On 28 October, Hurricane Melissa made landfall on the southwest coast of Jamaica at Category 5 strength. With maximum recorded wind speeds of 296 km/h (184 mph), the Global Disaster Alert and Coordination System (GDACS) anticipated that Hurricane Melissa could have a high humanitarian impact, with a total exposed population of 3 million to category 1 or higher wind speeds, and a maximum storm surge of 0.9 metres. In anticipation of the powerful hurricane, Jamaican authorities issued mandatory evacuation orders for at-risk areas, temporarily closed Norman Manley International Airport (KIN) in Kingston and Sangster International Airport (MBJ) in Montego Bay, and opened hundreds of shelters. The damages wrought by the hurricane were significant, with St. Elizabeth Parish among the worst-affected areas. At least eight deaths have been recorded in Jamaica, with early estimates of USD 22 billion in damages.

The hurricane also had a high level of impact in Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, the Bahamas and the Turks & Caicos Islands. The hurricane made landfall close to the city of Santiago de Cuba, Cuba, at Category 3 strength, with Cuban authorities having evacuated over 735,000 people in anticipation. The outer bands of the hurricane caused heavy rainfall and landslides in Haiti and the Dominican Republic, with at least 25 deaths recorded in Haiti.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Hurricane Melissa is the 13th named storm of 2025’s Atlantic hurricane season (June to November), with the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration having previously predicted an above-normal season with between 13 to 18 named storms and three to five major hurricanes. Hurricane Melissa is the third Category 5 Atlantic hurricane of the season. However, unlike the other Category 5 hurricanes, Erin and Humberto, which reached such intensities further east over the Atlantic, Melissa directly made landfall in Jamaica and then Cuba and had a far more severe level of impact. Moreover, the hurricane moved slowly, likely exacerbating the impact.

A country’s disaster resilience, which consists of multiple factors including preparedness measures, infrastructure quality, building planning, and emergency response capacity, remains the most critical determinant of a natural disaster’s potential impact. Jamaica is assessed by GDACS as having Medium vulnerability. Hurricane Beryl in the summer of 2024 led to at least four deaths in Jamaica and USD 204 million in damages, and many of the areas worst hit by Melissa were still recovering from the impact of Beryl.

So far, there have been no fatalities recorded in Cuba, with comprehensive evacuation orders almost certainly mitigating against high levels of casualties. Cuba has already, over the past year, been heavily impacted by a series of nationwide power blackouts, leading to rare instances of civil unrest, with these issues with the nation’s energy infrastructure almost certain to be exacerbated by Hurricane Melissa.

It is highly unlikely that Sangster International Airport on Jamaica’s northern coast in the Montego Bay area will reopen imminently, being far more directly hit by the hurricane than Kingston and Norman Manley International Airport. As of the morning (UTC) of 30 October, American Airlines has announced the resumption of operations in Kingston, Jamaica (KIN), Holguin, Cuba (HOG. and Providenciales, Turks and Caicos (PLS). It will almost certainly take years for Jamaica to fully recover from the impact of Melissa, which has been Jamaica’s strongest-ever storm, highlighting the on average increasing severity of storm systems as a result of climate change and the increasing need for resiliency measures and disaster preparedness.

On 28 October, Brazilian police launched “Operation Containment”, a series of large-scale raids across Rio de Janeiro state, deploying more than 2,500 officers and special forces troops. The raid targeted Comando Vermelho (CV), a militia and organised criminal group that retains a large presence across Rio’s favelas. Police forces and CV members engaged in clashes throughout 28 October, with CV reportedly deploying drone-dropped grenades against security forces.

According to local media, the raid resulted in the deaths of at least 132 people, four of whom were police officers, and in more than 113 arrests. This makes the raid the deadliest in Rio’s history, surpassing the death toll of the 1992 Carandiru Prison massacre. Following the raid, several road blockades were recorded across the Rio de Janeiro state. According to local media, these were staged by CV in retaliation for the operation.

Solace Global Assessment: 

As evidenced by its name, the raid was meant to address the growing efforts by CV to expand its area of operations in Rio de Janeiro state. In recent months, CV has engaged in repeated clashes with other militias in the Jacarepaguá region, in Rio’s southwest. Local media have argued that these efforts are part of a growing “nationalisation” strategy being adopted by CV, which aims to both expand the group’s presence in areas traditionally outside of its control, while simultaneously building or expanding partnerships with smaller local criminal groups.

The operation occurred only weeks before Brazil is scheduled to host the COP 30 summit, which will highly likely increase the number of high-profile international visitors to Brazil. While Belém, the summit’s host city, is located over 2,000 kilometres from Rio in the state of Pará, the summit will likely result in an increase in the number of international arrivals to Rio and other Brazilian cities. There is a realistic possibility that the timing of the operation was meant to weaken CV (which is the main criminal group in Pará) ahead of the summit.

Overall, it is likely too early to assess the success of the operation. However, early reports likely indicate that the raid failed to achieve any meaningful success against CV. First, authorities have remarked how the raid, while resulting in the arrest or killing of several high-ranking CV members, failed to capture Edgar Alves Andrade, known as Doca da Penha, one of the key CV leaders who is assessed to operate in the Complexo do Alemão and Penha favelas. Second, the high death toll of the raid is likely to result in significant domestic condemnation, as past police raids in Rio have already been criticised for resulting in disproportionately high civilian casualties in already marginalised communities. For CV, which often presents itself as an alternative provider of welfare in impoverished informal settlements, the large-scale violence is likely to offer an opportunity to increase recruitment efforts among the civilian population.

Ecuadorian Indigenous alliance to end highway-blocking protests.

Ecuador’s Indigenous alliance, the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE), stated that it will suspend its month-long highway-blocking protests on 22 October. The decision was made after President Daniel Noboa threatened to deploy the military to forcibly clear roadways. The protests, which were triggered by the government’s decision to end the diesel fuel subsidy, had caused severe economic disruption, particularly in the agricultural and transport sectors dependent on low-cost fuel. Diesel prices rose sharply from USD 1.80 to USD 2.80 per gallon, fuelling discontent among rural and low-income communities. CONAIE President Marlon Vargas said the decision to halt demonstrations was made to protect lives, likely in response to the threat of the military being deployed. However, Vargas warned that Indigenous resistance would continue politically, which is likely to involve less disruptive protests in urban areas. Moreover, while CONAIE is Ecuador’s largest and most influential Indigenous rights body, it does not account for or speak for all Indigenous communities, and there is a realistic possibility that smaller or unaffiliated groups could continue localised roadblocks that may lead to disruption and clashes with the security forces.

Argentine President Milei scores important victory in parliamentary elections.

On 26 October, President Javier Milei’s party, La Libertad Avanza (LLA) won more than 40 per cent of the vote both in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, achieving its best-ever result and becoming the largest party in parliament. While LLA is still short of an absolute majority, which means that it will continue to have to rely on deals with smaller parliamentary forces, the result is likely to greatly increase the momentum of President Milei’s radical libertarian economic agenda, after a period during which the president’s profile was marred by several political scandals. LLA’s victory, most notably, removes the opposition’s numerical strength to override the presidential veto, which Milei used repeatedly to block legislative proposals opposed to his agenda. In geopolitical terms, the result is highly likely to vindicate Milei’s strongly pro-Washington foreign policy.

US kills 14 in strike on suspected narcotics vessels off Colombia.

On 28 October, US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth announced that the US military had conducted strikes on four suspected drug-trafficking vessels in the Eastern Pacific off the coast of Colombia. The strikes reportedly killed 14 people, whom US officials described as members of transnational criminal networks linked to Venezuelan-backed smuggling operations. The death toll from the 13 disclosed strikes by the US military since early September now stands at nearly 60 people, with this incident marking the first time multiple strikes were announced on a single day.

Hegseth stated that the four vessels were known to US intelligence and were transiting along known-trafficking routes, with routes in the Eastern Pacific likely increasingly used by traffickers to avoid the US naval deployment in the Caribbean. The strikes off the coast of Colombia are likely targeting vessels linked to the guerrilla group and US-proscribed Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTO), the National Liberation Army (ELN), which Washington has long accused of engaging in large-scale narcotics trafficking operations supported by the Maduro regime.

Militant drone attack in Cauca, Colombia, injures eight.

On 29 October, militants of the Carlos Patiño Front, a subsection of the Estadio Mayor Central (EMC), one of the largest splinter groups that emerged from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), staged a drone attack targeting Colombian troops in Argelia, Cauca. The attack was reportedly botched, and the drone-dropped grenades missed the troops, instead injuring eight civilians. It is highly likely that the attack was in retaliation for the joint military-police Operation Perseus II, which aims to root out militant elements in the Micay Canyon. The canyon is a key region for the cultivation of coca leaf, and several armed groups operate in the area.

Putin signs strategic partnership treaty with Venezuela.

On 27 October, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law ratifying the strategic partnership and cooperation treaty with Venezuela. The accord, first established in May 2025, solidifies Moscow’s and Caracas’ relationship, spanning economic, political, and military spheres. The agreement formalises bilateral commitments on energy cooperation, including joint ventures in oil and gas production, the expansion of arms sales and defence training, and increased coordination on international political issues. The ratification of the treaty follows a major US military build-up in the Caribbean, which includes multiple warships, amphibious assault ships, the forward positioning of air assets and the planned arrival of a US Navy aircraft carrier strike group (CSG). This deployment has involved strikes on alleged narcotic smuggling vessels linked to Venezuela, but has also been analysed as a move to decrease Chinese, Russian and Iranian influence in South America. The treaty will likely enable Russia to strengthen its strategic foothold in Venezuela, providing Russia with an ally and potential logistical hub in the Western Hemisphere, and could result in the expanded presence of Russian military personnel, advisors, or assets on Venezuelan territory. However, such a development is likely to be a direct challenge to Washington’s security interests and may increase the risk of US military intervention in Venezuela.

Water shortages reported in State of Mexico following an operation targeting illegal water trade.

On 27 October, severe drinking water shortages were reported across the State of Mexico following Operation Caudal, a joint federal and state operation launched on 24 October to combat illegal water extraction and trade. The operation, which targeted nearly 200 clandestine wells and distribution points across 48 municipalities, led to the closure of multiple water sources used by water purification plants, industries, and tanker truck operators.

In response, owners and workers of purification plants have blocked major roads on the periphery of Mexico City in Chimalhuacán, Chicoloapan, Nezahualcóyotl, and Los Reyes La Paz, demanding that the authorities guarantee legal water access. Several businesses, schools, hospitals, and food-processing companies have since reported supply shortages, with some forced to suspend operations. The water shortages will almost certainly exacerbate Mexico City’s longstanding water crisis, which has included years of drought and losses from water leaks caused by damaged infrastructure. If sustained, the current shortages are likely to disrupt supply chains and increase the risk of unrest and several health risks, including reduced sanitation, contamination of stored water, and outbreaks of waterborne diseases.

Ecuador issues weather alert covering nearly the entire country.

Ecuador’s National Institute of Meteorology and Hydrology (INAMHI) issued a 20-hour weather alert from the afternoon of 28 October to midday on 29 October, warning of intense rainfall, flooding, and possible landslides across several regions. The most affected areas covered in the alert include the provinces of Esmeraldas and Santo Domingo, areas near the eastern slopes of the Andes, and much of the Amazon region, where rising river levels could cause overflow. The alert stems from humid air masses entering from the southern continent and the Amazon Basin, combined with atmospheric instability linked to an active Kelvin wave, a tropical weather disturbance that moves eastward along the equator, often bringing increased rainfall, thunderstorms, and atmospheric instability as it passes. NAMHI has warned of urban flooding and transport disruption, especially along major routes, with the heavy rainfall expected to heighten the risk of flooding, landslides, and power outages in affected regions.

Amid intensified Russian offensive operations against Pokrovsk in Donetsk Oblast, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on 27 October that Ukrainian forces are currently outnumbered eight to one in the besieged city. Russia’s Chief of the General Staff, Valery Gerasimov, claimed on 26 October that around 5,500 Ukrainian soldiers are encircled in and around Pokrovsk, a claim which was firmly denied by Zelensky as “a complete lie”. Ukrainian officials have stated that 200 Russian troops have penetrated central Pokrovsk, with previous footage posted by Ukraine’s 7^th Rapid Reaction Corps showing strikes conducted against Russian forces at a railway station in central Pokrovsk.

In addition to small groups of Russian troops penetrating Pokrovsk from the southwest, Russian forces have intensified offensive operations in the direction of Myrnohrad, a city approximately 6km to the northeast of Pokrovsk that also sits on the T0504 highway, a main supply route that links the eastern front to the city of Dnipro. Open source intelligence mapping currently indicates that the Ukrainian-controlled corridor out of the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad pocket has narrowed to potentially less than three kilometres.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Pokrovsk, which had a pre-war population of 60,000, has been a vital transportation and logistics hub for Ukrainian forces fighting along the frontlines in Donetsk Oblast. The loss of Pokrovsk would be a major battlefield defeat for Ukraine and could set the conditions for future advances into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, and potentially facilitate future Russia offensives seeking to encircle the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration. However, the Russian offensive on the Pokrovsk axis began in the summer of 2024 with Russian forces having advanced slowly and accruing enormous casualties, with any hypothetical future offensives highly likely to be similarly costly.

Compared to the Battle of Bakhmut over two and a half years ago, which was fought with house-to-house battles and large numbers of armoured vehicles, Pokrovsk has been fought with small groups of infantry being able to exercise a degree of control over entire streets, with considerable quantities of first-person view (FPV) drones, artillery and airstrikes attacking ground lines of communication (GLOCs).  Ukrainian forces come under significant drone attack when entering the Pokrovsk pocket, with defenders having to increasingly rely on uncrewed ground vehicles (UGVs) for resupply.

Russian claims of an encirclement have likely been exaggerated, and the ongoing Ukrainian defence of Pokrovsk indicates that Russian forces are unlikely to achieve a rapid breakthrough. However,  the high casualty rate and attrition facing Ukrainian units could eventually necessitate a tactical withdrawal to preserve combat effectiveness, re-establish balanced frontages and deny Russian encirclement. Moreover, while Ukrainian forces in Pokrovsk may not be physically encircled, the pressure on GLOCs from FPVs and indirect fires may have created conditions functionally equivalent to encirclement.

There have been reports that Russian President Vladimir Putin has ordered the seizure of Pokrovsk by mid-November, which, if accurate, would highly likely reflect a strong desire in the Kremlin to bolster its claims to annex the Donbas. The current position of both the US Donald Trump administration and Kyiv is to push for a freezing of the conflict along the current frontlines, with the proposed US-Russia Budapest summit almost certainly being called off following Moscow’s refusal to countenance any negotiations that do not involve full Russian annexation of the Donbas. Kyiv is almost certainly unable to cede the remaining Ukrainian-controlled parts of the Donbas (which include the highly defensible ‘fortress belt’) without forfeiting defensive depth and considerably exposing other parts of Ukraine to the threat of future Russian offensives.

However, pressures on the Kremlin are highly likely significantly increasing due to the successes of the Ukrainian campaign against Russia’s oil and gas industry, and the implementation of new sanctions by the Trump administration against Russia’s two largest oil companies, Rosneft and Lukoil, with Lukoil announcing on 30 October the planned sale of its foreign assets to the multinational Guvnor Group due to the sanctions. Moscow will highly likely continue to dedicate significant resources and manpower on the battlefield to coerce the ceding of the Donbas, with any seizure of Pokrovsk almost certain to be exploited by the Kremlin to push for maximalist concessions.

On 28 October, the US Embassy in Mali issued an evacuation order urging all US citizens in Mali to “depart immediately”. The ordered followed the 24 October decision by the US State Department to authorise the departure of non-emergency US government personnel and family members for Mali, stating that “the US government cannot offer routine or emergency services to US citizens outside of Bamako due to safety risks. The travel advisory level for Mali is currently at level 4, or “do not travel,” the highest the highest advisory level issued by the US State Department. On 29 October, the Italian Foreign Ministry followed suit, declaring “Italian nationals already in Mali are urged to leave the country as soon as possible”.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The US evacuation order was almost certainly issued in response to the ongoing fuel blockade imposed by Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), an al-Qaeda-linked militant coalition. The fuel blockade, which began in September, has targeted fuel trucks on key overland supply routes connecting Bamako to Côte d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast) and Senegal, through which the vast majority of the country’s fuel imports are transported. The blockade has resulted in severe fuel shortages, a reduction in energy output, disrupted commercial and humanitarian logistics, and forced the junta government to close all schools and universities.

The junta government, which is struggling to contain the JNIM insurgency and facing renewed offensives from Tuareg separatist groups and other armed factions across Mali after expelling Western forces, will almost certainly focus on regime survival. This will likely involve prioritising the remaining fuel reserves for military operations and electricity generation to mitigate the threat of large-scale civil unrest. This will highly likely result in critical fuel shortages in civilian sectors, including commercial aviation and transportation. Fuel shortages will almost certainly limit options for evacuation via commercial airlines should there be a major deterioration in the security environment, with overland routes assessed as too dangerous due to the threat posed by militant groups. 

JNIM’s strategy likely involves the gradual isolation of Bamako, which will almost certainly undermine the junta government and enable JNIM to position itself as an alternative governing authority, likely increasing the effectiveness of its recruitment and propaganda campaigns. Sustained fuel shortages are likely to result in energy shortages, the inflation of essential goods and disruption to public services. Long-term, this strategy is likely to increase anti-government sentiment, increasing the risk of major and potentially violent civil unrest or a coup, with Mali experiencing two coups and several alleged attempts in the last few years.

Initial reports indicate that the junta is looking to Russia to secure a fuel supply agreement and additional logistical support through the Africa Corps (formerly Wagner Group). This move will likely strengthen Bamako’s strategic relationship with Moscow, which may help to ensure short-term regime survival, but is likely to result in the further international isolation of the junta amid waning Western influence in Mali.  

On 28 October, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, Sudan’s military chief, confirmed the Sudanese Armed Forces’ (SAF) withdrawal from El-Fasher, the capital of North Darfur. According to the statement, the withdrawal was negotiated with local leaders to prevent the “systematic destruction and killing of civilians”, which has been a key Rapid Support Forces (RSF) tactic since the beginning of the 18-month siege.

Footage shared on social media depicted RSF fighters celebrating around the former military base in El-Fasher, as well as shooting, beating, and detaining civilians as they fled the city. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), RSF fighters carried out ethnically motivated “summary executions” of civilians upon capture of El-Fasher. The Sudan Doctor Network has also accused RSF fighters of looting hospitals and medical facilities, destroying the remaining healthcare infrastructure in the city. The Governor of Sudan’s Darfur region has declared that at least 460 patients were killed in an RSF attack on a Saudi maternity hospital in El-Fasher.

At least 26,000 people have been displaced from El-Fasher between 26 and 27 October, and over 3,000 people have arrived at Tawila, 60 kilometres southwest of El-Fasher, since 18 October. The UNHCR has reported that many of these refugees are starving or injured, with 75 per cent of a sample of 165 children found to be malnourished, 25 per cent of which are in “very severe” condition. Approximately 260,000 people remain in El-Fasher under the control of the RSF, half of them children.

Solace Global Assessment: 

El-Fasher, under siege by the RSF since April 2024, was the last remaining major SAF stronghold in Darfur. Its capture cements the RSF’s dominance across the Darfur region and almost certainly constitutes the most consequential strategic shift in the conflict since the SAF’s retaking of Khartoum in March 2025, an event that almost certainly prompted the RSF to intensify its campaign to seize El-Fasher.

Following the capture of Khartoum, the RSF declared itself a rival government body, dubbed the “Government of Peace and Unity”. The capture of El-Fasher highly likely creates a de facto split within Sudan, between the SAF-held north and east and the RSF-held west. The SAF will almost certainly find it even harder to recapture Darfur, likely cementing the conflict along the current lines of control.

El-Fasher’s capture will almost certainly worsen the humanitarian situation in Sudan, particularly since the city served as the main entry point for aid convoys distributing aid to Darfur. Furthermore, the capture of El-Fasher will highly likely intensify ethnically motivated killings. The Sudanese conflict has increasingly taken on an ethnic dimension, with mobilisation along ethnic lines contributing to large-scale atrocities against civilians. The RSF has heavily recruited from Arab tribal groups in western and central Sudan, including the Hawazma, Kenana, and Misseriya in South Kordofan. By emphasising ‘Arab’ vs ‘non-Arab’ identity in its recruitment drive, ‘non-Arab’ ethnic groups have been increasingly targeted during the war.

The tactical targeting of civilians in El-Fasher during the siege, was highly likely intended to exacerbate the humanitarian situation in the city, sever supply lines, crush morale, and increase pressure on the SAF. This almost certainly blurs the line between combatant and non-combatant, highly likely further contributing to the perception that civilians are legitimate targets. The fact that this tactic successfully contributed to uprooting the SAF from the city highly likely indicates that the RSF will continue to deploy it, making the further targeting of civilians highly likely.

The widespread news reports of RSF atrocities in El-Fasher will almost certainly increase pressure on the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which has been accused of supporting the RSF through arms transfers and logistics, particularly since the RSF’s loss of Khartoum. While the UAE has rejected these accusations, US intelligence agencies have accused it of supplying the RSF with military-grade Chinese-made fixed-wing drones capable of dynamic targeting. This support has highly likely contributed to the RSF’s success in capturing El-Fasher and helped sustain the conflict. While the US is a key ally of the UAE and has not formally accused the UAE of backing the RSF, its alleged support almost certainly complicates peace efforts. The International Criminal Court (ICC) is currently investigating alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity, and perceived UAE complicity could trigger protests in Western countries, including the US.

On 26 October, the eve of the announcement of the presidential election results, civil unrest broke out in Cameroon. In Douala, protesters reportedly attacked a gendarmerie brigade and police stations; four individuals died in the clashes. In Garoua, Bakary supporters clashed with security forces, who deployed tear gas to disperse protesters.

The following morning, Cameroon’s Constitutional Council declared victory for incumbent President Paul Biya, who won an eighth seven-year term with 53.66 per cent of the vote share. Opposition leader and primary challenger to Biya, Tchiroma Bakary, came second with 35.19 per cent of the vote.

Shortly after the announcement of the vote, Bakary announced that the military was shooting at civilians outside his Garoua residence, with unconfirmed reports claiming that two had been killed. Unverified images circulating on social media show gunmen posted on the roof of a home close to Bakary’s home. Demonstrations quickly broke out in Cameroon’s largest city, Douala, spreading to several other cities, including Yaoundé, Bandja, Bafoussam, and Melong. Protests escalated into clashes and arson, with protesters setting fires on roads in Yaoundé and setting the ruling party headquarters alight in Melong. Security forces responded forcefully, with reports of gunfire used against protesters.

While further protests were expected on 28 October, rain and a heavy security presence in Douala prevented large-scale protests, with smaller demonstrations being dispersed by security forces. A video shared on social media depicted gunfire from vehicles belonging to security forces in the town of Bafoussam; it is unclear what they are targeting. Crowds also gathered in the Odza and Ekounou neighbourhoods of Yaoundé.

On 29 October, protesters gathered in the Bilongué neighbourhood in Douala following reports of security forces having shot and killed someone earlier in the day. In Maroua’s 2^nd District, protesters reportedly stormed a police station.

On 28 October, Abdoul Raoufou, Secretary General of the Cameroonian Party for National Reconciliation (PCRN), resigned from the party, citing disagreement over the decision to recognise Biya’s electoral victory. Cameroon’s Interior Minister Paul Atanga Nji has declared that Bakary will face legal action, alleging he incited “violent post-election demonstrations”. Bakary has vowed to continue resisting, calling on his supporters to mobilise.

Overall, at least 23 people have been killed in the clashes since 26 October.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The vote results came after increasing tensions in Cameroon, with Bakary unilaterally declaring victory in the presidential election in a five-minute speech posted on social media on 14 October, in which he urged incumbent Biya to concede.  Following the victory claim, protests erupted in multiple cities on 15 October to demonstrate against perceived vote-counting irregularities, with clashes occurring in Douala, Dschang, Kousseri, and Limbe.

In Dschang, protesters set the courthouse, public prosecutor’s office, and ruling Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM) headquarters ablaze while police deployed tear gas and conducted arrests. Further demonstrations occurred on 21 October in Garoua, in the country’s north, in support of Bakary. Authorities announced that they arrested at least 20 people during the protests. One teacher was reportedly shot dead.

Bakary’s declaration of victory will highly likely be perceived as an opportunity to condemn, and potentially oust, the current government, almost certainly inspired by recent demonstrations in Nepal and Madagascar. The 2018 election resulted in protests across the country led by opposition figure Maurice Kamto, which the government responded to with a heavy crackdown and excessive force against demonstrators. Security forces have demonstrated similar patterns in response to recent demonstrations, and anti-government demonstrations would almost certainly be met with severe crackdowns, with security forces highly likely to use live ammunition, crowd-dispersal measures such as tear gas and water cannon, internet blackouts, and mass arrests.

There is a realistic possibility that protests could continue to intensify across major cities and Bakary strongholds, such as Douala, Yaoundé, and Dschang, and could spread nationwide. A significant portion of the population almost certainly believes the vote count was manipulated, and there is a realistic possibility that they will mobilise at scale in support of Bakary. If civil unrest further escalates, airport disruptions are likely, with airlines potentially cancelling flights and roadblocks preventing access to major airports. Curfews could also be imposed, further disrupting transportation.

However, heavy rain prevented demonstrations from significantly escalating on 28 October. Cameroon is in the middle of its rainy season, which spans from April to November. Heavy rain is currently forecast until at least 11 November in Douala, the likeliest hotspot for violent unrest, and there is a realistic possibility that this could prevent large-scale gatherings from taking place. Furthermore, security forces’ heavy crackdowns on demonstrations could dissuade many from engaging in civil unrest.

On 29 October, Tanzanians voted in general elections to elect the president for a five-year term, as well as members of parliament and councillors. Incumbent president Samia Suluhu Hassan is representing the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party.

Civil unrest broke out in Dar es Salaam, with protesters gathering along major highways to demand electoral reforms and fair elections. Security forces deployed tear gas to disperse opposition supporters in the Kimara Kibo area, with social media footage depicting demonstrators responding by throwing rocks. In the Kimara Baruti area, protesters set fire to a bus station. Demonstrations have also been reported in Magomeni, Ubungo, Kinondoni, Shekilango, and Tandale areas. Several polling stations have reportedly been attacked and multiple protesters have been injured, with Amnesty International declaring that two people had been killed. NetBlocks has reported a nationwide internet disruption, and authorities declared a curfew in Dar es Salaam overnight 29-30 October, starting 18:00 local time.

Protests have continued on 30 October, with security forces firing live ammunition and deploying tear gas in Dar es Salaam as demonstrators returned to the streets. Demonstrations have centred on Mbagala, Gongo la Mboto and Kiluvya areas. Eyewitness video shows heavy smoke rising from Namanga near the border with Kenya after a fire was started on the road. Social media footage depicts protesters entering Julius Nyerere International Airport (DAR / HTDA). Further protests, including marches on government buildings, have reportedly been discussed on Zello, a mobile application allowing phones to function as walkie-talkies.

The US Embassy in Tanzania has advised US government personnel to shelter in place and avoid demonstrations or crowds, keep a low profile, monitor local media for updates, and be aware of their surroundings. The embassy also declared that some major roads, including the primary road leading to Julius Nyerere International Airport, were closed. Some international flights have been cancelled to and from Julius Nyerere International Airport, and Arusha Airport (ARK / HTAR) is closed. Tanzanian authorities have asked civil servants and students to operate from home.

Solace Global Assessment: 

CCM has held power since the country’s independence in 1961, initially through its predecessor party, Tanzania Mainland (TANU). Since the 2015 election, which resulted in CCM achieving its smallest vote share of 58 per cent, the government has become increasingly authoritarian. Under incumbent president Samia Suluhu Hassan, the government has cracked down on opposition, civil society, and journalists.

The main opposition party, The Party for Democracy and Progress (CHADEMA), was barred from running in April 2025, with its leader, Tundu Lissu, arrested and charged with treason in response to pro-democracy protests. Luhaga Mpina, the presidential candidate for Alliance for Change and Transparency – Wazalendo (ACT-Wazalendo), was also disqualified from entering the race due to alleged procedural issues within the party’s nomination process.

The general election is widely perceived as cementing the continuation of CCM’s rule, with the party standing effectively unchallenged. Post-2015 elections have been characterised by observers as containing systematic fraud, intimidation, and obstruction. Electoral results have heavily favoured the government, with CCM securing 98.7 per cent of the vote share in the 2020 parliamentary elections and 99.3 per cent in the November 2024 local government elections. The ongoing general elections will highly likely result in the government achieving similarly high numbers to recent elections.

Tanzania has historically responded harshly to civil unrest. Following the 2020 elections, protests against government corruption erupted in Zanzibar. Security forces responded forcefully, with reports of soldiers, police, and a militia linked to the CCM beating civilians and using live ammunition against demonstrators, killing nine. Thousands also demonstrated in January 2024 to demand constitutional changes to reform the electoral commission and reduce presidential powers.

Authorities will highly likely crack down on public gatherings in an attempt to prevent the protests from gaining traction. If the protests continue, the authorities will likely respond with mass arrests, tear gas, water cannon, and live ammunition. Internet shutdowns are almost certainly being imposed to prevent the spread of anti-government sentiment, particularly among the youth, with large-scale ‘Gen Z’ protests leading to the ousting of governments in Nepal and Madagascar in recent months.

There is a realistic possibility that major protests will continue to spread and become widespread across Tanzania’s urban centres, including Dodoma and Zanzibar, where military personnel have reportedly been deployed. If civil unrest escalates, airport disruptions are likely, with airlines potentially cancelling flights and roadblocks preventing access to major airports.

Far-right loses ground in Dutch general elections.

Dutch citizens voted in the snap elections on 29 October. The vote had been called in June after Geert Wilders, the leader of the far-right Freedom Party (PVV), collapsed the coalition government due to disagreement on asylum policy reform. PVV, which had declined significantly in the polls following the government collapse, finished with almost the same votes as the centre-left Democrats 66 (D66). Overall, the centre performed well: the centre-right People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD), which some polls predicted was heading for a disaster, lost a small number of seats, while the Christian Democrats (CDA), who experienced a massive surge in the polls by campaigning on an “anti-populist” platform, more than tripled their seat share. As all the major parties have vowed not to work with Wilders following his electoral gamble, it is likely that the next Dutch government will be a large centrist coalition, likely bringing D66 and VVD together, alongside CDA and possibly the Conservative Liberals (JA21) and/or the Green-Labour Alliance (GL/PvdA).

Lithuania closes border with Belarus indefinitely over drone incursions.

On 27 October, Lithuania declared that it is closing its border with Belarus indefinitely. The decision was announced by the Lithuanian government after repeated incidents of helium balloons entering Lithuanian airspace, reportedly originating from Belarus. In early October, one such incident resulted in the shutdown of Vilnius Airport. Prime Minister Inga Ruginienė, in explaining the decision, described the episodes as part of Russia’s hybrid warfare targeting Europe, which has increasingly affected air traffic in several EU countries, including the alleged use of drones to disrupt aviation.

First anniversary of Novi Sad railway roof collapse almost certain to coincide with unrest in Serbia.

On 1 November 2024, the collapse of a railway station canopy in Novi Sad killed 16 people. The incident sparked a wave of protests that quickly began a the largest anti-corruption and anti-government movement in Serbia’s history. On 1 November 2025, large-scale protests will almost certainly occur in major Serbian cities to mark the anniversary. Local media has reported that student groups, who led the large-scale protests and road blockades that followed the incidents, are planning to march on Novi Sad.

Large anti-government gatherings are likely to turn violent. This is not only due to the likelihood of clashes between protesters and police, but also due to the possibility of intervention by pro-government counter-protesters, who have repeatedly staged attacks on their political opponents since late 2024. As past protests have coincided with blockades of some of Serbia’s key roadways, the unrest during the anniversary is highly likely to cause severe traffic disruptions, possibly affecting travel to and from major cities. Depending on the intensity of the unrest and the response by police, the protests on 1 November have the realistic possibility of causing a renewed increase in the intensity of anti-government unrest in Serbia.

Incumbent President Ouattara wins Ivory Coast presidential election.

On 27 October, Ivory Coast’s electoral commission declared incumbent President Alassane Ouattara the victor in the presidential election, winning 89.8 per cent of the vote. Ouattara’s primary challenger, Jeal-Louis Billion, came second with 3.09 per cent of the vote share, while former President Laurent Gbagbo’s ex-wife Simone Gbagbo received 2.42 per cent of the vote. Voter turnout was just 50.1 per cent. Laurent Gbagbo, and former primary challenger to Ouattara until he was removed from the electoral register, Tidjane Thiam, called the election a “civilian coup d’etat’ and declared that they would not recognise Ouattara as the legitimate leader. This marks Ouattara’s’ largest electoral victory so far, almost certainly driven by Ivory Coast’s high economic growth and infrastructural development. Furthermore, it has been Ivory Coast’s most peaceful election in decades, despite speculation over widespread civil unrest following the barring of numerous opposition candidates and demonstrations in Abidjan earlier in October, leading to the arrest of over 250 protesters. Following Ouattara’s victory and the lack of civil unrest in the immediate aftermath, the likelihood of widespread protests has significantly reduced but cannot be discounted.

Likely Anarchist firebombing car dealership in Greece.

On the night of 26-27 October, several vehicles were torched in Nea Filadelfia, near Athens. The firebombing’s dynamic, aimed at maximising property damage while minimising the threat of civilian casualties, resembles the usual tactics of Greek Anarchist groups. Greek media have noted that the attack is part of a growing series of firebombings that has been ongoing since early October. This is highly likely linked to the approaching anniversary of the 17 November 1973 Athens Polytechnic uprising, a large-scale student demonstration against the Regime of the Colonels, at the time ruling the country. The anniversary almost always coincides with demonstrations in Athens, which can turn violent, and with cases of firebombing and vandalism targeting private companies.

Israeli carry out large-scale airstrikes in the Gaza Strip.

On 28-29 October, Israel’s military carried out a wave of airstrikes across the Gaza Strip, which, according to Palestinian sources, killed 104 people. This would make the strikes the deadliest since the 10 October ceasefire was approved. On 29 October, Israeli channels stated that the ceasefire would resume after the strikes. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that the strikes had been ordered in response to Hamas violations of the ceasefire, including by reportedly killing one Israeli soldier during a confrontation in Rafah (for which Hamas denied responsibility). The strikes highlight the extreme fragility of the ceasefire agreement, and may further complicate the implementation of the next stages of the deal, including the de facto still unresolved issue of Hamas’ disarmament.

Nigerian military repels ISWAP attacks

On 23 October, Islamist insurgents launched simultaneous attacks in Mafa and Dikwa local government areas of Borno State using drones and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs). The militants reportedly set a military barracks and vehicles on fire and looted numerous weapons in Mafa after the Nigerian military was forced to flee. In Dikwa, the Nigerian Air Force supported the military and inflicted heavy casualties on the attackers. According to a military statement, Nigerian troops killed 50 militants overall. The attack was highly likely conducted by Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), who frequently use drones and heavy firepower to target military positions. The attack on Dikwa was likely intended to distract the Nigerian Air Force to enable operational freedom in the assault on Mafa. Despite the heavy militant losses, they will highly likely be emboldened by the success of the Mafa assault and conduct further attacks in Borno State using the looted weapons in the coming weeks.

ADF rebels attack mining town in the DRC’s North Kivu region.

On 28 October, members of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC), supported by Wazalendo fighters and Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF), repelled an attack on the suburb of the mining town of Manguredjipa in North Kivu by the Islamic State-affiliated Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). The attack reportedly began at 05:30 local time, with ADF militants approaching from a farm in Mangingi, but was quickly fended off by coalition forces, who held a large presence in the town. The attack caused citizens residing in the southeastern areas of Manguredjipa, primarily Brazza, Mangingi, and Matonge, to seek refuge in the town’s centre. The ADF reportedly targeted Manguredjipa’s commercial district and a nearby health facility. Five civilians and one FARDC member were killed in the clashes.

Following the failed assault, a second ADF attack targeted Gwado, a nearby village less than 5 kilometres from Manguredjipa, where security forces held no presence, killing at least seven and wounding two. Residents criticised security forces for failing to secure the nearby villages following the failed assault on Manguredjipa; the critical mining hub was highly likely prioritised over surrounding settlements due to its economic importance.

Attacks on mining towns with heavy security force presence are exceptionally rare, with the ADF typically targeting undefended villages. There is a realistic possibility that the ADF have been emboldened by recent attacks and, viewing the mining town as economically and strategically important, attempted to take security forces by surprise, but miscalculated the response. There is also a realistic possibility that Islamic State directives have ordered the expansion of the ADF’s operational scope. The attack may, therefore, have been intended to demonstrate reach and capability rather than achieve a material victory, or alternatively, to disrupt mining operations. If the assault was a miscalculation, the ADF are unlikely to conduct a similar attack in the near future. However, if this is an evolution in ADF strategy, further attacks on larger mining towns are highly likely.

Major flooding in Spain and Portugal results in widespread disruption.

Southern Spain and Portugal are experiencing severe flooding following days of heavy rainfall, prompting red flood warnings across multiple regions. In Spain, the Andalusia region has been hardest hit, with over 1,000 weather-related incidents reported, mainly in Seville and Huelva. Rail services in Seville, Huelva, and Cadiz have been suspended, while departures from the Port of Tarifa to Tangier, Morocco, have been suspended. In Portugal, the Algarve region has also been impacted, with flooded streets in Faro and reports of vehicles submerged. The Balearic Islands of Mallorca and Menorca remain on orange alert for continued torrential rain and flooding.

Several dozen injured by 6.1 magnitude earthquake in Turkey.

On 27 October, a 6.1 magnitude tremor occurred at a depth of 6 kilometres near Sindirgi in Balikesir province, south of Istanbul, causing severe infrastructural damage, including the collapse of several buildings. While local authorities have reported no deaths due to the earthquake, more than 22 people have been injured, and hundreds were temporarily displaced or evacuated. In August, Sindirgi had been struck by another 6.1 magnitude earthquake, which killed one person.

Three days of peace talks between Pakistan and the Taliban held in Istanbul ended on 28 October without a resolution following the implementation of a Qatari-brokered ceasefire in Doha on 19 October. Both countries have blamed each other for the failure to reach an agreement in Turkey, with Islamabad accusing Kabul of harbouring Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants, and the Taliban government blaming Pakistan for repeated cross-border airstrikes and civilian casualties. On 29 October, following the collapse of the peace talks, Pakistan’s defence minister threatened to “obliterate” the Taliban and suggested that Pakistan does not even need to employ even a fraction of its full arsenal to achieve this objective.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The collapse of the peace talks will almost certainly increase the risk of further cross-border violence along the Durand Line, the 2,640-kilometre border separating Pakistan and Afghanistan. Minor border clashes were observed during the peace talks, and these will likely increase in frequency and scale until a resolution is achieved, likely resulting in prolonged border closures. Unverified internal sources have indicated that another round of peace talks will likely be held in Istanbul. However, until a peace agreement is achieved, border closures and trade disruptions will almost certainly exacerbate Afghanistan’s fragile economy and compound the humanitarian situation, resulting in critical shortages of essential goods, including food, medicines, and fuel.  

While talks stall, Pakistan will highly likely continue its airstrikes in Afghanistan targeting TTP militants, which have increasingly involved strikes in Kabul and other major population centres. Furthermore, the TTP remains a distinct movement from the Afghan Taliban, with a separate structure, leadership and network. The Afghan Taliban likely have limited control over the TTP, which has conducted over 600 attacks in Pakistan in 2025, and will almost certainly struggle to rein in the group’s operations. Retaliatory Pakistani airstrikes in Afghanistan will likely become a recurring feature of Pakistan’s counter-militancy strategy, particularly in response to high-profile TTP attacks. The Afghan Taliban’s failure to curb TTP attacks may also increase the risk of Pakistan targeting Taliban leadership and infrastructure suspected of supporting or sheltering the TTP.

Severe flooding has been recorded across central Vietnam since 27 October 2025. The cities of Da Nang, Quang Ngai, Hue, and the popular tourist town of Hoi An worst affected, with at least ten deaths and dozens of injuries confirmed as of 30 October 2025. The flooding has resulted in the imposition of a state of emergency in Da Nang due to the impacts on transport, and the virtual isolation of several rural areas following heavy rains that have restricted road access. In Hue City, the flooding has resulted in the destruction of infrastructure, such as the Le No bridge in Khe Tre commune, and has left more than 200,000 households without electricity. The flooding also prompted the evacuation of Hue Central Hospital in the Thuan Hoa district.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The ongoing flooding has been caused by Tropical Depression Fengshen, which formed on 12 October and reached its peak intensity over the South China Sea. However, Vietnam has experienced a particularly severe tropical storm season, with Typhoons Bualoi and Matmo having killed at least 12 people earlier in October. Normally, Vietnam’s storm season occurs between June and October, with peak activity occurring in late summer. However, there is evidence indicating that the storm season is extending beyond its traditional peak months of August to October, with increased activity in November.

The ongoing flooding, which has also impacted other urban centres, including Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, though to a lesser extent, is likely to have resulted in major disruption. The damage to roads, bridges, and electricity networks will likely result in prolonged disruption to transport, emergency response, and public health services, while contaminated floodwaters increase the risk of disease outbreaks such as dengue, leptospirosis, and waterborne infections. The restoration of essential infrastructure and utilities may take several weeks, especially in rural and coastal communities where access has been severely restricted by landslides and damaged road networks.

Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) widens split with other parties on July National Charter.

The July National Charter was approved in the aftermath of the 2024 revolution by around 30 parties that opposed then-Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, and is aimed at achieving constitutional reform. BNP leaders have accused the National Consensus Commission, responsible for tracing a plan for the charter’s implementation, of favouring the other two major parliamentary forces: the student-led National Citizen Party (NCP) and the Islamist Jamaat-e-Islami (JI). The three parties have differing views on which aspects of the charter to prioritise: BNP prefers prioritising general elections before a constitutional referendum, JI calls for the referendum first, while NCP has argued for the complete implementation of the charter’s provisions before any vote. With competition between the various Bangladeshi parties repeatedly taking a violent form, with mob violence increasingly prevalent, disagreements over the correct interpretation of the July National Charter have a realistic possibility of translating into street violence or large-scale protests.

Indian authorities claim to have thwarted Islamic State plot to attack Delhi.

On 24 October, Indian security forces announced the arrest of two individuals in Bhopal and discovered a cache of arms and ammunition. According to authorities, the two suspects are affiliated with the Islamic State (IS) and had planned to conduct a suicide attack in a mall in New Delhi during the celebrations linked with the Hindu festival of Diwali. Authorities further added that the two were “radicalised online” and stated that they were still investigating whether they had access to out-of-country IS “handlers.”

However, a senior officer also suggested that the suspects may be linked to Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the primary military intelligence agency of Pakistan, claiming that ISI operates such networks under the guise of the Islamic State. This allegation was not supported by any evidence. The plot follows a similar thwarted attack in September, where raids in Delhi, Jharkhand, Telangana and Madhya Pradesh resulted in the apprehension of five suspects who were allegedly planning improvised explosive device (IED) attacks in India. These suspects were reportedly in touch with a Pakistan-based handler who guided them through encrypted social media platforms, radicalising them with extremist content and instructing them to collect weapons, chemicals and ammunition components.

Clashes in southern Philippines between military and elements of separatist group.

On 28 October 2025, clashes were reported in Tipo-Tipo, Basilan, an island province in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM), located in the southern Philippines. The fighting was reportedly between the Philippine military and an armed group linked to the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), a former separatist group turned political movement under the 2014 peace accord. However, while MILF is now part of the autonomous government in Bangsamoro, splinter elements have remained armed, and some are suspected of being involved in organised crime. The clashes resulted in the evacuation of the town, the suspension of schools, government offices, and businesses, and the deployment of additional security forces to restore order. The violence has reportedly now been contained; however, there is a realistic possibility of retaliatory violence, with the wider area having suffered from longstanding clan rivalries and intermittent insurgent activity.

Cyclone Montha causes widespread disruption in Eastern India.

Cyclone Montha has caused widespread disruption, mass evacuations, power outages and damage as it moved across parts of India. The storm made landfall on 29 October 2025 in Andhra Pradesh, bringing heavy rainfall, strong winds, and coastal flooding. Cyclone Montha has since weakened into a depression over the state of Chhattisgarh, moving north-northwest. The Indian Meteorological Department has issued red alerts for heavy rain in parts of Telangana, with additional warnings for Bihar, Andhra Pradesh, Odisha and West Bengal. Major flooding has been reported in parts of Telangana, while landslides in Assam have disrupted road transport. At least two fatalities have been confirmed in Andhra Pradesh, with the death toll expected to increase. Although the storm has weakened, continued rainfall and flooding are likely to cause ongoing disruption to transport, power supply, and communications across large parts of India, with an increased risk of landslides and infrastructure damage in the affected regions.

Thailand introduces a national period of mourning following death of Queen Sirikit.

Thailand is observing a national period of mourning following the death of Queen Sirikit, the Queen Mother, on 24 October 2025. The government has declared a year-long official mourning period, with national flags flown at half-mast for 30 days and officials required to wear black attire for one year. Members of the public have been encouraged to wear black or subdued clothing for at least 90 days, and public celebrations or entertainment events may be scaled back or postponed during this time.

Tourist services, attractions, and transport services remain operational; however, travellers are advised to dress respectfully, avoid loud or festive behaviour in public, and exercise sensitivity at temples, royal sites, and during official ceremonies, particularly in Bangkok, where major commemorative events are scheduled to take place. Thailand also enforces some of the strictest anti-monarchist laws in the world under its lèse-majesté provisions (Article 112 of the Criminal Code). These laws criminalise any act deemed to insult, defame, or criticise the monarchy and may be used more expansively during the mourning period. Penalties can include prison sentences up to 15 years, and heavy fines. Travellers and foreign residents should avoid making comments, gestures, or online posts that could be interpreted as disrespectful toward the royal family or the mourning process.

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