan troops assisting M23 in Goma. President Paul Kagame has denied allegations of supporting the Tutsi-led M23 but has consistently accused the DRC of collaborating with Hutu rebels, which he views as a threat to Rwanda.

Although Rwanda denies direct involvement, it is widely believed to provide military support to the group in an attempt to create a buffer zone and extract precious minerals from the DRC. The M23 militia’s continued territorial expansion, therefore, raises significant concerns over the escalation of tensions into a regional conflict, whereby the DRC perceives Rwanda as an aggressor violating its territorial integrity.


French government again at risk of collapse

The government of François Bayrou was appointed in December 2024 after the previous Prime Minister Michel Barnier was ousted following attempts to pass a controversial budget. While Barnier tried to obtain the support of France’s right, Bayrou has courted the Socialist Party (PS). To do so, Bayrou has stated that he is open to renegotiating some particularly inflammatory parts of the budget, such as President Macron’s unpopular pension reform.

On 28 January, PS threatened to withdraw support from Bayrou and possibly support a no-confidence motion following some comments by the PM against migration. While the PS’ threats almost certainly reflect a reaction to the possible political impact of Bayrou’s comments, socialist leaders are also likely seeking to intensify pressure on the government in order to obtain more concessions. The PS’ political strategy highly likely aims to solidly establish the party as a force against Macron’s “austerity” policies, while simultaneously preventing a further haemorrhage of votes towards the more radical and populist La France Insoumise (LFI).


US billionaire Elon Musk speaks at Alternative for Germany (AfD) event

Musk has repeatedly endorsed the AfD, which is on track to obtain its best-ever electoral result at the 23 February elections according to current polls. Connecting remotely to the event hosted in Halle on 25 January, Musk further endorsed the party’s platform and claimed that it is “the best hope” for the country. In response, mass counterprotests were organised in Berlin and Cologne, with 100,000 and 20,000 attending respectively. Musk’s direct engagement in European politics in support of far-right parties may increase risks for US businesses and assets, including diplomatic missions, in Europe. Musk’s Tesla “Megafactory” near Berlin has notably been repeatedly targeted by activists, with a case of sabotage in March 2024 resulting in at least EUR 1 billion in damages.


More than 100,000 protests Prime Minister Robert Fico in Slovakia

At least 60,000 people gathered in Bratislava on 24 January to protest against the Prime Minister’s perceived friendliness to Moscow. Last week, Fico had stated that the planned protests were part of an attempt by foreign forces and domestic fifth columns to stage a coup. In December, the Prime Minister travelled to Moscow to meet Putin, and more recently members of his party advanced the idea of leaving the EU. It is highly likely that the opposition will again attempt to push forward a no-confidence vote, as the pressure from civil society on the government continues to increase.


Lukashenko claims victory in Belarus elections

The authoritarian leader of the East European country claimed to have won a decisive victory, with more than 80 per cent of the vote, granting him a seventh term in office and prolonging his three decades of rule. The election result was not unexpected as Lukashenko’s regime has imprisoned or forced into exile virtually all opposition leaders. A notable development followed the elections as the Hungarian government blocked an EU joint statement condemning the vote as not “free and fair”. The symbolic move was almost certainly linked to the government of Hungary’s broader campaign to change the EU’s foreign policy towards Ukraine, or at least to obstruct support for Ukraine.


Italy arrests, then releases, Libyan police head under arrest warrant by the Hague

Osama Elmasry Njeem, the head of the Libyan judicial police who is accused by the International Criminal Court of multiple crimes including war crimes and crimes against humanity, was arrested earlier in January in Turin. On 21 January, Njeem was freed and repatriated on an Italian government plane. Italian authorities claimed that Njeem had been released due to a “procedural” error.

The episode was widely condemned by the opposition and civil society actors, who have accused Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni of securing Njeem’s release and repatriation in order to maintain good relations with the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity (GNU), a key player in Meloni’s plans to control migrant flows in the Mediterranean.

On 28 January, Italian prosecutors stated they are investigating Meloni, alongside two government ministers, over the episode. There is a realistic possibility of protests in Rome, Turin, and possibly Milan and Bologna, during the weekend.


Protests at key oil ports in Libya

Protesters occupied the ports of Es Sider and Ras Lanuf, which represent key hubs for the export of oil from the Oil Crescent region of the country. The protesters demanded the relocation of oil companies’ headquarters to the area, citing the lack of economic development in the oil-producing region. The protests are relevant as they occur at a time when Libya’s National Oil Corporation is seeking to increase its output in line with other OPEC members.  


Sahel juntas formally leave ECOWAS

The government of Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali announced their formal exit from the regional bloc on 29 January. The announcement comes after a year of ECOWAS’ attempts to convince the three states to remain within the bloc.

The three junta states will now highly likely seek to pursue further integration within the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), the alternative bloc they have formed in opposition to ECOWAS. The development is likely to accelerate the disintegration of ties between the landlocked junta states and the coastal members of ECOWAS. It may further worsen regional instability, as the three juntas, despite Russian help, remain unable to contain growing Islamist insurgencies in their territories.


Sporadic protests in Mozambique but widespread unrest diminishes

Sporadic protests have broken out along the N4 Maputo-South Africa motorway following Trans-Africa Concession’s (TRAC) attempt to resume toll collection. The most recent blockade by protesters occurred on 29 January, whereby protesters blocked the road shortly after 07:00 local time (05:00 UTC) and continued until approximately 17:30 local time (15:30 UTC), when protesters voluntarily demobilised.

President Daniel swore in a new General Commander of the Mozambican Police (PRM), Joaquim Sive on 27 January. The appointment comes after Chapo dismissed Bernadino Rafael on 23 January. Chapo announced that Sive’s task is to “regain the people’s trust in the police”. Following likely top-down orders to refrain from the use of force, there is a realistic possibility that security forces will attempt to refrain from using tear gas and live ammunition in further cases of unrest.

Security, Armed Conflict and Terror

Activist facing trial for Quran burning in Sweden killed

Salwan Momika had become a popular figure on social media as one of the most prominent faces of the 2023 Swedish Quran burning. He was scheduled to be sentenced alongside another man on 30 January for inciting violence. Momika was reportedly shot and killed on the night of 29 January in the town of Sodertalje, near Stockholm, while he was streaming on TikTok. Five people were arrested in connection with the shooting.

The global high visibility of the victim (Momika had more than 200,000 followers on X.com and videos featuring him have millions of views), plus the highly likely religious motive for the shooting, make the possibility of copycat violence highly likely. For the same reason, there is also a threat of “retaliatory” actions against Muslim communities in Sweden and other Western states.

Turkish forces arrest 100 in anti-Islamic State (IS) raid

The arrests, which occurred last week, were announced by Turkish officials on 29 January. More than 24 provinces were targeted in the operation, including Ankara and Istanbul. Overall, more than 900 suspected IS supporters were arrested in 2024.

Turkey remains a hotspot for IS recruitment and activity, due to its close proximity to the main areas of operations of IS in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and its closeness to Europe and Russia, two key targets for IS operations. Turkey is moreover a high-value target due to its counterterrorism efforts in the region. There is a realistic possibility of IS reprisal attacks in response to the raids.

Syrian government intercepts arms shipments to Lebanese Hezbollah

On 25 January, Syrian border forces intercepted a shipment of arms intended for Hezbollah in Serghaya, Rif Dimashq. The interception followed the previous interdiction of a shipment of drones to Hezbollah which was stopped at the port of Tartus. It is highly likely that the shipments had been organised by Iranian-backed elements as part of Tehran’s efforts to rearm Hezbollah following the latest conflict with Israel. The new Syrian government has significantly boosted its diplomatic engagements with international partners and is likely interested in removing Western and Israeli concerns about Hezbollah’s efforts to replenish its arsenals.

The Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) launches offensive against Boko Haram in Nigeria

On 27 January, pro-IS channels reported that ISWAP had attacked Boko Haram (JAS) fighters near the small village of Kachalla Kelluri, situated in Borno state at the border with Niger. IS sources claimed that at least 50 Boko Haram fighters were killed in the offensive.

In 2021, ISWAP forces killed Boko Haram leader Abubakar Sheaku in an offensive in Sambisa Forest, Borno State. Since then, the group has made considerable inroads in taking over territory previously occupied by Boko Haram, especially in the Lake Chad basin. Since 2023, Boko Haram has managed to recover some of its losses and has engaged in clashes with ISWAP. In April 2024, more than 100 dead were reported following clashes in the so-called “Tumbums” islands of Lake Chad.


Rapid Support Forces (RSF) intensify attack on al-Fashir, Sudan

At least 70 people were killed after RSF forces attacked the last functioning hospital in al-Fashir. The city is the last stronghold of the government in Darfur and has been under an RSF siege since May 2024. With the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) continuing to make considerable gains in the country’s east following the beginning of their offensive in Khartoum, it is highly likely that RSF officials are aiming to clear al-Fashir and redirect forces towards the capital. Taking al-Fashir would also represent a significant political victory that is highly likely considered valuable by the RSF after the recent setbacks near Khartoum.


INTERPOL and AFRIPOL arrest 37 in anti-Islamist operation in East Africa

On 27 January, it was reported that coordinated November-December counter-terrorism operations across Africa led to the apprehension of 37 suspected terrorists and the seizure of illicit material, including both small and heavy arms. Arrests were made in eight countries, including Somalia, the DRC, Tanzania, and Kenya- where 17 individuals were detained.

The detentions include suspected Islamic State (IS) and al-Shabaab members, as well as other local terrorist groups such as the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). The operations likely allude to greater international cooperation in Africa and the increased use of modern surveillance, particularly at ports of entry. However, the wave of arrests likely indicates the growing significance of Africa for transregional violent extremist organisations (VEOs) such as the Islamic State. IS has developed a network of affiliates across Africa, overseen by its General Directorate of Provinces, which is seeking to exploit porous borders, and overstretched governments to increase its influence.

Environment, Health and Miscellaneous

Storm Eowyn damages energy infrastructure, causes prolonged outages in UK

At least 3,000 properties continued to suffer outages days after the storm made landfall, and more than 45,000 people were affected by outages in Northern Ireland throughout the period between 24 and 28 January. In total, power outages caused by the storm are estimated to have affected more than one million people. At least two deaths have been recorded, and more than five people were injured. The Met Office described the weather event as the “strongest storm in ten years”. Forecasts indicate that, despite Storm Eowyn’s dissipation on 27 January, strong winds are likely to continue throughout the 31 January – 2 February weekend.


UNRWA ban comes into effect in Israel and the West Bank

The Israeli government had passed a law banning the activities of the United Nations Reliefs and Works Agency (UNRWA), but the legislation only came into effect on 30 January, after a legal challenge to pause it was struck down by Israel’s Supreme Court. The Israeli government has accused UNRWA operators of collaborating with Hamas. UNRWA plays a fundamental role in the West Bank and Gaza, where it operates dozens of clinics. As of the time of writing, the United Nations has said that UNRWA clinics remain operational.


On 29 January, President Asif Ali Zadari gave his assent to a controversial amendment to the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (PECA), a day after the amendment’s passage in the Senate. The bill had earlier been passed by the National Assembly on 23 January, causing condemnation from international human rights organisations and the Pakistan Federal Union of Journalists (PFUJ).

The new legislation criminalises ‘fake news’, expands regulatory control over content and expands the powers of the Pakistan Telecommunications Authority through the establishment of a new Social Media Regulation and Protection Authority. According to the law, spreading “false and fake information” will now be punishable by up to three years’ imprisonment and a fine.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The new laws are highly likely intended to be used by authorities to suppress dissent and target opposition supporters who use social media platforms to criticise the government. PECA was initially passed in 2016, and initial fears from activists and human rights organisations that the bill would be used to quash dissent have materialised in recent years during periods of unrest.

The major opposition party Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) have led a large-scale anti-government protest movement since the 2022 ousting of the Imran Khan government, which dramatically escalated in 2023 following Khan’s arrest and subsequent imprisonment.

The PFUJ, Pakistan’s largest trade union for journalists, has announced plans for nationwide protests set to culminate in a ‘grand sit in’ in front of Parliament House in Islamabad on 14 February. Parliament House’s location in Islamabad’s ‘Red Zone’, gives authorities extensive powers to prohibit protests and public gatherings in the area – it is highly likely that any significant protests will be met by violent crowd dispersal methods from security forces and result in violent clashes.


An investigation has been launched by authorities following the 19 January discovery of a “caravan” containing enough explosive material to create a bomb with a blast radius of more than 40 metres, in the Sydney suburb of Dural. Alongside the explosives, police found a list of targets linked with the local Jewish community. Two people have been detained in connection with the discovery. One of them had reportedly already been charged for other antisemitic attacks. More than 100 counter-terrorism police have been assigned to the investigation.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The discovery follows a significant increase in antisemitic and Islamophobic attacks in Australia. In December, an arson attack occurred at the Adass Israel Synagogue in Melbourne, causing extensive damage and injuring one worshipper. It is almost certain that the rise in sectarian violence targeting Jews and Muslims has been driven by the conflict in Gaza and matches similar trends identified in other Western countries.

Australian authorities have described the latest incident as an “escalation” of the terrorism threat in the country, as it is the first time that large quantities of explosives are found alongside attack plans. The explosive retrieved by authorities reportedly consists of a compound that is commonly used for mining. Access to it requires a licence and proper security clearance, indicating that the perpetrators either acquired it “legally” through their work or stole it from a facility related to the mining sector.


Stampede at Hindu festival in Uttar Pradesh, India, kills more than 30

The Maha Kumbh (“Festival of the Sacred Pitcher) is a Hindu pilgrimage whose location and date are decided via astronomical calculations and represents the largest single religious gathering in the world. In 2025, approximately 100 million people were expected to visit the festival location in Prayagraj over the course of 45 days starting on 13 January. A stampede on 29 January was reported after pilgrims tried to take a holy bath in the Triveni Sangam River, resulting in at least 30 deaths and more than 200 injuries. The massive influx of pilgrims to areas that have insufficient infrastructure poses a severe risk of similar events. There is a realistic possibility that protests will follow the recent incident.


Bangladesh’s Awami League calls for mass protests against Yunus governmen

The party of ousted long-time Bangladeshi ruler Sheikh Hasina called for mass demonstrations to take place between 1 and 18 February against the interim government of Muhammad Yunus. The protests will include a day-long Hartal (general strike) on 18 February. The protests are the most ambitious anti-government effort by the Awami League (AL) since Hasina was forced to flee the country following large-scale demonstrations in August 2024. Since the change in government, there have been multiple cases of political violence targeting AL members and sympathisers. These attacks have been mostly led by extra-parliamentary groups, and the Yunus government has de fact distanced itself from them. There is a realistic possibility of a sharp increase in sectarian political violence during the scheduled protest period.

Security, Armed Conflict and Terror

Myanmar National Unity Government (NUG) leader claim 2025 is “tipping point” in the war

The NUG oversees the anti-junta People’s Defence Force (PDF) coalition. Acting President Duwa Lashi La claimed, in an interview with Al Jazeera, that anti-junta forces are looking to achieve a “Syria-like” resolution to the conflict in 2025. The president also called for international involvement in the conflict and for the cutting of financial lines to the junta. The NUG is likely seeking to maintain a balanced position with regional powers, including Beijing, the junta’s key backer. With junta forces continuing to lose ground and facing significant defections, the NUG’s moderate public diplomacy approach will almost certainly continue in order to push regional powers to increasingly consider a post-junta Myanmar to be aligned with their key interests.


Philippines suspends survey in South China Sea following tensions with China

On 25 January, a scientific survey was suspended after perceived harassment from vessels belonging to China’s Coast Guard and Navy. As two Philippine fisheries vessels approached Sandy Cay to collect sand samples, Chinese vessels reportedly conducted “aggressive manoeuvres” in their vicinity.  In response to accusations by the Philippine Coast Guard, Beijing has claimed that Philippine vessels attempted to illegally land on the Tiexian Reef to collect sand samples. The cancellation comes after numerous instances of brinkmanship in the past weeks over contested waters in the South China Sea. Amid escalating tensions, Manila and Beijing met on 16 January and reportedly agreed to cooperate and resolve the territorial dispute.

Environment, Health and Miscellaneous

Deadly floods and landslides in Malaysian Borneo.

At least five people have been killed and almost 8,000 evacuated from the Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak in Borneo as a result of heavy rainfall and flooding that has occurred since 28 January. The Malaysian Meteorological Department has issued a danger-level continuous rain warning for Sarawak and Sabah, effective until at least 31 January due to continued heavy rainfall. Major roads have been blocked due to floods and landslides, with further damage to infrastructure anticipated due to saturated ground. The rural interior regions of Sabah have been greatly affected, with the remoteness of these areas restricting access to resources, healthcare and other services.


Tropical Low 13U off the coast of Queensland, Australia.

Tropical Low 13U is currently impacting the northern coast of Queensland, Australia. The system has brought torrential rains, leading to widespread flooding in Townsville. Local media reports indicate that the heavy rainfall has caused substantial disruptions in the area. Disaster authorities have issued warnings for the region, predicting up to 19 inches of rain between Cairns and Townsville over the weekend. Residents are advised to stay informed and take necessary precautions as the situation develops.


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