On 14 June, an individual carried out two targeted shootings at the homes of US lawmakers Melissa Hortman and John Hoffman. Hortman had been the Speaker of the House of Representatives for the state of Minnesota; Hoffman was a state Senator. Both victims are members of the Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party (DFL), a state affiliate of the Democratic Party. The shootings resulted in the deaths of Hortman and her husband, while the two other victims survived.

The perpetrator, who was later arrested, reportedly impersonated a police officer during the shooting and, in addition to the victims, visited the addresses of two further public officials. Officers retrieved weapons, flyers linked with the “No Kings” protests, a series of further addresses of policymakers, and an alleged “manifesto” (which, as of yet, has not been made public) in the vehicle used by the attacker.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The dynamic of the shooting makes it almost certainly a case of targeted political assassination, although the exact motive that drove the attack remains uncertain. The alleged perpetrator had listed approximately 70 other political figures and civil society leaders in his notes. Many of them had been linked with pro-choice activism and legislation, as well as with abortion providers.

While this could suggest a possible ideological motive, the shooter, besides the unreleased “manifesto”, did not seek to publicise his attack using media, in a notable departure from other lone actor shooters. The profile of the attacker also appears anomalous: a 57-year-old man, he is considerably older than other recent attackers.

According to authorities, the shooter had acquired the addresses via publicly accessible websites and had conducted extensive preparatory work ahead of the shooting, including modifying his vehicle to resemble a police car. The shooting’s timing was highly likely planned to coincide with the eve of the “No Kings” protests, which were held across hundreds of locations in the US and other countries on 15 June.

The shooting highlights a growing threat of political violence in the US, and there is a remote possibility that it will inspire further copycat activity.

At least six people have died and more than 300 are injured following clashes between government forces and the supporters of former President Evo Morales. Morales’ supporters have staged roadblocks at several highways across the country, calling on the government to allow the former president to run in the elections, which are scheduled to take place on 17 August.

On 15 June, protesters stated they would establish a “humanitarian pause”, amidst worsening shortages of food and other basic goods due to the blockades. The government has reportedly deployed more than 200 police officers to Cochabamba to prevent further roadblocks from being established.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The recent protests are notable as the participants have reportedly increasingly resorted to violent methods to attack police forces and other responders. One of the officers that were killed reportedly had dynamite strapped to his body, and local government sources have reported coming under fire from “snipers”.

Moreover, although these appear so far relatively isolated rather than systemic, there are increasing reports of targeted attacks against public institutions and private businesses and residences. For instance, on 13 June, a councillor in La Paz claimed her house had been bombed overnight; on the same day, the headquarters of a pro-Morales group were firebombed, also in La Paz.

The political landscape in Bolivia remains extremely divided. Of the ten registered candidates for the 17 August vote, none reached the 20 per cent threshold in recent polls. Moreover, the absence of both Morales and the incumbent President, Luis Arce, further contributes to this fragmentation, with lower-profile candidates competing to secure the support of the electorate.

It is highly likely that protests will continue, and they could intensify in the weeks preceding the elections. The Cochabamba region, where Morales resides and where the ex-president’s rural strongholds are located, is likely to remain a hotspot for protests, including violent forms of unrest.

‘No Kings’ protests in the US

On 14 June, ‘No Kings’ protests, also called ‘No Dictators’ or ‘No Tyrants’ protests in places with monarchies, took place across the US against Donald Trump’s presidency. According to protest organisers, at least five million people participated in over 2,100 cities and towns, making it the largest coordinated protest movement during Trump’s second term. Protests also occurred across the territories of Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the United States Virgin Islands, as well as 20 other foreign countries, including Canada, Mexico, Panama, and Japan.

The protests occurred during the military parade in Washington commemorating the Army’s 250^th anniversary, the same day as Trump’s birthday. The protests were marked by instances of violence in the US, with clashes between demonstrators and the police in Portland, Oregon, a vehicle ramming in Culpeper, Virginia, and shots fired in Salt Lake City, Utah. Authorities have since declared that most protests were peaceful.

Organisers of the ‘No Kings’ protests have announced plans for further demonstrations on 17 July titled ‘Good Trouble Lives On’, commemorating the fifth anniversary of the death of Congressman John Lewis.

Argentine government launches major police reform, likely to drive unrest

On 17 June, the Argentine President Javier Milei announced that he would expand the powers of the country’s police force by decree. Among the proposed reforms, which Milei stated were inspired by the US and Israeli models, Federal Police agents will be able to detain individuals for up to ten hours or search them without the need for a warrant if they suspect them of criminal activity. Moreover, police will be given the ability to monitor open social media spaces without the need for judicial approval.

Argentina’s opposition has attacked the measures as granting excessive power to police and threatening legal forms of civil dissent. The timing of the reform was likely meant to coincide with a major political win for Milei, whose government recorded a monthly inflation rate of 1.5 per cent in May, the lowest in five years. Nevertheless, it is likely that the reforms will continue to encounter significant opposition and may drive civil unrest in Buenos Aires and likely other large Argentine cities.

Mexican authorities arrest Tijuana Cartel leader in Baja California

Pablo Edwin Huerta Nuño, known as “El Flaquito”, was arrested by Mexican security forces in Tijuana on 17 June. The arrest is an important blow to the Tijuana Cartel (sometimes referred to as Arellano Félix Cartel, CAF), of which he was one of the key leaders in the border region with the US. The Tijuana Cartel has declined significantly in the past decades but retains large cells in strategic areas of the US-Mexico border.

According to local media, El Flaquito was engaged in talks with the powerful Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG) and with the “Mayitos” faction of the Sinaloa Cartel. Currently, the landscape of cartel control in Mexico is changing due to the internal fracture of the Sinaloa cartel between the Mayitos and the “Chapitos”, a rival group led by the sons of Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán, who is currently incarcerated in the US.

Groups like CJNG, who have a presence across much of Mexico’s territory, as well as regional cartels like Tijuana, are almost certainly leveraging this split to enter previously inaccessible markets. This driver of competition is almost certainly also compounded by the growing crackdown on cartel activity by Mexican authorities, favoured by heavy US pressure.

Clashes continue in Colombia as EMC declares “armed strike” in Guaviare

The Estado Mayor Central (EMC) has continued its high volume of attacks on government forces. On 15 June, EMC leaders announced that an “armed strike” would remain in place in the Guaviare department, in south-central Colombia, until 21 June, amidst a territorial confrontation with the rival Calarcá Córdoba faction. The EMC imposed a curfew, affecting approximately 40,000 people and has resulted in the halt of nearly all commercial activity.

Days prior, on 11 June, the commander of the EMC’s Isaías Pardo Bloc, “Cholinga”, was killed in the Cauca region in clashes with government forces. On the day prior, EMC forces had conducted dozens of attacks across several southern and western departments of Colombia to coincide with the anniversary of the foundation of the Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (FARC), which killed at least seven people.

Category 4 hurricane makes landfall in Acapulco, Mexico

Hurricane Erick has intensified into a Category 4 hurricane with maximum sustained winds of 233 km/h (145 mph) shortly before landfall between Lagunas de Chacahua, Oaxaca, and Punta Maldonado, Guerrero. The hurricane made landfall on 19 June. Authorities issued red weather alerts for 15 municipalities in Guerrero and 55 in Oaxaca, urging residents to avoid coastal areas due to expected heavy rains, severe winds, and storm surges.

More than 350 temporary shelters were set up in Oaxaca, and flights were suspended at international airports in Puerto Escondido and Bahías de Huatulco. Additionally, a preventative power outage was announced in Marquelia, Guerrero. The National Hurricane Center warns of potential wind damage, mudslides, and flooding as the storm makes landfall.

The unprecedented strength of the eastern Pacific hurricane before August is highly anomalous and is almost certainly indicative of worsening hurricanes as a result of global warming. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) additionally predicts an above-normal 2025 Atlantic hurricane season, which poses a significant threat across North America this summer.

At least two dead in southern Brazil due to severe rains

Heavy rains have resulted in severe damage and disruptions in parts of the southern region of Rio Grande do Sul. The rains resulted in flash floods, forcing more than 2,600 people to evacuate so far. According to local media, some of the worst-affected areas are the same that were severely damaged during the May 2024 floods, which killed around 100 people.

Flooding in the Rio Grande do Sul can be particularly dangerous as some towns are located in extremely remote areas, which can be difficult to reach for emergency services. Brazilian media reported on 20 June that the rains have decreased in intensity. However, the death toll from the severe weather event will likely rise during the 20-22 June period, as several individuals remain missing.

Magnitude 6.1 earthquake off coast of Lima, Peru

On 15 June 15, a preliminary magnitude 6.1 earthquake struck just off the coast of Lima, Peru, causing significant damage and disruption across the region. The earthquake killed at least one person and injured 17 others. Structural damage was reported in various parts of Lima, including collapsed homes in the Mi Perú district and damage to buildings at the Universidad Privada del Norte in Trujillo.

Seven health facilities were affected, and critical infrastructure, including roads and the Metro Line 1, faced closures and suspensions. Power outages were reported in multiple areas of Greater Lima. The following day, on June 16, a magnitude 4.2 aftershock was detected in the same region, causing further shaking in Lima. Damage assessments are ongoing as authorities continue to address the impact of the earthquake. Further aftershocks are highly likely.

Overnight 16-17 June, Russia conducted the third-largest layered aerial strikes against Ukraine of the war thus far. Strikes were recorded in Chernihiv, Cherkasy, Odesa, Sumy, and Zaporizhia Oblasts; however, the attack primarily targeted Kyiv. The Ukrainian Air Force (PS ZSU) stated that the attack in total involved 440 Shahed attack drones and decoys,  two ballistic missiles and 29 cruise missiles. Remnants of cluster munitions were also reportedly found in Kyiv.

At least 30 people were killed, including an American citizen, and 172 others were injured. Many of the casualties resulted from a nine-storey residential building being struck by a missile in the Solomianskyi District. In total, at least 30 locations in seven districts (out of ten) were struck.

The attack coincided with the 51st Group of Seven (G7) summit, which took place in the province of Alberta in Canada between 15 and 17 June, attended by the leaders of the US, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, Germany and the UK. Ukrainian diplomats were reportedly frustrated after US President Donald Trump left the conference before a scheduled meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, citing the ongoing Israel-Iran conflict. The US additionally reportedly vetoed a joint statement which condemned the Russian occupation of Ukraine.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The attack on Kyiv is the deadliest since 8 July 2024, when Russian strikes on the capital killed at least 32 civilians and injured 85, including a cruise missile which caused severe damage at the Okhmatdyt Children’s Hospital. The 16-17 June attack, coinciding with the G7 Summit, has been called deliberate by Ukraine’s Foreign Minister, Andrii Sybiha.

Whilst the summit was highly likely a consideration for Russian military planners, the attack additionally occurred within the context of likely still pending retaliation for Ukraine’s Operation Spider’s Web (Pavutyna) on 1 June, and a phase of considerably intensified long-range strikes against Ukrainian urban centres which has been observable since at least January 2025. The attacks are almost certainly characterised by their indiscriminate targeting patterns, with residential areas regularly being targeted, posing substantial risks to civilians.

The G7 summit was almost certainly disappointing from the perspective of Ukrainian officials, despite the securing of a new USD 1.7 billion support package. It was the first G7 summit to not issue a joint statement condemning Russia since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

In addition to concerns from the Trump administration that condemnation of Russia could compromise negotiations, the G7 conference almost certainly highlighted a transfer of attention from the Trump administration from Ukraine to Iran. Material evidence of the impact of this is the diversion of APKWS anti-drone interceptors, for example, with 20,000 APKWS interceptors that were designated for Ukraine from the US being diverted instead to the Middle East.

Longer-term, there are potential benefits for the Ukrainian war effort conferred by the degradation of Iran’s military industry. Iran’s ballistic missile manufacturing capabilities have almost certainly been heavily degraded, with Iran having previously transferred Fath-360 short-range ballistic missiles to Russia.

Iranian military materiel provided to the Russian armed forces has been considerable, particularly the Shahed one-way attack drone, which has become an almost daily feature of Russian long-range strikes against Ukrainian urban centres. There are indications of Shahed technology advancements also, with a Ukrainian specialist announcing on 18 June, for example, the discovery of a Shahed with an artificial intelligence module (possibly for terminal target guidance) and a new Iranian anti-electronic warfare system.

However, Shahed-variants are now domestically manufactured in Russia, and, likely, Russia’s defence industrial complex will not be significantly impacted. Nonetheless, the striking of targets in Shiraz, Iran, in particular, is notable as the city hosts Shiraz Electronic Industries, which is assessed to be a key developer and producer of advanced Iranian drone technology.

Furthermore, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) aerospace commander Amir Ali Hajizadeh has reportedly been killed, a figure who is thought to have been an essential facilitator of Iranian military support to Russia. There is therefore a realistic possibility that the development of future drone advancements for Russian attack drones will be notably hampered, an area in which Russia has already highly likely fallen behind Ukraine.

On 13 June, Israel launched Operation Rising Lion, conducting widespread airstrikes on Iranian nuclear facilities and supportive infrastructure, nuclear scientists, senior leadership within both the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and Artesh (conventional military), critical national infrastructure, including fuel and water supplies.

The Israeli Air Force (IAF) has also struck and destroyed a broad array of conventional military assets, including ballistic missile launchers, air defence systems; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms, and weapons production facilities. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has stated that the strikes will continue until both Iran’s nuclear facilities and missile stockpiles are completely destroyed.

Statements from the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) claim that the majority of Iran’s integrated air defences (IADs) have been degraded, along with more than half of its ballistic missile launchers. Israel claims to have achieved almost complete air superiority over Iran and has forced Iran to relocate many of its military capabilities from western Iran to central and eastern Iran. Iranian sources claim that Israeli strikes have resulted in the deaths of over 600 people, the majority of whom are civilians.

Iran has responded by conducting daily uncrewed aerial vehicle (UAV) and ballistic missile attacks against Israel. Iranian ballistic missile salvos are much smaller than observed in 2024, limited to 10-30 missiles. However, several missiles have penetrated Israel’s comprehensive and advanced air defence system.

Reports indicate that Israel’s stock of Arrow missile interceptors, its primary counter-ballistic missile system, is low, forcing Israel to intercept ballistic missiles with only one missile interceptor at a time, compared to 2024, when it fired two missile interceptors at each ballistic missile. US counter-ballistic missile systems deployed to Israel, such as the Patriot missile system and Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) systems, are also reportedly running low on munitions. According to some assessments, Israel may only be able to maintain its current interception rates for 10-12 days if Iran maintains the current rate of attacks.

Iranian strikes in Israel have resulted in a state of emergency being declared across the country, flight cancellations, at least 24 fatalities and hundreds of injuries. Iran has transitioned from targeting only military targets and is now deliberately targeting residential areas and civilian infrastructure, including a hospital in Beersheba. Israel has framed these attacks as war crimes and has vowed to sustain its attacks on Iran. There are also early indications that Iran is now using cluster bombs to target Israeli populated areas to maximise casualties.

Iranian proxy force activity has so far been limited to attempted Houthi attacks on Israel from Yemen and attempted attacks by Iranian-backed Shia militias on US forces in Iraq. Hezbollah has not committed forces to the current hostilities but has stated that US involvement or attempts at regime change in Iran are its red lines that will trigger its direct involvement in the conflict. 

The US response remains overtly ambiguous. President Trump has reportedly approved an operational strike plan but has stated that a decision on intervention will be made within two weeks. Concurrently, US force posture in Europe and the Middle East has been significantly enhanced, including the deployment of three Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs) to the region, and over 30 additional air refuelling tankers have been sent to Europe.

Airspace closures across Iran, Iraq, Syria, Israel, and Jordan have disrupted evacuation and commercial air traffic throughout the region. Arab states have publicly condemned Israeli strikes and warned against escalation or direct US involvement. Gulf States are leading efforts to broker talks between the warring parties or their intermediaries and have stated that the US should not use bases within their territory to conduct direct attacks on Iran.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Israel’s stated objectives are to delay and degrade Iran’s nuclear programme, weaken conventional military capabilities, disrupt command and control networks, and apply pressure on the regime. However, Israel’s operational limitations are clear. While it can target nuclear scientists, non-hardened nuclear infrastructure and other supportive infrastructure, it lacks the airframes and ordnance to comprehensively destroy hardened and deep underground nuclear facilities like the Fordow nuclear enrichment facility. This would almost certainly require US involvement and the deployment of GBU-57 MOP ‘bunker buster’ bombs delivered by B-2 strategic bombers.

Iran is likely to sustain its ballistic missile and UAV attacks on Israel until either a diplomatic solution is reached or until US involvement, when it will likely pivot to targeting US targets. While much of Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities have been degraded, it still maintains half of its launchers and has hundreds of missiles left. Depending on expenditure rates and the effectiveness of Israeli targeting, Iran could likely sustain daily salvos of 10-20 ballistic missiles for several weeks, despite its diminished capacity to replenish missile stocks. If Iran successfully maintains the current rate of fire, Israel’s interceptor stockpiles could become critically low, increasing the likelihood of successful Iranian strikes on strategic or populated targets.

Domestically, the Iranian regime is highly likely to intensify repression to control dissent and limit internal unrest. This will likely involve the deployment of the IRGC and Basij paramilitary forces, mass arrests, censoring the media, and shutting down telecommunications and internet services, reducing access to credible information in Iran. Iran is also likely to increasingly move ballistic missile launchers into populated areas and place them near schools, mosques and other sensitive sites to increase their survivability and complicate adversarial targeting decisions, a tactic that will almost certainly increase the threat posed to Iranian civilians.

While the US remains overtly uncommitted, Israel’s most likely course of action is to continue to degrade Iranian air defence and ballistic missile capabilities. This will likely help to attract US involvement by reducing the threat posed to US airframes and degrading Iran’s ability to launch counterstrikes against US forces in the region. The potential for US involvement remains uncertain. However, the Trump administration has been presented by Israel with a rare operational window to target Iran’s nuclear programme with a significantly lower risk to US forces and assets. Unless Iran resumes nuclear talks with the US within the specified time frame outlined by President Trump, the US will likely conduct strikes on Iran. US military assets have arrived in the region, and Iran’s conventional military capabilities have been severely degraded.

A direct US attack on Iran would highly likely provoke Iran into conducting retaliatory attacks on US forces in the region. Iran has threatened to target US forces stationed in Gulf States; however, such action is unlikely in the initial stages of any escalation. This is due to the high level of force protection at these bases and the risk that striking them could draw countries like Saudi Arabia and the UAE directly into the conflict – a scenario that would significantly increase regional pressure on the Iranian regime.

Iran’s most likely course of action will be to strike US forces in a more permissive environment, such as in Iraq and Syria. Iran previously conducted ballistic missile attacks against US forces in Iraq after the killing of the IRGC’s Qasem Soleimani. This strategy would help limit the opportunity for regional escalation, is unlikely to elicit a major response from Iraq and could be done in conjunction with the Shia militias.

However, the scale and success of any potential Iranian attack on US forces could trigger a calibrated and severe response from the US, increasing the risk of a broader military confrontation in the region that could also draw in Iranian proxy forces like the Houthis, who have previously conducted several attacks in Gulf States like Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

On the evening of 14 June, armed assailants attacked the Yelewata farming community in the Benue region, firing at villages, setting their homes on fire, and burning food stores in the market, destroying a year’s harvest. While exact casualty figures are unconfirmed, some estimates place the number at 200 people, a number which could continue to rise, and constitute the worst attack to date in Benue State.

According to witness accounts, at least 40 gunmen entered the village on motorcycles and opened fire on civilians. According to Nigeria’s Chief of Defence Staff, General Christopher Musa, some military personnel have been leaking information to “bandits”. On 17 June, Nigeria’s President Bola Tinubu ordered security agencies to bring an end to the killings; the police and military have launched a joint cross-border manhunt for the gunmen.

Solace Global Assessment: 

No group has immediately claimed responsibility. Whilst Benue Governor Hyacinth Alia maintains that the attackers were not Nigerians but foreign militants, and one of the Fulani leaders has declared that his people were not behind the killings, there is a historic pattern of violence conducted by nomadic Fulani herders, who have been engaged in a protracted conflict with farmers since the early 2000s. The roots of the conflict are embedded in farming communities accusing the nomadic herder communities of destroying their farms with their livestock, whilst herders accuse the farmers of farming on grazing routes, backed by law in 1965.

Whilst the Benue conflict has been ongoing for years, it has escalated recently, with approximately 1,043 people killed in the region between May 2023 and May 2025. In 2025, four separate attacks took place before this one, with the most recent attack killing 33 in June in Gwer West and Apa. Although the conflict has been ongoing for decades, the more recent attacks have escalated to what authorities describe as organised terrorism. Given the recent escalation in the frequency and deadliness of attacks in the region, further high-casualty attacks in Benue state are highly likely.

To combat the violence, the government launched a federal joint task force in 2018 to deploy the military to secure forest reserves in the region by May 2025. However, increased insurgent activity from Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) in northeastern Nigeria, armed kidnapping raids in the northwest, and secessionist demands in the southeast have highly likely strained resources for dealing with the Benue conflict.

In the wake of the attack and following likely perceptions that the government is failing to tackle the increasing violence, Nigerian security forces will highly likely re-allocate personnel to hunt down the attackers in Benue and will likely impose a state of emergency. This will likely provide increased operating freedom to militant groups in other regions, particularly Boko Haram and ISWAP in Borno State, whose attacks have increased in the lead-up to northeast Nigeria’s rainy season, during which they typically decrease.

On 9 June, demonstrations broke out in central Nairobi after blogger Albert Ojwang died in police custody the previous day after being arrested for the alleged defamation of the Deputy Inspector General of Police. While a police statement claimed that Ojwang died by suicide, a government-issued autopsy found signs consistent with assault. Two police officers have been arrested. On 12 June, the Government presented a new finance bill containing relatively conservative measures, including widening the tax base, improving adherence to tax rules, and cutting spending.

Protests steadily escalated, with demonstrators committing acts of vandalism and setting multiple vehicles alight on 12 June. Police forces responded with tear gas and water cannons in Nairobi’s Central Business District on 12 June. The same day, the Kenyan National Police released a statement confirming that a woman miscarried whilst in police custody at Rwanyambo police station in Nyandarua County and that an investigation is ongoing, but the officer in charge of the station has been ‘interdicted with immediate effect’.

On 17 June, a large group of unidentified “goons” on motorcycles arrived in the Central Business District in Nairobi armed with makeshift weapons. Police reportedly actively protected the “goons”, who were clashing with protestors. The same day, Kenyan police forces shot a bystander who had been selling face masks with an anti-riot shotgun at point-blank range in the head; the individual is still alive but is in the Intensive Care Unit (ICU) of Kenyatta National Hospital. A video of the incident circulated on social media, and Kenyan authorities have arrested the police officer responsible for the shooting. Protests escalated after the incident, spreading to other cities including Mombasa, Kilifi, and Kwale. 22 people were reported injured on 17 June.

Solace Global Assessment: 

While sporadic protests have broken out in Kenya over the last year, these constitute the most significant since the June to August 2024 protests triggered by the government finance bill. The 2024 protests saw a harsh response from security forces, who were accused of abducting, torturing, and killing civilians believed to be leaders of anti-government protests. At least 60 protesters were killed in total. The ongoing protests are highly likely far larger than they might have otherwise been due to the widespread mistrust of the police, which has been exacerbated by the attempt to cover up the almost certain murder of Ojwang, the miscarriage in police custody, the protection of armed “goons” who are likely linked to the police, and the shooting of a bystander.

The video of the shooting, in particular, will almost certainly inflame protests into the weekend. Despite some officials accused of police brutality either stepping down or being arrested by authorities, protests are highly likely to continue to escalate as security forces are perceived to forcefully crack down on protests. 25 June marks the first anniversary of the 2024 storming of parliament, something that will highly likely act as a significant date for protesters to rally around.

Despite the introduction of a new finance bill being the trigger for the 2024 protests, it is likely the least contributing factor in this wave of demonstrations. The 2024 finance bill aimed to raise 346 billion Kenyan shillings to pay off the country’s high debt by massively increasing taxes on consumers, such as value-added tax (VAT). Amidst a rising cost of living and inflation, this would have added significant economic pressure on ordinary Kenyans, triggering widespread youth-led protests. The current wave of unrest, on the other hand, is largely directed towards police brutality, with protesters demanding justice and the resignation of a senior officer they blame for the death of Ojwang, likely suggesting that sustained police brutality and a lack of accountability will continue to sustain violent unrest.

Metalworkers’ protests erupt in Cadiz, Spain

On 18 June, over 26,000 metalworkers in Cadiz went on strike over poor working conditions, stagnant wages and the erosion of benefits. The strike is ongoing and has been organised by Spain’s Workers’ Commissions’ Union (CCOO) and General Workers’ Union (UGT), two of the country’s largest unions.

The protests have converged with the local anti-tourism movement and are attracting widespread appeal, resulting in roadblocks, the burning of tires and property damage. The police have made multiple arrests and have used rubber bullets and tear gas to disperse the protests.

If no agreement is reached, the strike will likely evolve into an indefinite walkout starting June 23, likely leading to major disruption in the local area and affecting thousands of subcontractors tied to major firms like Navantia and Airbus.

Czech government survives Bitcoin scandal no-confidence vote

The populist ANO party (“YES”) filed an unsuccessful no-confidence motion against the government of Prime Minister Petr Fiala. This followed the resignation of the Justice Minister, Pavel Blazek, on 31 May, after it was revealed that he had accepted USD 45 million in Bitcoin on behalf of the state from Tomáš Jiříkovský, an individual who had previously been convicted of several offences, including drug trafficking and embezzlement.

Blazek initially claimed that the donation was an act of “repentance” but was later forced to resign due to overwhelming public backlash. Czechia is holding parliamentary elections in October, and ANO is currently the leading party in the polls with 32 per cent support. While unsuccessful, the no-confidence motion is still likely to strengthen ANO’s position ahead of the Autumn vote.

Syria establishes election committee

The transitional government of Syria established, on 14 June, the Supreme Committee for People’s Assembly Elections. Comprised of 11 members, the institution will oversee the creation of a new legislative authority. Ultimately, the new Syrian constitution grants the president direct authority to appoint a third of the 150 members of the People’s Assembly, with the remaining 100 elected via local committees. The development is an important step in the post-Assad state-building efforts, although questions remain over the actual translation of the framework into a workable representative system. It is highly unlikely that the government will accelerate the process leading to Syria’s first post-Assad elections.

Ex-South Sudanese MP forms new group.

On 15 June, Dei Tut Weang Khor, former member of the Transitional National Legislative Assembly (TNLA) for Nasir County and the Pan-African Parliament, resigned both roles and launched a new ‘movement’ called the South Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SSPLM). In his statement, Khor announced that his reason for forming the SSPLM is ‘because of the SSPDF [South Sudan People’s Defence Forces] and Ugandan Air Force bombing civilians in his constituency, political repression, and arbitrary arrests of opposition politicians.’

He has criticised President Salve Kiir, calling for his removal, having turned South Sudan into a ‘nightmare of genocide, ethnic cleansing, and unspeakable human suffering’, and claiming that the arrest of Vice President Riek Machar ‘marks a point of no return’ regarding the peace process.

Khor has promised to work alongside ‘opposition groups, civil society, faith leaders, youth, women, and the international community’ and has called on the UN Security Council, the African Union (AU), and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to take action. Khor’s formation of a new group occurs amidst months of escalating violence in South Sudan, particularly in the Upper Nile and Jonglei states. It is currently unclear what form the SSPLM will take, but the statement declares that it will release a ‘full political program’ and that the South Sudanese will ‘reclaim their country’.

Ugandan president reintroduces military trial for civilians

On 16 June, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni signed an amendment that allows military tribunals to try civilians. This was immediately opposed by the privately owned Uganda Law Society (ULS). In January 2025, the Supreme Court ruled the use of military tribunals for civilians who are found with military equipment unconstitutional since military courts were neither impartial nor competent for judicial functions.

The amendment to the law attempts to address these concerns, with those leading the tribunals mandated to have legal qualifications and training, as well as the impetus to remain impartial. It is unclear what stipulations would ensure impartiality. Prior to the Supreme Court ruling, Museveni used military tribunals to try opposition figures, notably opposition politician Kizza Besigye, in November 2024.

It is highly likely that with the 2026 general elections scheduled for 12 January 2026, Museveni, who has been in power for 39 years, aims to use the military tribunals as a tool to mute the opposition. While there is a realistic possibility that protests will occur, demonstrators must notify police forces before gathering, and Ugandan security forces would almost certainly violently crack down on unrest directed at Museveni.

Portuguese authorities arrest members of neo-Nazi group

Six people were detained on 17 June in a series of operations meant to dismantle the “Movimento Armilar Lusitano”. The operation, which is one of the largest of this kind in Portuguese history, also retrieved several firearms and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). According to Portuguese authorities, the group’s members sought to carry out attacks targeting state institutions to destabilise the Portuguese state. Ideologically, the Movimento seems to have been inspired by the neo-Nazi Nova Ordem Social group, active between 2014 and 2019.

US strike kills Islamic State attack planner in northwest Syria

On 10 June, US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted airstrikes in northwest Syria, resulting in the death of senior Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) commander Rakhim Boev. Boev was allegedly a senior external attack planner, responsible for orchestrating attacks outside of the Middle East. The strike likely marks a successful attempt to disrupt ISIS’ ability to plan and conduct external operations. However, with US forces currently drawing down in Syria and Iraq, a highly dynamic political environment in Syria, and increases in ISIS attacks, the long-term impact of such operations may be limited, with credible reports of ISIS regrouping in parts of Syria.

Several ethnonationalist groups call for revolution in Iran

Groups including the Baloch Jaysh al-Adl and the Kurdish Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK) have voiced support for the Israeli strikes as instruments for the destruction of the Iranian state, and called on their supporters to take advantage of Tehran’s instability to intensify operations. Another Baloch group, the Beebarg faction of the Baloch Nationalist Army (BNA-Beebarg), announced on 15 June that it would launch operations against Iranian forces in the Sistan and Baluchistan province of Iran, and called on other groups to start insurrections.

While Iran’s Persian majority is concentrated in the centre, northeast and south of the country, several active regionalist groups remain active in ethnic minority areas. Iran’s ground forces remain largely intact and are generally adept at countering insurgency. However, there is a realistic possibility that the weakening of the regime will encourage these groups to carry out a greater volume of attacks and increase recruitment should they sense an operational opportunity.

An increase in separatist activity is most likely in Iran’s Baloch regions near the border with Pakistan. Baloch militant groups based in Pakistan are currently ascendant due to Islamabad’s own security challenges, and militants in Iran would likely benefit from substantial cross-border support.

Two suspected JNIM attacks in Mali injure at least 34, with one attack using a drone

Two separate attacks in southern and northern Mali injured at least 34 people. Notably, one attack consisted of an uncrewed aerial vehicle (UAV) attack targeting the Tiby military training centre in the San region of Southern Mali. Another raid targeted Ansongo in the Gao region, whereby militants injured four people and stole goats and sheep.

It is highly likely that the attacks were conducted by the al-Qaeda affiliated Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM). Whilst JNIM have utilised weaponised UAVs since April 2024, a continuing trend of violent extremist organisations (VEOs) using drones is a major challenge to conventional security forces, as it allows insurgents to asymmetrically compete in the aerial domain.

The attacks are almost certainly part of an intensified regional offensive, with May constituting the highest casualty month involving JNIM since August 2024. Further attacks are highly likely across Mali as the JNIM offensive continues.

In Niger, the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) launches large-scale attack on military base

On 19 June, ISSP militants carried out a large-scale and successful attack on a Nigerien army base located in Bani Bangou, approximately 250 kilometres north of Niamey and near the border with Mali. According to available reports, at least 34 soldiers were killed and dozens more injured, with ISSP forces retreating to the north after the attack.

The attack almost certainly underscores severe logistical and operational deficiencies in the Nigerien army. Local media reported that ISSP forces had been spotted en route to Bani Bangou the day before, but, despite being alerted in time, junta forces were still surprised by the attack, incurring heavy losses.

Puntland forces claim that Islamic State Somalia Province (ISS) leader has escaped

The security forces of Somalia’s breakaway region are currently engaged in operations in the Cal Miskaad mountain range to root out the ISS fighters that have established their main strongholds there. Puntland forces’ offensive operations continue to be supported by US and UAE airstrikes and reconnaissance.

According to the latest available updates, Abdul Qadir Mumin, ISS’ leader, escaped the area and possibly the country due to the offensive. Mumin, who has (likely incorrectly) been at times identified as the Islamic State’s overall “caliph”, remains a fundamental figure for IS’ international networks, heading the vital al-Karrar office and controlling many of the group’s global operations and finances.

His presence in the Bari region of Puntland was almost certainly a major driver for the arrival of foreign fighters to the area from the Arab Peninsula, Turkey, and several African countries. Mumin’s escape could prompt a lull in ISS’ activity in the short term, although the group will almost certainly continue opportunistic attacks on Puntland forces and local civilians.

US air strike kills 25 al-Shabaab militants in Somalia

On 17 June, US airstrikes on the southern Bulo Haji area of the Lower Juba region killed at least 25 al-Shabaab militants and destroyed four vehicles, according to the Somali army. The airstrikes reportedly occurred as militants were mobilising in Maqoqaha and Halima Addey and planning surprise attacks.

This constitutes the latest in a series of US airstrikes targeting al-Shabaab, with 100 militants, including spokesperson Abdiasis Abu Mus’ab, killed on 30 May. The increase in US strikes is almost certainly in response to the al-Shabaab offensive, which has been ongoing since February 2025. The group has captured at least 20 villages and towns in Middle Shabelle, Lower Shabelle, and Hiiran, as well as escalating attacks on Mogadishu.

While airstrikes are unlikely to eliminate the threat, they are highly likely slowing the offensive and preventing the Somali military from being overwhelmed on the ground.

DRC and Rwandan governments sign preliminary peace agreement in Washington

On 19 June, the DRC and Rwandan governments reached a draft peace agreement regarding the ‘disengagement, disarmament, and conditional integration’ of armed groups fighting in eastern DRC.

The agreement also includes a joint security mechanism to prevent future breakouts of conflict. The peace deal is scheduled to be formally signed on 27 June. This preliminary deal builds on an agreement signed in April, whereby each side promised to respect each other’s sovereignty and forge a draft peace deal. The Washington-mediated peace agreement is almost certainly part of US President Donald Trump’s objective to attain a deal with the DRC over US investment in Congolese minerals such as tungsten, tantalum, and tin in exchange for support to end the AFC/M23 rebellion. AFC/M23 are unlikely to adhere to a formal peace agreement between the DRC and Rwanda.

Whilst Rwanda provides support to the group in the form of weapons and funding, the group is not beholden to Kigali, and the AFC/M23 has a documented history of refusing to observe peace agreements. The most recent example is the Qatar-mediated ceasefire agreed to by the AFC/M23 and the DRC’s government on 24 April 2025, which quickly collapsed following numerous ceasefire violations.

AFC/M23 have also recently ignored the Luanda peace process, despite Rwanda’s participation, leading to its eventual collapse. There is a realistic possibility, however, that Rwanda could completely withdraw support for the group, something it has generally been reluctant to do, which could lead to a government (and likely Wazalendo) counteroffensive to retake AFC/M23-held territory.

Kenyan security forces arrest suspect with bomb-making materials in Nairobi

On 18 September, Kenyan police forces arrested an individual in the Kamukunji neighbourhood of the capital, Nairobi. According to a police statement, ‘the 22-year-old suspect was found to be carrying 21 detonators, along with 21 packets of a white substance suspected to be ammonium nitrate, a five-metre-long electric cable and other items.’ The attack occurred the same day that Kenyan courts were due to sentence two suspected al-Shabaab militants for the 15 January 2019 attack on the DusitD2 hotel in Nairobi, which killed at least 21 civilians.

The DusitD2 attack constitutes the last al-Shabaab attack on Nairobi, and it is highly likely that the suspect, almost certainly associated with al-Shabaab, was planning on carrying out another attack on the capital. The presence of 21 detonators and 21 packets of suspected ammonium nitrate indicates that it is highly likely that there are at least 20 other al-Shabaab members in the capital who would collaborate in the attack.

Although Kenyan troops have withdrawn from Somalia, al-Shabaab are almost certainly inspired to commit terrorist attacks in Nairobi, since it constitutes a high-value, high-visibility location with a significant Western presence.

Europe’s Mediterranean coast records heatwave conditions

Temperatures of above 39 degrees Celsius have been recorded at several coastal locations, including Corsica, Italy, and Southern Spain. According to weather pattern data, the first major heatwave of the summer was caused by a protracted low over the North Atlantic. High temperatures are likely to continue during the 20-22 June period and after. Severe heat is likely to pose a threat to travellers in Europe and is likely to particularly affect tourists visiting the region.

Heavy flooding in Kinshasa, DRC

Flooding in Kinshasa, the capital of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), has resulted in the death toll rising to 77 people, with at least 100 people missing. The heavy rains have caused significant material damage, including the collapse of roads and the inundation of streets due to an overflowing river. Rehabilitation work is currently underway to repair the roads damaged by the floods. The severe weather has led to hundreds of houses being buried or damaged, with local officials and media highlighting the extent of the destruction across the city.

After an armed confrontation in the disputed border region of Preah Vihear on 28 May, which resulted in the death of one Cambodian soldier, tensions have escalated between the two countries. Thailand has introduced border crossing restrictions and has threatened to cut electricity and the internet to the border region, with Cambodia reciprocating with bans on Thai movies and television shows.

On 16 June, Cambodia threatened to stop importing Thai fruits and vegetables if Thailand refused to remove the border restrictions. Thai Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra has declared that the border restrictions are in place over safety concerns for the citizens of both countries due to the presence of armed forces.

Cambodian and Thai officials met in Phnom Penh on 15 June, but did not achieve a breakthrough. Cambodia has submitted a request for a resolution to the UN’s International Court of Justice (ICJ) and has declared that it would no longer discuss the issue bilaterally. The Thai Minister of Foreign Affairs declared that Thailand does not recognise the ICJ’s jurisdiction. On 18 June, thousands of Cambodians joined a state-organised rally in Phnom Penh to denounce Thailand’s increased activity in the area.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The dispute originates from a 1904 colonial-era agreement between France and Siam using the watershed principle to define the border, but a later French map placed the Preah Vihear Temple in Cambodia. The ICJ ultimately ruled in Cambodia’s favour.

Tensions over the disputed region have occasionally escalated, most notably in 2008 following armed skirmishes between Cambodian and Thai troops. In 2011, both sides engaged in a week-long exchange of artillery, mortars, and rocket fire, triggering at least 15 deaths and 85,000 displacements. Following the clashes, Bangkok and Phnom Penh agreed to settle future disputes with a Joint Boundary Commission; a means which failed to resolve the current dispute on 15 June.

It is unclear how the current dispute will be resolved. The ICJ has twice resolved border disputes between Cambodia and Thailand, in 1962 on the ownership of the Hindu Preah Vihear temple and in 2013 on the jurisdiction of the land around the temple. Bangkok’s refusal to recognise the ICJ’s jurisdiction is indicative that it would highly likely rule in favour of Cambodia once again.

Another route to resolution is through the regional bloc Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Cambodia and Thailand (ASEAN), which is highly likely to step in to attempt to resolve the dispute. However, ASEAN does not have an effective dispute resolution mechanism, and the group typically operates by consensus among its members, a factor that will be difficult to reconcile considering the nature of the dispute and the involvement of two ASEAN member states.

There are indications that neither side wants to significantly escalate, with the two countries typically enjoying peaceful relations and having withdrawn their troops on 8 June. However, Bangkok almost certainly does not want to look weak, particularly since the Thai military has released aerial photographs displaying Cambodians clearing trees, building roads, and digging trenches, which point to a military build-up.

There is a realistic possibility that the Thai military is deliberately escalating tensions and inflaming nationalist sentiment to add pressure on Thai Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra and justify another coup. Until the situation is resolved, protests are almost certain to continue in Phnom Penh and could also be organised in Bangkok.

Yunus meets Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) leader, seeks detente

Bangladesh’s Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus met BNP leader Tarique Rahman in London. The meeting occurred at a period of extremely high domestic political tensions in Bangladesh. While Yunus, who has led an interim government following the ousting of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in the August 2024 revolution, has sought to prioritise domestic reforms ahead of scheduling new elections, the BNP and some of its allies have called for an immediate vote, with some officials threatening civil unrest if their demands are not met.

The Yunus-Rahman meeting reportedly resulted in concessions for both sides, with the BNP obtaining an anticipation of the proposed election date to the week before next year’s Ramadan (rather than April, as Yunus had previously suggested), and the interim government obtaining support for their proposed reform plan.

While likely positive, the meeting will not suffice to resolve the deep political instability affecting Bangladesh, which is driven by several groups with different priorities, objectives, and interests.

India’s airspace restrictions on Pakistani aircraft due to be lifted

India is set to lift its airspace restrictions for Pakistani aircraft on 23 June for the first time since relations deteriorated following the Pahalgam attack in Jammu and Kashmir in April. While the closure was initially expected to end in May, both countries extended it amidst rising tensions.

The airspace closure has had significant economic repercussions, with Air India facing large losses due to having to reroute flights. If India lifts the airspace ban, Pakistan will highly likely follow suit. Tensions between the two sides remain, however. The Indus Water Treaty remains suspended, and there is a realistic possibility that India could once again delay the lifting of airspace restrictions.

Shia scholar killed in Afghanistan, highlighting growing threat to minorities

Sayed Kazim Amiry, a Shia religious scholar, was reportedly beheaded by unknown assailants in the Darvaz area of Badakhshan, located near the border with Tajikistan. While currently, no groups have claimed responsibility for the killing, regional analysts have reported some positive commentary by channels linked with the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP).

Past cases of killing or harassment of Shia individuals and leaders have resulted in some localised civil unrest, for instance, in late 2023 in Herat. There is a realistic possibility that the conflict between Israel and Iran could drive further violence against Shias in Afghanistan. This is particularly the case as Iranian security forces recently arrested 18 Afghan nationals, who are accused of collaborating with Mossad.

Twin attacks in Thailand’s Deep South

On 17 June 2025, suspected Muslim insurgents in Thailand’s Deep South launched coordinated attacks in Pattani and Narathiwat provinces, killing a Muslim woman and injuring a Buddhist army ranger. In Pattani, six militants disguised in hijabs shot and killed a government worker suspected of aiding the authorities. In Narathiwat, a roadside bomb seriously injured a ranger during a patrol.

The attacks are part of a broader campaign which has primarily targeted Thai security forces but also increasingly Thai civilians suspected of assisting the central government. These attacks follow a rare statement issued by the separatist militant group Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) in May, in which it stated that it regrets civilian casualties and reaffirmed its policy of not targeting non-combatants.

A recent wave of attacks targeting civilians may indicate a split within the BRN, with more radical factions pursuing a more hardline strategy.

Heatwave conditions in western China

Parts of Xinjiang province, in northwestern China, reached 47 degrees during this reporting period. China’s authorities issued a heatstroke alert, the first for the year, followed by several yellow alerts for other at-risk parts of the country. Extreme heat was also recorded in the area of the Sichuan Basin, in the eponymous province. This Spring has been one of the hottest on record in China. Temperatures in early June are likely to pose significant health threats to locals and travellers, particularly in sparsely populated areas where emergency services are more limited.

Dozens hospitalised in Japan due to heatwave

Japanese authorities reported that at least 117 people have been hospitalised with heatstroke symptoms across the country, with at least one death having been recorded. Japan is currently having prolonged high temperatures, with maximums of 34 degrees recorded in Tokyo and Osaka, and 36 degrees in Nagoya. While forecasts indicate rain across much of central Japan on 21-23 June, which will likely lower temperatures, urban centres remain at a high risk from severe heat.

Volcanic eruption causes disruptions in Indonesia

Mount Lewotobi Laki Laki erupted on 17 June, resulting in an 11-kilometre-high ash cloud above the island of Flores, southeast Indonesia. The eruption prompted authorities to issue the highest possible alert level and advised residents and travellers to avoid the area.

Notable airport disruptions were recorded in Bali, which is a key hub for transport in Indonesia and across the region. Some airlines also reportedly cancelled flights to Jakarta. It is unlikely that the eruption will result in severe direct threats to residents or travellers. However, the airport disruptions have a realistic possibility of having knock-on effects on air travel during the 20-22 June period.

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