On 1 November, the Mayor of Uruapan, Carlos Manzo, was assassinated in a targeted attack during the local Day of the Dead celebrations. Uruapan is the second-largest city in Michoacán, a state that has seen growing levels of violence in recent years due to the efforts of the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG) to expand its operations. According to local media, Manzo was assassinated by CJNG gunmen. As Manzo was well-known for his outspoken stances against the cartels and for criticisms of his own party, Morena, for what he perceived as inaction in the fight against organised crime, the killing has sparked significant outrage.

On 3 November, a protest was staged in Morelia, the capital of Michoacán, during which demonstrators tried to forcibly enter the Government Palace, leading to at least ten arrests. On 4 November, protesters set fire to the city hall in Apatzingán, southwest of Uruapan. Other acts of vandalism and arson were recorded at building sites and public transport infrastructure in Uruapan as part of the ongoing unrest.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Manzo’s killing is not the highest-profile to occur in Mexico in recent years, and he was the seventh mayor to be killed in Michoacán since 2022. The assassination occurred amidst a severe surge in violence in Michoacán that is almost certainly driven by the ongoing splintering of the Sinaloa Cartel and the corresponding growth of CJNG. The unrest is likely driven by Manzo’s personal popularity and profile as a rare dissenting voice in Morena, who clearly opposed Sheinbaum’s approach to combating the cartels. There is a realistic possibility that the unusual scale of the unrest that has followed Manzo’s killing reflects pre-existing grievances towards Sheinbaum, who has faced very little organised opposition since taking office in 2024. The unrest’s momentum, as well as the harsh reaction by local police to the protests in Morelia, makes it likely that further demonstrations will occur in the short term, with a large-scale march planned in Mexico City on 15 November.

The fallout from the killing is likely to prompt the Mexican government to respond harshly, likely by deploying increased security forces in Michoacán and conducting increased raids against CJNG and other local cartels to restore control and demonstrate state authority. President Sheinbaum has already demonstrated a willingness to adopt a more assertive posture against the cartels by increasing military-led operations and expanding National Guard deployments in high-risk regions, leading to increased arrests and drug seizures.

However, Michoacán has become a stronghold of the CJNG, where it regularly engages in confrontations with Mexican security forces. There is a realistic possibility that CJNG will respond violently to any deployment to assert dominance and deter further incursions by federal forces. Previous tactics employed by the CJNG include ambushes, assassinations, arson attacks, and road blockades, methods the cartel has repeatedly used in Michoacán, Jalisco, and Guanajuato to disrupt counter-cartel operations. Rival cartels like Los Viagras and Cárteles Unidos may exploit any increased pressure on CJNG to expand their territory control, particularly in contested areas, potentially resulting in a deterioration in the local security environment.

On 31 October, unverified sources claiming to have inside knowledge reported that the Trump administration was preparing imminent airstrikes on military installations inside Venezuela. The report indicated that strikes could occur within days or even hours and that they would target installations used by Tren de Aragua and the Cartel de los Soles (Cartel of the Suns), an informal Venezuelan criminal organisation designated by the US as a narcoterrorist group and allegedly headed by high-ranking members of the Armed Forces of Venezuela and its incumbent President Nicolás Maduro.

Other sources have indicated that senior US military officials have also developed a range of options against Venezuela that include kinetic strikes on military units protecting Maduro, seizure of oilfields and airfields, and special forces missions to capture or kill Maduro. On 3 November, President Trump downplayed the possibility of a US war with Venezuela, but suggested that  Maduro’s days as the country’s president were numbered.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The military operations reportedly planned by the US have likely been designed to pressure regime change and force Maduro to step down. Many of the options, such as special forces operations or direct strikes on Venezuelan military installations, are high-risk, potentially leading to US losses, escalation, civilian casualties and both domestic and international backlash. Trump’s downplaying of the risk of war, even while suggesting Maduro’s days are numbered, has coincided with the deployment of substantial naval, air and intelligence assets to the Caribbean region. This has included strategic bombers, special forces, amphibious assault ships, destroyers, and recognition of CIA operations, with the USS Gerald Ford carrier strike group (CSG) currently underway and on course for the Caribbean. This approach of mixed messaging has likely enabled the US to achieve and maintain strategic ambiguity, a development that will likely increase pressure on the Maduro regime and complicate its decision-making, but also potentially increase the risk of calculation.

If the US is planning on striking Venezuela, it is unlikely that it will until the arrival of the Gerald Ford CSG, which passed the Strait of Gibraltar into the Atlantic Ocean on 4 November and is expected to be in theatre by mid-November. The CSG includes over 70 aircraft, multiple guided-missile destroyers and other escort vessels, providing the US with enhanced power projection, operational flexibility and sustained reach. However, any direct strike on Venezuelan territory would likely require additional legal justification. The Trump administration has reportedly told Congress that the executive branch is arguing that current operations do not constitute “hostilities” as they involve remote strikes from international waters. This interpretation will likely permit continued strikes on vessels in international waters without congressional approval, a logic that could be stretched to include limited land strikes, but this has drawn significant bipartisan criticism and accusations of executive overreach.

The legal challenges and domestic pressure may limit the administration’s willingness to escalate to land strikes in the near future, unless it can obtain clear legal justification and political backing. As a result, the administration may instead opt for a strategy of sustained isolation and economic pressure, leveraging its enhanced military posture as a deterrent while continuing with its controversial strikes on Venezuela-origin vessels suspected of narcotics smuggling.

Politics, Economics and Civil Unrest:

US government shutdown becomes longest on record.

On 5 November, the US government shutdown, which started on 1 October, entered its 36^th day, making it the longest in US history by surpassing the previous record set in 2019. The shutdown has so far impacted several key federal services, including airports and public transport, and other programmes such as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Programme (SNAP), affecting around 42 million people. Approximately 750,000 federal employees have been furloughed. The continuation of the shutdown is likely to increase the risk of civil unrest and transport disruptions in the short term.

Peru severs ties with Mexico after former Prime Minister is granted asylum at Mexican embassy.

Peru has officially severed diplomatic relations with Mexico following the decision by Mexico to grant asylum to former Peruvian Prime Minister Betssy Chávez. Chávez, who faced prosecution over an attempted coup in December 2022, has sought refuge in the Mexican embassy located in Lima’s San Isidro district. The Peruvian government, led by President José Jerí, has ordered the chargé d’affaires of the Mexican embassy to leave the country, marking a significant diplomatic rift between the two nations. In response, the Mexican foreign ministry has rejected Peru’s “unilateral decision” to cut ties, asserting that its decision to grant asylum was in full compliance with international law. The police have deployed officers outside the Mexican Embassy, and protests will likely be staged outside the installation.  

US security forces thwart a possible Islamic State-inspired attack on Halloween.

On 31 October, the FBI arrested five individuals in Dearborn, Michigan. The group, which comprised individuals in their late teens and early twenties, is accused of planning to attack during the Halloween celebrations on behalf of the Islamic State (IS). The suspects’ legal defence has denied the accusations. The city of Dearborn has a large Muslim community, and it has increasingly figured in far-right discourses in the US, with some residents stating that, since 2024, a spike in online threats has forced them to adopt more stringent security measures at places of worship and other facilities. In late 2023, a six-year-old was fatally stabbed in Dearborn in a likely anti-Muslim attack. There is a realistic possibility that the recent arrests will lead to further calls for violence targeting the Muslim community.

Mexican forces ambushed by cartel operatives in Sinaloa.

On 3 November, Mexican federal agents were reportedly ambushed by cartel members on a roadway outside Guasave, on the coast of Sinaloa state. Local media reported that the police managed to fend off the attackers, killing at least 13 and arresting four, also rescuing nine people “held captive at the scene”. The attack is almost certainly part of the spate of violence that has erupted in Sinaloa following the killing of Luis Rodriguez, alias “El Morral”, a high-ranking member of the “Los Chapitos” faction of the Sinaloa Cartel, earlier in October. Los Chapitos are highly likely the main actors responsible for the violence. The group, which is led by some of the sons of Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán (now imprisoned in the US), is currently losing its internal war with the other major faction of the Sinaloa Cartel – “Los Mayitos” (led by supporters of Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada, also imprisoned in the US). As Los Chapitos face mounting pressure from rival groups like Los Mayitos and the security forces, they may adopt more aggressive tactics, including actions that pose heightened risks to both law enforcement and the public.

Protests and investigations organised in response to Brazil’s deadliest police raid.

Brazil’s council for human rights has requested a separate investigation into police conduct during Operation Containment on 28 October. Operation Containment, which targeted the Comando Vermelho (Red Command) organised crime group in the Alemão and Penha favelas of Rio de Janeiro, resulted in violent clashes with the security forces, leading to the deaths of over 120 alleged gang members and four police officers. Protests have been staged in response to the operation, including outside of a morgue used to temporarily house many of the bodies. Ongoing investigations and other developments relating to the operation are likely to lead to further protests in Rio in the lead-up to COP 30, with many international visitors expected to also visit the city during the climate summit.

Louisville, US, cargo plane crash kills nine.

On 4 November, at approximately 17:13 local time, UPS flight 2976 crashed during take-off procedures at Louisville Muhammad Ali International Airport, in Louisville, Kentucky. Footage shows the cargo aircraft struggling to take off from Runway 17R, with one engine on fire, before exploding. The plane reportedly crashed just outside the airport perimeter, and the explosion, which was almost certainly affected by the high fuel load, damaged nearby structures and possibly caused some explosions at a petroleum recycling plant. Authorities have confirmed that nine people were killed in the crash, and 11 were injured.

Death toll from Hurricane Melissa has reached at least 75 across Jamaica, Haiti, and Cuba.

Hurricane Melissa made landfall in Jamaica on 28 October and tracked in a northeasterly direction, hitting Cuba on 29 October. The overall death toll has risen to at least 75 people in total. Haiti, which was not directly hit, has the highest death toll, with 43 people confirmed dead and at least seven others still missing, and approximately 12,000 homes flooded or severely damaged.

32 people have been confirmed dead in Jamaica, with estimated damages of between USD 6 and USD 7 billion, equivalent to roughly one third of the country’s GDP. Prime Minister Andrew Holness warned that the country’s debt-to-GDP ratio would almost certainly significantly rise as the government activates emergency provisions to temporarily suspend fiscal rules. He also stated that over 30 communities likely remain cut off by damages to roads and bridges. The economic impact will almost certainly be exacerbated by the number of people uninsured, which, according to Moody’s, stands at 80 per cent of properties, with 95 per cent underinsured. Furthermore, while flights have since restarted, the tourism sector, which makes up approximately 20 per cent of Jamaica’s GDP, will almost certainly be impacted, highly likely resulting in widespread job losses in the sector, further worsening the crisis.

While official figures from Cuba have not yet been released, the UN estimates that approximately 2.2 million people have been impacted, with 60,000 homes damaged. Authorities have reported no deaths. Given the scale of the damage across Hurricane Melissa’s wake, there will highly likely be a lingering drag on the economy, which could exacerbate poverty rates in Haiti, Jamaica, and Cuba and complicate clean-up efforts. In the long term, this could trigger protests, particularly in the worst-hit areas. Hurricane Melissa dissipated on 4 November and no longer poses a threat.

The highly strategically significant battle for Pokrovsk continues, with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stating on 3 November that although “things [are] not easy” for Ukrainian forces, Russia has had “no success” in Pokrovsk in recent days. Zelensky added in a 4 November post, which was accompanied by photographs of Zelensky meeting soldiers in what is labelled the Dobropillya sector (part of the broader Pokrovsk axis), that “[t]his is our country… we will certainly do our utmost to keep it Ukrainian”. The messaging comes amidst some criticism from Ukrainian commentators of the continued dedication of significant resources and manpower to defend Pokrovsk despite the increasingly critical situation.

In a Hromadske article published on 4 November, a journalist deployed to the front line interviewed Ukrainian commanders and personnel defending Pokrovsk. One high-ranking officer claimed that 60 per cent of the city is now under Russian control and that “[t]he situation is sh**ty”, another Ukrainian defender claimed that forces “on the forward positions are already basically in encirclement”. In footage published on 31 October, a Black Hawk helicopter is shown landing Ukrainian special forces in the vicinity of the Pokrovsk axis. Moreover, the offensive against Kupyansk in Kharkiv Oblast has continued, with Zelensky stating that a “clearance operation is underway” and that Ukrainian forces “will clear everything”, while a Russian commander speaking to Russian state-owned media claimed that he is “confident that the city will be completely [taken] next week”.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The Russian advances in the Pokrovsk axis have taken close to two years to achieve, since the announced withdrawal of Ukrainian forces in Avdiivka in February 2024. It is unlikely that Ukrainian forces will be able to successfully expel the Russian forces who have infiltrated Pokrovsk, although Ukrainian forces almost certainly continue to increase the costs of the battle for Moscow in both manpower and equipment. The Ukrainian 7^th Rapid Response Corps has published data indicating that 11,000 Russian forces are storming the city, a considerable concentration of force, with a Ukrainian drone unit claiming that Russian forces are now sending almost 100 fireteams of up to three troops into Pokrovsk every day. Almost certainly, a key issue for Ukrainian defenders has been that the deepening advances into Pokrovsk have challenged their ability to conduct attacks with first-person view (FPV) drones. This is due to pilots and drone operators being increasingly under threat from direct firefights with enemy infantry and reconnaissance teams that have bypassed forward infantry positions, reducing the ability for Ukrainian forces to attack Russian forces on approach to Pokrovsk.

The penetration into Pokrovsk by small groups of Russian troops began in July 2025, entering from the seized village of Zvirove. In late August and early September, reports emerged of a significant redeployment of Russian forces to the frontlines of Donetsk Oblast from secondary axes such as Kursk and Sumy, including more elite formations. In previous key battles in the war, such as Avdiivka and Bakhmut, Ukrainian defenders ordered to withdraw came under intense pressure and suffered heavy casualties, and a reluctance to withdraw in a controlled manner from Pokrovsk will likely threaten a similar situation. Ukrainian military command will likely be weighing the relative positives and negatives of withdrawing, which could potentially give Russian forces only a pyrrhic victory if done without major casualties, or continuing daring but costly operations, such as the likely failed special forces insertion, in an attempt to turn the tide.

However, if Ukraine is forced to withdraw from Pokrovsk, it will likely set the conditions for Russian forces to advance west to isolate or encircle the Kramatorsk-Sloviansk agglomeration, which represents the last major Ukrainian-held urban area in the Donbas and a critical economic hub. Moreover, victory in Pokrovsk would likely result in an even greater concentration of force on the Kupyansk axis, a battle which remains likely notably less critical for Ukrainian forces than Pokrovsk but is highly likely nonetheless highly unstable. The loss of Kupyansk would likely facilitate further Russian advances south along the Oskil River, a strategically important natural buffer, with further advances potentially threatening to place the city of Izium in range of Russian indirect fires. Highly likely, the ongoing Russian offensives intend to ultimately threaten a pincer movement from the north (from a hypothetical Izium axis) and south (Pokrovsk axis) against the ground lines of communication (GLOCs) into the Kramatorsk-Sloviansk agglomeration, to fulfil Moscow’s key strategic objective of militarily seizing the entirety of the Donbas. However, this is highly unlikely to be achievable either rapidly or without accruing enormous casualties.

As of 6 November, Mali remains in a fuel crisis caused by the ongoing blockade imposed by Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM). In addition to the official Malian Crisis Coordination and Management Centre (CECOGEC) statement on 29 October, which outlined the reserving of select fuel stations for military use, authorities have issued further prohibitions and measures in response to the fuel crisis.

On 30 October, an interministerial decree between six government departments was signed mandating that “all service stations in the country are now required to provide continuous service, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, to guarantee the supply of petroleum products to the population.” The decree prohibits the “[t]he sale of fuel in jerrycans or other containers”, with an exception for “for powering generators and machines for professional or domestic use. In this case, the buyer must present documentation justifying the product’s intended use”. Overnight on 30 October, a convoy of “several dozen” fuel tankers under protection from Malian military personnel reportedly entered the capital Bamako.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Multiple Sahel analysts and observers from prominent think-tanks and international organisations have warned of the potentially severe threat to Bamako posed by the fuel blockade. Although JNIM is unlikely to possess the immediate capacity to seize the capital by force, continued instability and a deteriorating economy in Bamako could heighten the risk of an internal coup and significantly undermine the junta’s hold on power. Furthermore, a senior member of Mali’s previous government, who claims to be in close contact with senior members of Mali’s armed forces, stated that a Malian colonel who months ago insisted that a fall of Bamako to JNIM was impossible, now says that “[w]hat we are seeing is the country collapse before our eyes.”

It is highly likely that the junta will prioritise the use of limited fuel reserves for the military, exacerbating fuel shortages in civilian sectors. This will likely further drive anti-junta sentiment, improving JNIM recruitment efforts and potentially resulting in rare outbreaks of civil unrest. The previous warning on 28 October issued by the US Embassy in Mali advising US citizens to depart immediately, while commercial aviation options remain available, has been followed by multiple other international governments urging their citizens to leave, including Italy, Australia and Canada.

National advisories for Western governments are almost certainly urging their citizens to leave as soon as possible due to an assessed risk that evacuation without severe risks will be near impossible, should the junta collapse or Modibo Keita International Airport (BKO/GABS, formerly Bamako Senou International Airport) fail to continue commercial operations due to a major shortage of fuel, with most overland options assessed as too dangerous.

On 31 October, US President Donald Trump threatened military intervention in Nigeria in response to perceived persecution of Christians by “[r]adical Islamists”. He posted on Truth Social, “[t]he United States cannot stand by while such atrocities are happening in Nigeria, and numerous other Countries.” Trump subsequently called on the Secretary of War to “prepare for possible action” and that the US would enter Nigeria “guns-a-blazing”, reportedly insinuating that this could include boots-on-the-ground deployments.

Trump’s statement comes after months of campaigners and politicians in Washington having claimed that Islamist militants have systematically targeted Christians in Nigeria. Nigeria’s government has pushed back, claiming that the claims are a “gross misrepresentation of reality” and that “[t]errorists attack all who reject their murderous ideology—Muslims, Christians, and those of no faith alike.” However, Nigeria’s government also stated that it would welcome US assistance in helping with counterinsurgency efforts, as long as it respected its territorial integrity.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Trump’s post is almost certainly in reference to the ongoing jihadist insurgencies in Nigeria’s north east, where security forces are combating insurgencies from Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) splinter group. Both groups have targeted civilian communities in the region, with Boko Haram in particular carrying out numerous massacres and raids on villages near the tri-border area in Borno State, while ISWAP has typically targeted military outposts.

Boko Haram has destroyed churches and explicitly targeted Christians on several occasions, including beheading those who refuse to convert to Islam. The most recent Boko Haram attacks on Christians occurred on 30 and 31 August 2025, where its fighters killed eight Christians in two separate attacks in Borno State: five in Ngoshe village and three in Mussa village. On 3 November, ISWAP claimed killing a Christian in the town of Shikara, near Chibok, although this is the first targeting of Christians in months by the group. This claim highly likely aims to provoke the US into intervening militarily, which the group could use for propaganda purposes.

While Nigeria is at a national level demographically evenly split between Christians and Muslims, northern regions are primarily Muslim, with Christians comprising approximately 7 per cent of the 85 per cent Muslim Borno State. While Christians have constituted targets, Boko Haram has also targeted Muslims and irreligious people opposed to the group, with anyone refusing the group’s strict interpretation of Sharia considered apostates. On 5 September 2025, for example, Boko Haram indiscriminately killed at least 60 people in Darul Jamal, a village containing returnees from an internally displaced persons (IDP) camp.

Trump’s comments are highly likely to be perceived as undermining Nigerian sovereignty. Opposition political figures are highly likely to use this to criticise the government, and it could trigger anti-government protests. Furthermore, a key insurgent tactic typically involves undermining security forces and delegitimising the state. By influencing civilians into losing faith in the state’s ability to govern in the region, insurgents often aim to convert local populations to their cause by portraying themselves as able to govern more effectively. Furthermore, attacks on civilians are often intended to provoke an overreaction from security forces, which then harm local populations. Trump’s comments are highly likely to be used by jihadist propaganda to demonstrate Nigeria’s inability to exert a monopoly of force on its territory, as well as portraying the US as an evil power that seeks to destroy Islam, a key motif in jihadist propaganda.

Nigerian security forces are already undertaking an airstrike campaign against Boko Haram and ISWAP under Operation Hadin Kai (OPHK), which has resulted in high rates of civilian collateral damage. This is largely due to the militant group’s adeptness at blending in with local populations and the Nigerian Air Force’s (NAF’s) reliance on spot reports, informants, and aerial surveillance. It is likely that Trump’s comments are in part designed to force Nigeria into stepping up its counterinsurgency efforts, something which could bring with it a greater risk of civilian casualties. Increased efforts alone by Nigeria’s security forces will be unlikely to contain the insurgency, which has been ongoing since 2009, and there is a realistic possibility that this could trigger concrete US military intervention.

If the US were to intervene militarily, it could take a similar form to its counterinsurgency efforts in Somalia, which have involved missile strikes targeting insurgent strongholds. If the US military were to establish an entrenched presence in Nigeria, it could potentially also use this for hypothetical future operations in the broader Sahel region, particularly Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, where the military juntas are struggling to contain jihadist insurgencies.

According to the UN, at least 48 people have been killed in the protests, which broke out in support of Issa Tchiroma Bakary after he unilaterally declared victory in the 12 October presidential election. The most recent, and largest, wave of unrest took place between 26 and 30 October and followed sporadic violent clashes leading up to the announcement of the election results on 27 October.  Most of the deaths reportedly occurred in and around Douala at the hands of security forces, who allegedly beat and shot protesters.

Cameroon’s Interior Minister Paul Atanga Nji has declared that Bakary will face legal action over the protests, alleging he incited “violent post-election demonstrations”. However, Bakary has vowed to fight on. On 30 October, Bakary reported that his personal cook and a family member were detained by security forces. The following day, Bakary declared that he had been escorted to a secure location by soldiers loyal to him for his protection. On 31 October, Bakary called for three days of nationwide “ghost towns” to paralyse the economy. In a video posted on social media, Bakary urged supporters to close all businesses, stay home, and halt economic activity in a “peaceful paralysis” from 3 to 5 November.

Images from social media indicate that many businesses are closed across multiple Cameroonian cities, including Douala and Yaoundé. On 3 November, protests took place in Banyo, following a visit by the prefect. The home of the local official and the political party building were set on fire by protesters.

Biya is expected to be sworn in by 9 November. Reports indicate that the ceremony will take place on 6 November in Yaoundé. Meanwhile, unconfirmed reports have declared that a parallel “swearing-in” for Bakary will take place on the same day. However, some reports indicate that Bakary has already fled Cameroon to Adamawa State, Nigeria, close to the Cameroonian border.

Solace Global Assessment: 

If the dual swearing-in ceremonies take place, further unrest is highly likely, particularly in Yaoundé and Douala. Conducting a parallel ceremony would almost certainly indicate that Bakary is willing to lead the protest movement against the government, despite the high likelihood that he will be arrested. There is a realistic possibility that Bakary will announce further protest waves, which would likely help sustain civil unrest and increase pressure on the government by directing it from above. Security forces will highly likely respond forcefully, which could intensify protests.

The imposition of “ghost towns” is a popular tactic in Anglophone regions of Cameroon. The tactic involves a large-scale general strike, shutting down normal economic, social, and public life, leaving streets deserted, businesses and schools closed, and transport suspended. The tactic is implemented every Monday in Bamenda, the largest city across the Northwest and Southwest Anglophone regions. If residents disobey, they risk being attacked, kidnapped, or shot. Ghost towns have negatively impacted the local economy, with many being laid off due to the inability of employers to pay salaries, and investors pulling out of the Anglophone regions. There is a realistic possibility that Bakary will announce further waves of “ghost town” tactics, something that could be highly damaging for Cameroon’s economy. This tactic could circumvent the threat of security forces to protesters, since Cameroonians would be able to protest without risking their lives.

Civil unrest broke out across major cities in Tanzania between 29 and 31 October in protest of the ruling CCM party’s exclusion of major opposition parties in the 29 October general election. During the demonstrations, protesters clashed with security forces, and authorities declared a curfew and internet shutdown. Significant airport and transportation disruptions occurred, and many tourists were stranded at airports and in Zanzibar.

Death toll estimates differ significantly, with the UN confirming at least 10 fatalities, Amnesty International reporting over 100, and opposition sources claiming as many as 1,000. Agence France-Presse published that a security source informed them of reports of over “500 dead”, “maybe 700-800 in the whole country”. No major demonstrations have occurred since 31 October; security forces effectively locked down major cities over the weekend to prevent further protests.

On 1 November, incumbent President Samia Suluhu Hassan was declared the winner with 97.66 per cent of the vote, with turnout at 87 per cent, despite observers reporting many largely empty polling stations. A swearing-in ceremony took place at a military parade ground in Dodoma, instead of the usual stadium, with the event closed to the public. Hassan ordered authorities to ensure that people’s lives return to normal immediately. CHADEMA, the primary opposition party, rejected the results and called for a fresh election.

Following Hassan’s swearing in, a government spokesperson declared that social and economic activities would return to normal on 4 November. After the announcement, the curfew was lifted and internet access was restored, although NetBlocks has reported widespread restrictions to multiple social media and messaging platforms.

Before the lifting of internet restrictions, Tanzanian police circulated a text message on 3 November, warning the public to “Avoid sharing photos or videos that cause distress or degrade someone’s dignity. Doing so is a criminal offence, and if found, strict legal action will be taken.” Despite these warnings, many Tanzanians have shared footage of the protests across social media. Several images and videos depict security forces using live ammunition against protesters. Viral Scout Management, a sports management consultancy, posted on X that seven young football players it represented between the ages of 15 and 22 had been shot and killed in their homes during the unrest.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Footage and accounts of the security forces’ use of deadly force are highly likely to exacerbate anti-government sentiment, and there is a realistic possibility that this could lead to further civil unrest across the country. The prices of food, fuel, and other essentials have doubled or tripled in many areas, and some supermarkets are running low on food supplies due to the closure of Dar es Salaam port. Public hospitals are also reporting a shortage of medical supplies. The cost of living will likely add to the population’s frustrations with the government’s authoritarianism and electoral manipulation.

However, protests in Tanzania are generally rare, and security forces’ severe reaction to the protests, including the prolific use of live ammunition, is likely to deter many from engaging in further demonstrations. Furthermore, the quick swearing-in of Hassan is likely to lead to a sense of defeatism among protesters, and with many opposition members already arrested and the government’s control over the judiciary, there is no clear path to overturning the election. Any further demonstrations will highly likely be met with severe resistance from security forces, who are unlikely to hesitate to use lethal force.

For the first time, French far-right party National Rally (RN) passes legislation.

On 30 October, the National Assembly of France adopted a nonbinding resolution calling for the repeal of a contentious 1968 migration agreement with Algeria. The text was put forward by RN, and was supported by Horizons, a centre-right party that is part of President Emmanuel Macron’s Ensemble (EN) coalition. While not directly consequential in policy terms, the resolution likely represents an important political development, as it is the first time that RN has explicitly broken through the “cordon sanitaire” – the agreement between the centre and left to keep the far-right out of government.

RN, which currently polls first with around 34 per cent popular support, likely owes this success to the severe worsening of France-Algeria relations, which started in July 2024 after Macron backed the Moroccan position on Western Sahara. While the non-binding resolution is likely not enough to trigger large-scale unrest, further breaches in the cordon sanitaire have a high likelihood of provoking demonstrations in France, with universities being likely hotspots of turmoil.

Several ongoing and upcoming strikes in Italy.

Several strikes are scheduled to occur across Italy in November, with some having already started. On 4 November, student groups staged some protests, including by occupying some high schools in cities like Rome, Siena and Naples. This was followed, on 5 November, by a family doctors’ strike. Upcoming planned labour actions include: on 6 November, a strike by pharmacy staff, as well as a strike by the municipal staff in Bologna alone; on 7 and 30 November, two strikes by public transport staff in Milan; on 14 November, a strike by air traffic controllers; finally, a general strike on 28 November, which is likely to affect public transport, air traffic, and other services throughout the country. The strikes have almost certainly been called due to the recent submission, by the government, of the 2026 budget law, which several union leaders argue fails to address concerns regarding stagnating public sector salaries and the lack of funds for the education and healthcare sectors.  

Large-scale anti-government protests in Serbia, on anniversary of station canopy collapse.

On 1 November, large-scale protests were held in Novi Sad and Belgrade. The protests marked the first anniversary of the collapse of a train station canopy, which killed 16 people in Novi Sad. The incident sparked the largest protest movement in Serbia’s history. The protests on 1 November were attended by tens of thousands of people, with student groups, who have led much of the unrest, staging a multi-day march from Belgrade to Novi Sad. Further demonstrations were recorded in Belgrade on 2-4 November. While the protests remained generally peaceful, there were isolated cases of violence, including the throwing of pyrotechnics at protesters by likely counterprotesters and a journalist being physically assaulted.

Guinea’s junta leader announced his intention to stand in the December presidential election.

On 3 November, Guinea’s junta leader, Mamady Doumbouya, announced his intention to stand in the presidential election, which is scheduled to take place on 28 December. This announcement came despite the junta, which came to power in a 2021 coup, previously claiming that all members of the transitional military authority would be unable to serve in the new government. Doumbouya’s candidacy is enabled under Guinea’s new constitution, which was endorsed in a 21 September referendum. Periodic protests have been held by opposition parties and civil society organisations, despite the junta’s ban on demonstrations that was imposed in 2022.

Demonstrations erupted after the Guinean military junta postponed the elections in December 2024, resulting in a crackdown by security forces that killed a protester during clashes, and resulted in the arrest of hundreds of mostly young people. While the election is an important step in the transition towards democracy, the transition process has been marred by a lack of transparency, and Doumboya’s candidacy will highly likely cement the junta’s rule over the country. Should Doumbouya claim victory amidst an election lacking transparency and facing broad condemnation from both domestic opposition and international actors, there is a realistic possibility of widespread unrest erupting.  

Repeated clashes in Thessaloniki, Greece.

On the night of 1-2 November, clashes broke out in central Thessaloniki, with police forces being targeted with stones and Molotov cocktails. The violence reportedly started after the end of a music show in the area, when some individuals attacked police units stationed near the Turkish consulate. Police arrested at least 18 people. On the following day, 3 November, further clashes occurred outside a courthouse in Thessaloniki’s centre. The violence was reportedly started by football fans and coincided with the beginning of appeal proceedings regarding a football-related killing which occurred in 2022. As of 6 November, it is still unclear if the two cases are related. The threat of further violence during the 6-9 November period cannot be discounted.

Mass stabbing on a train carriage in Huntingdon, United Kingdom.

On 1 November, an individual carried out a mass stabbing on a train from Doncaster to London, England. Ten people were injured in the attack, and the perpetrator was arrested by responding police. Local police have linked the stabbing with three more incidents, including the stabbing of a 14-year-old, which occurred earlier on the day in Peterborough. Police have also ruled out classifying the attack as terrorism, and there is no indication that the attacker espoused any extremist ideology. Nevertheless, it cannot be ruled out that the attack was inspired by previous high-profile stabbing attacks in the UK.

Likely lone-wolf car-ramming attack on Île d’Oléron, France.

On 5 November, an individual carried out a car-ramming attack on Île d’Oléron, an island off the western coast of France south of Nantes. The suspect reportedly drove between two local villages, hitting pedestrians, before setting his car on fire in a likely attempt to cause an explosion (police found an unexploded gas tank in the vehicle). Ten people were injured in the attack, two critically. The suspect was detained at the scene by responding police. While the dynamic of the incident makes it highly likely that it was a terror attack meant to cause civilian casualties, the attacker’s ideological motive has not been conclusively confirmed by authorities as of 6 November, although available information seems to suggest that the attack was at least partly inspired by radical Islamist ideology. Authorities have, however, disclosed that the suspect was not known to counterterrorism police. This likely means that he underwent a process of individual “self-radicalisation”, highly likely via social media and other digital media.

German Anarchist group firebombs local AfD leader’s vehicle in Hamburg.

On the night of 3 November, German anarchists torched a car of a local leader of the far-right party Alternative for Germany (AfD) in Othmarschen, western Hamburg. The group, which identified itself as a local Antifa chapter, claimed that the attack was in retaliation for developments in both Germany and the US, particularly the upcoming trial of 13 activists in Dresden and Düsseldorf, and the designation of Antifa as a foreign terrorist organisation by the Trump administration.

German far-left groups continue to be among the most active in Europe and increasingly use sabotage to target both political opponents and high-value ideological targets (the most notable recent example is the sabotage of the Tesla “Gigafactory”, near Berlin, in March 2024). As November has several important political anniversaries, such as 7 November (the October Revolution), 9 November (the 1918 November Revolution, 1923 Beer Hall Putsch, Kristallnacht, Fall of the Berlin Wall), and 21 November (1992 killing of Silvio Meier by neo-Nazis), further cases of direct action and vandalism cannot be ruled out.

US to establish military presence in Damascus, Syria.

On 6 November, Reuters published a report claiming that the US will establish a military presence at an airbase in the Syrian capital, as part of growing diplomatic relations with the new Syrian government. On 10 November, Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa is expected to meet US President Donald Trump in Washington. US officials have increasingly sought to establish security ties with post-Assad Syria. In the short term, Washington aims to bring Syria further within the global anti-Islamic State (IS) coalition, which will likely be one focus of the 10 November summit. More ambitiously, the US administration likely seeks to increasingly integrate Syria within the Abraham Accords, although this hinges on the resolution of Israeli-Syrian border disputes, which appears unlikely in the short term.

Israeli media reports that Israeli officials are considering further decapitation strikes in Lebanon.

On 4 and 5 November, several Israeli news agencies reported that Israeli officials are considering carrying out a “several-day” operation targeting the leadership and infrastructure of the Lebanon-based militant groups. The reports likely follow assessments that Hezbollah is seeking to rearm and replenish its manpower following the severe attrition it suffered from Israeli strikes over the past years. Hezbollah’s efforts in this direction have almost certainly been complicated by several adverse developments, including the fall of the Assad regime, the weakening of Iran’s own international position, and the election of an unfriendly government in Lebanon. It is likely that, ahead of carrying out possible strikes, Israeli officials will seek to amplify pressure on their Lebanese counterparts to carry out disarmament efforts aimed at reducing Hezbollah’s military capabilities. Beirut, in turn, almost certainly fears directly kinetically deploying the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) against Hezbollah, due to the risk of such a move provoking severe civil strife in Lebanon, including sectarian violence along religious lines.

Iraqi parliamentary elections to be held on 11 November.

Iraq is scheduled to hold parliamentary elections on 11 November, which are the most important in the Iraqi political system, as MPs are responsible for appointing the president, who then nominates a prime minister. The previous elections in October 2021 led to a year-long government formation crisis and significant civil unrest. A defining feature of the upcoming election has almost certainly been the growing fragmentation within Iraq’s various ethno-sectarian blocs, most notably within the ‘Shia powerhouse’ of Iraqi politics.

Given the complex political dynamics, it is unlikely that there will be a rapid and uncomplicated route to government formation in the immediate aftermath of the election. This will likely mean a period of protracted political instability, which will increase the risk of violent civil unrest, politically motivated attacks and internal armed conflict. There is a realistic possibility that the elections and likely subsequent period of political instability will provoke violent civil unrest in Baghdad and other urban centres, as has occurred in most Iraqi elections. Although the 2021 elections resulted in lower levels of civil unrest than in previous years, violent and deadly clashes still occurred in Baghdad, resulting in two deaths and 125 injuries.

Clashes between ISSP and JNIM continue near Dori, Burkina Faso.

On 2 or 3 November, fighters of the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) reportedly ambushed a Jama’at Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) convoy near Kacham, located at the Burkina Faso-Mali border in Oudalam province, and approximately 50 kilometres north of Dori. The attack killed three JNIM fighters and was reportedly in retaliation for a previous raid on a village. While clashes between JNIM and ISSP have been ongoing for more than a year around Dori, ISSP has recently accelerated its pace of operations, with several successful attacks recorded by the group in recent months. There is a realistic possibility that ISSP is taking advantage of JNIM’s deployment of resources against the junta to carry out actions in peripheral areas such as Dori, where it enjoys relative manpower and resource parity with the otherwise much stronger regional rival.

JNIM conducts first attack in Nigeria.

On 31 October, the al-Qaeda-linked Jama’at Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) claimed responsibility for an attack that killed a soldier in Kwara state in central Nigeria. The attack occurred in the early hours of 29 October and targeted a military patrol, with JNIM also managing to seize ammunition and cash. The assault was reportedly launched from Kainji Park, a forested area reportedly used as a hideout for armed groups.

This attack is highly likely indicative of JNIM’s expansion into Nigeria and follows a video the group published in June 2025, where a spokesperson claimed it intended to set up a Katiba (brigade) in the country. There is a realistic possibility that JNIM militants crossed into Nigeria from eastern Benin, where the group maintains an established foothold. In recent months, JNIM has significantly intensified its operations in the country, including two coordinated assaults in Wara and Bessassi near the northern border overnight between 4 and 5 October. However, as JNIM’s primary area of activity remains northern Benin rather than its eastern regions, it is also likely that the group has maintained a presence in Nigeria for several months.

Confirmed JNIM presence in Nigeria will almost certainly increase pressure on Nigeria’s already strained security forces, which are struggling to contain numerous insurgencies, primarily from Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) in the northeastern Borno State, as well as numerous bandit groups in northern regions. Further attacks are highly likely, with JNIM almost certainly looking to entrench its foothold in the region and exploit security forces’ overstretched counterinsurgency efforts.

Pirates attempt to board two tankers off Somalia’s coast.

In the early hours of 6 November, armed pirates attacked a commercial tanker, HELLAS APHRODITE (IMO: 9722766), off the coast of Mogadishu. Pirates reportedly fired machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) at the vessel in an apparent attempt to board it. The vessel was en route from Sikka, India, to Durban, South Africa and Latsco Marine Management confirmed that all 24 of the vessel’s crew members reported safe. United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) subsequently issued an alert to warn vessels in the area of the attack.

This attack comes just days after a similar incident on 3 November, where pirates targeted the STOLT SAGALAND (IMO: 9352200), suspiciously approaching on a small skiff before being warded off by warning shots from the vessel’s Armed Security Team (AST). Reports indicate the pirates are operating from an Iranian fishing boat they seized, which they are highly likely using as a mothership. These constitute the first piracy attack targeting commercial tankers since May 2024, although numerous fishing vessels have been targeted. Given that the allegedly seized Iranian fishing vessel continues to operate in the area, pirates are highly likely to target more vessels in the region in the coming days and weeks.

Water crisis in Tehran, Iran.

Iranian state media reported, on 2 November, that the country’s capital is at risk of a severe water shortage amidst a drought. Water levels at Amir Kabir Dam, one of the key reservoirs supplying water to Tehran’s ten million residents, have dropped to 14 million cubic metres of water, down from approximately 86 million one year ago. Decreasing levels at the dams near the capital, which provide around 70 per cent of Tehran’s water needs, have resulted in increased pressure on groundwater sources, which, however, take longer to replenish. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian has repeatedly warned of the risks from the water crisis. In October, he called for the country’s capital to be moved to the south of the country to address the problem. A further worsening in Tehran’s water crisis could become a major driver of unrest in addition to provoking a domestic humanitarian crisis. In a worst-case scenario, it could result in the mass displacement of people inside Iran.

Typhoon Kalmaegi, known in the Philippines as Typhoon Tino, made landfall in the Eastern Visayas region of the Philippines on 3 November. The typhoon caused significant flooding as it traversed through the Visayas Islands in central Philippines, particularly in the Province of Cebu. At least 114 deaths have been recorded, particularly on Cebu Island. Guiuan town in Eastern Samar and Cebu province have both declared a state of calamity due to severe flooding and damage. At least 400,000 individuals were displaced by the storm as a result of anticipatory evacuations, and dozens of people remain missing.

As of 12:00 UTC, 6 November, the typhoon is anticipated to make landfall imminently in central Vietnam, with sustained wind speeds of up to 200 km/h. Vietnam has already experienced significant flooding, with at least 40 people killed in recent days. In anticipation, Vietnamese authorities have halted operations at six airports and issued urgent evacuation orders for citizens in high-risk areas. 

Solace Global Assessment: 

The area of the Philippines most impacted by Typhoon Kalmaegi was in the process of recovering from a magnitude 6.9 earthquake on 30 September that killed at least 79 people. Moreover, the Philippines was recovering from the impact of two other back-to-back typhoons, Super Typhoon Ragasa (known locally as Nando) and Typhoon Bualoi (known locally as Opong).

The Philippines typically experiences around 20 storms and typhoons annually, and with the arrival of Kalmaegi, the disaster-prone archipelago has already reached that number in 2025. A weather specialist employed at PAGASA has stated that at least “three to five” more storms are anticipated in the Philippines by the end of the year.

Disaster resilience, which consists of multiple factors including preparedness measures, infrastructure quality, building planning, and emergency response capacity, is a critical determinant of a natural disaster’s potential impact. The Philippines, due to its confluence of extreme exposure to environmental threats (both earthquakes and tropical storms) and poor disaster resilience, is frequently cited as one of the most vulnerable countries in the world to natural disasters.

The most effective method of mitigating against mass casualties from an incoming tropical cyclone is almost certainly the mandatory mass evacuation of exposed populations in areas anticipated to be highly impacted. In anticipation of Typhoon Kalmaegi, authorities pre-emptively moved nearly 400,000 people. However, Cebu’s governor, Pamela Baricuatro, stated that the impact of the current disaster is “unprecedented”, with multiple sources indicating that the sheer extent of the flooding in the Province of Cebu, almost certainly resulting from the overflowing of so many rivers, has overwhelmed emergency response efforts.

The severe impact of the current flooding will likely further galvanise the nationwide protest movement against corruption in disaster resiliency projects, which were triggered by alleged gross mismanagement and corruption in flood management initiatives. Protests have occurred several times a week since September, with large-scale protests occurring, for example, on 21 September when an estimated 60,000 people attended demonstrations in Metro Manila.

In Vietnam, the imminent landfall of Typhoon Kalmaegi will highly likely exacerbate ongoing severe flooding in central Vietnam since at least 27 October, which has particularly impacted the cities of Da Nang, Quang Ngai, Hue, and the popular tourist town of Hoi An. These floods have resulted from monsoon rains and Tropical Depression Fengshen. Kalmaegi is forecast to make landfall south of Da Nang in central Vietnam, directly in the areas worst impacted by the already ongoing floods. Infrastructure in the region has already been severely impacted, isolating several rural communities, and it is highly likely that this impact will significantly worsen. Typhoon Kalmaegi’s landfall in central Vietnam will highly likely pose a high threat to life in at-risk areas.

Jamaat-e-Islami threatens “mass uprising” in Bangladesh on 11 November if demands are not met.

Representatives of Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), the largest Islamist party in Bangladesh, have threatened to stage a “mass uprising” on 11 November if the interim government fails to meet their demands to hold a constitutional referendum ahead of the next election (which is currently expected to take place in February 2026). JI, like the other two major parties in Bangladesh – the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and the student-led National Citizen Party (NCP) – seeks to prioritise its preferred timeline for the implementation of the July Charter reforms meant to govern Bangladesh’s political transition following the ousting of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in the summer of 2024. Threats of large-scale protests have increasingly been leveraged by the main parties in likely efforts to coerce the interim government, which has reduced room to manoeuvre with the approaching election date. Continuing political tensions over the implementation of the July Charter are highly likely to remain key drivers of violent civil unrest, including mob violence, in Bangladesh.

Pro-Palestine protesters clash with police in Sydney, Australia.

On 3 November, pro-Palestine protesters clashed with police outside the Sydney International Convention Centre, which was hosting an expo attended by weapons manufacturers. The protests had been called due to the participation of Israeli firms in the convention. Police deployed pepper spray and carried out 12 arrests. Previously, in September 2024, protesters and police clashed during a similar expo in Melbourne, with the protests resulting in more than 110 arrests. The incident highlights the continued threat of unrest driven by the war in Gaza, despite the recent approval of a ceasefire deal between Israel and Hamas.

New Islamist group claims attacks in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan.

On 2 November, a previously unknown group calling itself Ansar ul Jihad claimed, via its alleged leader, to have carried out multiple attacks on 31 October and 1 November in the Kurram, Bajaur, and Dir districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The group shares its name with some Al-Qaeda affiliates, but it does not appear, so far, to be clearly aligned to any overarching extremist network. There is a realistic possibility that the group is an affiliate or offshoot of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). It cannot be ruled out that the group’s appearance is related to the killing, on 27 October, of senior TTP leader Qari Amjad (alias “Mufti Muzahim”) in the Bajaur district by Pakistani forces.

Magnitude 6.3 earthquake near Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan.

On 3 November, a 6.3 magnitude tremor occurred near Mazar-e-Sharif, northern Afghanistan, at a depth of approximately 28 kilometres. The earthquake caused widespread damage in the area, killing at least 27 people and injuring more than 500. It also damaged the Blue Mosque or Mausoleum of Ali, an important religious shrine. Local media have reported that the earthquake’s impact was exacerbated by the poor building quality and weak materials used in structures in the area. Furthermore, the location of several impacted communities in the mountainous Samangan province likely further complicated rescue efforts. The USGS’s “aftershock forecast” indicates a 32 per cent likelihood of a magnitude 5+ aftershock over the next month.

Maldives introduces world-first ‘generational’ smoking ban.

On 31 October, a new law was approved by President Mohamed Muizzu prohibiting individuals born in 2007 or later from smoking or purchasing tobacco products, including e-cigarettes. Infringements are punished by fines of approximately USD 3,200 for consumers, while retailers face considerably higher penalties. This is the first ‘generational’ smoking ban in the world.  Notably, the law applies to both locals and travellers, meaning that foreign tourists taking tobacco products for personal use to the Maldives are highly likely to face penalties.

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