On 21 August, at least six people were killed and more than 60 were injured after a truck-borne improvised explosive device (IED) was detonated on a street outside of the Marco Fidel Suárez Military Aviation School in Cali, Colombia’s third-largest city. The authorities have stated that all the victims were civilians and that a second truck-borne IED failed to detonate. Earlier on the same day, a police helicopter was downed in the department of Antioquia in northern Colombia, killing 13 officers onboard and injuring several others. The helicopter was reportedly downed using small arms fire and drones.

The attacks have been attributed to two separate dissident factions of the now-defunct leftist guerrilla group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The authorities have linked the Cali bombing to fighters loyal to Iván “Mordisco”, leader of the Estado Mayor Central (EMC), the largest and most powerful FARC offshoot, which is now primarily engaged in drug trafficking and armed activity across western and southern Colombia. The helicopter downing has been attributed to a different EMC cell operating in Antioquia. While both groups operate under the banner of EMC and trace their origins to FARC, they now allegedly operate as semi-autonomous factions following the collapse of the 2016 peace agreement.

In response to the twin attacks, President Petro, who has previously championed peace talks over military operations, has vowed to counter the threat from armed groups and announced plans to officially designate EMC, the Segunda Marquetalia and the Clan del Golfo as terrorist organisations under a so-called “Junta del Narcotráfico”. Defence Minister Pedro Sanchez stated on 22 August that the government will launch “Operation Sultana” to neutralise the “terrorist threat”. The operation will involve the deployment of Search Bloc units to Cali and the surrounding areas, a special operations unit of the National Police of Colombia tasked with capturing or killing high-value targets.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The Cali bomb attack marks the most deadly incident within a major Colombian city since the intensification of hostilities in early 2025 and follows a series of attacks in the Cali region in June. However, previous attacks were largely conducted in municipal areas where armed groups have greater influence. The detonation of a truck bomb outside of a military base in a relatively central part of Cali almost certainly reflects the capability of armed groups to strike high-value targets (HVTs) and project violence into urban centres outside of their immediate areas of operations and under government control. Moreover, it likely signals a willingness to accept a high rate of civilian casualties in pursuit of their objectives.

President Petro’s move to designate armed groups as terrorist organisations is highly likely indicative of a decisive change in strategy from his previous “Total Peace” agenda, which championed dialogue and reintegration over military confrontation. The designation is likely aimed at delegitimising FARC dissidents’ claims of being genuine political actors and curbing popular support for the groups. This shift, combined with the commencement of Operation Sultana, will almost certainly result in increased security operations, which will likely focus on the capturing or killing of HVTs like Iván Mordisco, and likely signals a suspension of any meaningful peace negotiations in the near term.

However, armed groups in Colombia remain highly fragmented, decentralised, embedded in local communities and with fluid leadership structures, making them resilient and hard to dismantle through conventional military operations. This fragmentation has also made it harder to achieve peace through dialogue, as no single leadership can credibly represent or enforce agreements across a decentralised network of armed groups. The Petro administration now likely has to contend with the dual challenges of increasing counterterrorism operations while also trying to revive productive negotiations under increasingly difficult conditions.

Colombia’s armed groups are likely to respond to intensified operations with an increase in attacks against Colombian police and military targets to deter further pressure. The attack in Cali may also indicate an increased willingness to shift violence from traditional rural strongholds to urban areas in an attempt to exert maximum psychological pressure and to undermine the government. This change in strategy will almost certainly increase the risk of civilian casualties, and future attacks may expand to include non-military targets such as shopping centres, bars, transport hubs and public events, as evidenced by previous periods of internal conflict in Colombia.

Transport operators announce mass strike in Mexico City.

Major public transport operators have announced that they will carry out a large-scale protest, including a general strike and road blockades, across Mexico City on 1 September. The announcement follows the collapse of talks with the governments, with the operators calling for an increase in fares over falling revenue. The date of the planned protest coincides with the beginning of the school year, as well as President Claudia Sheinbaum’s State of the Union speech, and is therefore likely aimed at maximising travel disruptions in the Mexican capital.

Two children killed in lone wolf terrorist attack in Minnesota, US.

On 27 August, a gunman opened fire on a Catholic church in Minneapolis during a scheduled mass for a local Catholic school. Two children were killed in the attack, and 17 other people were injured. The shooter committed suicide ahead of the arrival of responding police. The online footprint of the alleged shooter, which included a manifesto, diary, and videos, almost certainly indicates that the perpetrator sought to copy previous lone wolf terrorists and school shooters and espoused an array of different extremist ideologies.

Sinaloa Cartel leader “El Mayo” pleads guilty to drug trafficking at New York hearing.

On 25 August, Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada, one of the historic leaders of the Sinaloa Cartels, who was arrested on US territory in 2024, made a guilty plea for drug trafficking and other charges, almost certainly to avoid the death penalty. El Mayo stated that he will not seek to negotiate with US authorities, likely meaning that he will not collaborate to implicate other individuals within the cartel. Following El Mayo’s arrest, the Sinaloa Cartel has de facto split into multiple factions, the most powerful being “Los Mayitos”, who are loyal to El Mayo, and “Los Chapitos”, headed by the sons of imprisoned Sinaloa Cartel leader Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman. The de facto cartel civil war has led to an extended period of severe violence in Sinaloa, including in the state capital, Culiacán.

Venezuelan President Maduro calls for mass enlistment to defend against US “invasion”.

On 23 August, Maduro issued an appeal to citizens to enlist in the National Bolivarian Militia, a branch of the armed forces that acts as a paramilitary force directly headed by the president. The appeal is almost certainly a reaction to the deployment of US Navy assets to the southern Caribbean as part of Washington’s efforts to disrupt the trafficking of narcotics at sea. The Venezuelan government has repeatedly portrayed the recent US deployments as a part of efforts to topple the regime or infringe on the country’s sovereignty. Maduro continues to benefit from the “rally round the flag” effect driven by growing tensions with the US, and likely assesses that an expansion of the Bolivarian Militia’s ranks will benefit the regime’s stability at home.

7.5 magnitude earthquake in the South Atlantic briefly triggers tsunami warnings.

A major seismic event occurred on 22 August in the South Atlantic, at approximately 710 kilometres southeast of Ushuaia, Argentina, in the Drake Passage, between South America and Antarctica. The earthquake occurred at a depth of 10.8 kilometres and had a recorded magnitude of 7.5. Following the tremor, the Chilean government issued tsunami warnings for its research bases in Antarctica, although these were lifted shortly after. Major tremors happen with some frequency in the Drake Passage, with another 7.4 magnitude earthquake being recorded in the area in May 2025.

Over the course of the past few weeks, Ukrainian forces have significantly intensified a campaign against Russian energy infrastructure, primarily using long-range attack drones. At least ten oil refineries have been partially disrupted, assessed to account for at least 17 per cent of Russia’s total refining capacity. For example, on 23-24 August, the Novatek gas processing complex was struck by drones in the Ust-Luga port, Leningrad Oblast, as well as the Syzran Oil Refinery in Samara Oblast. Dramatically increasing gasoline prices (up to 38 and 49 per cent for different types of gasoline) and shortages, with long queues being reported at filling stations,  have forced authorities to revise export plans and, in some cases, even impose export bans.

The success of the long-range campaign occurs as Ukraine further bolsters its aerial threat. On 21 August, President Volodymyr Zelensky unveiled a new domestically-built cruise missile, dubbed the “Flamingo”, with a claimed range of up to 3,000 kilometres and a 1,150 kilogram warhead. In addition, the White House has approved the delivery of 3,350 Extended Range Attack Munitions (ERAMs) to Ukraine, which is a low-cost air-launched weapon system, essentially a hybrid between a cruise missile and a bomb, with a range of between 240 to 400 kilometres. However, reports emerged on 23 August that the Pentagon has quietly been blocking Ukrainian forces from using the Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) to strike targets inside internationally recognised Russian territory. This policy is thought to also impact the use of UK-provided Storm Shadow cruise missiles, due to the reliance on US intelligence for strikes.

Overnight 27-28 August, Russian forces launched a large-scale and layered wave of aerial attacks against Ukrainian urban centres, particularly Kyiv, where more than 20 locations were hit. The combined strike package reportedly included over 600 attack drones/decoys and over 30 ballistic and cruise missiles, making it the largest attack on Kyiv this month. As of 28 August, at least 13 deaths have been reported and dozens injured as a result of the attack.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Ukraine’s expanding long-range strike threat, which has so far been primarily achieved with domestically produced attack drones, is highly likely to compound pressure on Russia’s war economy. In addition to strikes targeting military infrastructure and industry, the intensifying campaign against Russia’s oil refining capabilities poses a significant threat to what has been a critical factor in Moscow’s war effort and is coinciding with US secondary tariffs against India for importing Russian oil.

Manpower has been Russia’s greatest advantage on the battlefield, with the Kremlin able to not only sustain but extensively grow its ranks without resorting to politically costly mass conscription. This has almost certainly been heavily achieved with the considerable financial incentives offered to recruits.

While the Russian economy has suffered from international sanctions, it has managed to withstand a strategically decisive impact on the war effort, largely in part due to continuing and even developing economic relationships with key partners such as China and India. Moscow derives substantial revenues from its oil exports. In addition to the domestic impact of fuel shortages resulting from Ukrainian strikes, the revision of export plans and, in some cases, even export bans, likely poses a major strategic challenge to the Kremlin in the long term.

This is a threat which is likely to increase as Ukrainian long-range strike capabilities further develop. It is almost certain that the Pentagon’s block on ATACMS strikes in Russian territory is yet another reason for Kyiv to prioritise the rapid development of domestic long-range strike capability. The ‘Flamingo’ (FP-5) cruise missile is claimed to be currently produced at a rate of one per day, with an aim to produce seven per day by October 2025. If this is achieved, Ukraine will likely be able to stockpile large enough quantities of FP-5s to then launch mass strikes against targets deep in Russian territory. This emerging capability, layered with attack drones and other long-range weapon systems, will likely overwhelm, overstretch and successfully penetrate Russian air defence. The claimed range of the system indicates that it will be able to comfortably reach strategically vital high-value targets deep in Russia, such as the Yelabuga drone factory in the Republic of Tatarstan.

Concurrently, Russian forces have almost certainly resumed the previously high intensity of long-range strikes against Ukrainian cities. Combined Russian strike packages dramatically escalated in size from late May to August, with records being consistently surpassed week-to-week. This has been almost certainly conditioned by increased Russian production rates, which have considerably increased since the start of 2025.

However, while aerial attacks against Ukrainian cities continued, there was a relative reduction in their scale from the start of August until after the Alaska Summit. This was highly likely part of an effort by Moscow to ward off pressure from Washington, but also likely suggests that Russian forces have been able to stockpile attack drones and missiles. The 20-21 August and 27-28 August large-scale aerial attacks underscore that the threat profile in Ukrainian cities far from the frontlines, particularly Kyiv, remains the highest since the initial stages of the full-scale invasion.

On 25 August, Israeli forces carried out a double strike on the Nasser Hospital in Khan Yunis. The attack killed at least 20 people, including five journalists who worked for Reuters, the Associated Press and Al Jazeera, and four health workers. The second strike was recorded, attracting significant international outrage. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called the strike a “tragic mishap”. The strikes in Khan Yunis were part of a broader campaign of airstrikes across the Gaza Strip, which has recently intensified as a prelude to the planned ground offensive by the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) on Gaza City, meant to occupy the area and eliminate the remaining Hamas fighters in the city.

IDF channels have also stated that they plan to issue evacuation orders for all the remaining civilian population of Gaza City, relocating it to areas in the Gaza Strip’s south, likely referring to the al-Mawasi humanitarian area. On 26 August, Israeli forces, including armoured units, entered the northern Ibad al-Rahman area of Gaza City.

In Washington, US Special Middle East Envoy Steve Witkoff has stated that the administration is developing a “very comprehensive” plan for the post-war administration of Gaza, and stated to the press that the administration expects the war to be settled by the end of 2025.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The strike on Khan Yunis follows a previous attack in Gaza City, which killed five Al Jazeera journalists. The strike has attracted significant condemnation, and it is highly likely that it will drive protests in the short term in major European and North American cities, including New York, London, and Paris.

The planned offensive on Gaza City has already proven highly controversial both in Israel and abroad, and is opposed by Israeli Hostages and Missing Families Forum, who argue it will endanger the 20 captives who are estimated to be still alive. It is highly likely that there will be further international and domestic civil unrest following developments in the Gaza Strip.

US statements regarding the likelihood of the war ending by the end of 2025 are likely reflective of the current administration’s weariness with the conflict, which recent polls show is increasingly unpopular among the US electorate. However, it is unclear if Witkoff’s new framework will result in a breakthrough in the impasse between Israel and Hamas in the short term. In May, a US-backed plan that had broad Israeli support was rejected by Hamas. On 18 August, following Tel Aviv’s announcement of the plan to occupy Gaza City, Hamas officials changed their stance, stating that they would approve the proposal. However, this was in turn rejected by Tel Aviv, with Netanyahu rejecting the phased release of the remaining hostages envisioned by the plan. It is highly likely that the Israeli government assesses that Hamas is under extreme pressure, which could be conducive to the group making greater concessions, and will thus prefer to start the offensive on Gaza City ahead of agreeing to a ceasefire plan.

On 25 August, Botswana’s President Duma Boko declared a nationwide public health emergency in response to the country’s critical shortages of medicine and medical equipment. President Boko declared that the national medical supply chain had failed, resulting in hospitals and clinics being short of medicine and other essential supplies like dressings and sutures. The president also announced 250 million Botswana Pula (USD 18.5 million) in funding for emergency medicines, the distribution of which will be administered by the military.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The declaration of a public health emergency follows warnings in early August from the Ministry of Health. On 4 August, the ministry announced that non-urgent procedures were being suspended and that Botswana was critically short of medicines used to treat hypertension, diabetes, cancer, asthma and eye conditions, as well as sexual and reproductive health. While it is not immediately clear why there are such shortages, President Boko has blamed the state procurement agency Central Medical Stores (CMS) for increasing drug prices in the country.

Furthermore, Botswana’s finances are heavily dependent on the international diamond market, with the country being the top producer of diamonds by value. Due to a global downturn in the diamond market, it is highly likely that the government is struggling to fund its health initiatives. In 2024, the diamond market accounted for approximately one-quarter of Botswana’s GDP, one-third of government revenue and around 80 per cent of exports. Botswana has heavily relied on the diamond market to fund its public healthcare system, which provides services to all citizens at little to no cost, with primary care, preventative services and many treatments widely available through clinics, health posts and mobile units.

The Trump administration has also cut funding to Botswana, adding additional strain on the medical sector. While the emergency funding package may temporarily ease supply shortages, it is unlikely to resolve Botswana’s vulnerabilities associated with procurement, overreliance on diamond revenues and decreased international funding. Given these issues, the public health emergency is likely to remain in place, with chronic shortages persisting, which is likely to increase the prevalence of both non-communicable and infectious diseases, including HIV/AIDS, with over 20 per cent of the adult population estimated to be living with the virus. Any disruption to antiretroviral treatment could have severe consequences for public health, leading to increased morbidity, rising transmission rates and long-term setbacks in HIV/AIDS management, any area where Botswana has made significant progress.

Should medical shortages remain in place in the long term, there is a realistic possibility that Botswana’s healthcare system becomes overwhelmed, and growing public dissatisfaction could translate into unrest if the public perceives that the government is increasingly unable to guarantee access to healthcare. The suspension of US aid to Botswana has already been associated with scaled-back NGO activity, disrupting HIV, tuberculosis and malaria programmes. If the US is perceived as partly responsible for Botswana’s emerging health crisis, there is a realistic possibility of growing anti-US sentiment in the country.

Anti-migrant protests and counterprotests continue in the United Kingdom.

Large-scale protests took place near hotels housing asylum seekers in England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland during the 22-24 August period. Protests targeting accommodation housing asylum seekers have increased in the second half of the summer, particularly following two high-profile cases in Epping and in the Canary Wharf area of London. At several locations, anti-migrant protesters were met by groups of counterprotesters, although a large police presence successfully prevented cases of mob violence. Tensions over the UK’s migration policies are highly likely to continue in the medium term, with a realistic possibility of targeted sectarian violence occurring in large urban centres. On 13 September, several prominent anti-migrant and far-right groups and influencers plan to hold a large-scale demonstration in central London. Several European and North American far-right figures are also expected to attend the protest, while multiple counterprotests are planned to occur during the day.

French Prime Minister François Bayrou calls confidence vote, risking government collapse.

On 25 August, Bayrou called a confidence vote for 8 September, over his plans to slash the budget deficit with welfare and tax reforms. Both the left-wing opposition and the right-wing populist National Rally (RN), which, although not formally a government ally, has so far de facto protected Bayrou from a no-confidence motion, have announced they will oppose the prime minister, highly likely leading to a government collapse. If Bayrou were to be ousted, President Macron could either appoint another successor, prolonging France’s political impasse, or call for new parliamentary elections. In both cases, there is a high likelihood of large-scale civil unrest. It is unlikely that Macron will resign, as this would almost certainly boost populist candidates from both the left and right, leaving the president’s centrist coalition in a position of extreme weakness.

Dutch government weakened as coalition member New Social Contract (NSC) quits.

On 22 August, Foreign Minister Casper Veldkamp announced that he and other NSC ministers would resign from their positions, following irreconcilable differences with the rest of the coalition over the country’s policies towards Israel. The NSC ministers’ proposal to impose new sanctions on Tel Aviv due to the planned offensive in Gaza City was rejected by the rest of the coalition. With NSC, the coalition of Prime Minister Schoof loses 32 parliamentarians and nine ministers. The Netherlands was already headed for new elections in October, following the split of the Party for Freedom (PVV) from Schoof’s coalition in June, over disagreements on asylum policies. The NSC’s move is likely reflective of political pragmatism. The party obtained 16 per cent of the vote in 2023, granting it a strong parliamentary presence, but has collapsed in the polls and is now estimated to have about one per cent of overall popular support.

Portugal airport staff plan holiday season strike.

The Metallurgical and Related Industries Unions (SIMA), which also represents thousands of ground staff at Portuguese airports, has announced a strike action period between 3 September 2025 and 2 January 2026, which will cover several holiday periods, including Christmas, with intermittent strikes set to fall on weekends. SIMA is demanding an increase in workers’ base salaries and the extension of workers’ benefits. Previously, SIMA scheduled strike action in July and August 2025 over salary disputes, causing significant disruptions, and cancelled further strikes planned for late August after talks with the Ministry of Labour. If the strikes were to materialise, they would almost certainly result in widespread flight delays and cancellations, particularly in late December, ahead of Christmas and New Year’s Eve.

“Wrench attack” targeting crypto investor in France

On the night of 26-27 August, a cryptocurrency investor was kidnapped by a group of individuals between Paris and Saint-Germain-en-Laye. The kidnappers reportedly sent a demand for a EUR 10,000 ransom to one of the victim’s acquaintances. The victim was later freed by the perpetrators, although, as of 28 August, available reports do not clarify if this occurred following a ransom payment.

The case is the most recent in a growing number of “wrench attacks”, a term referring to cases of express kidnapping and extortion targeting cryptocurrency investors. Perpetrators, who identify their victims by scrutinising their online footprint, leveraging data leaks from cryptocurrency brokers, or knowledge of local investor communities, likely see this category of investor as desirable targets. This is due to cryptocurrency’s anonymous and difficult-to-trace payment systems, which complicates authorities’ responses. France is the European country where most “wrench attacks” have taken place, and it is highly likely that several active criminal groups involved in these incidents operate internationally, often coordinated by leaders based outside of the EU.

Syrian Druze leader announces new faction with remnants of Assad regime.

Hikmat al-Hijri, one of Syria’s most influential Druze leaders and one of the main advocates against reconciliation and political integration with the post-Assad government, announced the creation of a new paramilitary force on 23 August in the Suwayda governorate. The so-called “National Guard” includes several former officials within the security apparatus of the Assad regime. The announcement will highly likely provoke a response from Damascus, and has the potential to threaten the fragile ceasefire in place in Suwayda between Druze and Sunni forces. While al-Hijri has called for Suwayda’s “secession” from Syria, the province is not economically or politically viable. In the medium term, the unresolved situation in Suwayda is likely to remain a key driver of sectarian violence in Syria, and may pose an obstacle to the integration of other Druze factions who maintain better relations with Damascus.

Egyptian officials push for joint deployment with Palestinian Authority (PA) forces in Gaza Strip.

Egyptian officials have accelerated their international campaign to obtain support for a plan to deploy an estimated 10,000 troops to the Gaza Strip to provide security after a cessation of hostilities between Israeli forces and local Palestinian militant groups. Cairo further stated that it is currently training 5,000 troops, mostly comprised of members of the Palestinian Authority’s security forces.

The increased diplomatic activity is highly likely reflective of Egyptian officials’ worries regarding the possible impacts of the planned Israeli campaign to occupy Gaza City. On 19 August, local media reported that the number of Egyptian troops in the Sinai Peninsula, including the border areas with Gaza, reached 40,000, amidst fears of a possible mass displacement of residents of the Gaza Strip.  The plan is likely to be met with Israeli opposition, as Tel Aviv continues to oppose a PA-led option for the post-war governance of Gaza.

Israeli Air Force (IAF) conducts airstrikes on Sanaa, Yemen, following Houthi attack against Israel.

On 22 August, the Yemen-based Houthi Movement launched long-range strikes against Israel, with two attack drones targeting sites in Tel Aviv and Ashkelon, and a missile targeting Ben Gurion International Airport (TLV). According to some sources, the missile was armed with a cluster munition warhead that disperses multiple bomblets, which reportedly complicated Israel’s air defence efforts. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) confirmed that several interception attempts took place, with the projectile ultimately fragmenting midair over central Israel and reportedly causing no damage or casualties. The Houthis have targeted Ben Gurion Airport on multiple occasions and will highly likely continue to regularly target it, due to the potential to cause mass disruption by closing Israel’s primary international airport. 

In retaliation, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) conducted airstrikes on the Houthi-held capital Sanaa on 24 August. The Presidential Palace complex was successfully struck, as well as a fuel depot and power stations. The Houthi-run health ministry claimed that at least ten people were killed, with 102 injured.

Fall of Farabougou underscores growing junta inability to control armed forces in Mali.

On 19 August, Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) fighters carried out a successful attack against the Malian military base in Farabougou, in the Ségou Region. According to local media, during the attack, local military officials requested reinforcements from nearby Markala and Dioura. However, mutinies were recorded at both locations, with units refusing to obey orders and calling for the deployment of special forces units instead. The case follows other mutinies in Mali, where Malian soldiers have lamented a lack of equipment and pay, and observers have noted widespread low morale and dissatisfaction with the junta’s handling of the conflict from Bamako. There is a realistic possibility of further mutinies in rural areas of the country in the face of growing JNIM pressure. In turn, this is likely to undermine central authority and play into the hands of militant groups who will likely frame the Malian forces as unreliable and the junta as incapable of governance.  

Rise in West Nile Virus (WNV) cases in South Europe.

The European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) reported on 22 August a rise in the number of cases of WNV in nine European countries. Italy and Greece are the two most affected countries, with Italy’s northern plains and south-west coast recording the most cases. The ECDC has noted that mosquito-borne diseases like WNV and Chikungunya virus have spread to new areas, likely due to a combination of prolonged warm and humid temperatures, and cheap travel during the summer. Other factors, such as ageing populations, are highly likely to contribute to the diseases’ mortality in countries like Italy and Greece.

After initially passing the Philippines as a tropical depression on 22 August, the storm system intensified into Typhoon Kajiki by 24 August south of Hainan, China. With maximum recorded wind speeds of 176 km/h, businesses and public transport were forced to close in Hainan’s resort city of Sanya. Kajiki tracked west, making landfall on Vietnam’s north-central coast near the city of Vinh on 25 August at typhoon strength, before weakening into a tropical disturbance. Over 500,000 people in Vietnam were evacuated in anticipation of the typhoon. The storm resulted in heavy flooding and landslides, which affected over 10,000 residences and offices, and power blackouts impacted 1.6 million people. Vietnam’s capital city, Hanoi, also experienced significant flooding. As of 28 August, the death toll stands at eight people killed, seven in Vietnam and one in Thailand, where eight provinces were affected by flooding and landslides.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Typhoon Kajiki’s impact underscores the ongoing threat of tropical cyclones in late summer, which is typically the peak of the Northwest Pacific typhoon season. This year’s Northwest Pacific typhoon season has been projected to be likely 15-20 per cent below the 30-year norm, but it remains highly likely that further typhoon-strength storms will develop in the region in the coming weeks.

The development of La Niña conditions later in the year, although unlikely, would enhance Northwest Pacific typhoon activity, potentially triggering an uptick in abnormal late-year typhoon formation. As well as increasing the average severity of tropical cyclones, climate scientists have warned that global warming is causing major storms to increasingly occur outside of typical timeframes. In 2024, Taiwan was heavily impacted by two typhoons between late September and early November, with Typhoon Kong-rey being the first typhoon to make landfall after mid-October in Taiwan’s history.

A country’s disaster resilience, which consists of multiple factors including preparedness measures, infrastructure quality, building planning, and emergency response capacity, remains the most critical determinant of a natural disaster’s potential impact. Vietnamese authorities effectively conducted mass evacuations in anticipation of Kajiki, likely with lessons learnt from the catastrophic impact of Typhoon Yagi in August-September 2024. These evacuations almost certainly mitigated against far greater casualties, with Yagi having been not much stronger than Kajiki but killing at least 300 people.

On 25 August, student-led protests were staged outside the Parliamentary Complex of Indonesia in Jakarta, with protestors demanding reductions to perceived excessive salaries and housing allowances of MPs, following reports that some were being paid in excess of 100 million Indonesian rupiah (USD 6,150) a month. Riot police were deployed and used tear gas and water cannons to disperse crowds attempting to breach the parliamentary compound and in response to protestors throwing rocks and other projectiles at the police. Reports indicate that over 300 people were arrested during the initial protest.

Further protests have been organised on 28 August and are planned to take place in all 38 of Indonesia’s provinces. These protests are a separate movement and were organised under the banner of HOSTUM (“Eliminate Outsourcing, Reject Low Wages”), and were planned in advance of the 25 August protests. The protests are being led by the Labour Party, the Coalition of Trade Unions, and the Confederation of Indonesian Trade Unions (KSPI), who are demanding improved working conditions, an end to outsourcing, the ending of layoffs, stronger anti-corruption measures and tax reforms. The main protest is planned outside the House of Representatives (DPR) in Jakarta, with around 10,000 workers originally expected to march from the surrounding areas. Simultaneous protests are planned in other major cities, including Surabaya, Medan, Bandung, Semarang, Makassar, and Banda Aceh.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Protests in Indonesia have increased under the new presidency of Prabowo Subianto. Student-led protests in February were staged over President Subianto’s austerity measures, which involved significant budget cuts and the expansion of military roles within the civilian government. These protests were then supported by civil society groups and unions, and expanded into a coordinated and disruptive nationwide movement, which involved multiple clashes with the police.

Economic hardship associated with rising living costs, high inflation and government spending cuts has almost certainly increased dissatisfaction with the incumbent government, especially among Indonesia’s youth, who have been disproportionately affected. However, the revelations of MPs’ expenses coinciding with a major austerity programme have almost certainly exacerbated public resentment, with allowances estimated at ten times the minimum wage.  This development will likely serve as a catalyst for broader anti-government demonstrations and could help unite student-led protests with wider movements supported by trade unions, opposition groups, and civil society.

The convergence of student protests with organised labour and union-backed demonstrations will likely result in larger, more frequent and coordinated protests across Indonesia. Many of these protests are set to be held outside government buildings and will almost certainly result in clashes with the security forces, mass arrests and the deployment of tear gas and other forms of crowd dispersal tactics.

Social media has been pivotal in the organising and coordinating of protests, and the government has repeatedly blamed online platforms for what it perceives to be disinformation. The authorities have already summoned companies such as Meta and TikTok, threatening fines, temporary suspensions, and even outright bans if content moderation is not improved. However, any attempt by the government to restrict or suspend online platforms will almost certainly be seen as an overreach aimed at restricting free speech and will likely further fuel public anger and intensify anti-government sentiment.

Nationwide anti-immigration rallies organised by far-right groups are scheduled to take place on 31 August. Named “March for Australia”, the protests are scheduled to begin at 12:00 local time. According to protest literature disseminated on social media, the demonstrations will be held in the following locations: Sydney – Belmore Park; Melbourne – Flinders Street Station; Brisbane – Roma Street Parklands; Perth – Supreme Court Gardens; Adelaide – Rundle Park; Canberra – Regatta Point; Darwin – Darwin Civic Centre; Townsville – Anzac Memorial Park; and Cairns – Freedom Park.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The rallies come within a context of increasing anti-immigration sentiment in Australia, although it is unlikely that the turnout will match the publicity that the demonstrations have received. Sympathetic media to the protests suggest that “tens of thousands” may attend the rallies, which will likely be inaccurate, but local police forces have highly likely prepared for potentially large crowds.

It is likely that the demonstrations will result in violent confrontations between rival protesters despite almost certain attempts by police forces to separate protest groups, with counter-protests already being organised. So-called “anti-fascist” organisers have planned, for example, a simultaneous counterprotest to take place at the State Library in Melbourne.

Furthermore, 31 August coincides with weekly Sunday pro-Palestine protests, further increasing the potential for disruption. On 24 August, at least tens of thousands attended pro-Palestine marches nationwide and on 3 August, pro-Palestine protesters shut down the Sydney Harbour Bridge during a demonstration. There is a realistic possibility of targeted violence, with community leaders warning immigrant communities to stay inside during the protests, in anticipation of potential harassment. The leader of the neo-Nazi National Socialist Network (NSN), Thomas Sewell, has attempted to claim leadership of the “March for Australia” and made calls for mobilisation, further increasing the likelihood of violence. Sewell was arrested on 22 August due to an alleged assault that occurred during a 7 August NSN march in Melbourne’s Central Business District (CBD), and it is likely that Sewell’s supporters will use further “March for Australia” to protest his arrest.

One person killed in mob violence in Kishoreganj, Bangladesh.

Local media have reported clashes, including shootings, between rival groups of Jubo Dal, the youth wing of the Bangladeshi Nationalist Party (BNP), in Kishoreganj. At least one individual was killed, and around 20 were injured during the clashes. Violence between opposing BNP factions has been ongoing in the area since at least early August, with local sources reporting family rivalries involving several local Jubo Dal leaders as the driving factor.

The case illustrates how local leaders are able to leverage their political groups to settle personal or family disputes. It also further showcases the complex dynamics driving political mob violence in Bangladesh, which is highly likely to remain a major factor contributing to local instability.

Former President of Sri Lanka arrested under corruption charges.

On 22 August, former President Ranil Wickremesinghe, who ruled the country between 2022 and 2024, was arrested under charges of misusing public funds and remanded in custody. Wickremesinghe allegedly used public funds to attend his wife’s graduation in London in 2023. The former president was granted bail on 26 August, and several thousand supporters staged a demonstration in Colombo near the Magistrates’ Court. Further developments in the case, which follows other arrests of government officials as part of current President Kumara Dissanayake’s anti-corruption push, have the potential to drive further unrest in Sri Lanka.

Australian officials accuse Iran of being responsible for arson attacks.

On 26 August, Australian government channels reported that several Iranian diplomats would be expelled, alleging Tehran’s responsibility for several arson attacks on businesses owned by Jewish individuals and synagogues. The attacks were reportedly carried out by “agents” of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), although the exact attack planning dynamics remain unclear as of 28 August.

Iran’s alleged involvement in sabotage and vandalism actions targeting Jewish communities was already reported by several European countries. In Scandinavia, officials accused Iranian intelligence of leveraging local criminal gangs to carry out the attacks. This ‘outsourcing’ of asymmetric operations is reminiscent of Russia’s own ‘gig economy’ model, which offers significant advantages in terms of low costs, low risks to operatives, and plausible deniability. Canberra’s decision is highly likely to trigger retaliation by Iran.

Two police officers killed in shooting in Porepunkah, Australia.

On 26 August, two police officers were killed and one was injured after reportedly being targeted by a gunman while executing a warrant at a property in a rural area of Porepunkah, Victoria State. The perpetrator reportedly escaped, with local authorities launching a search to locate him. According to local media, the suspect espoused the “sovereign citizen” ideology. This indicates a loosely structured movement of individuals who believe that government rule and jurisdiction are groundless, as they are not based on direct individual consent.

While most popular in the US, the sovereign citizen movement has thousands of adherents throughout English-speaking countries, as well as European countries like Germany. Several cases of terrorism have been directly linked to the ideology, or claimed by its supporters as being inspired by it. In 2022, two Queensland police officers were killed during a shootout at a property in Wieambilla, which followed a similar dynamic as the Porepunkah incident. The three perpetrators, who were killed following a protracted standoff with responding police, reportedly espoused a mix of conspiratorial beliefs, Christian fundamentalism, and ideas adjacent to the sovereign citizen movement.

India warns Pakistan of flooding risk following dam gates opening.

On 27 August, Indian officials warned their Pakistani counterparts of an increased risk of floods in parts of Kashmir and Punjab in the short term. The warnings followed the Indian authorities’ decision to open major dams in the region following heavy rainfall. Pakistan’s Punjab region, which is nationally important due to its agriculture sector, is at a severe risk of flooding, and India’s move has the realistic possibility of further exacerbating the threat. Currently, there are an estimated 160,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Punjab, mostly due to flooding. The development is likely to further drive tensions between India and Pakistan, with water-related policies continuing to shape insecurity in the region.

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