On 18 January, President Gabriel Boric declared a “state of catastrophe” due to ongoing, large-scale wildfires that have displaced more than 50,000 people. The wildfires have impacted several regions, including Bio Bio, Ñuble, Araucania, Maule, and O’Higgins. At least 20 people have died due to the wildfires, almost 100 have been injured, and hundreds of homes have been destroyed. In some cases, wildfires have directly damaged inhabited areas. For instance, in Lirquén, a port area in Greater Concepción, in the Bio Bio region, wildfires destroyed an estimated 80 per cent of structures.

Authorities have reported several security incidents during their evacuation and firefighting efforts. On 21 January, firefighters responding to the fires in Lirquén reportedly came under gunfire, with no injuries reported. Authorities have, furthermore, arrested at least two people suspected of starting fires.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The rapid spread of the wildfires was almost certainly favoured by the dry, hot, and windy conditions recorded in central Chile over the past week. Particularly during the 17-20 January period, several of the most affected regions recorded temperatures of up to 38 degrees Celsius. Weather forecast services have reported that temperatures are likely to decrease; however, the accumulation of dry vegetation – particularly in rural areas – during the summer months means that wildfires are likely to continue in the short term.

The wildfires have not caused any airport disruptions as of 22 January. However, road closures remain possible, particularly in the Bio Bio and Ñuble regions, which remain the worst affected.

US government threatens to act if Haitian government destabilises the country.

On 22 January, the US Embassy in Haiti posted on X that “The U.S. would regard any effort to change the composition of the government by the non-elected TPC [Transitional Presidential Council] at this late stage in its tenure to be an effort to undermine that objective and as such null and void. The United States would consider that any person who supports such a destabilizing initiative, which favors the gangs, would be acting against the interests of the United States, the region, and the Haitian people, and will take appropriate measures accordingly.”

The post comes as some TPC members are reportedly at odds with Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aimé, with the differences emerging during a meeting behind closed doors on 21 January. Fils-Aimé was appointed in November 2025 after the council fired his predecessor, Garry Conille. The council is due to step down by 7 February, but there are fears that it may attempt to hold on to power ahead of the August 2026 general election, potentially deposing Fils-Aimé and using this as an excuse to remain in control of the government until the election. If this happens, widespread unrest is likely. It is unclear what measures the US would take should the council fail to step down, but it is likely to involve a withdrawal of assistance and a potential expansion of sanctions.

Bolivian government declares “energy and social emergency”.

The Bolivian government has announced an “energy and social emergency” in response to fuel shortages, escalating inflation, and dwindling dollar reserves, some of which have likely been exacerbated by the recent nationwide protests and roadblocks that significantly disrupted transportation networks. The government is planning on implementing extraordinary measures for one year to ensure the stability of fuel supply and stimulate economic activity. The emergency allows individuals and businesses to freely import and sell petrol at international prices, removes diesel from price controls temporarily, and formalises the end of long-standing fuel subsidies, which the government argues were draining around USD ten million per day. The measures will likely improve the fuel shortages and help tackle fuel inflation caused by the end of subsidies, decreasing the likelihood of renewed protests. However, Bolivia’s primary workers’ union says it will remain on permanent alert and defend the right to protest, accusing the government of criminalising demonstrations after the repeal of Decree 5503, the original subsidies framework.

US and several European nations increase Greenland deployments.

In response to the US administration’s hostile rhetoric and continuous attempts to control Greenland, several European nations have increased military deployments to the Arctic territory. Denmark has bolstered its forces on the island, and NATO European allies, including France, Germany, the UK, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, Finland, Iceland and Slovenia, have begun sending small contingents of troops and staff as part of joint exercises under Operation Arctic Endurance, a move likely designed to signal collective support for Danish sovereignty and the existing international legal order in the Arctic. The US has also reinforced its presence in Greenland by deploying additional forces to Pituffik Space Base (formerly Thule Air Base), including refuelling and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft. However, the deployment has been framed as routine and does not include combat aircraft, likely intended to message US interest in Greenland without escalating.

Mexican media reports creation of new cartel in Yucatán.

On 20 January, local media reported that a new cartel, known as Cartel de la Costa, has begun operating in the Merida area of coastal Yucatán. The cartel was reportedly created by local organised criminal groups who have lost power due to the growing influence of the much larger Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG) in the area. Yucatán and neighbouring Quintana Roo have historically had a lower level of cartel violence. While several organised criminal groups, like the Sinaloa Cartel, operate in the states, the large influx of tourists to areas like the Yucatecan Riviera and Cancún has likely deterred criminal groups from carrying out actions that could disrupt tourism-related revenues. In 2025, however, violence in popular tourist areas, including Yucatán and Quintana Roo, has increased, particularly due to the fragmentation of the Sinaloa Cartel, and the subsequent expansion of CJNG. The formation of a new cartel in Yucatán is highly likely reflective of the growing inter-cartel competition in the area, which could increasingly threaten tourism hotspots and result in higher rates of cartel violence.

Guatemala declares State of Emergency to respond to gang violence.

On 18 January, the Guatemalan government declared a state of emergency in response to several prison riots, reportedly coordinated by the Barrio 18 gang, and the killing of ten police officers by alleged gang members. The state of emergency mirrors similar frameworks deployed in other Central American states as a response to organised crime: it lasts for 30 days (and can be renewed), allows greater freedom to police and the army to act against suspected criminals, including arresting them without a judicial order, and limits some civil rights. It is likely that Guatemalan officials will utilise the state of emergency to implement Mano Dura (“Iron Fist”) measures similar to those introduced by El Salvador and other regional powers. Particularly in the short term, an aggressive implementation of Mano Dura has the potential to trigger a violent response by the gangs. Prisons, which serve as hubs for gang activity and allow gang leaders to operate with little real oversight, are likely to be key flashpoints for violence, with inter-gang prison violence potentially resulting in increased retaliatory violence on the streets.

US seizes seventh Venezuelan-linked oil tanker in Caribbean.

On 20 January, the US military seized a Venezuela-linked tanker in the Caribbean, marking the seventh seizure in its current campaign to prevent the transport of illicit oil shipments. US Southern Command (SOUITHCOM) indicated that MV SAGITTA without incident and now remains in US custody. Sustained pressure on Venezuelan-linked oil shipments is likely intended to force Caracas into complying with the Trump administration’s political and economic demands, including continued concessions on oil exports to the US. On 21 January, Venezuela reported receiving USD 300 million in oil-sale proceeds, representing the first tranche of funds linked to President Trump’s 50-million-barrel oil supply deal with Caracas, likely indicating that US pressure and interdiction operations are beginning to shape Venezuelan oil flows, likely to the detriment of China and Iran.

Clashes between FARC-dissident groups kill dozens in central Colombia.

On 18 January, Colombian authorities reported that several clashes had occurred between FARC-dissidents in rural areas near El Retorno, in Guaviare department. The clashes killed at least 27 people and injured an unspecified number. “FARC-dissidents” refers to groups that split from the leftist Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) after the group’s 2016 peace deal with the government. The two groups involved in the clashes are the Central General Staff (EMC), led by Iván Mordisco, and the General Staff of Blocs and Fronts (EMBF), led by Calarca Cordoba. The Guaviare area is a key cocaine production and trafficking hub, and violence in the area has intensified since mid-2024, after the EMBF split from EMC.

Colombia is currently undergoing a period of increased violence linked with the end of President Gustavo Petro’s “total peace” approach to dealing with organised criminal groups and militias. Furthermore, Colombia is highly likely to be negatively impacted by the recent US operation that removed Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro from power. If Colombia’s cartels, many of which have historic ties with the Venezuelan regime, feel that they are being directly threatened, or if the post-Maduro Chavista government – which appears to have adopted a more conciliatory tone towards the US – carries out operations that could disrupt Colombian cartels’ operations and sources of revenue, they are likely to increase their operational tempo. Less revenue would also likely increase the risk of inter-cartel violent competition.

Flash flooding kills one in Arequipa, Peru.

On 19 January, Peruvian media reported that one person had been killed by flash floods caused by heavy rains in the Arequipa region, in Peru’s south. According to the Regional Emergency Operations Committee (COER), the rains also affected more than 100 homes and caused disruptions on more than 50 kilometres of roads. Local weather forecast services have noted that the rains are likely to continue at least until 23 January in the city of Arequipa, meaning that further flooding and mudslides remain likely.

Following the declaration of a state of emergency in Ukraine’s energy sector, due to a Russian campaign of strikes against energy infrastructure as temperatures have dropped to as low as -19 degrees Celsius, authorities have announced that Kyiv’s schools will remain shut until February. Overnight 19-20 January, Russian forces conducted another large-scale wave of strikes with 34 missiles and 339 attack drones/decoys, primarily targeting energy infrastructure in Kyiv Oblast. Ukraine’s largest private energy investor, DTEK, stated that 173,000 households were left without power in Kyiv City, with power outages also reported in the oblasts of Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk, Sumy, Rivne, and Kharkiv. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on 16 January that Ukraine’s air defence systems were suffering from a shortage of interceptor missiles until a “substantial package” arrived earlier that day.

European allies announced several measures to assist Ukraine during the energy crisis on 16 January, including a Finnish military aid package valued at USD 114 million, unspecified combat aircraft capable of interception from the Czech Republic, USD 26.7 million from the UK to assist with repairs to Ukrainian energy, and 80 industrial boilers from Italy. Zelensky did not initially intend to travel to the World Economic Forum (WEF) annual meeting in Davos, Switzerland, due to the water and energy crisis. However, US President Donald Trump stated that he will meet Zelensky at Davos on 22 January.

The Trump administration’s posturing over Greenland and a potential transatlantic rift proved to be a highly prominent topic at Davos, with the Secretary General of Greenland, Mark Rutte, urging that the main issue should instead be Ukraine. US envoy Steve Witkoff and President Trump’s advisor and son-in-law Jared Kushner are expected to meet Putin in Moscow on 22 January, following a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s envoy Kirill Dmitriev on 20 January in Davos.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The Kremlin has almost certainly sought to exploit the Greenland issue to foster further divisions between Europe and the US, in aid of a longer-standing strategic objective to condition a transatlantic rift in aid of its war against Ukraine, and more broadly, competition with European NATO members. Statements from Moscow initially issued firm rejections of allegations of territorial designs on Greenland, which Trump has used to bolster his claim to the Arctic territory, but likely sensing an opportunity to divide NATO, the Kremlin has since signalled favourability towards Trump’s ambitions. The Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov stated that “Trump will certainly go down in [world] history” if the US incorporates Greenland, and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated that “Greenland is not a natural part of Denmark” and “is a colonial conquest” and compared Greenland’s importance to US security to that of illegally occupied Crimea for Russia.

The renewal of direct US negotiations with Putin, with Witkoff and Kushner’s visit to Moscow, will be the first such meeting in nearly two months. In the past two months, the ’20-point peace plan’ has progressed with Kyiv broadly agreeing to the proposal. However, the proposal’s answers to the two most contentious issues, security guarantees and territorial concessions, are highly unlikely to be acceptable to Moscow. It is overall unlikely that the current diplomacy will lead to peace in the short term. There remains a fundamental contradiction between Kyiv’s desire for sovereignty, which necessarily requires credible security guarantees given Russian aggression, and Moscow’s maximalist objectives to address what it perceives as “root causes” for the conflict. However, the Kremlin will almost certainly continue its attempts to ward off US pressure by nominally engaging in negotiations and attempting to portray Kyiv as the primary obstacle to peace.

The situation in Ukraine remains critical due to the impact of the strikes against energy infrastructure that have coincided with a cold snap. Freezing temperatures and a lack of heating for several days in a row threaten a humanitarian catastrophe in cities like Kyiv, and Kyiv’s mayor, Vitali Klitschko, previously urged residents who can temporarily leave the city for places with alternative sources of power and heat to do so. However, the 19-20 January strikes do indicate considerably improved interception rates, which are highly likely linked to the delivery of interceptor munitions. 14 out of 18 Iskander-M ballistic missiles / S-300 air defence missiles and 13 out of 15 Kh-101 cruise missiles were reported to have been intercepted in the overnight strikes. This is a much higher interception rate than has been observed recently. For example, the overnight 12-13  January strikes only saw a reported two out of 18 Iskander-M/S-300s and five of seven Iskander-Ks intercepted.

Ukrainian air defences almost certainly struggle to intercept ballistic missiles, as, excluding the SAMP/T, which is less numerous, the Patriot air defence system is Ukraine’s only reliable method of consistently intercepting ballistic missiles. The previous interceptor shortage, which has now been confirmed by Zelensky following a substantial delivery of interceptors, was almost certainly most acute with Patriot PAC-3 MSE missile interceptors. PAC-3 MSEs cost approximately USD 4 million each, and a single interception can require two to four interceptors (much more for hypersonic missiles), and Ukraine has been highly reliant on US supply (now done through purchases by European allies) for the advanced interceptors. There is a realistic possibility that the currently unfolding diplomacy will lead to the Trump administration again using the sale of critical military aid, including interceptors, as a means to compel Kyiv to agree to greater concessions.

Heavy fighting in northeast Syria between transitional government forces and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) has continued, with the government offensive resulting in the SDF having withdrawn from nearly half of its previously held territory. On 18 January, the President Ahmed al-Sharaa-led government announced the agreement of a ceasefire with the SDF, which would involve SDF withdrawal from areas west of the Euphrates River. Government forces then captured Al-Tabqa and its dam, Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor, and seized the Raqqa, Conoco and Omar gas and oil fields.

Notably, the areas which the SDF withdrew from have Arab majority populations, and many of the local Arab tribes which were previously under SDF control have reportedly defected to the transitional government. For example, 4,500 fighters from the SDF Sanadid Forces unit, which consists of members of the Shammar tribe, reportedly defected.

The announced ceasefire followed a meeting with the US Special Envoy to Syria, Tom Barrack, in Damascus, which was not attended by the SDF commander-in-chief, Mazloum Abdi, due to weather conditions, according to al-Sharaa. The ceasefire rapidly fell apart with renewed clashes, with Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) inmates escaping from Shaddadeh prison, previously managed by the SDF. Syria’s Interior Ministry claims that 120 detainees escaped, with 81 recaptured, while Kurdish forces stated that 1,500 detainees had escaped. Moreover, the SDF withdrew from the al-Hol camp on 20 January, which houses relatives of ISIS members, and fighting occurred in the vicinity of the Aqtan ISIS detention facility near Raqqa.

On the evening of 20 January, a new four-day ceasefire was announced, with agreement that the SDF would have four days to conduct consultations on the integration of its territory and fighters under the control of the state, and that government forces would not enter the Kurdish-majority cities of Hassakeh and Qamishli, or Kurdish villages. On 21 January, US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced a new mission to transfer ISIS detainees from northeastern Syria to a “secure location” in Iraq. CENTCOM reported the successful transfer of 150 detainees already, with up to 7,000 more to follow.

Solace Global Assessment: 

During and subsequent to the rapid Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)-led lightning offensive in late 2024 that overthrew the Assad regime, months of fighting occurred between the SDF and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA). The fighting stopped with a US-French mediated deal that agreed to integrate the SDF into the new Syrian military. The proposed implementation proved highly challenging due to key issues such as the degree of autonomy that would be maintained as separate divisions and the status of the Kurdish female fighters in the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ).

Issues with the negotiations, and likely also pressure from Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)-aligned hardliners, led to previous outbreaks of clashes in Aleppo. Following the Aleppo clashes in October 2025, breakthroughs were made with an agreement to integrate the SDF with three divisions and several independent battalions by the end of 2025.

However, this deadline passed, and hardliners in the SDF reportedly hampered Abdi’s efforts to implement the agreement. The SDF is a coalition and requires approval from multiple elements in the group, and it is highly likely that this conditioned the refusal of some SDF units to abide by the terms of several ceasefires in Aleppo earlier in January 2026. Following the loss of almost half its previous territory, the SDF is now highly vulnerable, and the new integration proposal, as per the four-day ceasefire, involves SDF members joining the Syrian military as individuals.

Abdi requires four days for the consultations with other SDF-affiliated leaders, and it will almost certainly prove to be challenging to convince many Kurdish leaders to make such a significant concession for integration. However, the scale of the losses to the government offensive presents a potentially existential threat to Kurdish autonomy and security, although the four days will allow SDF forces to consolidate defences in its remaining Kurdish-majority strongholds, and the SDF has lost major leverage in negotiations due to the loss of Syria’s gas and oil fields.

Fundamentally, al-Sharaa and his transitional government maintain a key strategic objective of gaining centralised control over all of Syria. Al-Sharaa has criticised the results of ethnoreligious power-sharing agreements and/or federalism in countries like Lebanon and Iraq, and almost certainly has a red line of either implementing a federal system in Syria or granting semi-autonomy to Kurdish forces, as in Iraq with the Kurdistan Region and Peshmerga, which has highly likely been the key desire of the SDF.

Kurdish populations in the wider region have at various times suffered significant abuses, discrimination, and ethnic cleansing, which almost certainly factors into significant concerns from SDF leaders over the potential threat posed by losing their autonomous security capabilities. Accusations of intercommunal violence and extrajudicial killings have already been made amid the offensive, from both the SDF and government forces. Without sufficiently addressing these concerns in a hypothetical takeover of Kurdish Syria, the transition government likely risks triggering an insurgency by Kurdish militants.

The SDF served as the US’s key partner in Syria in the campaign against ISIS, and the SDF has continued to regularly conduct counterinsurgency operations with US support and guarded the detention facilities and camps housing ISIS members, supporters and family members. The collapse of the SDF in these areas risks fuelling a resurgence in ISIS, and the security of the ISIS prisons and camps is almost certainly a critical interest for Washington. In November 2025, Syria joined the anti-ISIS coalition during a visit by al-Sharaa to Washington, and US and transitional government forces now regularly collaborate in anti-ISIS operations.

The transitional government reportedly proposed the offensive against the SDF weeks ago to the US, with it getting Washington’s blessing, provided Kurdish civilians were protected. The US has almost certainly retracted its longstanding backing of the SDF, with Barrack stating that its “original purpose… as the primary anti-ISIS force on the ground has largely expired”, with Damascus “now both willing and positioned to take over security responsibilities”. However, Syrian government forces are almost certainly a less reliable partner for counterinsurgency against ISIS than the SDF, due to the integration of jihadist fighters into Syrian security forces and rapidly expanded recruitment efforts, increasing defection and infiltration risks, as illustrated by the December 2025 Palmyra ISIS attack in which a member of Syria’s Internal Security forces killed three US personnel.

Credible estimates indicate that the death toll in the Iran protests is now confirmed at almost 5,000, including 500 members of Iran’s security forces. with over 9,000 further cases under review. However, some opposition-linked estimates place the death toll closer to 20,000, with security forces also conducting internal security operations against separatist movements in areas like Kurdistan and Balochistan.

The regime has maintained a near-total internet blackout, severely limiting independent verification and situational awareness, signalling its intent to prioritise internal control over economic and reputational costs, although Iran has pledged to restore internet by 23 January. The regime has yet to execute any protestors, but Iranian officials continue to threaten harsh punishments and have begun expropriating assets from individuals participating in or supporting the protest movement.

President Trump has prevaricated publicly, initially praising the regime for the suspension of executions but then directly calling for regime change in response to accusations that the US is fomenting unrest, and has signalled that “help is on its way”. The US force posture in the region remains significantly lower than during the June 2025 12-Day War, but is gradually being augmented.

The USS Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group (CSG) transited the Malacca Strait on 20 January and is assessed to arrive in theatre around 24 January, significantly expanding US strike and deterrence capabilities in the region. The US Air Force has also forward deployed 12 F-15 fighter aircraft, supported by four KC-135 Stratotanker aerial refuelling aircraft, to Jordan from the UK. Washington is deploying further Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) and Patriot air-defence systems to the region to strengthen layered air defence capabilities.

Israel’s Defense Establishment has also raised the alert level ahead of any possible US strikes on Iran, anticipating that retaliatory strikes would target Israeli territory, and has refused to rule out a scenario in which the Israel Air Force (IAF) would strike targets in Iran in response to missile fire. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warned on 19 January that Israel would respond with unprecedented force if Iran were to attack

Iran’s foreign minister warned that Tehran would retaliate without restraint against any military attack, stating that, unlike in June 2025, Iran would respond with “everything we have,” with many of Iran’s shorter-range missiles that can’t reach Israel but are in range of US Gulf Bases, not used during the previous round of hostilities. Kataib Hezbollah, an Iranian-backed Shia militia in Iraq, has also warned that it will attack US regional bases if the US strikes Iran. The Gulf States have continued to urge the US to prioritise negotiation and restraint over strikes. A senior member of Qatar’s ruling family, Khalid bin Jassim Al Thani, reportedly warned the US that its presence at Al-Udeid Air Base is conditional, framing US forces as “tenants” rather than permanent stakeholders.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The Trump administration is likely trying to maintain strategic ambiguity by balancing military reinforcement with inconsistent public messaging. Trump’s prevaricating rhetoric is consistent with his established pattern of maintaining strategic ambiguity, allowing the US to exert pressure while preserving freedom of action, without committing to immediate large-scale military operations. The halting of strikes has also provided more opportunity for diplomatic breakthroughs or for the protests to subside, decreasing the immediacy of US intervention. However, these developments are unlikely to remove the underlying drivers of tensions or new developments, such as executions or renewed repression, which could rapidly lead to escalation.

While the impending arrival of a US CSG, combined with an uplift in aerial capabilities and air defences, will almost certainly increase the US strike and deterrence in the region, it remains significantly lower than during the June 2025 12-Day War, when the US had two CSGs in CENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR) and one in EUCOM’s AOR, as well as a large-scale forward deployment of fighter aircraft and other naval assets. The deployment of 12 F-15s to Jordan alongside tanker aerial refuelling aircraft does provide the US with enhanced operational flexibility, including the ability to sustain persistent combat air patrols, increase air and missile defence, particularly in support of Israel, and conduct rapid, limited strike options if required. However, the deployment lacks the mass of 2025 and may be linked to counter-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) operations, with the US formally withdrawing all military assets except a few advisors from Iraq in mid-January.

The further deployment of CSGs and a substantial surge in land-based combat aircraft, including the forward positioning of bomber task forces, would serve as clear indicators and warnings of the US transitioning from deterrence and contingency planning toward a decision to initiate potentially large-scale and sustained military operations against Iran. However, unlike in 2025, there is no clear military objective in the form of Iran’s nuclear programme. There are currently no clear indications of what the military objective could be, with rumours ranging from the degradation of Iran’s internal security apparatus to broader efforts aimed at regime change. The lack of a clear objective significantly complicates escalation management and increases the risk of miscalculation, especially as there is currently no formal communication channel open between Washington and Tehran. The risk of miscalculation has likely further increased as Iran is conducting nationwide air-defence exercises and is increasing readiness across its forces.

Should the US commit to direct military action against an Iranian regime that is already under acute internal pressure and increasingly isolated, there is a high likelihood of a strong and multi-domain Iranian retaliation involving regional proxy forces. Iran’s most likely course of action would be to reassert deterrence and regime credibility through a combination of direct missile and UAV strikes on US bases. Tehran likely calculates that the risk of a large-scale US ground intervention is low and that such a response would increase pressure on Washington from its Gulf allies and potentially jeopardise Washington’s long-term military footprint in the region. Attacks on Israel are also likely; however, if calibrated to demonstrate capability rather than overwhelm Israeli air defences, there is a realistic possibility of limited Israeli retaliation, as demonstrated by Israel’s restrained and largely symbolic response to Iran’s April 2024 missile and UAV attack.

Continuous heavy rainfall has triggered widespread flooding in Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and South Africa. In Zimbabwe, over 70 people have been killed, 51 injured, and more than 1,000 homes destroyed since the beginning of January. Floodwaters and ongoing rainfall in southern Zimbabwe are feeding rivers that flow into Mozambique, worsening conditions downstream.

In Mozambique, at least 103 people have died, with over 200,000 people affected by the flooding nationwide. More than 513,000 people were affected across Gaza, Inhambane, Maputo, and Sofala provinces, with the cities of Xai-Xai, Chokwe, Boane, and Maputo affected. Over 50,000 have been evacuated. The government issued a red alert on 16 January after the death toll passed 100 since the start of the rainy season. According to the Minister of Transport and Logistics, approximately 40 per cent of Gaza province had been submerged by water, 152 kilometres of roads had been destroyed, and over 3,000 kilometres of roads were damaged. Approximately 173,000 acres of farmland are waterlogged, according to the World Food Programme (WFP).

In South Africa, the provinces of Limpopo and Mpumalanga have been the worst affected, with the towns of Phalaborwa and Graskop. At least 30 people have died, and over 1,600 homes and 31 schools have been damaged. Kruger National Park, one of Africa’s largest wildlife reserves, was closed after several private reserves near the park were cut off by floodwaters, prompting the evacuation of over 600 visitors. South African authorities declared the floods a national disaster on 19 January. The South African National Defence Force deployed two helicopters to assist with rescue operations and evacuations.

Flooding has also reportedly hit Tanzania, Madagascar, Malawi, and Zambia. According to the US’s Famine Early Warning System, flooding is also likely in northern Botswana.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The heavy rainfall has been triggered by a slow-moving low-pressure system that has been linked to La Niña. La Niña is a climate pattern characterised by cooler-than-average sea surface temperatures in the central and eastern equatorial Pacific Ocean. During La Niña events, there is typically above-average rainfall over southern and eastern Africa, more frequent and intense multi-day rain events, and a higher overall flood risk.

The flooding is highly likely to result in severe economic damage. According to some estimates, the Mozambique government faces a cost of 6.6 billion meticais (77 million GBP) to provide humanitarian assistance, support displaced people, and supply health services and food to accommodation centres. It is highly likely that the government will be largely dependent on aid from neighbouring countries.

The flooded farmland will almost certainly exacerbate the long-term economic damage. The most affected crops include maize, rice, beans, cassava, and sweet potatoes: key staples for household consumption and local markets; livestock and fisheries have also been affected. Zimbabwe and South Africa have been similarly affected by the flooding, with approximately 180 million GPB in damages in Limpopo province alone. The flooding will highly likely exacerbate poverty levels in the region and increase the need for international aid.

The flooding has almost certainly increased the risk of water-borne, vector-borne, and sanitation-related diseases. The contamination of water sources and damage to sanitation infrastructure will highly likely exacerbate the spread of cholera, particularly in Zimbabwe, which has had recurring cholera outbreaks in recent years. E. coli, Shigella, and other pathogens are likely to also spread, increasing diarrhoeal disease cases. Standing water from floods also creates ideal mosquito breeding conditions, which is likely to increase cases of malaria in the coming weeks.

Heavy rainfall is still ongoing in the region, which is likely to further exacerbate the humanitarian situation. Given the saturation of the ground, it is likely to not take much rainfall to trigger further instances of flooding over the coming weeks.

French Prime Minister Sébastien Lecornu forces 2026 budget through, likely triggering unrest.

On 19 January, Lecornu announced that he would use Article 49.3 of the constitution to enact a budget for 2026 without a parliamentary vote. The decision triggered a vote of no confidence, which is scheduled for 23 January. The vote is unlikely to pass, as Lecornu secured the last-minute backing of the Socialist Party (PS), whose leader pledged not to vote against the government after it agreed to significant “concessions” in the budget. On the other hand, both the far-right National Rally (RN) and far-left France Unbowed (LFI) parties have called for the government to be toppled. Lecornu’s decision breaks with the prime minister’s previous pledge not to invoke Article 49.3. Moreover, PS’s backing of the government represents a major break in the left-wing front. Both factors contribute to increasing the likelihood of civil unrest led by left-wing groups in Paris following the no-confidence vote, particularly in the 23-25 January period.

EU-Mercosur trade deal delayed amid large-scale protests in France and Belgium.

On 17 January, EU and Latin American officials representing the countries of the Mercosur trade block signed a long-debated trade deal in Asunción, Paraguay. The deal lowers trade barriers across several key sectors and would eventually entail the phasing out of 90 per cent of tariffs on EU exports to the bloc. In Europe, the deal has sparked severe protests by farmers’ unions, who worry about the potential impact of competition by Mercosur agricultural producers. Protests, which had been going on for weeks in France and Belgium, continued following the signing. In Strasbourg, farmers clashed with police as they tried to breach the perimeter of the EU Parliament on 20 January. In Brussels, farmers staged an airport blockade between 15 and 17 January. Days prior, on 12 January, Ostend-Bruges airport had also been blockaded.

On 21 January, the EU Parliament narrowly voted, thanks to a last-minute joint effort by the left, greens, and right, to refer the agreement to the EU Court of Justice. This development is highly likely to result in a significant delay in the deal’s implementation, as the Court can take years to deliver similar opinions. This late development, which is a significant win for agricultural sector unions, is likely to reduce the immediate likelihood of further farmers’ protests, which have caused significant traffic disruptions in European capitals. Nevertheless, further parliamentary decisions and deliberations regarding the EU-Mercosur agreement remain likely to constitute causes of unrest. For example, if the deal were to be applied provisionally before the Court’s decision, as some MPs and leaders have suggested, this would almost certainly result in unrest in countries that have a strong farmers’ protest movement, like Belgium, France, and the Netherlands.

Multiple pro-Kurdish protests observed in several European cities.

The hostilities in Syria between Kurdish and government forces (see main Syria piece) have resulted in several pro-Kurdish protests across Europe since 20 January. In France, police fired tear gas to disperse pro-Kurdish protesters near Paris’ Place des Invalides. In Germany, where there are an estimated 1.3 million members of the Kurdish diaspora, protests have occurred in Hannover, Stuttgart, Aachen, Frankfurt, Bremen, Düsseldorf, Münster and Dortmund, where a Syrian restaurant was attacked, and several police officers were injured, with several of the protests attracting thousands of participants. Pepper spray was also used in Winterthur, Switzerland, after protestors gathered outside the main train station, and protests were also staged in Basel. In Turkey, where the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) have only recently agreed to dissolve, large-scale protests have occurred in the southeast, and Kurdish parties have warned that violence against Kurdish groups in Syria threatens ongoing peace efforts within Turkey and have organised marches. Further demonstrations in response to the situation are highly likely, with large-scale protests likely on the weekend of 24-25 January, unless a resolution is reached.

Bulgarian parliament appoints a new prime minister, president resigns.

On 15 January, Bulgarian lawmakers voted to re-appoint Rosen Zhelyazkov, of the centre-right GERB party, as the country’s new prime minister. Days later, on 19 January, President Rumen Radev resigned from his position, and is set to be replaced by acting Vice President Iliyana Yotova. The two developments are the most significant since the December anti-government protests that toppled the previous Zhelyazkov government, sparking a month-long political deadlock.

On 1 January, Bulgaria officially joined the eurozone and the Schengen Area, the former move being extremely controversial and opposed by large sections of the population. Zhelyazkov, who has the support of a broad coalition of centre-right, liberal, and left-wing lawmakers, has positioned himself as a pro-EU figure. On the other hand, Radev’s resignation has led analysts to speculate that he will seek to form a party to capture the Eurosceptic vote. It is highly likely that these moves will shape the campaign for the upcoming parliamentary elections, which are expected to occur in 2026. The 2026 vote will be the eighth snap election in Bulgaria since 2021, demonstrating the country’s high levels of political instability.

Trump offers to mediate GERD dispute between Egypt and Ethiopia.

On 16 January, US President Donald Trump posted on his social media a letter he sent to Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, which stated, “I am ready to restart ⁠U.S. mediation between ⁠Egypt and Ethiopia to responsibly resolve the ⁠question of ‘The Nile Water Sharing’ once and for all.” El-Sisi responded by stating that Egypt is committed to “serious and constructive cooperation with the Nile Basin countries, based on the principles of international law, in a manner that achieves shared interests without causing harm to any party.”

The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) was inaugurated on 9 September 2025 and has long been a point of contention between Egypt and Sudan, on the one hand, and Ethiopia on the other, with Cairo perceiving the dam upstream of the Nile as a threat to the country’s access to its water source. There have been numerous mediation attempts over the last decade, including during Trump’s first term, all of which have failed. Trump’s previous backing of Egypt in the dispute, with suggestions that Cairo could “blow up that dam”, as well as Ethiopia’s support from other upstream states, which fail to recognise the colonial-era laws Egypt typically falls back on over the GERD, are unlikely to compel Ethiopia to compromise.

Opposition leader in hiding following incumbent president’s victory in Ugandan election.

On 17 January, incumbent President Yoweri Museveni was declared the winner in the Ugandan general elections, securing 72 per cent of the vote. Bobi Wine, Museveni’s primary challenger, secured 24 per cent of the vote. Wine rejected the results as fraudulent, accusing the electoral commission of ballot-stuffing, and has gone into hiding amid concerns for his safety. On 19 January, Museveni’s son and successor and Uganda’s army chief, General Muhoozi Kainerugaba, posted on X that Wine had “exactly 48 hours to surrender himself to the police”. Kainerugaba also added that the military has “killed 22 NUP terrorists since last week” and that he is “praying the 23^rd is Kabobi” (Wine). Aside from some sporadic violence after polling closed, widespread protests have not materialised, despite Wine’s calls for demonstrations. Many Ugandans are highly likely to be wary of security forces, who would almost certainly severely crack down on demonstrations. The civil unrest risk almost certainly increases over the weekend, and there is a realistic possibility of protests around 24 January.

Europol dismantles international synthetic drug trafficking network.

On 21 January, the transnational police agency Europol reported having carried out what it described as its “largest ever” operation, dismantling a transnational network engaged in the manufacturing and distribution of synthetic drugs. The operation involved officers from six European countries and resulted in the arrest of 85 individuals. According to Europol, the network secured shipments of large quantities of synthetic drug precursors from China and India, and subsequently distributed them across dozens of laboratories. According to the European Union Drugs Agency (EUDA), 2025 was marked by “increased production [of synthetic drugs] within Europe”. Moreover, EUDA adds, seizures of precursor chemicals have significantly increased, from an average of 54 tonnes in the decade up to 2022, to 178 tonnes in 2023.

Israeli forces occupy and partly demolish UNRWA HQ in East Jerusalem.

On 20 January, Israel Defence Forces (IDF) units occupied and partially bulldozed structures of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) in East Jerusalem. The move represents the most serious crackdown on UNRWA operations since the October 2024 passing of legislation by the Knesset barring UNRWA from operating in Israel. Israeli officials have justified the seizure by arguing that UNRWA collaborates with Hamas, which UN officials deny.

Bandits abduct 177 worshippers from three churches in northwest Nigeria.

On 18 January, an armed gang seized 177 people from three churches in Kurmin Wali village in northern Kaduna state. 11 people later escaped. Nigerian police initially denied the attack amid growing pressure on the government to deal with banditry, but amended their statement on 19 January, confirming the raid and claiming their statement had been “widely misinterpreted”. Security forces have reportedly been deployed to the area to conduct search-and-rescue operations and patrols.

This is the latest in a series of kidnappings in northwest and central Nigeria, which has been matched by a recent increase in security operations with the assistance of US intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. On 21 January, Nigerian troops rescued 62 hostages and killed two militants in separate operations in Kebbi and Zamfara states. There is currently no confirmation whether the 62 hostages were part of the 177 taken from Kurmin Wali village.

RSF conducts drone strikes in El Obeid, Sudan.

On 21 January, the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) intensified drone strikes in and around El Obeid in central Sudan. El Obeid is the capital of North Kordofan state and has remained under the control of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), who broke the RSF’s prolonged siege of the city in February 2025. Kordofan has come under increased attacks after the RSF captured El Fasher from the SAF on 26 October 2025, with the group conducting weekly drone attacks on El Obeid and taking over towns and villages across the region. The RSF has not yet approached El Obeid, but a resumption of the siege on the city is highly likely in the coming months. As the RSF approaches the city, they will highly likely increasingly target healthcare and humanitarian convoys to attempt to increase pressure on the SAF.

Large troop buildup in Bor, South Sudan, amid escalating fighting.

On 21 January, heavy Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) troop deployments were reported in Bor, the capital of Jonglei State, with long convoys of soldiers witnessed arriving in the city. The deployments are reportedly in preparation for an imminent offensive against positions held by the Sudan People’s Liberation Army in Opposition (SPLA-IO) in Akobo County. According to reports citing security sources, the redeployment serves to secure Bor from potential attacks and to stage grounds for an offensive into opposition-held territory.

The troop movements come amid fighting along several fronts, having intensified in Jonglei, Upper Nile, Unity, and Central Equatoria states in recent weeks. It is highly likely that this threatens a return to full-scale civil war in South Sudan amid an ongoing collapse in the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS), a power-sharing agreement negotiated in 2018 to end the previous fighting. While the agreement technically remains in place, the numerous violations, including the March 2025 arrest of Vice President and SPLM-IO (the political wing of the SPLA-IO) leader Reik Machar, and return to fighting between the SPLA and SPLA-IO make its full collapse likely imminent.

Congolese forces regain control of Uvira in South Kivu.

On 18 January, the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) retook the South Kivu city of Uvira following the Rwanda-backed AFC/M23 militant group’s withdrawal. The pro-government Wazalendo militias reportedly entered the southern districts of Uvira first, closely followed by elements of the Congolese special forces. FARDC spokesperson Mak Hazukay declared that the city had been recaptured on 19 January, announcing a plan for the gradual restoration of state authority following the arrest of around 20 civilians involved in looting. AFC/M23’s stated reason for the withdrawal was to give peace efforts in the region a chance, and that it would place Uvira “under the full responsibility of the United Nations and the international community”.

Two train crashes kill 43, injure hundreds, in Adamuz and Barcelona, Spain.

On 18 January, a high-speed train from Málaga to Madrid derailed near Adamuz, Córdoba province. Seconds later, three carriages of the train, which had ended on the opposite track, were hit by another train, travelling from Madrid to Huelva. The impact killed at least 41 people and injured around 300, making it the deadliest train accident in Spain in a decade.

Days later, on 20 January, another train accident occurred in Gelida, near Barcelona. A retaining wall reportedly collapsed on the track of the R4 line, hitting a train travelling from Gelida to Sant Sadurní d’Anoia. The driver was killed in the accident, and 37 people were injured.

Authorities have launched investigations into both accidents. Regarding the Adamuz crash, authorities have stated that they have ruled out human error. Instead, their early findings reportedly suggest that a faulty joint could have caused the derailment of the Málaga-Madrid train. However, Transport Minister Oscar Puente stated that the segment of the track where the crash occurred had been renovated less than a year ago.

The two accidents will almost certainly attract significant political scrutiny. On 21 January, train drivers’ unions announced a strike – without selecting a date – in response to the incident. There is a realistic possibility that, as the investigations advance, the crashes will become a cause of civil unrest, as observed in the case of the 2023 Tempi train crash in Greece.

Storm Harry causes flooding in Western Mediterranean, Malta.

On 16 January, the Spanish State Meteorological Agency (AEMET) named Storm Harry, which had developed as a low-pressure area over the Iberian Peninsula. The storm moved eastwards during the reporting period, causing heavy rains in Catalonia, the Pyrenees, and subsequently Sardinia, Sicily, and Malta. Both Spanish and Italian authorities issued red alerts for rain in the affected area on 20 January. Record-high rainfall was also recorded in coastal parts of Tunisia, resulting in widespread flooding and killing at least five people. Flight disruptions have been recorded across several European airports, particularly Malta International Airport, due to the storm. It is highly likely that severely affected regions, including Sicily and northern Tunisia, will continue to face widespread travel disruptions due to the infrastructural damage caused by the storm.

On 19 January, a militant affiliated with the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) at a Chinese-run hotel restaurant in the Shahr-e-Naw neighbourhood of Kabul. One Chinese national and six Afghans were killed, and several more were injured. The ISKP has claimed the attack. The blast, which occurred in an area of Kabul that is generally considered “safe” and has a large presence of businesses and hotels catering to foreigners, was almost certainly aimed at killing Chinese citizens.

Solace Global Assessment: 

China has, since the Taliban came to power in 2021, greatly increased its commercial and political ties to Afghanistan, while simultaneously also heavily investing in Pakistan. However, with the spread of Beijing’s economic footprint in the region, several transnational and local militant groups have increasingly prioritised targeting Chinese nationals and assets. These include not only religiously-motivated extremist groups like ISKP, but also nationalist and separatist forces, such as the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA).

Over the past decade, Chinese nationals have been increasingly designated as desirable targets by Islamist-jihadist groups, including the Islamic State. This has been partly linked with long-standing ideological opposition to the Communist Party of China and to Beijing’s ongoing policy of internment of Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang and crackdown on religiosity (these were cited by ISKP channels as their justification for the Kabul attack). However, the increase in propaganda targeting Chinese citizens and assets is also likely reflective of Beijing’s increasingly visible presence abroad.

The sharp rise in attacks targeting Chinese citizens internationally has almost certainly prompted Beijing to take risk mitigation measures. For example, in early January, Chinese officials agreed with their Pakistani counterparts on the creation of dedicated Special Protection Units (SPUs) dedicated to ensuring the safety of Chinese assets. Following the Kabul attack, the Chinese Foreign Ministry reportedly “formally requested” that the Taliban government take measures to protect Chinese nationals.

Sources from within the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), Thailand’s largest and most active insurgent group, have warned that while the group does not reject the upcoming 8 February elections, it is likely to conduct attacks like arson, shootings and bombings to remind political parties of the BRN’s demands for self-government in the predominantly Muslim regions in the Deep South. The warning follows a series of coordinated detonations at 11 different petrol stations in the provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat on 11 January, which injured four people and caused extensive property damage. The attacks have yet to be officially claimed by the BRN but have been widely linked to the insurgent group and match the BRN’s previous tactics. The Thai military has since increased security in the region, closing all border crossings with Malaysia except key permanent border trade checkpoints, and has tightened all immigration processes.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The previous attacks and recent warning were likely aimed at sending a signal to Thailand’s main political parties not to overlook the insurgency and local issues during this upcoming electoral cycle. Insurgents in Thailand’s Deep South have traditionally increased the scale and frequency of attacks during electoral cycles to raise visibility, exert pressure on political actors, and shape national policy attention toward the region. However, this electoral cycle is likely to be dominated by anti-corruption and institutional reform, economic issues and the current border conflict with Cambodia. These issues have likely subordinated separatist concerns within the national political discourse, likely increasing the incentive for insurgent groups to conduct high-visibility and disruptive attacks.

Insurgent attacks during electoral cycles have traditionally been contained to the Deep South, and there is no clear precedent of violence migrating to other parts of Thailand during elections. Furthermore, the Thai military has increased its security deployments to disrupt attacks in this region and is also likely to limit the risk of spillover into other parts of Thailand. However, the discovery of 11 improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in July 2025 at prominent Thai tourist locations, including Phuket, Phang Nga and Krabi, was heavily linked to the BRN, with the number 11- whether reflective of a number of devices, attacks or as a date- often featured in BRN operations, potentially as an attribution marker. This plot, combined with past operations like the 2016 bombings, which targeted tourist areas like Hua Hin and Surat Thani, demonstrates that while uncommon, insurgent groups retain the capability and intent to conduct attacks outside their traditional area of operations, and that attacks outside of the Deep South cannot be fully discounted in the run-up to the 8 February election.

Former South Korean prime minister sentenced to 23 years in martial law case.

On 21 January, former South Korean Prime Minister Han Duck-soo was sentenced to 23 years on charges including insurrection, for his role during former President Yoon Suk Yeol’s declaration of martial law in December 2024. Prosecutors had originally sought 15 years for Han, although the verdict is likely to be challenged in the Supreme Court. Former President Yoon, who has already been sentenced to five years after being found guilty of multiple charges, is set to face trial on insurrection charges in February 2026, with the prosecution seeking the death penalty.

Japan’s Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi dissolves parliament, calls general election.

On 19 January, Takaichi dissolved the House of Representatives, fixing a snap election for 8 February. The political gamble is almost certainly motivated by Takaichi’s assessment that her Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) needs a stronger mandate to govern. Current polls indicate that the LDP has around 28 per cent support. While, if confirmed at the ballot box, this would be an improvement over the disastrous 24.4 per cent won by the party at the July 2025 parliamentary elections, such a result would still fall short of granting the LDP a parliamentary majority.

Takaichi has, since winning the LDP leadership bid in September 2025, overseen her party’s split with its centrist coalition partner Komeito, replacing it with the right-wing Japan Innovation Party (JIP). JIP is, however, polling at around 3.5 per cent, two and a half points below its 2025 results. Current polls, therefore, place an LDP-JIP coalition on the threshold of obtaining a parliamentary majority with a narrow margin.

Police officer killed during raid near Chattogram, Bangladesh.

On 18 January, Bangladeshi security forces carried out a raid in the Jungle Salimpur area of Sitakund, north of Chattogram. During the raid, the officers were reportedly ambushed by armed gunmen, resulting in the death of one policeman. The incident has sparked significant criticism in Bangladesh, with authorities warning that the area is de facto under the control of organised criminal groups. In 2023 and 2022, attempts by authorities to evict residents of local informal settlements were beaten back following resistance by locals. Approximately 100,000 residents live in informal settlements in the area, this likely complicates policing operations, which must balance efforts to dismantle criminal groups with the risks to bystanders. It is likely that the manpower shortages suffered by Bangladesh’s police force since the 2024 July Revolution have contributed to the spread of these “grey” areas where the government exercises limited control.

At least 60 killed and 20 injured in fire at Gul Plaza in Karachi.

On 18 January, a fire broke out on the ground floor of Gul Plaza in Karachi before quickly spreading to the third floor of the 1,200-shop plaza. The fire was extinguished on 19 January after blazing for around 24 hours. At least 60 people died in the fire, although the state of the remains makes it difficult to determine the exact number. According to Karachi South Deputy Commissioner Javed Nabi Khoso, preliminary data suggests that approximately 50 per cent of the victims were shopkeepers. The cause of the fire is currently unknown. Rescue and recovery operations remain ongoing, and the death toll is highly likely to rise in the coming days.

Cold front results in major transport disruption in northern Japan.

Since 19 January, the Japanese authorities have issued weather warnings for a winter storm forecast to bring heavy snow from 21 January to 25 January, particularly to Hokkaido, Aomori, and areas along the Sea of Japan coast. Dozens of flights to and from airports in Hokkaido and Aomori have been cancelled due to heavy snowfall, affecting over 5,000 passengers. Shinkansen bullet train services were also suspended between Akita and Morioka because of the snow, and high-speed services between Nagoya and Kyoto are running at slower speeds. As of 22 January, delays on train services are reportedly beginning to be resolved.

Multiple beach closures in Australia due to spate of shark attacks.

On 20 January, multiple beaches, including Sydney, closed along Australia’s east coast, following four shark attacks in two days. The first attack left a boy in critical condition after he was bitten at a city beach on 19 January. The second took place that evening, when a surfer in his 20s was bitten and forced to fashion a makeshift tourniquet out of his board’s leg rope. The same day, a shark bit a chunk out of a child’s surfboard, knocking him off it. The final incident occurred on 20 January with a shark biting a man while he was surfing. Heavy rains had left Australia’s waters murky, attracting the suspected bull sharks, which thrive in brackish water and are more likely attack due to being unable to clearly see ahead of them and taking defensive or curious bites if they bump into something. Despite Australia having around 20 shark attacks per year, only three on average are fatal.

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