On 12 November, US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) reported that the USS Gerald R. Ford carrier strike group (CSG) had entered its area of responsibility  (AOR) and linked up with the US Fourth Fleet after crossing the Atlantic Ocean. The CSG transited the Strait of Gibraltar on 4 November and loitered off the coast of Africa for several days.

The Pentagon stated that the enhanced force posture “will bolster US capacity to detect, monitor, and disrupt illicit actors,” adding that all deployed assets currently operate under a Joint Task Force tasked with dismantling transnational criminal organisations.

The CSG will improve SOUTHCOM’s ability to identify and interdict vessels suspected of smuggling narcotics from Venezuela, but will also significantly enhance its ability to strike land-based targets in Venezuela. The CSG consists of four squadrons of F/A-18s multi-role fighter jets, one squadron of E/A-18 Growler electronic-warfare aircraft, one of E-2D Advanced Hawkeye command-and-control planes, several MH-60 Seahawk helicopters, and a detachment of C-2A Greyhound logistics aircraft. The CSG is further supported by three Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, providing enhanced air defence coverage and land-attack cruise missile (LACM) capabilities.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The exact position of the USS Gerald R. Ford CSG is unknown, and the SOUTHCOM AOR extends as far east as the Cape Verde Islands, approximately 2,000 miles from Venezuela, suggesting it may still be several days from being in effective striking distance of land targets on Venezuelan soil. The arrival of the CSG follows the recent decision by the US Senate to block proposed legislation that would have prohibited the Trump administration from conducting offensive land strikes in Venezuela without explicit Congressional authorisation. The rejection of the bill has likely left the executive branch with broad authority to strike Venezuelan targets under the extant counterterrorism and anti-trafficking mandates, despite bipartisan concerns that such a course of action would be in violation of international law.

The stalling of the CSG’s arrival, its vague positional data, and the consistent framing of the US military buildup have likely been calibrated to maintain strategic ambiguity, while exerting increased pressure on the Maduro regime to step down or commit to considerable concessions. Washington’s next course of action will likely be determined by how Maduro reacts before committing to politically costly land strikes. Venezuela has responded by launching a new phase of military mobilisation and conducting nationwide exercises involving a reported 200,000 troops, primarily focusing on air defence readiness and guerrilla warfare. This has likely been done to project strength and increase deterrence by signalling to the US that any intervention would be at huge costs, despite the current task force being considerably less than what would be required to launch an effective invasion. The Maduro regime is also framing US action as imperial aggression and exploiting this narrative to rally domestic support. This strategy will likely involve increased crackdowns on opposition figures, arbitrary arrests, and expanded censorship under the guise of national security to help consolidate power. However, this strategy of heightened militarisation will also likely increase the risk of miscalculation or escalation, which may be difficult to control or de-escalate once any active hostilities begin.

US Government shutdown ends after President Trump signs funding bill.

On 12 November, the US’s longest government shutdown in history, lasting 42 days, ended after President Donald Trump signed a government funding bill in the Oval Office. The bill was negotiated by Republicans and six Democrat-aligned senators and was narrowly passed by the US House of Representatives at 222 to 209 shortly beforehand, with approval being given by the Senate, which funds the government through January 2026.

Operations have begun returning to normal, although some sectors, such as air travel, are still experiencing disruptions. American Airlines has warned of potential lingering delays and cancellations as operations restart. Flight reductions at US airports have been adjusted, with a reduction rate of 6 per cent instead of the anticipated 10 per cent by the end of the week, due to fewer air traffic controller callouts. The government shutdown has resulted in 730,000 federal employees having to work without pay, 670,000 furloughed, and thousands more laid off. Many services, including economic data releases and government contracts, have been delayed or unavailable, and benefits under the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) faced disruption, with states warning of missed payments to millions of people. While operations are set to begin returning to normal, continued disruptions are highly likely. Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP), for example, will reportedly be unavailable for weeks.

Mexican teacher union threatens 48 48-hour protest on 13-14 November.

Mexico’s National Coordinator of Education Workers (CNTE), one of Mexico’s largest teacher unions, has announced a new round of protests scheduled to take place on 13 and 14 November. CNTE is demanding dialogue with President Claudia Sheinbaum and the repeal of the ISSSTE Law of 2007, the repeal of the Educational Reform, social and labour justice, as well as the democratisation of the National Union of Education Workers (SNTE). CNTE has threatened to block access to the Aeropuerto Internacional de la Ciudad de México (AICM), the Palacio Nacional, and key highways across Mexico, as part of the 48-hour protests. The CNTE has leveraged disruptive tactics in the past, such as airport and highway blockades, to amplify pressure on the government, with previous protests resulting in significant transport disruption and violent clashes with the security forces that have occasionally resulted in fatalities.

Nationwide peace march organised in Mexico on 15 November.

On 15 November, a large-scale nationwide march for peace and security titled “México Unido por la Paz” is scheduled to occur across Mexico. The mobilisation, organised by civil society groups, community leaders, and citizens, aims to express collective frustration over escalating violence, corruption, and impunity for criminals or those suspected of aiding cartels. Demonstrations have been planned in several cities, including Mexico City, Guadalajara, Monterrey, Mérida, Tijuana, and numerous smaller cities. Participants are expected to wear white as a symbol of peace and unity.

The protest follows increased cartel violence and homicides in several Mexican states, particularly Michoacán, Guanajuato, Guerrero, and Zacatecas, and has likely been partly influenced by the recent high-profile assassination of the Mayor of Uruapan in Michoacán. The protests are widely expected to remain peaceful, but the anticipated large-scale participation is likely to result in increased police deployments and transport disruptions.

Peru’s Congress declares Mexican president persona non grata as diplomatic crisis escalates.

On 7 November, Peru’s Congress voted to declare Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum persona non grata following Mexico’s decision to grant asylum to former Peruvian Prime Minister Betssy Chávez, who faces charges linked to the 2022 attempted dissolution of Peru’s Congress and remains sheltered in the Mexican Embassy in Lima. Peru had previously severed ties with Mexico on 3 November. No large-scale protests have been recorded outside of the Mexican Embassy in Lima; however, extra security has been deployed to the location. Mexico has dismissed Peru’s actions as “excessive and disproportionate”, reiterating Mexico’s prerogative to grant asylum under international conventions.

Protestors break into COP30 venue in northeast Brazil.

On 11 November, protestors clashed with United Nations security at COP30, which is being held in Belém, in northeast Brazil, from 10-21 November. Protestors, which included Indigenous and non-Indigenous groups, attempted to breach security and enter the Blue Zone, where official negotiations, country pavilions, and high-level delegate meetings are taking place. At least two security guards received minor injuries, and minor damage to the venue was recorded. Organisers stated that the venue has been fully secured and that COP negotiations will continue as planned following the incident. Previous protests targeting the event had been peaceful; however, activists have been growing in number, and several demonstrations have been organised, with the largest planned protest scheduled for 15 November. Moreover, an estimated 100 Indigenous vessels arrived on 12 November, led by prominent Indigenous leaders. Further protests and attempts to breach the venue’s perimeter are highly likely. If security forces succeed in securing the venue, protestors may also attempt to block critical transport routes leading to COP30, including both roads and key waterways around Belém.

Dozens killed in two prison riots in Machala, Ecuador.

On 9 November, two large-scale riots occurred in the space of less than one day at a prison facility in Machala, the capital of the El Oro province, resulting in 31 deaths and dozens of injuries. The incident occurred only months after a previous wave of violence, in September, had resulted in 14 deaths at the same facility. According to available reports, the majority of the victims had been hanged, likely indicating the deliberate targeting of inmates during the violence, as well as an intention to “send a message”. The facility where the violence took place is considered a hotspot for violence between Ecuador’s two main rival organised criminal groups, Los Choneros and Los Lobos.

According to some reports, the latest riot occurred in response to authorities’ plans to relocate some inmates to a different, maximum security facility. Ecuadorian gangs’ chains of command often start from prisons, where gang leaders can operate with little oversight while enjoying a relatively greater level of protection. In several facilities, police exercise only nominal control, with criminal groups retaining the ability to traffic weapons, including firearms, and narcotics to and from prisons.

Major power outage recorded in Dominican Republic.

On 11 November, a widespread power outage occurred across much of the Dominican Republic after a fault in the transmission system triggered a chain reaction, affecting multiple power stations in the country. Major disruption was reported, including in the capital, Santo Domingo, and the San Cristóbal Province. Services on both the metro and cable car systems in Santo Domingo were suspended, and many households and businesses in the wider region remained without electricity for hours. The authorities have begun restoring power, with transport and health being prioritised.

However, protests have been staged in response to the power cuts in the northern Puerto Plata province, where several tourist resorts are located. Protests have involved tyre burnings and street blockades, as well as the deployment of the military. Energy officials have stated that full restoration across the north could take several more days as transmission lines are repaired, likely increasing the risk of further unrest.

Overnight on 7-8 November, Russian forces launched over 450 one-way attack drones/decoys and 45 missiles against Ukraine, killing at least seven people. The strikes damaged energy infrastructure in Kyiv, Poltava and Kharkiv Oblasts, leading to mass power blackouts. On 9 November, the Ukrainian state-owned electricity transmission system operator Ukrenergo stated that power would be cut for between eight and 16 hours across most of Ukraine’s Oblasts to stabilise the grid, with another state-owned energy company, Centerenergo, stating that electricity generating capacity “is down to zero”. 

Solace Global Assessment: 

Since the start of the full-scale invasion, Russian long-range strikes against Ukraine’s critical national infrastructure (CNI) have considerably escalated in both the run-up to and during the winter months. First, this has highly likely been due to the higher strategic and psychological impact achievable. During the winter, demand on Ukraine’s energy grid is at its highest, and the economic impact of strikes on energy-related CNI is amplified. Moreover, a lack of heating is particularly demoralising for Ukraine’s civilian population during winters that can see temperatures drop as low as -20 degrees Celsius. Second, winter conditions limit the feasibility of large-scale ground offensives, with ground conditions restricting manoeuvrability and poor visibility reducing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. This forces Russian military planners to maintain pressure on Ukraine while advances at the front lines slow.

2025 has seen the intensity of Russian aerial strikes against Ukraine dramatically escalate, with records for the size of combined strike packages of missiles and long-range attack drones being consistently broken. This intensity has been maintained, enabled through significantly increased Russian production rates for both Shahed-type attack drones and missile systems, almost certainly making the threat environment in Ukrainian cities far from the front lines the highest since the initial phases of the full-scale invasion. This intensified aerial threat is now being concentrated against Ukrainian CNI, the impact of which is highly likely to be more pronounced than in previous winters. A senior government figure told international media that they “think it will be the worst winter of our history”, and the chief executive of the private energy investor DTEK stated that “it is clear Russia is aiming for the complete destruction of Ukraine’s energy system.”

The weekend’s attack against Ukrainian gas infrastructure, in particular, was the ninth since early October, with Kyiv’s School of Economics estimating that these attacks have resulted in half of Ukraine’s natural gas production being shut down. It is highly likely that Russian forces will continue their aerial campaign against Ukrainian CNI, which in worst-case scenarios, could result in humanitarian disasters in cities such as Kyiv if temperatures fall below -10 degrees Celsius and power and heating plants go offline for several days. It is highly likely that the Kremlin is seeking to crush the morale of Ukraine’s civilian population in conjunction with its significant offensives into Pokrovsk and Kupyansk at the front lines, aiming to exert additional pressure on Kyiv and influence Kyiv toward negotiations on terms favourable to Moscow’s maximalist political and territorial objectives.

On the 8-9 November period, Syrian government forces carried out dozens of raids against suspected Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) cells across the country, with operations recorded in Hama, Idlib, Aleppo, Raqqa, Deir ez-Zor, Homs, and Damascus. According to available reports, around 70 suspects were arrested in the raids, including a senior leader of the group. Some of the arrests occurred in areas populated by religious minorities, particularly Druze and Christians.

On 11 November, Syrian President al-Sharaa met with US President Donald Trump in Washington, only days after the UN Security Council (UNSC) removed sanctions on the Syrian leadership. Shortly after the meeting, Syrian officials confirmed that Syria would join the global coalition against the Islamic State.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Syria’s entry into the coalition demonstrates how the transitional government is continuing to capitalise on its warming relations with the United States to establish itself as a key regional partner. Despite multiple vulnerabilities, the Sharaa-led government has already demonstrated itself as capable of carrying out several anti-ISIS operations, and the 8-9 November raid was almost certainly meant to showcase the new post-Assad Syria’s growing capability to counter the threat of ISIS.

On 10 November, the eve of the Washington bilateral meeting, senior Syrian officials stated that security forces had foiled at least two assassination plots targeting the president. It is highly likely that Syria’s entry into the global coalition, possibly followed by greater cooperation with Western forces, will further result in ISIS seeking to target the Syrian leadership. Overall, ISIS’s key objective remains destabilising the Syrian state. So far, it has done so by systematically targeting minorities (an intention further demonstrated by the discovery of ISIS cells embedded in religious minority areas), trying to win the support of disillusioned government fighters, particularly foreign fighters, who oppose Sharaa’s Western overtures, and targeting key leaders at the local and national level. A key vulnerability for the transitional government is highly likely the concentration of power into Sharaa himself as a figurehead for Syria’s transition, which threatens an outbreak of significant internal conflict should an assassination attempt succeed.

Iraq’s parliamentary election went ahead on 11 November. In the Iraqi political system, MPs are responsible for electing the president, who then nominates a prime minister. The parliamentary elections are therefore the most important in Iraq. Incumbent Prime Minister Mohammed Shiaa al-Sudani’s new parliamentary bloc, called The Reconstruction and Development Coalition, won a plurality (the largest number) of the votes, and is projected to secure approximately 50 seats in Iraq’s 329-member Council of Representatives.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The previous elections in October 2021 led to a year-long government formation crisis and significant civil unrest. Muqtada al-Sadr’s Sadrist Movement bloc won the most seats in the 2021 election. However, since a failed attempt by al-Sadr to push for snap elections in 2022, the prominent Shia cleric has boycotted the Iraqi political process. Despite the boycott by the Sadrist Movement, turnout for the 2025 elections was higher than anticipated at 56 per cent, although lower in Sadrist stronghold areas like Baghdad and Najaf.

Despite the strong performance of al-Sudani’s new bloc, it is unlikely that a government will be formed quickly, with coalition talks likely to be complex and protracted. On the one hand, the calm and orderly conduct of the election itself is a success when compared to previous elections, as they passed without any major security incidents or unrest. However, the now likely protracted period of political instability during government formation talks will likely increase the risk of violent civil unrest, politically motivated attacks and internal armed conflict.

The two main triggers for violence in the aftermath of the elections are highly likely to be the potential actions of al-Sadr and his Sadrist Movement, and Iran-aligned militias in the Islamic Resistance of Iraq (IRI). In the case of the former, if al-Sadr strongly condemns the election results and calls on supporters to demonstrate in the streets, there will likely be violent civil unrest as in previous years. However, some analysts suggest that al-Sadr is keen to rely on behind-closed-doors talks and political leverage to achieve his objectives this year, and violent unrest would likely undermine his potential influence.

In the case of the latter, Washington has pushed strongly for the disarmament of the Iran-backed militias, with almost all of the militias having reportedly agreed to a plan proposed by the Shia Coordination Framework to publicly disarm by fully integrating into the Iraqi state-backed Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF). The notable exception is Kataib Hezbollah, which has refused the plan and, as recently as in the past week, issued threats against the US. The status of the Iran-backed militias, with international pressures coming from both Washington and Tehran, will almost certainly be a key issue in the upcoming government formation negotiations. There is a realistic possibility that Kataib Hezbollah, in particular, will leverage kinetic force to apply pressure on the negotiations. Previously, Iran-backed militias have launched attack drones and rockets against oilfields in Iraqi Kurdistan in attacks that were likely intended to pressure the two main Kurdish parties against supporting political initiatives in Baghdad that were against IRI interests.

Protests in Lisbon, Portugal, over labour reform law.

On 8 November, Portugal’s main labour unions staged large-scale demonstrations in the capital, which involved tens of thousands of protestors, with some estimates suggesting 100,000 participants. The demonstrations were against a proposed labour reform and demanded an increase in the minimum wage from EUR 870 a month to EUR 1,050. The proposed labour reform will make it easier to fire workers, outsource jobs, and remove certain types of leave. According to union representatives, approximately 100,000 people attended the rally. As the bill appears likely to pass due to the joint support of the centre-right government and the far-right opposition party Chega, further protests or strikes remain likely, unless meaningful amendments are made. There is a realistic possibility that the bill will be passed as early as late November, should it receive enough support in parliament.

Georgia charges former prime minister with abuse of power.

On 12 November, prosecutors in Georgia charged former Prime Minister Giorgi Gakharia with abuse of power and causing injury during his tenure as interior minister in 2019. Gakharia remains in exile; however, the charges could result in a 13-year prison sentence, which would prevent him from returning to the country. The charges follow a series of crackdowns on opposition figures by the Georgian Dream party, led by billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, which opponents accuse of being responsible for democratic backsliding, growing authoritarianism and taking an increasingly pro-Russian stance. The charges, which will almost certainly be perceived as politically motivated and an attempt to weaken the opposition, will likely further exacerbate political polarisation and increase the risk of unrest in the country, which has experienced multiple waves of violent and disruptive protests in recent years.

French security thwarts Islamic State-inspired terror plot in Paris.

On 8 November, French media reported that three women had been arrested for allegedly planning a terror attack in Paris on behalf of the Islamic State (IS). The arrests date back to October, but the attack had been reportedly planned for 13 November, the 10^th anniversary of the 2015 IS attacks that killed 130 people in Paris during the Bataclan attack. The authorities noted that one of the individuals who was arrested had a large following on the social media platform TikTok, which she used to disseminate pro-IS content. The incident showcases both the increased terror threats associated with notable political, historical, or religious anniversaries or commemorations, and further highlights the growing threat of radicalisation on online platforms, with extremists often being both consumers and producers of extremist content.

Houthis announce suspension of anti-Israel maritime operations.

On 9 November, the Yemen-based Houthi Movement published an undated letter that it had sent to Hamas, the content of which signalled a suspension of anti-Israel maritime operations. Following the implementation of the currently effective Gaza ceasefire in early-mid October, the leader of the Houthis, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, had already reportedly ordered his forces to halt attacks against Israel and Israeli-linked vessels in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, conditional on Israel observing the ceasefire. Despite the Gaza ceasefire having been marked by numerous violations from both parties, the Houthis’ letter to Hamas suggests that the violations thus far have not reached the threshold for the Houthis to recommence attacks against merchant shipping. Nonetheless, the letter warns that the Houthis are closely monitoring developments and are prepared to “reinstate the ban on Israeli navigation in the Red and Arabian Seas”, i.e. conduct attacks against vessels deemed to have connections to Israel, with misattribution having been commonplace.

Considering the severe threat posed to seafarers by the Houthis’ attacks against merchant shipping during the campaign, which began in late 2023, it is unlikely that shipping firms will immediately return to the levels of pre-2023 shipping routes that transit past Yemen. The fragility of the Gaza ceasefire and the unreliability of previous Houthi statements further compound these risks. Moreover, it is likely that the Houthis will exploit a suspension of their campaign as an opportunity to replenish stockpiles and rebolster their capabilities, increasing the threat in future should the Houthis resume their attacks against merchant shipping.

JNIM expands kidnapping campaign in Mali.

Jama’at Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) fighters are continuing and expanding their kidnapping campaign targeting foreigners in Mali. On 9 November, the group claimed to have kidnapped three Egyptian workers, demanding a USD 5 million ransom. Days prior, on 7 November, JNIM had reportedly abducted five Indian workers, who were reportedly freed on 12 November following the payment of an unspecified amount. JNIM has almost certainly increasingly prioritised kidnapping operations after its successful abduction of two Emirati nationals in October, which was resolved with the reported payment of a USD 50 million ransom by UAE authorities, an amount of money that almost certainly greatly expands the group’s operational capabilities. JNIM’s growing use of kidnapping as a strategic instrument represents a major shift, with the group carrying out considerably fewer abductions than its regional rival, the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP), up to 2024.

Islamic State Sahel Province continues and expands offensive near Dori, Burkina Faso.

After conducting several attacks on Jama’at Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) positions near Dori, in the northeastern Burkina Faso-Niger border area, Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) forces have expanded attacks against both the rival jihadist group and government forces in the area. On 7-9 November, ISSP forces reportedly carried out almost continuous attacks against JNIM positions in Gordadji (west of Dori), with available accounts stating that several JNIM fighters were either taken prisoners or persuaded to switch sides. On 9 November, local observers stated that JNIM leaders deployed “reinforcements” to Arbinda (approximately 40 kilometres west of Gordadji) to try to stop the ISSP offensive. ISSP’s offensive operations have so far followed R6 (the Dori-Djibo road), which is a key roadway just south of the Sahel Reserve. JNIM’s delayed response, likely due to its prioritisation of anti-government operations, has likely enabled ISSP to consolidate its strength and seize the initiative in the region.

IS West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Boko Haram (JAS) engage in “naval battles” in northeast Nigeria.

Starting in early November, heavy clashes have been ongoing between the two rival jihadist groups in Borno State, northeast Nigeria. Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) has launched an offensive targeting key JAS positions in the area, including in the Lake Chad area and in the Mandara mountains, where JAS holds defensive positions. On 10 November, Nigerian media reported on a large-scale “naval battle”, with ISWAP and JAS trading fire from improvised light vessels, in the Lake Chad region, with some reports claiming around 200 dead from the clashes, although this figure remains unverified. The Nigerian Air Force also reported conducting airstrikes on ISWAP vessels during the engagement. The rival groups are likely fighting to contest the control of territory and resources across the Lake Chad basin, including key waterways, fishing zones, and smuggling routes that provide revenue and influence for both factions.

Sudan’s RSF agrees to humanitarian ceasefire proposal, though halt to fighting unlikely.

On 6 November, Sudan’s paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) agreed to a proposal for a humanitarian ceasefire and declared that it is open to talks regarding the cessation of hostilities. The idea, which would involve a three-month humanitarian pause before a permanent ceasefire would be negotiated, was proposed by the Quad, a mediator group comprising the US, Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) has not responded to the proposal.  

Despite the RSF’s agreement, a halt to the fighting is unlikely. The RSF conducted drone attacks targeting Omdurman, part of the greater Khartoum area, on 7 November, although the SAF’s air defence systems intercepted these. Numerous other ceasefires have been agreed upon throughout the conflict, although none have held. Furthermore, UN human rights chief Volker Turk stated the following day that “[d]evelopments on the ground indicate clear preparations for intensified hostilities.”

The announcement comes shortly after the RSF’s capture of El-Fasher, the capital of North Darfur, which has cemented its control over western Sudan. It is likely that, by agreeing to a ceasefire, the RSF are attempting to consolidate its control over Darfur following El Fasher’s capture. The RSF is also likely attempting to deflect international condemnation following the reports of attacks on civilians following the city’s capture.

Storm Claudia triggers flooding in Portugal and Spain before affecting the UK.

Storm Claudia has caused significant disruption across Portugal and Spain. In Portugal, heavy rains and flooding led to the deaths of a couple in Fernão Ferro near Setubal on 13 November. Authorities raised weather alerts to red in Santarem and Setubal, and at least 20,000 households lost power across Lisbon, Santarém, and Setúbal. Civil protection officials reported more than 415 weather-related incidents overnight 12 to 13 November, with cars swept away by flooding in Seixal and several roads blocked across affected areas. The Portuguese weather service had issued an orange rain warning for most districts starting 12 November.

In Spain’s Canary Islands, Storm Claudia prompted authorities to suspend classes and all outdoor activities, close parks, and shut schools from 12 November. The government in Lanzarote also suspended outdoor events and closed schools due to the storm. On 13 November, Spanish authorities closed roads near Tiagua in Las Palmas following weather-related damage, while operations at Gran Canaria Airport (LPA / GCLP) gradually returned to normal after earlier disruption. Ports in Arrecife, Lanzarote, were closed, affecting cruise and ferry services between Lanzarote and Gran Canaria. The Spanish weather agency issued orange warnings for Gran Canaria, Lanzarote, Fuerteventura, La Palma, and southern Tenerife. Lingering disruptions are highly likely. The storm is forecast to hit southern regions of the UK on 14 November, with the Met Office issuing an amber weather warning, stating that flooding and up to 80mm of rain are likely.

On 11 November, at approximately 12:39 local time (07:39 UTC), an explosion occurred outside the District Judicial Court complex in Islamabad, Pakistan, located adjacent to Srinagar Highway in the G-11 sector of the city. The Interior Ministry has confirmed that at least 12 people were killed and at least 27 were injured in the explosion.

Footage reportedly showing the aftermath of the explosion shows a vehicle on fire on the service road outside the complex’s gates, as well as possible victims near the location of the blast. Authorities have established a security perimeter near the incident location and appear to have halted traffic on the nearby section of the Srinagar Highway.

The authorities have stated that they assess that the explosion was a terrorist attack perpetrated by an individual equipped with a person-borne improvised explosive device (PBIED, likely a suicide vest). Some unconfirmed testimonies state that the alleged attacker approached the complex on a motorcycle, while the Interior Ministry stated that he unsuccessfully attempted to enter the courthouse.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Suicide bombings in Islamabad have been less common in recent years relative to other Pakistani urban centres, such as Peshawar and Quetta, which are closer to the primary area of operations of militant groups. Islamabad is Pakistan’s most securitised urban space, containing security checkpoints and fortified zones to prevent such attacks.

There is no official confirmation of the perpetrator’s affiliation. Pakistani media has accused “Fitna al-Khawarij”, a term often applied to the Kabul-linked Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which primarily operates in regions next to the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, particularly Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Jamaat‑ul‑Ahrar (JuA), a TTP splinter group, claimed responsibility shortly after the attack, although there were conflicting reports from the TTP’s central leadership, which initially denied any link to the attack. However, the group has since claimed responsibility, stating “[j]udges, lawyers and officials who carried out rulings under Pakistan’s un-Islamic laws were targeted.”

The TTP has claimed responsibility for numerous attacks in Pakistan’s major cities, including a 2014 attack on Jinnah International Airport in Karachi, a 2017 suicide bombing in Lahore, and a 2023 attack on a police headquarters in Karachi. The group has previously targeted Islamabad, attempting a suicide bombing in Islamabad’s government district in December 2022. In August 2025, Pakistan’s intelligence agency announced that it foiled a planned TTP suicide car bombing. Early assessment suggests that the TTP are the most likely perpetrators of the Islamabad District Judicial Court bombing, although there are multiple other terrorist threat actors present in Pakistan.

Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) has also claimed responsibility for numerous attacks in the country. PBIEDs are often used by the group; however, most of ISKP’s attacks have taken place in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and the group has not previously targeted Islamabad. The Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) is also active in Balochistan, with typical targets including Pakistani security forces, infrastructure projects, and government installations in the Balochistan region or in nearby Karachi.

The attack comes amid heightened tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Pakistan has frequently accused the Taliban-led government in Afghanistan of providing TTP with safe havens across the border and facilitating TTP attacks in Pakistan. Recent tensions escalated into airstrikes conducted by Pakistan on TTP targets in Kabul on 15 October, following TTP attacks on Pakistani military posts along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and a series of attacks in Pakistan. There is a realistic possibility that the Islamabad attack was facilitated by the Afghan Taliban following the airstrikes on Kabul. The attack may have been designed to demonstrate the Taliban’s capability of reaching deep into Pakistan despite its lack of long-range weapons and airframes.  

If confirmed to be TTP, already high relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan will highly likely deteriorate, and there is a realistic possibility of renewed Pakistani airstrikes in Afghanistan targeting TTP hideouts, which may extend to Kabul. Additionally, Islamabad may suspend ongoing diplomatic engagement, fully close partially open border crossings, and/or impose further travel restrictions on Afghan nationals.

Islamabad has also frequently blamed New Delhi for supporting the TTP as a proxy to destabilise Pakistan, and Pakistani media have accused the perpetrators of the attack of being “India-backed”. There is a realistic possibility that protests will occur close to the High Commission of India in Islamabad, although demonstrations are generally restricted inside the diplomatic zone and are likely to be met with a heavy security presence. Furthermore, conflict ignited between the two sides in May this year over a terror attack in Kashmir. Blaming India for the attack will likely increase tensions between the two countries and raise the risk of reciprocal blame over the Delhi explosion on 10 November, something which could trigger further escalations between the two countries.

A heightened security presence across major cities in Pakistan is highly likely, with increased security checkpoints and road closures. Heightened security will likely lead to increased travel disruptions in the short term. Intensified security operations in across Pakistan are highly likely, which may increase the risk of retaliatory violence.

At approximately 19:05 local time, 10 November, an explosion occurred near the Red Fort, an important tourist attraction in a densely populated area of Delhi. At least 12 people were killed and over 30 were injured. Multiple casualties were brought to Lok Nayak (LNJP) Hospital. The explosion appeared to take place inside a vehicle outside a metro station. The blast set multiple other vehicles alight. Videos on social media depicted a large fire on a congested street close to the Red Fort metro station gate number one.

Indian authorities now assess the explosion to have been an act of terrorism. The incident has also been linked with a raid in Faridabad, south of Delhi, that occurred only hours before the explosion, and led to seven arrests and the discovery of a cache of nearly 2,900 kilograms of explosive materials. Authorities have declared that the materials were prepared by individuals linked with the Islamist groups Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), based in Pakistan, and Ansar Ghazwat-ul-Hind (AGuH), based in Kashmir, to carry out coordinated attacks. In response to the raid and the attack, Indian security forces have conducted numerous further raids, leading to several more arrests.

Delhi and other large Indian cities, including Mumbai, have been placed on high alert, with police ordered to conduct more searches on suspect vehicles or properties and increase patrols near perceived at-risk locations. The National Security Guard (NSG), the National Investigation Agency (NIA), formed after the 26/11 2008 Mumbai attacks, and the forensic department were dispatched to Delhi to continue the investigation. Due to the declaration of the incident as an act of terrorism, Indian security forces have expanded powers to carry out raids and arrests.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The Red Fort, also known as the Lal Qila, is a Mughal-era fort located in the old city and is a popular tourist destination with heavy foot traffic. The location of the blast in the area and near a traffic hub suggests the purpose of the explosion was to maximise civilian casualties while also obtaining maximum visibility.

Authorities also noted that the explosion’s effect was diminished by the fact that the improvised explosive device (IED) that was used had been “premature and not fully developed”. This further suggests that the attack was likely hastened by the raids in Faridabad and would have otherwise been carried out as part of a series of coordinated bombings.

While JeM has not claimed responsibility, the group has conducted several previous attacks in India, including an attack on India’s parliament in New Delhi in 2001. Due to the high tensions between India and Pakistan following the April 2025 Pahalgam attack, which India blamed on Pakistan, Indian authorities have refrained from directly accusing Pakistan of involvement in the Red Fort explosion. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi declared in May that “any future act of terror will be treated as an act of war”, and any direct link to a Pakistan-linked terror group is highly likely to escalate tensions. Despite the cautiousness from the government, sectarian tensions in India, alongside religious-nationalist groups, will likely increase the likelihood of “retaliatory” attacks, including cases of mob violence or targeted killings, targeting Muslim communities in India.

While Indian authorities have linked the Red Fort explosion to the Faridabad raid, possible links to other recent terrorism-related incidents in India cannot be ruled out. On 9 November, three individuals were arrested in Gujarat after they were found in possession of several firearms and approximately four kilograms of ricin precursors. Indian authorities have suggested that they had had links with an Afghanistan-based operative of the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP). In late October, Indian authorities had already arrested two suspected ISKP-linked operatives for planning attacks in Delhi on Diwali.

Following the explosion, IndiGo Airlines received several bomb threats. These covered several international airports, including Delhi, Mumbai, Chennai, Thiruvananthapuram, and Hyderabad. While these e-mails may be a hoax attempting to capitalise on recent developments, they will almost certainly be taken seriously by the authorities, resulting in increased security measures and disruptions at Indian airports for the foreseeable future.  

There is a realistic possibility of further attacks in the short term. High-traffic and high-visibility locations in Delhi, Mumbai, and other major cities are likely to be considered primary targets for terrorist groups. They are likely to target shopping centres, transport hubs, places of worship, or tourist attractions, as well as military, police, and government buildings.

On 13 November, Bangladesh’s International Crimes Tribunal announced that it will issue a verdict in the case against former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and her top aides on 17 November. Hasina, who was ousted in the 2024 student-led July Revolution, is being tried in absentia (having escaped to India) for offences including crimes against humanity and murder, related to her conduct during the uprising. The case has been ongoing for several months, and the proceedings, which ended on 23 October, were televised for the first time in Bangladeshi history.

Protests erupted following the announcement. Hasina’s party, the Awami League (AL), has called for a “lockdown” on 13 November, with marches in Dhaka and other major Bangladeshi cities. Anti-AL protesters have, in turn, attacked AL headquarters, with the party office in Gulistan, Dhaka, being firebombed. Several clashes and blockades have occurred on key roadways, with at least one bus set on fire on the Dhaka-Tangail Highway.

Several firebombings and detonations of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) occurred in the days leading up to the 13 November announcement. These included at least 17 IEDs being detonated at locations across Dhaka on 10 November, attacks targeting vehicles across the country on 12 November, and several firebombings targeting religious minority institutions, including the Catholic Cathedral in Dhaka and a Catholic-run school.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Unrest is highly likely to persist from 13–17 November, particularly surrounding the anticipated sentencing of Hasina, which is widely expected to result in a death penalty verdict. Further demonstrations are almost certain in the immediate aftermath of the ruling. Violent clashes are likely between rival political supporters, including those aligned with the AL, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), and Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), as well as between AL loyalists and security forces.

Bangladesh has recorded a significant spike in, often social media-driven, targeted mob violence. This has not only affected actual or suspected AL supporters, but also religious and ethnic minority groups. Further cases of opportunistic violence directed at minority groups are likely in the short term.

Protests are likely to disrupt travel and transport throughout Bangladesh. This is because unrest in the country often coincides with improvised road blockades on major roadways, which will likely cause significant transport delays. There is a realistic possibility of unrest near airports, which could cause flight delays or cancellations.

Bangladeshi police will likely respond to disruptive or large-scale protests with violent crowd control methods. These include tear gas, baton charges, water cannons, and, in some cases, live ammunition. There is a realistic possibility that police actions will escalate unrest.

On 10 November, a landmine exploded along the Cambodia-Thailand border, injuring four Thai soldiers. Thailand accused Cambodia of laying new mines in violation of the US-brokered peace agreement, which was formally signed on 26 October. Anutin Charnvirakul, Thailand’s prime minister, subsequently announced the suspension of this agreement, stating that the “hostility towards our national security has not decreased as we thought it would”. The Thai defence minister, General Nattaphon Narkphanit, announced that the release of 18 Cambodian prisoners of war (POWs), which comprised part of the peace agreement, would be “put on hold”.

Cambodia’s defence ministry denied the accusation and emphasised that it was committed to working with Thailand for a solution. Its statement urged Thailand to avoid patrolling in old mine-contaminated zones from past conflicts. Independent experts and Thai officials countered this insinuation, declaring that there was evidence that the landmines had been recently laid, with Thai army spokesperson Major General Wintai Suvari assessing that new Russia-manufactured PMN-2 mines were placed on the Thai side of the border following the removal of barbed wire.

On 12 November, Thai Foreign Ministry spokesperson Nikorndej Balankura demanded an apology from Cambodia and to “find the facts on what happened and who is accountable, and with it, asked them to put in place measures to prevent the future recurrence of the situation.” The same day, Thailand and Cambodia accused each other’s militaries of opening fire along the border in the Ou Beichoan area in the Banteay Meanchey Province in northwestern Cambodia. Cambodia’s information minister declared that at least five civilians had been injured after Thai forces “opened fire on Cambodian civilians” in the village of Prey Chan. Thailand responded by saying gunfire was heard for approximately 10 minutes from the Cambodian border area, but that the Thai side did not engage, and speculated that it was a staged event. However, the military subsequently confirmed that it fired on Cambodian positions in self-defence after Cambodian troops opened fire on Thai soldiers. Thailand has deployed tanks and artillery to its border following the incident.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The apparent collapse of the peace deal comes months after tensions over a long-standing border dispute over the ‘Emerald Triangle’ region escalated into cross-border clashes between the two countries in May through July 2025. Tensions began after a small cross-border skirmish took place between the two sides, which escalated when Thailand alleged that Cambodian troops laid new PMN-2 mines along the border, injuring several Thai soldiers. Full-scale fighting erupted on 24 July along multiple border points involving artillery and air strikes. At least 48 people were killed and approximately 300,000 displaced, according to some estimates.

The two sides agreed to an “immediate and unconditional ceasefire” on 28 July following talks in Malaysia. External international pressure was also applied by the US and China. Provisions of the ceasefire included the withdrawal of heavy weapons from contested zones, cooperative efforts to clear landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO), and the restoration of communications and cross-border movement. Malaysia also led observer teams made up of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states to monitor the ceasefire. The alleged laying of new landmines is almost certainly in violation of the peace agreement.

There is a realistic possibility that the ceasefire can be rescued, particularly given the political instability it caused and the economic damage that resulted from sustained border closures, suspensions in trade and mass displacement. However, neither side appears to be backing down, and further skirmishes are likely, which, combined with Thailand’s pulling out of the peace agreement and refusal to release the Cambodian POWs, are highly likely to continue to escalate the situation. ASEAN will almost certainly attempt to prevent further escalation by mediating between the two sides, and it is highly likely that they will be joined by the US and China, who may exert pressure on each side to de-escalate. There is a realistic possibility that US President Donald Trump will threaten to increase tariffs on Cambodia and Thailand if they continue to escalate, which could force them to the negotiating table due to the potential impact on their economies.

Pakistani Parliament boosts Army Chief’s powers.   

On 12 November, Pakistani legislators approved a constitutional amendment which grants Army chief Asim Munir the title of Chief of Defence Forces (thus giving him command of both the Navy and Air Force) as well as immunity for life, including after the completion of his term. Moreover, the amendment redirects constitutional cases from the Supreme Court to a newly formed Federal Constitutional Court, with judges appointed by the government. The amendment, which was boycotted by the main opposition parties, including Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), will almost certainly significantly reduce restraints on the executive and military leadership and will likely pave the way for further centralisation of powers. It is highly likely that the development, which has likely been interpreted as another example of democratic backsliding, will increase the risk of unrest in Islamabad, Karachi, Lahore, and other large Pakistani cities.   

Lone wolf attack at high school mosque in Jakarta, Indonesia.

On 7 November, an individual reportedly detonated up to seven improvised explosive devices (IEDs) at a mosque located in a school compound in the Indonesian capital of Jakarta. The explosions occurred during Friday prayers and injured dozens of students, with some reports suggesting up to 55 people were injured. The suspected perpetrator, who was injured by the explosions, is a 17-year-old student at the institute. According to local media, the suspect was also armed with a replica firearm, on which he had painted several slogans that are linked to online white supremacist extremism, and almost certainly inspired by the 2019 Christchurch mosque shooting (the Christchurch shooter had written slogans on his firearms, and his name is legible on the replica gun carried by the Jakarta attacker). The incident is therefore almost certainly a case of lone wolf terrorism, with the perpetrator having become self-radicalised online. The obvious contradiction between the attacker’s identity and his espousing of white supremacy has already been observed in previous cases (such as the 2024 Eskisehir stabbing and the 2025 Antioch shooting), and almost certainly demonstrates the growing trend of terrorists espousing increasingly complex, inconsistent, and possibly intentionally “absurd” ideologies, and is a rare case of this form of lone wolf terrorism in East Asia.

Authorities in Delhi implement strict air pollution measures in response to toxic smog.

The authorities in the Indian National Capital Territory (NCT) of Delhi have implemented Stage 3 of the Graded Response Action Plan (GRAP), part of the emergency framework for tackling severe air pollution in Delhi and the wider region. On 12 November 2025, PM2.5 concentrations reached 438 µg/m³, about 30 times the WHO’s safe limit of 15 µg/m³ and around eight times India’s national average. The measures have resulted in the suspension of non-essential construction, mining and the restriction in the movement of vehicles transporting dust-producing materials. Schools have been instructed to conduct online lessons, and doctors have urged residents to stay indoors and wear protective masks when outside. “Smog guns” and water sprinklers have been deployed to reduce dust in public areas. The restrictions are expected to be lifted when pollution levels decrease; however, prevailing weather conditions and continued crop-burning in neighbouring states make it unlikely that the air quality will improve in the immediate term. The pollution has triggered public protests and has also become a political dispute, with opposition leaders accusing the Bharatiya Janata Party-led Delhi government of manipulating air-quality data and neglecting public health, accusations that may help to increase or sustain unrest.

Truck crashes into market in South Korea, killing two and injuring 18.

On 13 November, a truck hit pedestrians at an outdoor market in Bucheon city, near Seoul, killing two and injuring 18, nine severely. According to an official at Bucheon’s fire station, witnesses reported that the truck reversed approximately 28 metres before driving forward 150 metres, hitting several pedestrians on the way. The driver, a man in his 60s, who was reportedly not under the influence of drugs or alcohol, claimed that the truck malfunctioned and suddenly accelerated. The driver has been arrested for negligence. The incident is unlikely to be treated as terror-related. Transportation disruptions in the area are highly likely as safety inspections are carried out in the market.

Super Typhoon results in disruption and environmental risks in the Philippines and Taiwan.

Super Typhoon Fung-Wong, which formed on 3 November, made landfall in the Philippines on 9 November, killing at least eight people, displacing over 1.4 million and causing widespread damage to infrastructure. Rescue operations are ongoing, and the government has declared a year-long state of national calamity to unlock additional funds for recovery. Authorities have warned of increased risks of flooding and landslides, particularly in northern and eastern Luzon, where soils remain saturated and river levels are elevated. The typhoon then transitioned towards Taiwan, making landfall on 12 November. Despite weakening, the typhoon brought heavy rains, resulting in flooding and landslide risks in southern and eastern Taiwan. The typhoon has since weakened and is not expected to make landfall elsewhere.

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