Colombian rice farmers have been protesting since 15 July, due to what they perceive as government failures to combat excessively low market prices and illegal rice imports from Ecuador. Prior to the strike, the government had announced a measure to fix the prices of paddy rice, which fell by more than 11 per cent last year despite stable production costs. Moreover, the government has pledged to increase checks at the Ecuadorian borders. The farmers’ unions have called these measures insufficient.

The protests have been characterised by widespread road blockades, affecting ten departments across the country and particularly in its centre and north. Organisers have called for the strike to continue past the initially scheduled ten-day period, due to what they claim is a lack of government guarantees.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The protests have developed into a standoff between the ministry and the farmers’ unions. While the farmers’ union has requested direct negotiations with Agriculture Minister Martha Carvajalino, the ministry has stated that lifting the blockades is a necessary precondition for talks. Some local media have reported that the economic damages from the blockades and strike have already surpassed USD 20 billion, and it is highly unlikely that Bogotá, which is already facing significant economic and security pressures, can afford the potential impacts of the strike.

While the protests have remained peaceful, the road blockades are highly likely to continue in the short term. This is likely to impact travel and logistics, particularly in departments where rice farming is prevalent, like Tolima, Huila, and Córdoba, where protests have been organised on key transport corridors connecting these areas to major cities like Bogotá. Moreover, it is important to note that several of the regions where rice farming is concentrated are currently facing severe security threats. Armed groups like the National Liberation Army (ELN), Estado Mayor Central (EMC) and the Gulf Clan are highly active in many of the rural rice growing areas like Tolima, Huila and Norte de Santander, and also on the Ecuadorian border. The government is likely limited in its ability or unwilling to forcefully disperse the blockades in these areas due to the risk of escalation or ambush. As a result, the authorities are likely to prioritise negotiated solutions, which have so far yielded only limited success.

Nationalist group protests against Haitian migrants in Dominican Republic.

On 23 July, the nationalist group Antigua Orden Dominicana (Ancient Dominican Order) conducted a march to the National Congress in Santo Domingo to demand that the government take stronger, more patriotic measures in response to the influx of Haitian migrants into the country. The group opposes policies such as the granting of work permits to undocumented Haitian migrants, which they argue are benefiting business at the expense of ordinary Dominicans and national sovereignty. Since late 2024, anti-Haitian demonstrations have surged in the Dominican Republic and have often involved clashes with the police. With Haitian gangs increasingly expanding their areas of operations into central and eastern Haiti, it is almost certain that refugee flows to the Dominican Republic will increase, likely resulting in larger and more frequent protests in the country.

Brazil’s Supreme Court rules out jailing Bolsonaro over breach of restrictions.

The court decided, on 24 July, against imprisoning former President Jair Bolsonaro after he spoke to the press. Bolsonaro, who is being tried for allegedly attempting to stage a coup in 2023, was ordered not to use social media and to wear an ankle bracelet. The decision likely demonstrate the court’s concern over the potential for protests if Bolsonaro were to be arrested. Bolsonaro’s trial remains extremely politically charged both at home and abroad, as Washington has threatened to impose tariffs and travel restrictions on the country’s officials and accused them of carrying out a “witch hunt” against the former president. Further developments in the trial are likely to be major drivers of unrest in large Brazilian cities.

Mexican cartels increasingly leveraging Colombian paramilitaries to train fighters

In recent months, local media have reported that Mexican cartels, like La Familia Michoacana or the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG) and even smaller groups like Los Viagras and Santa Rosa, have ramped up their recruitment of Colombian paramilitary fighters. The phenomenon is, reportedly, particularly marked in the states of Michoacán, Sinaloa, Guanajuato, and Jalisco, which are some of the most affected by cartel-driven violence. Colombian paramilitary groups, like the National Liberation Army (ELN) or the offshoots of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), can almost certainly offer valuable operational and technical expertise to the Mexican cartels, which are increasingly militarised and willing to openly clash with government forces. In a notable recent case in May, for instance, seventeen people, of whom twelve were Colombian nationals and ex-military personnel, were arrested in Michoacán in connection with the explosion of a landmine-like device, which killed eight Mexican soldiers.

Colombian dissidents use modified drones to target security forces

On 20 July, three Colombian soldiers were killed in a drone attack while patrolling in the Catatumbo region, where a conflict with the guerrilla group the National Liberation Army (ELN) has been ongoing since January 2025. While armed groups in Colombia have increasingly incorporated commercially available drones into their asymmetrical warfare tactics, this latest attack likely marks a significant improvement in their capabilities. Reports indicate that the drones had been modified with heat sensors and infrared systems. The integration of these systems will almost certainly improve the ELN’s targeting capabilities, even in low-visibility conditions, such as in dense jungle environments, at night, and in adverse weather conditions. Moreover, such systems will make it far more challenging for Colombian military personnel to conceal their movement in contested environments or where the terrain typically works to their advantage. The success of this technology will likely result in wider proliferation, with other actors involved in Colombia’s internal conflict acquiring similar systems or these capabilities being adopted by other regional non-state actors.

Floods cause disruptions in Mexico City.

On 21 July, severe flooding affected parts of south Mexico City, triggering a “yellow alert”. The flooding was caused by protracted heavy rains and resulted in dozens of homes being damaged. Mexico is having its wettest summer in more than 50 years, and has been affected by several severe storms, including Hurricane Erik, which caused at least 23 deaths in June and has been the most destructive storm of the 2025 Pacific hurricane season so far.

French authorities have declared a 15-day curfew for people under 16 years old in several quarters of Nîmes, starting on 21 July. Similar curfews are also in place in cities like Limoges and Béziers. The measures were issued as a response to severe cases of violence that have occurred in France’s south in recent weeks. These include a string of shootings and targeted assassinations in Nîmes, a reported “ambush” of police forces, who were first lured with fireworks and then attacked by groups of individuals, in Béziers, and a mass riot in Limoges on 18-19 July, where between 100 and 150 individuals reportedly blocked main roadways and indiscriminately attacked passing vehicles and responding police forces. According to local media and authorities, most of the individuals responsible for the violence are in their teens and early twenties, and come from disadvantaged quarters where drug trafficking is rampant.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The wave of violence is almost certainly reflective of growing instability in France, centred on local organised crime groups (OCGs) involved in drug trafficking. Two main factors have highly likely contributed to this trend. First, the French government has increasingly shifted towards a policy of isolating imprisoned high-level drug traffickers by moving them to a purpose-built high-security prison. The first transfer of inmates to this new facility, located on Vendin-le-Vieil in France’s north, occurred on 22 July, days after the clashes in Limoges and Béziers. French officials likely assess that the new incarceration policies will help disrupt vertical chains of command in France’s drug trafficking networks, which often remain resilient despite the imprisonment of leaders.

Second, there is an ongoing gang war involving multiple groups based in large urban areas in southern France, particularly Marseille and Nice, and this has likely expanded to other towns in the region. In Marseilles, for example, the OCG known as “DZ Mafia” has been engaged in a violent conflict since late 2023. The group largely recruits from the local Algerian diaspora and has built transnational links with major organised crime syndicates, including the Italian ‘Ndrangheta. This conflict first led to the decimation of the rival “Yoda” group. It was followed by escalating clashes with another gang, the “Blacks,” which mainly recruits from the Comorian community. According to some reports, members of the “Blacks” were responsible for ambushing a prison van in May 2024. The attack resulted in the deaths of two prison officers and the escape of drug trafficker Mohamed “La Mouche” Amra. According to some French authorities, DZ Mafia was also likely responsible for the wave of attacks on prison infrastructure which occurred across the country in April 2025.

The recent developments almost certainly demonstrate how French OCGs have become increasingly emboldened, evidenced by direct attacks on the authorities, police and state institutions. Incidents like the May 2024 prison van ambush, the April 2025 prison firebombings, and the recent mob violence in Limoges and Béziers suggest that this shift is increasing the risk to bystanders and civilians, who would not typically be direct targets of OCGs.

On 19 July, a coordinated wave of “Stop Immigration” marches took place in over 80 Polish towns and cities, with the police reporting 110 separate gatherings and deploying over 4,200 officers to maintain order. The protests were organised by the far-right Confederation (Konfederacja) alliance, whose candidate Sławomir Mentzen came third with almost 15 per cent of the vote in May’s first round of the presidential election. The demonstrations were characterised by their small sizes, mostly attracting a few hundred or fewer attendees, with the largest estimated to have been attended by 3,000 in Katowice. Counter-demonstrations were additionally held in many locations, with isolated incidents of low-level scuffles between rival protesters being reported in Katowice, Warsaw, and Łódź.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Polish politics is deeply polarised, and the presidential election first round delivered Confederation its strongest national result to date. Mentzen’s rise in the polls had made it a realistic possibility that he would finish second and therefore proceed to the next round. It is almost certain that Confederation will continue to organise protests on its primary platform of anti-immigration. Prime Minister Donald Tusk has almost certainly sought to move towards the political right since the Civic Platform party’s candidate lost in the presidential election to the right-wing hardliner Karol Nawrocki. The centrist government has recently introduced border controls with Germany, and a government reshuffle has made the conservative Radosław Sikorski deputy prime minister.

The government remains limited in implementing a reformist platform that can overturn key legislation brought in by the previous hard-right Law and Justice Party government following Nawrocki’s victory, due to the presidential veto. Continuing instability and deep polarisation are likely indicators of a Polish political system vulnerable to the influence of populism, which will likely drive greater civil unrest in future. While these protests were relatively small in attendance, the number of individual protests and the geographic spread likely suggest a level of coordination and mobilisation that could enable Confederation to stage larger and more disruptive protests in the future.

Following the reversal in US President Donald Trump’s policy towards the arming of Ukraine, Germany’s Defence Minister has confirmed that Berlin has agreed with Washington on the financing and delivery of five additional Patriot air-defence systems to Ukraine. Moreover, on 19 July, the US House of Representatives approved legislation to continue military assistance to Ukraine, with the bill now proceeding to the Senate, and an estimated USD 322 million in weapon sales was announced by the State Department on 23 July. The increase in assistance (particularly for air defence) comes within the context of a dramatically escalated phase of Russian aerial attacks against Ukrainian cities. Overnight 20-21 July, Russian forces conducted another large-scale and layered wave of aerial attacks, launching over 400 attack drones and decoys, and 24 missiles, primarily targeting Ivano-Frankivsk in western Ukraine and Kyiv.

On 22 July, a rare wartime protest with approximately 1,000 attendees occurred in Kyiv, and demonstrations were also held in Lviv, Dnipro and Odesa. Protesters demonstrated against a contentious amendment passed by Ukraine’s parliament and signed by President Volodymyr Zelensky. The amendment granted the Prosecutor General, who is appointed by the president, the authority to reassign NABU and SAPO (anti-corruption agencies) cases. On 24 July, Zelensky submitted a draft bill to the parliament with provisions to maintain the independence of the anti-corruption agencies.

On the frontline, there are multiple indications that the situation on the Pokrovsk axis is becoming critical. Reports on 21 and 22 July state that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance units have infiltrated the city limits from the southern suburb of Zvirove, and Russian forces have redeployed both aviation and armoured units on this axis.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The reversal in US policy on arming Ukraine has likely averted the risk of critical advanced interceptor shortages in the short to medium term. Previously, periods of critical interceptor shortages allowed Russian forces to strike and destroy high-value targets (HVTs) such as Trypilska thermal power plant in April 2024, due to a holdup in military aid from the US Congress. Ukrainian air defence efforts will not only be sustained but also bolstered by the newly approved weapon sales. Ukraine is currently estimated to operate around five to six Patriot air defence batteries (although exact numbers are classified). The planned delivery of five more systems could potentially double Ukraine’s only consistent means of intercepting ballistic missiles. Nonetheless, their delivery will take time, with two being delivered from Bundeswehr stocks while three are expected to be produced in the US with accelerated backfill from German inventories. It is likely that Russia will seek to exploit the period before the delivery of critical air defence by sustaining and potentially increasing its campaign of mass aerial strikes against Ukrainian cities in the coming weeks.

The protests are notably the first nationwide protests in Ukraine since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in early 2022, with the gathering in Kyiv the largest protest so far. They have been quickly weaponised by Russian officials and media to undermine the legitimacy of Ukraine’s government, with Russian outlets portraying the protests as anti-war, which is false. Sources briefed that the trigger for the bill may have been the opening of NABU investigations into the dealings of insiders in Zelensky’s office, while the stated cause from the government was potential infiltration by Russia into the agencies, with raids by Ukrainian security services targeting NABU and SAPO on 21 July. Almost certainly due to the domestic and international backlash against the amendment, with EU officials additionally warning that the bill will damage Ukraine’s hopes of EU accession, Zelensky has effectively U-turned on the changes.

The situation on the frontlines of the  Pokrovsk axis can be attributed to multiple factors. First, it is likely that the Russian movement of specialist units using effectively unjammable fibre optic drones from the Kursk salient has been a major challenge. Second, Ukrainian manpower shortages have likely limited the ability to reinforce Pokrovsk, with substantial reserves needing to be committed on fronts such as the Sumy axis. Despite the incursions into the outskirts of Pokrovsk, Russian forces will likely prioritise advances along the city’s flanks. This strategy will enable Russia to envelop the city and cut off its supply lines, which could potentially avoid a long attritional urban battle as in Bakhmut.

If Ukraine is forced to withdraw from Pokrovsk, it will likely set the conditions for Russian forces to advance west with the objective of isolating or encircling the Kramatorsk-Sloviansk agglomeration, which represents the last major Ukrainian-held urban area in the Donbas and a critical economic hub.

Although negotiations are ongoing in Istanbul, with the third round held on 23 July, the current tempo of Russian military action almost certainly indicates that the Kremlin’s objective is to achieve full territorial control of its claimed oblasts before seriously engaging in peace talks.  

On 22 July, Venâncio Mondlane was charged with five criminal offences, including instigation to terrorism and incitement to public disobedience, linked to the post-October 2024 election unrest. The prosecution claims that Mondlane encouraged “a wave of violent protests” on 21 October, which ended up “injuring various people” and “blocking roads”. The terror charges relate to a quote from Mondlane the following day, where he called for “25 days in which we terrorise the terrorists. We shall create a climate of terror for the liars, a climate of terror for the murderers, a climate of terror for the thieves”. Mondlane has responded to the charges, stating that he is being targeted for exposing “massive electoral fraud”. 31 police officers are also facing trial for their roles in the protests.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Protests erupted in Mozambique following the 9 October 2024 elections. The ruling party, Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), won a contested landslide victory, making Daniel Chapo president. Demonstrations, organised by Mondlane, quickly spread across major cities, including the capital Maputo. Approximately 400 people were killed and 600 injured in clashes, where security forces reacted with tear gas, live ammunition, and arrests of demonstrators. The demonstrations ultimately failed to provoke an electoral recount or the unseating of FRELIMO.

Mondlane is highly likely to be found guilty, and there is a realistic possibility that his trial will trigger further unrest in Mozambique. However, the anti-FRELMO momentum has significantly diminished since the widespread unrest. In April, Mozambique’s parliament approved the Political Commitment for an Inclusive Dialogue aimed at political reconciliation, implementing constitutional reforms and alterations to presidential powers. The law stemmed from an agreement between Chapo and nine opposition parties on 5 March, which Mondlane has accused Chapo of going against with his arrest.

Furthermore, opposition is relatively fractured, with Mondlane cutting ties with PODEMOS in April. It is highly likely that opposition parties would not support further nationwide demonstrations, particularly since being brought back into the political fold and almost certainly being dissuaded by Mondlane’s prosecution. Given the extent of the economic disruption during the protests and the fact that they failed to achieve meaningful change, Mozambique’s population is unlikely to re-ignite the large-scale protests of 2024-2025. Small-scale localised protests among Mondlane supporters in Maputo are more likely.

Anti-immigration protests likely in the United Kingdom over the next week.

Following protests against the housing of asylum seekers in hotels in Epping, near London, Canary Wharf, and Diss, which resulted in several arrests and cases of vandalism, British police and media have reported that further demonstrations are likely to occur over the 25-27 July period. Moreover, 29 July is the anniversary of the killing of three children in Southport that triggered violent unrest in multiple UK cities and towns. Protests will highly likely occur during this period, and there is a realistic possibility of vandalism or violence linked with the unrest.

France to recognise Palestinian state.

On 24 July, President Macron announced that his government would recognise a Palestinian state at the next UN General Assembly (UNGA) meeting in September. The announcement makes France the first G7 country to recognise Palestine and follows similar decisions by other EU states, including Slovenia, Ireland, and Spain. Israel and the United States reacted negatively to Macron’s announcement, with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stating that he “strongly rejects” the announcement and the decision is “reckless”. There is a high likelihood of protests in Paris during the 25-27 period against the government’s decision, with a realistic possibility of tensions involving counter-protest groups. The decision will also likely drive protests in neighbouring EU states that are yet to recognise Palestine, like Italy, Belgium, and Germany.

Generation Identity (GI) occupies mosque in Copenhagen, Denmark.

On 18 July, activists from the Danish chapter of the pan-European far-right group Generation Identity (GI) occupied a Shia mosque in the Nørrebro area of Copenhagen. GI was founded in 2012, and its first notable action was the occupation of a mosque in Poitiers, France. While the group is almost certainly unable to stage frequent large-scale protests, particularly outside of its strongholds in Germany and Austria, it has increasingly sought to return to prominence via high-visibility actions, which are likely meant to stoke sectarian tensions and gain maximum visibility.

Civil society group plans march in Niamey, Niger.

The Independent Movement for a New Niger in Justice and Equality (MINNJE) announced that the group intended to organise a peaceful demonstration on 27 July. The movement will call for the independence of the judiciary, justice to economic offenders, and strengthened capacities for the Defense and Security Forces (FDS). The march is set to begin at Toumo Square and will make its way to Concertation Square. Authorities in Niger typically prohibit demonstrations in advance and will likely deny MINNJE’s request. If the march goes ahead without permission, security forces will highly likely use force to disperse the protests and arrest demonstrators.

Protests scheduled in Angola over cost-of-living crisis.

After a first round on 19 July, a second stage of unrest is scheduled to occur in Luanda on 26 July, with a realistic possibility of continuing over the 27-28 July period. Moreover, the same period will have a scheduled strike by taxi drivers, who are protesting increases in fuel costs. In addition to socioeconomic grievances, the protests are also in opposition to past cases of police brutality. On 12 July, a demonstration in the capital was violently broken up by police, with two people injured and 17 arrested. As the 12 July incident attracted widespread domestic and international condemnation, there is a realistic possibility that it will drive larger crowds over the 26-28 July period. There is a high likelihood of violent police intervention, which may pose a threat to bystanders.

Ceasefire agreed in Sweida, Syria.

Following several days of intense fighting between Druze militias and Sunni Bedouin tribal fighters in Sweida, a ceasefire was announced on 20 July and has been enforced by the redeployment of Syrian government forces to the area. However, the ceasefire is likely to offer only a temporary reprieve.  The underlying issues have yet to be addressed, and the fighting has almost certainly undermined the legitimacy of the Syrian transitional government in Sweida. Reports of atrocities committed by government forces, Bedouin militias, and Druze militias have also exacerbated existing sectarian tensions. There is a realistic possibility of renewed hostilities in the near term. Bedouin militias have reportedly been mobilised from other parts of Syria and have deployed to Sweida province. Current government efforts to safely evacuate Bedouin civilians from the area will almost certainly be instrumental in how the situation develops.

Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) seeks to capitalise on Sweida violence.

ISIS channels have increased propaganda efforts attacking the Druze community during the violence in Sweida and have called for supporters to join the fight against Druzes in the area. While ISIS retains its base of operation in other parts of the country, particularly the central desert, the group has in the past sought to establish a presence in the Sweida area as a springboard for operations in the country’s south. Furthermore, multiple sources indicate that members of ISIS were involved in recent hostilities against the Druze in Sweida. The developments illustrate how ISIS, whose strength has been significantly degraded in recent years, is likely seeking to capitalise on security vacuums, sectarian strife, and political disagreements within the post-Assad government to increase its propaganda, recruitment and expand its operations.

Gaza ceasefire talks stall again.

On 24 July, US Special Envoy Steven Witkoff stated that the American team, currently engaged in negotiations over a ceasefire in Gaza, will withdraw from the talks. Israeli officials also released a similar statement. The development occurred one day after Hamas members delivered a ceasefire plan to the American and Israeli teams. Witkoff has dismissed this plan, stating that it showed a “lack of desire” to reach an agreement. International media reported that the Hamas proposal entailed the release of ten living hostages in the first phase of the truce, although the other details remain unclear. It is highly likely that the latest round of talks’ collapse is centred on the same issues that have derailed previous negotiation efforts: namely, the status of the southern Philadelphi corridor, and questions over how to transition from a temporary truce to a lasting peace. However, it is also highly likely that developments on the ground in Gaza, particularly the destruction of much of Khan Yunis’ east following the establishment of the Magen Oz corridors, have further degraded the possibility of an agreement acceptable to both sides.

Malian junta rejects appeal to release mining company employees.

On 22 July, a court in Mali rejected an appeal to release four employees of the Canadian mining company Barrick Gold, who were previously arrested in 2024 on charges including money laundering and regulatory violations. The case is part of a broader disagreement between Barrick Gold and the Malian junta over retroactive tax increases and state ownership following the imposition of a new mining code in 2024. The government has since suspended Barrick’s gold exports, seized gold stocks, effectively suspended operations at a mine primarily owned by the foreign mining company, and issued an arrest warrant for the CEO. This latest incident is likely part of a wider trend in the region, where Sahelian junta governments are attempting to renegotiate mining contracts to capture a larger share of the revenue in response to rising gold prices in order to help fund security operations and prop up faltering economies.

DRC government and AFC/M23 sign declaration regarding a permanent ceasefire.

On 19 July, the DRC government and Rwanda-backed AFC/M23 rebel group, which seized provincial capitals Goma and Bukavu in the east of the country in early 2025, signed a Qatari-brokered “Declaration of Principles”. The Declaration includes that both sides must refrain from attacks, hate propaganda, and “any attempt to seize by force new positions on the ground”. The agreement aims to be implemented by 29 July comes weeks after the DRC and Rwanda signed a peace agreement on 27 June, and aims to end the conflict in North and South Kivu. A final peace agreement is due by 18 August. Despite the declaration’s signing, absolute peace between the two sides remains unlikely.

Fighting has continued, with clashes between AFC/M23 and pro-government Wazalendo fighters occurring near Pinga in North Kivu and alleged AFC/M23 shelling of Bukera in South Kivu on 22 June. Furthermore, while DRC spokesperson Patrick Muyaya has stated that the deal includes the government’s “red line” of the “non-negotiable withdrawal” from AFC/M23 from occupied areas, AFC/M23 negotiator Benjamin Mbonimpa denied any mention of withdrawal. It is unlikely that AFC/M23 will agree to hand over territories it has seized without significant pressure from Rwanda, and any peace agreement is likely contingent on Rwanda’s withdrawal of support for the group.

Wildfires in Cyprus kill several people.

Severe wildfires have been recorded across large parts of Cyprus. The wildfires, which began outside Limassol on 23 July, have been worsened by a combination of very hot temperatures, up to 44 degrees Celsius, dry conditions, and strong winds. Authorities have also noted several failures to clear dry vegetation and illegal waste dumps in the past months, which almost certainly contributed to fuelling the fires. Forecasts indicate that maximum daily temperatures of above 40 degrees Celsius will continue in the short term, which will almost certainly drive further wildfires. Preliminary reports, including from the fire brigade chief Nikos Longinos, have indicated that the wildfires were caused by arson, with evidence suggesting that two separate fires were started 100m apart in a village in the north of Limassol District.

Turkish wildfires kill several first responders.

At least 10 forestry and rescue workers have been killed and several injured in the central province of Eskisehir in Turkey. he fire broke out amid extreme heat, with temperatures exceeding 40°C in recent days, and is one of several ongoing wildfires across the country, including in Sakarya, Bilecik, İzmir, Karabük and Manisa. Hundreds of wildfires have affected Turkey during the summer season, prompting mass evacuations, including from tourist destinations. Turkey may be on course for a wildfire season as devastating as the 2021 one, with opposition leaders and rights groups accusing the incumbent government of not responding effectively, gross negligence, poor planning and mismanagement.

The ongoing border dispute between Thailand and Cambodia has intensified after five Thai soldiers were injured by a landmine in the disputed area along the Cambodian border in Ubon Ratchathani province on 23 July. According to Thai authorities, the mines were newly laid along paths that were supposed to be safe by mutual agreement. The incident prompted Thailand to expel the Cambodian ambassador and close all border crossings with Cambodia, to which Cambodia responded by downgrading diplomatic ties and evacuating its embassy in Bangkok.

In the most significant escalation, on the morning of 24 July, a confrontation involving six Cambodian

soldiers and an alleged drone, and several Thai soldiers has triggered direct strikes between the two

territories. Thailand and Cambodia have accused each other of provoking the incident.

In response to the clashes, Thailand launched airstrikes at two Cambodian military targets and deployed F-16 fighter jets. Cambodian media claimed to have downed one, something that the Thai Air Force refuted as “fake news”. One F-16 fired into Cambodia, destroying a military target, according to a statement by the Thai military. According to Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet, Thailand attacked Cambodian military positions at Prasat Ta Moan Thom and Prasat Ta Krabey in Oddar Meanchey province, and Cambodia’s defence ministry has accused Thailand of targeting a road and using cluster munitions, which are banned in much of the world due to their large attack radius and indiscriminate effects.

Cambodia has responded with artillery fire into a civilian area in Thailand’s Surin province, according to the Thai defence ministry spokesperson. Artillery fire from Cambodian forces has reportedly caused damage in the Kantharalak district of Si Sa Ket, Thailand, setting a 7-Eleven store ablaze and striking the Phanom Dong Rak Hospital in Surin province. Thai officials have accused Cambodian forces of targeting civilian areas. Cambodia has claimed to have taken control of disputed temples along the border, with reports of Thai soldiers being killed or injured.

Fighting has continued into 25 July, with clashes in 12 locations, up from six on 24 July. Thailand’s military has accused Cambodia of using artillery and Russian-made BM-21 rocket systems to target schools and hospitals, and Thailand has retaliated with artillery barrages. At least 16 people have been killed, including civilians, and over 58,000 people have been displaced, according to the latest figures. In a noteworthy statement, Thailand’s Acting Prime Minister Phumtham Wechayachai has declared that the situation could “move towards war” but has signalled a readiness for diplomatic talks with Cambodia, potentially mediated by Malaysia, the current chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

Solace Global Assessment: 

Thailand has a significant military advantage over Cambodia, outmatching Cambodia in airpower, offensive fires, troops and mobility. Thailand is classified as a major non-NATO ally by the US, with a 2024 defence budget of USD 5.73 billion and at least 360,000 active military personnel, including approximately 400 tanks, 1,200 armoured personnel carriers, and 2,600 artillery units. Cambodia, on the other hand, had a 2024 defence budget of USD 1.3 billion, with 124,300 active military personnel, and has historically relied on symbolic and diplomatic efforts during disputes with Thailand. On 14 July, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet declared that mandatory military conscription would be implemented in 2026 to bolster Cambodia’s military capabilities, although this will almost certainly not be enough to counter Thailand in the short term and will take a long time to implement.

Continued clashes are highly likely, as both sides continue to conduct retaliatory strikes. The alleged deliberate targeting of civilian areas significantly escalates the risk of miscalculation from both sides. Cambodia has accused Thailand of committing “war crimes” through its alleged use of cluster munitions and heavy weapons. The accusations of war crimes significantly reduce the likelihood that either side will ‘back down’, since being perceived as weak in the face of foreign aggression would add pressure to an already fragile political situation in each country.

With Thai Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra currently suspended, as well as the nationalist sentiment in each country, bilateral diplomacy is unlikely to resolve the situation in the short term. Instead, a mediator will highly likely emerge. While ASEAN has, so far, been diplomatically impotent regarding the escalations due to its lack of formal mechanisms for conflict dispute and consensus-based decision-making, diplomatic intervention to de-escalate between the two sides is likely. Alternatively, the United Nations (UN) is set to hold an emergency meeting and could move to act as an arbitrator between the two sides, potentially providing them an off-ramp without losing face.

A demonstration is scheduled in Bangkok for 27 July by the Ruam Palang Phaendin (United Power of the Nation). Jirayu Huangsap, spokesperson for the Prime Minister’s Office, has urged protesters to avoid exacerbating the tense situation. While the rally was planned before the border clashes, it will highly likely attract a significant number of protesters and could be co-opted by nationalist demonstrations. Protests are also highly likely in Phnom Penh, where they have already taken place in June over tensions with Thailand. Demonstrations could add significant fuel to the conflict by pressuring the governments into continuing to retaliate. Furthermore, if the respective government is perceived as weak during ceasefire talks, civil unrest could erupt in both countries, exacerbating the already fragile political situations.

After a monsoon depression initially formed in the Philippine Sea in mid-July, a storm system tracked north of Luzon in the Philippines before intensifying into a typhoon named Wipha near Hong Kong and southern China, then tracking west into northern Vietnam.

In Hong Kong, a hurricane signal No. 10 (T10) was issued on 20 July and held for seven hours before being lowered. With maximum wind speeds of over 167km/h and heavy rainfall, dozens of storm-related injuries were reported in Hong Kong. Significant disruption occurred, as public transportation was shut down, and 500 flights were cancelled, affecting approximately 80,000 passengers.

In mainland China, Wipha made landfall near Taishan City as a severe tropical storm, with Guangdong, Hainan, Guangxi and Fujian provinces being put on high alert. Air travel disruption occurred in Shenzhen and Zhuhai. In Vietnam, Wipha made landfall in the north on 22 July, with heavy rain and strong gusts impacting Hanoi.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The issuance of a T10 warning in Hong Kong is the first since Super Typhoon Saola in 2023, which resulted in roughly USD 500 million in damages. The Northwest Pacific typhoon season typically peaks between August to September, and it is highly likely that stronger typhoons than Wipha, with a greater impact, will occur in the region during this timeframe. However, forecast agencies currently suggest that the 2025 season will likely be less active than long-term averages, although the emergence of La Niña conditions could alter this outlook.

Current forecasts indicate that it is likely that ENSO-neutral conditions (no La Niña and El Niño) will continue during July-September 2025, although there is a realistic possibility that La Niña will develop later in the year. La Niña, characterised by cooler-than-average sea surface temperatures in the western Pacific, strengthens trade winds and can lead to more frequent and powerful typhoons in the western Pacific.

The two primary considerations for evaluating the developing risk of tropical storms are climate change and disaster resilience. Climatologists warn that global warming is already leading to more intense and frequent tropical storm systems, and the risk is almost certain to continue growing.

Moreover, differing levels of disaster resilience, which consist of multiple factors including preparedness measures, infrastructure, building planning, and emergency response capacity, can lead to a drastically different impact from similarly strong storms in different locations. For example, Typhoon Yagi in August-September 2024 caused catastrophic damage in northern Vietnam, killing at least 300 people, despite being notably weaker than when it transited past large southern Chinese cities and made landfall in Hainan. This was almost certainly due to the different levels of disaster resilience between China and Vietnam, underlying the importance of evaluating this factor for risk management.

Metro Manila has suffered from severe flooding caused by heavy monsoon rains, compounded by the effects of the tropical storm Wipha, locally known as Crising.  The floods are likely the worst to impact Metro Manila in a decade. On 22 July, the mayor of Manila, Isko Moreno, declared a state of calamity in the city. Formalised on 23 July by the City Council, the declaration allows the local government to access calamity funds and impose price controls.

The impact of flooding and landslides has nationwide left at least 12 people dead and resulted in over 40,000 families being aided and sheltered in evacuation centres. It is estimated that over 2.7 million people have been affected by the floods. In Metro Manila, the flooding resulted in mass disruption, including school closures, the cancellation of dozens of flights, and the suspension of government work.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The Philippines is among the most severely affected countries in the world by environmental risks. First, the country is situated in the Pacific Ring of Fire tectonic belt, leading to severe and frequent earthquakes, in addition to the presence of several active volcanoes. Second, the Philippines has, on average, 20 tropical cyclones a year that enter the Philippine Area of Responsibility (PAR), more than anywhere else in the world, with between eight and nine crossing the Philippines directly.

With the frequency and severity of tropical storms almost certainly increasing with global warming, the worsening impact in the Philippines is almost certainly magnified by poor disaster resilience. In response to the recent floods, a research fellow at the Resilience Development Initiative stated that flood preparedness and mitigation are insufficient. Although a total of PHP 300 billion has been allocated to flood control this year, President Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr. vetoed PHP 16.7 billion in flood defence programs in the 2025 national budget. There is a realistic possibility that continued government failures to address disaster resilience issues will trigger protest movements.

Taliban arrest hundreds of women across Afghanistan for dress code violations.

The United Nations mission in Afghanistan has expressed concern over the Taliban’s recent waves of arrests, which have targeted women and girls for allegedly failing to comply with the authorities’ strict dress codes. Hundreds of women arrested in public spaces like shopping malls, cafes and universities have been detained in “morality centres” run by the Taliban’s Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, with the arrests reportedly ordered by the Taliban’s Supreme Leader Hibatullah Akhundzada. The arrests have also been condemned by the Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF) and the National Resistance Front (NRF), two of the largest opposition groups in Afghanistan. The AFF has even declared that the Taliban’s morality police are now a legitimate target and on 21 July, conducted an attack on the Taliban’s Directorate of the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice in Kunduz province, killing two Taliban members.

Pakistani court sentences PTI senior members ahead of planned 5 August protests.

On 22 July, an anti-terrorism court in Pakistan sentenced eight senior members of former prime minister Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party to ten years in prison for inciting protests that targeted military installations following Khan’s arrest in 2023. The trial was held behind closed doors, and the opposition has widely condemned the arrests as politically motivated and an attempt to weaken PTI. The sentences are likely an attempt to warn PTI ahead of planned nationwide protests on 5 August to mark the second anniversary of Khan’s arrest. However, it is highly likely that the convictions will further fuel the protest movement and deepen mistrust between PTI supporters and the military-dominated government.

Bangladesh’s Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) stages large rally in Dhaka.

On 19 July, tens of thousands of JI supporters marched through the streets of Dhaka in a demonstration demanding free and fair elections. Bangladesh, which is currently led by an interim government following the fall of Sheikh Hasina in the August 2024 revolution, is scheduled to hold elections in early 2026. JI is the country’s largest Islamist party, although it has, in recent years, shifted towards a more left-oriented position, and is likely to perform well at the polls, also due to its strong support among younger voters.

Japan’s government coalition loses majority in upper chamber.

On 20 July, Japan held elections for half of the seats of the House of Councillors, the upper chamber of the country’s parliament. The ruling government coalition, led by Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba and comprising the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Komeito, had a record-low vote share, losing a total of 24 seats. The result means that the government now lacks a majority in both chambers. The centre-right Democratic Party for the People (DPP) and the ultranationalist Sanseitō (DIY) performed well, the latter increasing its seat count from one to 15. While Ishiba has stated that he will not resign following the results, the vote is likely to add to Japan’s political instability, which is already driven by a worsening economic outlook and partly unresolved tensions with Washington.

Militants start using commercially available drones to attack security forces in Pakistan.

Pakistani authorities have warned that militants in northwest Pakistan have begun using commercially available off-the-shelf (COTS) drones armed with grenades, mortar shells and other explosive payloads to conduct attacks on the security forces. In the last two months, there have been at least eight attacks involving the use of drones in the area; however, no group has claimed the attacks to date. Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is the most active militant group in the region, and although it has denied involvement, it has admitted to acquiring drone capabilities. Security officials have noted that the militants appear to be in an experimental phase, characterised by poor targeting accuracy. However, as this capability evolves, it will likely pose a significant threat, which will enable militant groups to circumvent many traditional security measures and strike from distance with decreased risk. Moreover, Pakistani security forces remain overstretched, poorly funded, badly trained and lack sufficient counter-drone capabilities.

Pakistan’s monsoon season results in hundreds of fatalities and widespread disruption.

Pakistan’s ongoing monsoon season has continued to result in nationwide fatalities and major disruptions, highlighting the country’s vulnerability to climate change. Since late June, it is now estimated that at least 245 people have been killed and over 600 injured, with children accounting for nearly half of all fatalities. Torrential rainfall has triggered flash floods, landslides, urban flooding, and glacial lake outburst floods (GLOFs), with northern and central regions worst affected. The situation has almost certainly been compounded by poor infrastructure and ineffective disaster relief mechanisms, particularly in rural and mountainous areas, where blocked transport corridors are impeding rescue efforts. Pakistan’s disaster agency has warned of further heavy rains and the threat of urban flooding in low-lying areas of major cities, including Lahore, Faisalabad and Peshawar.

Jet crashes into Bangladesh school, killing at least 31 people.

On 22 July, a military jet crashed into the Milestone School and College in Dhaka, Bangladesh, killing at least 31 and injuring at least 160. The air force declared that the F-7 fighter jet had suffered from a mechanical failure and that the pilot, Flight Lieutenant Md Taukir Islam, had attempted to steer the jet away from crowded areas. The crash site, a school building, was severely damaged and caught fire, prompting an immediate emergency response. In the aftermath of the crash, protests erupted in Dhaka, with demonstrators gathering outside Milestone College in Uttara and clashing with law enforcement near a government building. The protests were sparked by public outrage over the incident, leading to heavy police deployment and the use of tear gas. At least 40 protesters were reported injured in these clashes. Further protests are likely, particularly if the death toll rises or if the mechanical fault is traced back to human error.

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