=On 3 January, US forces conducted Operation Absolute Resolve, a coordinated military and law-enforcement action to capture Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his wife Cilia Flores in Caracas. US special forces, supported by the US Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and intelligence units, executed a pre-dawn raid on the facility housing Maduro, resulting in his successful capture and extraction. The raid was supported by over 150 aircraft from 20 bases and naval assets based in the Western Hemisphere, primarily used to suppress and overwhelm Venezuelan air defences, radars and communication systems with kinetic and non-kinetic effects to cover the low-altitude helicopter insertion and extraction. The issuing of a Notice to Air Mission (NOTAM) by the Federal Aviation Administration was used to cover the operation and limit risk to commercial aircraft, but resulted in short-term but widespread disruption to commercial air traffic in the Caribbean region.

Approximately 75 host-nation fatalities have been recorded, including Venezuelan and Cuban security forces; however, no US forces were killed during the operation. President Donald Trump publicly declared the mission a success, posted images of Maduro aboard the USS Iwo Jima, and asserted that the US would ensure stability in Venezuela during the transition by effectively running the country. Trump also stated that Venezuela will be handing over up to 50 million barrels of oil to the US and that US oversight of Venezuela may last years.

President Maduro and his wife remain in custody in New York pending trial, where both have been indicted in the Southern District of New York on charges relating to narco-terrorism, cocaine importation and the possession of machine guns and destructive devices. The operation has drawn international condemnation from both US allies and adversarial powers, particularly in Latin America, where multiple governments characterised the action as a breach of Venezuelan sovereignty and international law.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The capture of President Maduro likely marks the primary immediate objective of the Trump administration in Venezuela, aimed at removing a sanctioned leader hostile to US interests and one who had enabled adversarial powers like Russia, China and Iran to increase their influence in Washington’s near abroad. With this objective achieved, further US military operations of a similar scale are unlikely in the near term unless there is a major escalation, which remains unlikely due to the US’s force overmatch and Venezuela’s limited capability to retaliate. However, US force posture in the region will likely remain enhanced in the near term in order to deter external interference, enforce sanctions, interdict narcotic shipments, exert influence over Venezuela’s oil reserves and, most importantly, to apply pressure on acting President Delcy Rodríguez, who has immediately assumed power following the capture of Maduro.

Rodríguez has publicly condemned the US operation as a violation of Venezuelan sovereignty and international law, convened a National Defence Council meeting and has demanded the release of Maduro. However, her government remains unstable and under significant pressure from the US. If Rodríguez calculates that Washington’s primary interest now rests in obtaining preferential access to Venezuelan oil, rather than regime change or the combating of illicit networks, her next most likely course of action is to appease Washington by abiding by its demands on energy cooperation, opening Venezuelan oil production and exports to the US in exchange for sanctions relief. This would likely be a significant loss for China, which is the main consumer of heavily discounted Venezuelan oil, and potentially a catastrophic loss for Cuba, which has become structurally dependent on Venezuelan oil.

Within Venezuela, the removal of Maduro will likely embolden demands for a democratic transition. However, if the new regime determines that this is not a genuine primary objective of Washington’s, it will likely seek to consolidate internal control by maintaining the existing Chavista power structures and suppressing any internal dissent, while framing cooperation with the US as necessary for Venezuela’s political and economic stability. This is likely to have no immediate or meaningful effect on domestic democratic reform, corruption, or the running of illicit economies, and will likely increase the risk of internal unrest, detention and repression.

Large-scale protests have been observed across Bolivia since 18 December, when President Rodrigo Paz issued Decree 5503, which removed long-standing government fuel subsidies. The decree, which has been condemned by the political opposition, major labour federations, and transport unions, has effectively doubled the price of petrol and diesel in the country. Since 19 December, multiple protests have been organised, including nationwide strikes and blockades by transport unions, with significant disruption in La Paz, El Alto, Santa Cruz, and Cochabamba. On 22 December, the Central Obrera Boliviana (COB) and affiliated unions, including the National Teachers’ Confederation, the Federation of Miners, and the National Confederation of Transport Workers, formally declared an indefinite, nationwide strike until the decree is repealed by President Paz. Violent confrontations have occurred in La Paz and El Alto, which have included miners using dynamite charges and police deploying tear gas and rubber bullets to disperse crowds. Security forces have also deployed to key transport corridors to remove roadblocks, resulting in several clashes.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The nationwide unrest represents the first major test for newly inaugurated President Paz, whose centre-right Christian Democratic Party (PDC), effectively won control of the executive by default after the fragmentation and electoral collapse of the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS), which had dominated Bolivian politics for nearly two decades. While negotiations are ongoing and the government has indicated it may adjust the decree, it is refusing to repeal the decree, arguing that it is necessary to address Bolivia’s fiscal and economic problems. However, unions, including the COB, have rejected any mitigation and are demanding the full abrogation of the decree, and the immediate repealing of it would likely significantly undermine President Paz’s authority, only weeks into his tenure.

With negotiations stalling and protests already entering their third week, the protests will likely persist for several weeks. The mobilisations are becoming more organised and disruptive, and there is growing participation from Indigenous groups and additional transport unions, increasing the risk of large-scale roadblocks across multiple regions of Bolivia. Furthermore, on 5 January, the executive secretary of the COB announced that, following a national assembly, it was decided that Bolivia’s largest union would implement a nationwide roadblock if Decree 5503 is not repealed.

The Evo Morales-led nationwide roadblocks in 2024, which lasted 17 days, resulted in fuel shortages, reduced exports, price increases, lost productivity and were estimated to have cost around USD 2 billion. This resulted in the mass deployment of police and military forces to reopen key transport corridors, resulting in multiple violent clashes and deaths on both sides. With the imposition of roadblocks likely to significantly increase, Bolivia likely faces an elevated risk of violent unrest and economic disruption until a substantive compromise is achieved.

US rhetoric on Greenland increases tensions with Europe.

On 4 January, following the raid that led to the capture of Venezuelan President Maduro, US President Donald Trump returned to call for the US to annex Greenland. The remarks were followed by a similar rhetoric by other high-ranking members of the administration, and provoked a sharp rebuke by several European states, particularly following hints that the US would not rule out the use of military force to establish control over the island. It is highly unlikely that the US would attempt to seize Greenland militarily, and the apparent threats are likely aimed at improving Washington’s position before possible negotiations with Denmark. The high profile of the diplomatic spat, and the fact that it involves US NATO allies are likely to drive some limited protests near US diplomatic offices in Europe. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio is set to meet Danish officials next week after Denmark and Greenland requested urgent meetings in response to President Trump’s comments. Rubio is expected to discuss pathways for the US acquisition of Greenland.

High likelihood of civil unrest following fatal shooting by immigration enforcement in Minneapolis, US.

On 7 January, a woman was fatally shot by an Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agent in Minneapolis, Minnesota. According to available footage of the shooting, which was shared online, and witness reports, the shooting occurred after the individual, who was blocking a road with her vehicle, was approached by agents and attempted to drive away. The shooting occurred only one day after US officials started what they described as the “largest” ICE operation ever in the state. In the hours after the incident, the Minneapolis mayor publicly condemned the federal agency and several protests were reported in Minneapolis and at several other large US urban centres. It is highly likely that protests will continue and intensify over the 8 to 10 January period, and possibly continue over the following week. There is a realistic possibility of “retaliatory” violence by self-radicalised individuals targeting ICE agents and other federal government personnel.

Colombia deploys troops to Venezuelan border after capture of President Maduro.

Colombia is deploying an extra 30,000 soldiers to the Venezuelan border following the US capture of President Maduro. Defence Minister Pedro Sanchez announced the plan on 4 January, a day after the operation, citing concerns over border security and the need to implement measures required to support refugees. Colombia, which is home to an estimated three million Venezuelan refugees, is expecting up to an extra one million refugees following the US operation.

Sanchez also stated that the security forces have been “activated” to prevent any potential retaliation from armed groups that operate in both Colombia and Venezuela. Several powerful armed groups suspected of being involved in transnational drug trafficking, such as the National Liberation Army (ELN) and Second Marquetalia, a dissident faction of the leftist group Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), have operated with virtual impunity in Venezuela for years. Colombian intelligence has raised concerns that the leaders of armed groups may return to Colombia if they determine that their security in Venezuela is now jeopardised following the removal of Maduro.

Cuban economic crisis exacerbated by suspension of Venezuelan oil shipments.

Cuba is reportedly suffering its worst economic crisis since the 1959 revolution, marked by critical shortages in food, fuel, electricity and medicine, combined with high inflation and major power outages observed in several parts of the country. US operations in the Caribbean region have exacerbated the situation, with declining Venezuelan oil shipments compounding the already dire economic situation. Cuba has relied heavily on Venezuelan oil since 2000, with the Cuba–Venezuela Cooperation Agreement signed by Fidel Castro and Hugo Chávez, which accounts for much of Cuba’s total energy needs. The suspension of Venezuelan oil deliveries is likely to accelerate economic contraction and exacerbate power outages, which are likely to affect critical sectors, including the tourism industry, and if sustained, are likely to increase the risk of large-scale unrest on the island nation.

Chile affected by severe wildfires, resulting in six region being placed under red alert.

On 29 December, Chilean officials placed six regions under red alert for wildfires, including Valparaíso, Metropolitana, O’Higgins, Maule, Ñuble, and Biobío. This followed days of protracted high temperatures that, combined with dry conditions, have contributed to the rapid spread of several wildfires. Local media has reported that at least 2,000 separate wildfires have occurred since the start of the 2025-2026 wildfire season, which normally starts in December and continues until March. The fires have forced mass evacuations, damaged residential areas and critical infrastructure, and disrupted transport networks, with emergency services stretched by the scale and spread of the wildfires. Weather forecasts for much of the region indicate continued high temperatures and low humidity, suggesting a likelihood that fire will continue to spread and new ones form.

On 3 January, a fire was reported by German authorities at a cable bridge near the Lichterfelde power plant, in south-west Berlin. The fire damaged power infrastructure and caused severe outages, affecting more than 45,000 households and 2,200 businesses across four of the capital’s districts, with some affected households remaining without power until 8 January.

On 4 January, the fire was claimed as a sabotage action by Vulkangruppe, a far-left activist group that also claimed responsibility for the March 2024 arson attack that temporarily shut down the Tesla “gigafactory” facility near Berlin, causing an estimated USD 1 billion in damages.

Solace Global Assessment: 

In Europe and North America, critical infrastructure (CI), or that infrastructure which is essential to the basic functioning of government and the economy, is increasingly targeted by both state and non-state actors. Physical attacks on CI are often cheap and require minimal technical knowledge to execute. Moreover, such attacks are relatively risk-free but high-reward for the perpetrators. Targets like isolated power infrastructure are often not guarded, and authorities are seldom able to respond to an attack in time to apprehend those responsible. As Vulkangruppe’s actions demonstrate, these attacks can be extremely impactful and cause severe economic damage, whilst also providing greater exposure for the authors’ ideological messaging.

Local and international observers have commented on the credibility of Vulkangruppe’s claims, speculating that the attack may have been an example of hybrid warfare sponsored by a foreign state actor, possibly Russia, and attributed to a far-left group to polarise German politics. This would follow earlier confirmed cases, such as an incident in February 2025, when German authorities arrested three individuals who had allegedly been recruited by Russian intelligence to damage hundreds of vehicles across Baden-Württemberg, Berlin, Brandenburg, and Bavaria, and to plant pamphlets claiming support for the Green Party at the scenes. Following the spread of claims of Russian direction behind Vulkangruppe, the group released another statement denying them and reasserting responsibility for the attack.

On 6 January, a summit was held in Paris for the Coalition of the Willing, attended by the leaders of Ukraine, France, the UK, and a delegation from the US, which included special envoy Steve Witkoff and President Donald Trump’s adviser and son-in-law, Jared Kushner. A signed Coalition of the Willing statement declared readiness to deploy troops to Ukraine as part of security guarantees for the country, following the start of a ceasefire with Russia. Moreover, the coalition statement said that members will participate in a proposed US-led ceasefire monitoring and verification mechanism, in addition to other security guarantees, which include binding commitments to defend Ukraine against Russia.

UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer stated that “following a ceasefire, the UK and France will establish ‘military hubs’ across Ukraine”, although on 7 January, Starmer emphasised that any British deployment would require a parliamentary vote. The French President Emmanuel Macron stated that “several thousand” French soldiers could be deployed. For the first time, the US delegation appeared to publicly support the potential deployment of an Anglo-French force to Ukraine, in addition to the other security guarantees laid out, with Witkoff stating that Trump “strongly stands behind security protocols”, which are meant to both “deter any attacks in Ukraine” and “if there are any attacks, they’re meant to defend”.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Security guarantees for Ukraine are a fundamental objective for Kyiv. There is almost certainly a high threat of Russia launching another invasion against Ukraine in the future, following a hypothetical peace deal which would likely include concessions such as withdrawal from the remaining unoccupied sections of Donbas.  Therefore, robust and credible security guarantees are almost certainly the most critical factor that could persuade the Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s government to consider concessions, such as a withdrawal from Donbas.

During the war and negotiations, several potential security guarantees for Ukraine have been proposed. Previously, however, the deployment of troops from NATO members had been ruled out, and multiple other proposals have not been deemed as credible by Kyiv. Given the failures of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum in providing security assurances for Ukraine in exchange for giving up its nuclear arsenal, assurances which proved worthless in both 2014 and 2022, Kyiv has required far more ironclad guarantees. The set of guarantees proposed by the Coalition of the Willing after the Paris summit has almost certainly been the most robust and credible, with US support being particularly crucial.

The proposed guarantees will not involve US boots on the ground, which is almost certainly a political priority for President Trump. US officials have said that the proposed US-led ceasefire monitoring and verification mechanism would probably be done with drones, sensors and satellites, without the requirement for a ground deployment. On 4 January, President Trump responded to a reporter’s question regarding the alleged late December Ukrainian drone attack against Russian President Vladimir Putin’s residence by saying that “we don’t believe that happened, now that we’ve been able to check”. This is highly likely indicative of the Trump administration again warming to Kyiv, with the allegations of the drone attack almost certainly being used by the Kremlin to disrupt progress in negotiations between the US and Ukraine.

Fundamentally, it is highly unlikely that the Kremlin will accept the deployment of NATO-member peacekeepers to Ukraine, given its reiterated desire to address “root causes” for the conflict, which in part has referred to NATO expansion to Russian borders. The deployment of NATO-member forces to Ukraine is highly likely a red line for the Kremlin. There remains a fundamental contradiction between Kyiv’s desire for sovereignty, which requires credible security guarantees, and Moscow’s maximalist objectives to address what it perceives as “root causes” for the conflict, making a near-term peace deal unlikely. As negotiations favourable to Ukraine continue, Russian forces will likely continue to apply maximum military pressure, particularly with aerial strikes, with the threat of strikes against Ukrainian cities typically increasing during and after major diplomatic meetings.

On 2 January, the Saudi-backed National Shield Forces (NSF) under the command of Hadhramaut Governor Salem al-Khanbashi launched a counteroffensive against the secessionist Southern Transition Council (STC), recapturing the territory seized by the STC in late 2025. The operation was conducted with air support from the Royal Saudi Air Force. Notably, strikes were targeted at a shipment of military hardware from the UAE in Mukalla. At least 80 STC fighters were reportedly killed, and footage showed the flag of South Yemen being lowered in the city of Mukalla. The head of Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), Rashad al-Alimi, declared a 90-day state of emergency, claiming it was necessary to confront both the Houthis and “the internal strife led by mutinous military elements that received orders from the [UAE]”.

Coinciding with the launch of the counteroffensive, the STC published a constitution for an independent “State of South Arabia”. On 3 January, Saudi Arabia backed a call from the PLC’s head for participation in a forum to “formulate a comprehensive vision for fair solutions to the southern cause”. However, on 7 January, STC President Aidarus al-Zoubaidi fled to an unknown location after failing to board a plane to Riyadh for talks.  The PLC subsequently dismissed al-Zoubaidi from his position on the council and charged him with treason. Moreover, the STC reportedly withdrew from its symbolic capital of Aden with ground forces now aligned with the internationally recognised government (IRG) seizing the presidential palace, and multiple indications emerged of a UAE withdrawal from Socotra.  By 8 January, reporting claimed that al-Zoubaidi had left Aden on board a boat to Somaliland, before being met by Emirati officers and a plane that likely departed to Abu Dhabi.

Solace Global Assessment: 

It is almost certain that the recent developments significantly increased tensions between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and the UAE have effectively backed down and lost its power in Yemen. The highly likely Emirati withdrawal from Socotra following a decision by the Saudi-backed IRG to halt maritime and airline traffic from the UAE to the island, evidenced by the removal of the UAE flag from the local authority and the closure of Emirati-linked business activities in the region, could mean an end to the significant resources and effort the UAE has put into establishing a presence in the Gulf of Aden through STC-controlled territories. In Yemen overall, the UAE has likely lost in eight days what it took eight years to create.

The divisions between Saudi Arabia and the UAE over Yemen have almost certainly arisen from different strategic priorities and risk thresholds for intervention in the region. The Saudi-led coalition’s involvement in the civil war in Yemen accrued considerable reputation and economic costs for Saudi Arabia, and it is highly likely that Riyadh is reluctant to re-engage in further conflict in Yemen with the Houthis. Further conflict in Yemen almost certainly threatens Riyadh’s primary strategic priority: the diversification of its economy to ensure long-term future prosperity, with Saudi Arabia instead pursuing an approach of regional de-escalation.

However, it is likely that the UAE has had a far higher risk appetite for renewed conflict in Yemen, so has been willing to empower the destabilising STC in pursuit of its own objectives. While sharing many similar economic priorities, particularly the maintenance of the UAE as a safe harbour for business in the Middle East, the UAE is less vulnerable to chaos in Yemen than neighbouring Saudi Arabia. Abu Dhabi has likely sought to pursue greater long-term regional stability for its own goals through riskier intervention, accepting short-term instability as a cost for addressing sources of instability, namely the Houthis.

The STC offensive in late 2025 that seized Hadhramaut and Marah governorates meant that the STC successfully established control over territory which covered most of the pre-1990 unification state called the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen). This set the conditions for the STC to pursue its ultimate objective, independence for a new State of South Arabia, and posed a major threat to the Houthis. A senior STC official stated in December 2025 that the STC was consulting partners on the pursuit of a ground offensive against the Houthis, and earlier during the US Operation Rough Rider campaign against the Houthis in March 2025, international media reported that UAE-backed Yemeni factions were planning an offensive with the advice of private American security contractors.

A reignition of the civil war would not only dramatically change Yemen’s security environment but also pose considerable risks of Houthi long-range attacks being conducted against Gulf states. The rapid disintegration of the STC and the likely loss of key allies for the separatists, such as the Giant Brigades, which appear to have switched allegiances to the Saudi-backed IRG, has likely reduced the chances of the Yemeni factions launching an offensive against the Houthis. However, there is a realistic possibility in 2026 that the Houthis could seize the instability by launching its own offensive, a development that would most likely be observable should the Houthis begin a military buildup near the city of Marib.

Large-scale anti-government protests, which began on 28 December, have now spread to most Iranian provinces and have resulted in the deaths of at least 36 protestors. The protests first started in Tehran’s Grand Bazaar, when merchants, traders and Bazaar workers demonstrated in response to the plunging of the Rial and increasing inflation, which significantly eroded local purchasing power.

By early January, anti-government demonstrations had spread to multiple cities and provinces, and had drawn participation from students, industrial workers and a broader section of Iranian society. Protests have increasingly shifted from economic grievances to more explicitly challenging the country’s leadership, with some protestors openly calling for regime change.  The regime has deployed law enforcement, Basij militia, and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) units to disperse demonstrations using rubber bullets, tear gas and in several cases, live ammunition to disperse protests.

Solace Global Assessment: 

While the current wave of protests has yet to reach the same scale as the last two major uprisings in 2019 and 2022, there is a realistic possibility that the current protests will continue to spread and eclipse the two previous waves. Iranian citizens have endured prolonged economic deterioration characterised by accelerated inflation, currency depreciation, high unemployment, declining real wages, and reductions in government subsidies. These issues have been compounded by a nationwide water crisis and issues with severe air pollution in major cities, which are partially interlinked and largely attributed to government mismanagement.  Anti-government sentiment has likely been further increased by regional developments in the Middle East, with Iran’s war with Israel, regime change in Syria and the degradation of both Hamas and Hezbollah, effectively undermining decades of Iranian investment in deterrence and proxy forces at the expense of domestic investment and public welfare.

President Trump has repeatedly threatened to intervene if more protestors are killed, a threat that has likely been given more credence following the high-risk US operation in Venezuela to capture President Maduro, an Iranian ally. However, despite escalatory rhetoric from both the US and Israel, foreign intervention remains unlikely, due to the costs involved and the internal nature of the unrest, which does not directly threaten US interests. Washington also likely calculates that the Iranian leadership maintains effective control of the state’s security apparatus, particularly through the Basij militia and IRGC, the size, loyalty and capabilities of which are likely sufficient enough to counter the unrest.

As the protests continue to develop, the regime will likely respond with an extensive security crackdown and increasingly use violence to deter unrest. In 2019, it is estimated that over 1,000 protesters were killed by the state, with thousands more arrested. In the 2022–2023 “Woman, Life, Freedom” protests following the death of Mahsa Amini in morality police custody, security forces again used live ammunition, mass detentions, and harsh legal penalties to suppress demonstrations after months of nationwide unrest. The regime may also impose a nationwide internet shutdown to limit the ability to organise protests, reducing situational awareness of those in Iran and as the security situation deteriorates, non-Iranian individuals in the country, such as dual nationals, journalists, academics, aid workers, or tourists, will likely face an elevated risk of arbitrary detention, interrogation, and restricted movement, particularly if they are perceived to be in support of the protests.

On 5 January, opposition leader Bobi Wine of the National Unity Platform shared social media footage of security forces arresting and manhandling a journalist. This is the latest in a series of instances of rough treatment by security forces, typically against Wine supporters at his political rallies. Wine has claimed at least three deaths at his rallies at the hands of security forces, including one instance of a supporter being shot and another being hit by a military truck. Crackdowns have extended beyond Wine to other opposition figures. On 2 January, local media reported one person killed and five injured after soldiers opened fire at a crowd gathered in Orungo County, Armuria District, in support of General Jeje Abubaker Odongo, who is running as an independent, despite his historical support for incumbent President Yoweri Museveni.

Uganda’s Electoral Commission has cleared 27 parties to participate in the 15 January election. Eight presidential candidates are competing. The 80-year-old Museveni is declared as the ruling National Resistance Movement party’s candidate and is looking to extend his rule, which has been ongoing since 1986. Wine is the primary opposition candidate and the biggest threat to Museveni’s rule.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Security forces are highly likely attempting to deter any potential unrest around the election. In July 2024, young Ugandans engaged in anti-government protests in Kampala, largely inspired by similar youth-led movements in Kenya. Security forces quickly cracked down on demonstrations, detaining at least 100 protesters and quashing any unrest. Museveni, Africa’s third-longest-running leader, has cracked down on opposition in recent years, arresting and trying numerous opposition party members by military court. Wine himself has been arrested multiple times since campaigning for the presidency, most recently in October 2023.

A rising cost of living driven by fuel and food costs, and perceptions of government corruption, has led to significant youth frustration. If the election is perceived as unfree and unfair, or if security forces are widely perceived as using unwarranted excessive force in their crackdown on rallies, there is a realistic possibility that widespread unrest could break out. Security forces have historically cracked down on protesters with severe force and will highly likely respond similarly to any election unrest. While the July 2024 protests were quickly suppressed, there is a realistic possibility that better-organised youth demonstrations led by Bobi Wine could erupt in defiance of the almost certain security crackdowns.

Despite the head of the Uganda Communications Commission’s (UCC) reassurance that reports of potential internet blackouts were “mere rumours”, internet blackouts are highly likely in the lead-up to the election. Because of African youths’ reliance on social media to mobilise, a key government response has been shutting off the internet or access to social media to prevent civil unrest. Youth protests are generally heavily reliant on real-time updates, viral content, and livestreamed evidence of police brutality to sustain demonstrations. By cutting the internet, the government can break protester coordination, prevent the documentation of abuses by security forces, isolate activists, and stop the virality of anti-government sentiment. During the 2021 election, during which widespread protests took place in Kampala, the internet was cut for four days. The government has already banned the sharing of live footage of protests, “unlawful processions”, and other violent incidents ahead of the election.  

Greek government proposes reforms to end farmers’ protests.

On 7 January, the Greek government presented a new reform package that is aimed at ending the ongoing farmers’ protests, which have caused severe disruptions across Greece since late November. On the same day, Greece’s Prosecutor General Konstantinos Tzavellas reportedly issued a directive to arrest farmers taking part in the blockades and subject them to “expedited court proceedings” if they are arrested during a protest. The announcements occurred on the eve of a planned “escalation” of the unrest by the farmers’ unions, who have announced a 48-hour blockade on 8 and 9 January. Protests will likely intensify over the 8-10 January period, likely leading to notable travel disruptions, particularly on key national highways and on routes heading to Greek major ports.

Israel and Syria strike deal on “communication cell” in Paris.

On 6 January, Israeli and Syrian negotiators announced that they had reached an agreement following their talks in Paris on establishing a “communication cell” between the two countries. While details of its structure remain unclear, it is likely meant to be a de-escalatory tool aimed at preventing confrontations in Syria’s south, similar to the ones that have occurred since the toppling of the Assad regime in November 2024, and at sharing some intelligence. The agreement is unlikely to solve some ongoing disputes, such as that regarding the southern flashpoint of Sweida. On the other hand, the agreement likely has the potential to improve regional counterterrorism initiatives, with Damascus proving increasingly effective in carrying out anti-Islamic State (IS) operations alongside American and coalition forces, and could help both Israel and Syria prevent Iran and Hezbollah from re-establishing in Syria.

Incumbent president Touadéra wins presidential election in CAR.

On 5 January, provisional results revealed that incumbent president Faustin-Archange Touadéra won a third presidential term in office in the 28 December Central African Republic (CAR) presidential election, receiving 76.15 per cent of the vote. Touadera controversially ran after a constitutional referendum in 2023 eliminated the presidential term limit. The primary opposition coalition, Republican Bloc for the Defence of the Constitution (BRDC), boycotted the election, calling it unfair. Under Touadéra, Russian influence has significantly expanded in CAR, aiding the government with internal security against dissident rebel groups. Following the condemnation by opposition figures, there is a realistic possibility of opposition-led protests following Touadéra’s victory. Security forces will highly likely crack down on demonstrations with crowd dispersal measures and arrests.

US interdict sanctioned Russian-flagged vessel in North Atlantic suspected of sanctions evasion.

On 7 January, US special forces and Coast Guard personnel seized the Russian-flagged oil tanker MV Marinera (formerly MV Bella 1) in the North Atlantic Ocean off the coast of Scotland. US forces reportedly used UK airports to interdict the vessel and were supported by UK military forces, including a Royal Air Force RC-135W Rivet Joint electronic surveillance aircraft. The vessel had changed its flag to Russia after exiting Venezuelan waters, and after a previous US attempt to board the sanctioned vessel. The vessel had been pursued and monitored for two weeks and is suspected of being part of a shadow fleet involved in oil shipments for Iran, Venezuela and associated networks, including the militant group Hezbollah. The seizure reportedly took place in front of Russian naval forces onboard a submarine, which was deployed to deter the interdiction. Russia’s foreign ministry has asserted that the vessel was sailing in accordance with maritime law and has condemned the action. US forces also seized a second Venezuelan-linked vessel,  the Panama-flagged M Sophia, near the northeast coast of South America.

Turkish authorities carry out mass anti-Islamic State operation.

Local media reported that, over the last two weeks of 2025, Turkish counterterrorism forces carried out security operations resulting in the arrest of more than 500 alleged supporters and members of the Islamic State (IS). According to officials, the raids, which were carried out across more than 25 provinces, were prompted by the discovery of several plots to carry out attacks during Christmas and New Year’s celebrations, similar to the 2017 Istanbul nightclub attack, which killed 39 people. While the operation was overall successful, one raid, which occurred on 29 December in Yalova, near Istanbul, resulted in a gunfight that killed three police officers and six IS members.

Clashes between Syrian forces and Kurdish militants in Aleppo.

On 6 January, clashes between Syrian government forces and fighters of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) broke out in the northern city of Aleppo. The clashes started only two days after a meeting between Syrian and SDF leaders in Damascus, focusing on the unresolved question of the integration of SDF units in the Syrian military. The Syrian military opened, on 7 January, humanitarian corridors to allow residents to leave the Kurdish neighbourhoods of Aleppo. At least nine people have been killed in the clashes, which are the deadliest to erupt so far between the two sides. There is a realistic possibility that the violence in Aleppo could precipitate tensions between the government and SDF, possibly leading to clashes in the north of Syria. Such a scenario would likely constitute the greatest threat to the stability of Syria since the fall of Assad. It would, moreover, almost certainly destabilise the Damascus government, forcing it to redirect vital resources to the north and creating opportunities for local militant groups and non-state actors to exploit.

Russian Africa Corps forces enter Sudan from the Central African Republic (CAR).

Local media reported that, on 2 January, forces from the Russian Ministry of Defence-controlled Africa Corps, the successor to the Wagner Group, entered the Karkar region of South Darfur and confronted local units of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The advance was reportedly prompted by the RSF setting up a trade point in the area. The incident represents the first time that Africa Corps forces have entered Sudan from their stronghold in CAR. While initially backing the rebel RSF, Russia has increasingly backed the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), which controls the country’s east and can offer Russia a strategically valuable access to the Red Sea in the form of a planned naval facility near Port Sudan. With the RSF gaining significant momentum in October 2025 after the capture of El Fasher, it is likely that Moscow will increasingly deepen cooperation with Khartoum, highly likely leveraging Africa Corps resources in central Africa.

At least 30 killed and several abducted in attack on market in Niger State, Nigeria.

On 4 January, gunmen attacked Kasuwan Daji market in Demo village, Niger State, killing at least 30 and abducting multiple others. Locally known as bandits, the gunmen stormed the market on motorcycles at approximately 16:30 local time, burning stalls and looting food items while they indiscriminately fired into the crowd. According to witnesses, the attack was part of a series of raids that had begun on 3 January in Agwarra and Borgu, nearby villages. Attacks by bandits have increased in recent months, driven largely by security vacuums in Nigeria’s northwest. The ongoing bandit conflict stems from Fulani herder and non-Fulani farmer disputes amid competition for limited resources, forcing many to turn to criminal activity to earn a living. Further attacks are highly likely due to the profitability of kidnap-for-ransom.

ISWAP kills at least nine in ambush in Borno State and executes a further six.

On 5 January, at least nine Nigerian soldiers were killed and five injured when their convoy hit a landmine before being attacked by gunmen near Bindundul village in Borno State. Bindundul village is approximately 20 kilometres from Kereto, where Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) militants operate. It is highly likely that the attack was conducted by the group, who routinely attack Nigerian security forces in the region. On 7 January, ISWAP carried out four executions: one Nigerian soldier, two Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) members, and one alleged spy, bringing the total number of executions to 27 in under a month. While ISWAP have exploited an ongoing security vacuum in Northeast Nigeria, the US Christmas Day airstrike on Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) in the Northwest of the country is highly likely indicative of further counterinsurgency collaboration, which could help plug the vacuum and reduce ISWAP’s operational freedom.

South Sudanese military seizes Bentiu IDP camp from opposition.

On 3 January, clashes broke out at Bentiu internally displaced persons (IDP) camp, resulting in the South Sudan People’s Defense Forces (SSPDF) seizing control of the camp from the Sudan People’s Liberation Army in Opposition (SPLA-IO). No casualties were reported, although the fighting triggered an internal displacement within the camp’s sectors. Before the clashes, the SSPDF deployed heavy weaponry, including one tank, to the camp’s perimeter following fighting in Pakur and Kubri Jamus. The Bentiu IDP Camp is one of South Sudan’s largest displacement sites, hosting a fluctuating population of over 100,000 internally displaced persons. The recent clashes are the latest in a series between government forces and the SPLA-IO, signalling a potential breakdown of the 2018 Revitalised Peace Agreement (R-ARCSS), a power-sharing mechanism designed to resolve the South Sudan civil war. Although South Sudan has not formally relapsed into a full-scale civil war, the country is almost certainly at risk of descending into renewed civil war. Further clashes are highly likely.

Somali military kills at least 20 Al Shabaab members in two operations.

On 4 January, Somali special forces, in conjunction with the US, killed 15 Al Shabaab (AS) members and wounded eight in an airstrike in Jilib district, Middle Juba. The operation reportedly targeted members of AS’s leadership and resulted in the deaths of key members of the insurgent group. One civilian also died in the strike, with several more injured, and AS reported through its media channels that the attack failed. On 6 January, the Somali National Army (SNA) conducted another security operation in Ceel-Cilaan in the Gedo region, approximately 30 kilometres east of Bardheere district, allegedly killing five more AS militants and destroying several militant hideouts. The militants had reportedly harassed and attacked civilians in the area. The US has significantly expanded its air campaign in Somalia in 2025 against both AS and Islamic State Somalia (ISS). While the air campaign has severely weakened ISS, AS has been more resilient, able to adapt to the setbacks, despite the more aggressive aerial campaign. US airstrikes have reportedly killed up to 150 civilians since 2017, and this has almost certainly been utilised by AS in its propaganda against the Somali government.

ADF kill at least 15 people across three villages in Lubero State, DRC.

On 2 January, Islamic State-affiliated Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) attacked three villages in the DRC’s Lubero territory, Kilonge, Katanga, and Maendeleo, killing at least 15 people. This is the latest in a series of attacks targeting civilians in the region. 2025 saw a significant increase in the pace and lethality of ADF attacks on civilians, driven by the security vacuums caused by the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s (FARDC) being preoccupied with the ongoing AFC/M23 insurgency. Given the recent return to fighting between the FARDC and AFC/M23, despite the ongoing Qatar-mediated peace talks, a continued high pace of ADF activity in Ituri and North Kivu regions is highly likely through 2026. It is likely that joint FARDC and Ugandan People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) will manage to push the ADF further west, away from the Ugandan border, which could precipitate an increase in attacks in Tshopo province.

At least seven killed and 40 injured in drone strike in Masisi, DRC.

On 4 January, the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s (FARDC) conducted a drone strike targeting two military positions in the Mont Ngaliema district of the AFC/M23-controlled Masisi Town in North Kivu amid elevated fighting in the area. The strike reportedly killed at least seven and injured over 40 civilians. The United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) condemned the attack in a post on X. According to Doctors Without Borders (MSF), 42 people were admitted to the Masisi General Referral Hospital. Masisi was captured by M23 in January 2025, and is one of the hardest hit areas by the ongoing conflict. Violence also occurred on the same day near Uvira in South Kivu between AFC/M23 and Wazalendo militias.

Storms Francis and Goretti cause disruptions across western Europe.

Several European countries were affected by strong winds, rain, and snow starting on 31 December, as the two Atlantic storms hit the continent. Hundreds of flights have been cancelled across France and the Benelux countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg), while the United Kingdom issued regional warnings for strong winds and snow. Nordic countries also recorded disruptions, with Swedish authorities warning of “likely” power cuts due to the increased snowfall. Southern Europe and the Balkans were impacted by heavy rains and flooding.

At least six people have died due to the severe weather events. Disruptions are likely to continue during the 8-10 January period. In the United Kingdom, forecasts indicate a high likelihood of strong winds in the southwest, and possibly heavy snow in Wales on 8-10 January. Sub-zero temperatures are likely to continue across much of western and southern Europe, including parts of northern France, Switzerland, and northern Italy. In Spain, where the storm has caused heavy rainfall in southern and coastal areas, there is a protracted risk of flooding. Air travel disruptions remain likely.

Bar fire in Switzerland kills 40 people, injures more than 100.

On 1 January, a fire broke out at a bar in the ski resort town of Crans-Montana, in Valais Canton, Switzerland. At the time of the fire, New Year’s celebrations were ongoing in the bar. Authorities have determined that the fire, which killed 40 people and injured 116, started accidentally and was worsened by the use of flammable materials in the bar’s interior, as well as the presence of narrow exits that resulted in a crowd crush. While the incident has prompted national mourning and scrutiny of safety standards at entertainment venues, it is unlikely that the incident will cause large-scale protests in Switzerland, as has been observed after similar events in Romania and North Macedonia, where alleged corruption was blamed for the incidents.

Wildfires in the Western Cape, South Africa.

Two wildfires have been ongoing in the Mossel Bay area of the Western Cape. On 6 January, multiple homes were destroyed, and several neighbourhoods north of Mossel Bay were evacuated as the wildfires spread rapidly. Early on 7 January, authorities confirmed that several structures and vehicles had been destroyed and that evacuations were carried out in the Aalwyndal residential area. By the afternoon, the wildfire near Aalwyndal was no longer spreading, and clean-up operations were underway. The N2 roadway was closed for several hours but has since reopened.

Annual reporting from Taiwan’s National Security Bureau indicates that Chinese cyberattacks targeting Taiwan’s key infrastructure rose by over six per cent in 2025, increasing to an average of 2.63 million attacks per day. This marks the largest year-on-year increase since records began. Chinese cyberattacks on infrastructure primarily target energy, telecommunication infrastructure, hospitals, banking and emergency services, with the Taiwanese authorities asserting that attacks increasingly coincide with military exercises and times of heightened political tension.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Taiwan has accused China of incorporating cyberattacks into its wider “hybrid warfare” strategy aimed at compromising Taiwan’s crucial infrastructure and disrupting its government and social functions, an allegation Beijing denies. The scale and frequency of the attacks likely suggest that the primary aim is to pressure the Taiwanese government and to cause sustained disruption to undermine public confidence. However, the largely limited and non-decisive effects of the attacks likely indicate that the activity is more consistent with signalling, network mapping, vulnerability probing and access preparation, with many of China’s more destructive cyber capabilities likely kept in reserve for use in a potential future invasion of Taiwan.

While many of the Chinese attacks included distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks designed to disrupt,  man-in-the-middle attacks designed to steal sensitive or proprietary information have also proliferated. China has sought to become self-reliant in technology and economic development, and is likely attempting to procure intellectual property, credentials and other information in support of this objective. Cyberattacks targeting Taiwan are highly likely to increase in 2026, with advanced technology like artificial intelligence and deepfakes leveraged to increase the frequency, sophistication and success of cyberattacks. For foreign businesses operating in Taiwan, there is almost certainly an increased risk of networks and data being compromised, either directly or incidentally, particularly where firms are connected to critical infrastructure or involved in sensitive or high-value industries like semiconductors or defence.

Unrest and clashes break out between Muslim and Hindu communities in southern Nepal.

On 6 January, authorities imposed a curfew in Birgunj following an outbreak of violence between Hindu and Muslim communities. The violence started after Muslim groups started protesting the vandalism of a mosque in a nearby town, which was matched by a rival Hindu demonstration. While only minor clashes took place, the curfew was imposed pre-emptively, with authorities warning that security forces may shoot violators. Following the curfew’s imposition, armed soldiers and police officers patrolled the streets. The curfew was subsequently lifted the same day from 15:00 local time, allowing shops, schools, markets, and factories to gradually re-open following an end to the protests. Clashes between Hindus and Muslims are rare in Nepal, which has a deep-rooted culture of religious coexistence.

Myanmar’s junta releases over 6,100 prisoners on independence anniversary.

On 4 January, the 78^th anniversary of Myanmar’s independence from Britain, the Tatmadaw released over 6,100 prisoners and reduced numerous further sentences. 52 foreign nationals were included in the releases to be deported. Mass releases are common in Myanmar on major national occasions, with approximately 6,000 prisoners released on Independence Day in 2025. The move comes amid a three-stage election process, which has largely been described by observers as a doctored exercise to legitimise the status quo. While the recent release is not abnormal, it is likely intended to increase the popularity of the Tatmadaw amid the ongoing polling.

Pakistani security forces seize two tons of explosives and arrest three in Karachi.

On 5 January, Pakistani counterterrorism police conducted raids on multiple hideouts in Karachi, seizing two tons of explosives and arresting three people associated with the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA). One vehicle had been loaded with explosives and transported from Balochistan, where the BLA has been conducting an insurgency. According to official statements, the operation thwarted an imminent attack in Karachi. Pakistani authorities routinely allege that the BLA operate from Afghan territory and receives support from the Taliban government. Previous attacks have led to escalations between Pakistan and Afghanistan, leading to Islamabad conducting airstrikes on Kabul in October 2025. While the latest raids are unlikely to lead to a significant escalation in tensions, additional successful attacks on major cities or security forces will likely trigger further hostilities between the two sides.

China conducts military drills near Japan in coordination with largest ever Taiwan exercises.

Japanese authorities reported heightened Chinese air and naval military activity around Okinawa and Miyako Island on 27-30 December, and scrambled fighter aircraft from the Japan Air Self-Defence Force (JASDF) after eight People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) aircraft, including strategic bombers and electronic intelligence aircraft, crossed through the Miyako Strait. Chinese operations in the vicinity of Japanese territory coincided with the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) “Justice Mission 2025”, the largest exercise ever conducted to simulate the blockade of Taiwan. The activity may indicate that China will increasingly involve Japan and other Asian nations in its Taiwan-focused exercises to test adversarial responses and simulate Taiwan contingency scenarios in preparation for a future invasion of the island nation.

Cambodian mortar strike along border region reportedly a mistake.

On 6 January, Cambodia conducted a mortar strike in a disputed border region, injuring one Thai soldier. Following the strike, Thai forces accused the Cambodian military of violating the truce that was signed on 27 December. However, a subsequent statement released by the Thai military revealed that the Cambodian military contacted them to explain that “there was no intention to fire into Thai territory” and that Cambodian personnel had conducted an “operational error”. This is the second accusation of a ceasefire since its signing, the first occurring after Cambodia was accused of flying over 250 drones over the border on 28 December. These two instances almost certainly reflect the fragility of the ceasefire and the distrust between the two sides. The earlier 28 July ceasefire collapsed following renewed hostilities between Thailand and Cambodia, and further accusations of ceasefire violations are likely. There is a realistic possibility that they will lead to another ceasefire collapse.

Sri Lanka issues highest landslide warning for areas near popular tourist destination.

Level 3 landside evacuation warnings have been issued by the authorities in Sri Lanka, covering three areas in Nuwara Eliya district and Kandy, a major tourist destination, as signs of potential landslides have been observed in these areas. The warnings are the highest in Sri Lanka’s warning system and have been issued due to continued heavy rainfall saturating soil, increasing ground instability, and raising the risk of slope failure in the vulnerable highland locations. Moreover, the risk of landslides has further increased due to the formation of a deep depression over the Bay of Bengal, which is expected to bring heavy rains to both Sri Lanka and southern India in the coming days.

Magnitude 6.4 earthquake prompts tsunami warnings in the Philippines.

On 7 January, a magnitude 6.4 earthquake struck offshore east of Manay in Davao Oriental, Philippines. The tremor, which was initially reported as being magnitude 6.7, prompted authorities to issue tsunami warnings, which were quickly retracted. The tremor caused some disruptions and minor damage, and local media reported that classes were suspended in Nabunturan and Mabini in Davao de Oro as a precaution.

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