Haitian gangs will almost certainly continue to expand their territorial control and increase attacks across the country until significant external intervention is achieved.

President Noboa’s securing of a second term in Ecuador was likely achieved by his tough stance on organised crime and will almost certainly result in a continuation of draconian policies aimed at curbing violence.

The firebombings at French prisons are highly likely an escalation by criminal groups in response to Paris’ efforts to crack down on organised crime. There is a realistic possibility of further attacks on security personnel.

In the likely scenario that Russia does not extend the ‘energy ceasefire’, significant long-range strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure and urban centres will likely follow, almost certainly posing risks to civilians.

Lebanon’s push to disarm Hezbollah is unlikely to succeed, with recent moves by the militant group likely aimed at buying time to regroup and continue its armed resistance against Israel.

RSF attacks on displacement camps in western Sudan are likely aimed at forcing displacement, reducing foreign oversight and securing vital ground to undermine the SAF’s control of El Fasher.

Further and potentially violent protests are highly likely across India after the government passes controversial amendments to the Waqf Act.

Dangerous driving conditions are almost certain to lead to increased road traffic accidents across Thailand as the country celebrates the Songkran festival.

Gang violence has continued to spread in Haiti and has resulted in a series of attacks in areas previously assessed as more secure. On 10 April, gangs launched an attack in Léogâne, located approximately 30km west of Port-au-Prince, marking the onset of a surge in violence. This was followed by another gang assault in Gode, situated in the northwest of the country, on 12 April. Additional gang attacks occurred on 13 and 14 April in Madelaine, near the area of Kenscoff, to the south of Port-au-Prince, and the gangs have continued attacks in Mirebalais, approximately 40km northeast of the capital.

In response to the increased violence, the United States Embassy in Haiti updated its security alert to include multiple regions of the country, advising American citizens to avoid travel. In addition, the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community (Caricom) issued a statement on 14 April indicating that it is deeply concerned over reports of a coalition of armed gangs seeking to seize power by force and “disrupt the transitional arrangements currently in place.” Caricom has called on the international community, particularly the United Nations and the Organization of American States, to take “all necessary measures” to support the Haitian authorities during this critical period. On 16 April, the cruise line company, Royal Caribbean, suspended its port calls to the Haitian tourist destination of Labadee in the north of the country.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Recent attempts to expand their area of operations likely indicate a concerted effort to undermine the government’s authority and deny humanitarian aid to areas under gang control, particularly in and around Port-au-Prince (PAP). This strategy is likely aimed at further destabilising the state by making communities dependent on the gangs for access to essential services and will likely involve increased attacks on public services and the looting of critical supplies, as evidenced by the looting of the hospital in Mirebalais.

On 14 April and in reaction to the effective loss of Mirebalais, the Haitian government adopted a “war budget” aimed at combating the gangs. However, the budget only included USD 275,000, indicating the lack of resources available to the government and the urgent need for greater external assistance. Approximately 40 per cent of the budget will go to the Haitian military and police, with nearly 20 per cent being used to enhance security at the border with the Dominican Republic, a key entry point for illicit weapons. The remainder will be spent on social programmes focused on education, health and humanitarian assistance.

However, given the expanding territorial control of the gangs, who have consistently blocked key supply routes, looted critical supplies, and currently maintain near-total control in several regions, it is highly unlikely that the budget will have any meaningful impact in countering the gangs’ influence or restoring state control. Until significant external intervention is achieved, the gangs will almost certainly continue their attempts to expand their control and increase their attacks, resulting in a deterioration in the humanitarian situation.  

On 13 April, President Daniel Nobia was re-elected following the second round of Ecuador’s presidential election. Figure’s released by Ecuador’s National Electoral Council indicate that Noboa received almost 56 per cent of the vote compared to his rival, leftist lawyer Luisa Gonzalez, who secured 44 per cent of the vote. Gonzalez has demanded a recount of the vote, suggesting that the process was marked by ‘grotesque’ electoral fraud and that pre-election polls had put her ahead of President Noboa. The vote was monitored by international observers from the Organization of American States and the European Union, but neither body has released its official reports.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Noboa’s re-election was almost certainly secured by his tough stance on organised crime, which closely mirrors the strategies implemented by President Bukele in El Salvador. However, unlike in El Salvador, the imposition of states of emergencies, the mass deployment of the police and the military, and the suspension of many civil liberties have yet to yield a significant improvement in Ecuador’s security environment.

Ecuador’s challenges differ substantially from those faced in El Salvador. Gangs in Ecuador are more sophisticated and involve transnational criminal organisations such as the Mexican Sinaloa and Jalisco New Generation cartels. These organisations have entrenched themselves in Ecuador, seeking to benefit from the country’s porous borders, proximity to the major cocaine producing nations of Peru and Colombia, and to exploit Ecuador’s access to the Pacific Ocean.

Moreover, these transnational criminal organisations are far better funded and armed than the gangs in El Salvador, likely suggesting that an emulation of Bukele’s tactics is not sufficient for effectively addressing the scale of Ecuador’s security challenges.

President Noboa has recently expressed that he is willing to host US military forces in Ecuador and would welcome US support in combating organised crime in the country. The Trump administration’s recent designation of organised crime groups, including the Sinaloa and Jalisco New Generation Cartels, as Foreign Terrorist Organisations (FTOs) could provide a foundation for increased US involvement. The designation, combined with Trump’s commitment to combating organised crime, could result in greater access to intelligence-sharing, specialised resources, and in the long term could potentially involve direct US military support to combat the cartels, although initial Ecuadorian plans only involve the US providing supportive roles, such as intelligence gathering and surveillance operations.

Ecuador is currently constructing a naval base in the city of Manta, and there are proposals to host the US military there. If the US establishes a naval presence on the Ecuadorian coast and is involved in maritime interdiction efforts, this could disrupt cocaine smuggling from Ecuador and ultimately deter transnational organised crime groups from operating in the country, a development that would likely improve Ecuador’s internal security.

USA gets El Salvador’s support for further deportations

On 14 April, US President Donald Trump met his Salvadoran counterpart, Nayib Bukele, in Washington. The president of the Central American country endorsed Trump’s plans to carry out further deportations of migrants, and possibly US citizens who commit crimes, to his country. Moreover, Bukele backed Trump over the issue of a citizen of El Salvador who was deported despite having protected status, a decision that the White House has refused to reverse.

El Salvador, which in recent years has built massive prisons to house more than 80,000 individuals accused of having ties to criminal groups, has increasingly portrayed itself as a means for the US to “offshore” its migrants abroad. A growing partnership between San Salvador and Washington is likely to drive civil unrest in the US. High-visibility deportations, such as those of the Salvadoran citizen or those of Columbia University activists, are particularly likely to result in protests in large cities and near university campuses.

First report on Dominican Republic roof collapse released

The document was published by the government on 11 April. Notably, the report did not clarify what caused the incident, which killed 221 people at a packed nightclub in the country’s capital, Santo Domingo. The incident is one of the largest mass casualty events in the country’s history and has attracted massive domestic and international attention. Consequently, as more details emerge, there is a realistic possibility of civil unrest, especially if investigations indicate the government was at fault or the accident was a result of corruption.

Deaths of two football fans result in protests in Santiago, Chile

Two individuals, including a minor, were killed during a stampede at the Monumental Stadium on 10 April. On the following day, protests erupted in multiple parts of the capital, including downtown Santiago, La Pintana, Cerro Navia, and San Joaquín. According to local media, protests began peacefully as groups of fans of the Colo-Colo football club gathered near the stadium before a Copa Libertadores match. However, a group of protesters reportedly began to throw rocks at police and passing vehicles. The spread of the protests throughout the night resulted in limited traffic disruptions and some cases of vandalism.

Argentina secures USD 20 billion deal with the International Monetary Fund (IMF)

The announcement follows Buenos Aires’ decision to lift its strict currency controls, which limit the ability for Argentine nationals to purchase US Dollars, and to float the official Peso exchange rate. The IMF has stated that it would transfer USD 12 billion upfront on 15 April, an unusually large amount. The deal is a political victory for President Javier Milei, but the possibility of significant currency devaluation following the deal, which could push inflation higher, may drive short-term civil unrest.

US Army to control parts of the US-Mexico border

On 15 April, the Trump administration announced the emergency transfer of nearly 110,000 acres of federal land along the US-Mexico border within New Mexico. The move is almost certainly part of Trump’s broader efforts to improve border security, disrupt drug smuggling and deter illegal immigration and could authorise the US Army to detain migrants. The move to detain migrants is likely to be challenged in the courts, although US Army personnel would technically not be detaining migrants but rather trespassers on military land.

The land only encompasses a 170-mile section of a nearly 2,000-mile border, but will likely drive migration flows to other parts, potentially enabling law enforcement to focus resources on a more concentrated area. Moreover, approximately 30 per cent of the US-Mexico border is federally owned, suggesting that such a strategy could be greatly expanded to cover additional sections of the border if deemed effective.

Pennsylvania governor’s residence firebombed

On the night of 13-14 April, an individual reportedly broke into Governor Josh Shapiro’s residence and started a fire, which destroyed parts of the building but resulted in no injuries. The perpetrator reportedly turned himself in and stated that he planned to kill Shapiro. Early authority reports state that the perpetrator was motivated by a “deep hatred” for Shapiro.

The incident is almost certainly to be politically motivated and to be linked to the high visibility of the target. Shapiro is one of the key Democratic politicians in the early race for the 2028 presidential nomination and was considered a front-runner to be Kamala Harris’s running mate in 2024. Moreover, there is a realistic possibility that the attack was religiously motivated, as it took place only hours after a Passover Seder dinner.

Increasing signs of volcanic activity from Mount Spurr, Alaska

The US Geological Survey (USGS) has detected hundreds of small tremors within a 30-mile radius of Alaska’s Mount Spurr, resulting in it issuing an advisory warning that the volcano is likely, but not certain, to erupt in the next weeks to months. The volcano lies around 129 km (80 miles) west of Anchorage, the largest city in Alaska, which is comprised of almost 300,000 inhabitants. The authorities have instructed citizens to be vigilant and prepare in case of widespread disruption caused by ash and other volcanic material, which is likely to shut down air travel. However, this has reportedly resulted in panic buying in the area, with locals in anticipation of a state of emergency, amassing food, N95 masks and other critical supplies.

Aftershocks possible after earthquake registered near San Diego, California

On 14 April, a 5.1 magnitude earthquake was registered near Julian, California, with tremors felt in San Diego and as far away as Los Angeles. Initial damage assessments are ongoing, but no major damage has been recorded. However, at least seven aftershocks have been recorded, increasing the chances of structural strain in the affected areas. Governor Gavin Newsom has been briefed, and the authorities are reportedly on high alert to respond to any further seismic activity.

On the night between 14 and 15 April, coordinated firebombings and shootings occurred at various prisons across the French mainland, including in Valence, Marseilles, Nanterre, and Toulon. Some of the attackers reportedly wrote the acronym “DDPF” on torched police vehicles or prison walls. “DDPF” highly likely means “Droits des Prisonniers Francais” – Rights of French Prisoners. In the early hours of 16 April, another attack was recorded at a prison in the town of Tarascon in southern France, only hours after the French government commented on the first wave of incidents. The attacks, while not resulting in any casualties, are almost unprecedented in scale and scope.

Solace Global Assessment: 

French media have claimed that the attacks were carried out by organised criminal groups, and that they are in response to the government’s prison reform efforts. Paris has recently pledged to open a new maximum-security facility in July 2025 to house approximately 100 drug trafficking leaders. Moreover, the government has more broadly intensified its efforts to combat drug trafficking, and drug seizures have increased in 2024 compared to previous years. This has continued in 2025: in March, French police seized ten tonnes of cocaine in Dunkirk in a single raid, an amount which is approximately equal to a fifth of the total seizures of 2024.

The attack almost certainly demonstrates a growing vulnerability of the French state against organised groups, and is meant to send a political message by attacking symbols of France’s security apparatus. French organised criminal groups are extremely well armed and have shown their ability to carry out sophisticated attacks. A notable example of this was the ambush on a prison van that led to the (temporary) escape of jailed drug trafficker Mohamed Amra in May 2024.

The scope and scale of the attacks pose an almost certainly immense pressure on the Macron government, which has long faced accusations of being unable to contain criminality in France. They will, therefore, highly likely force the government to respond aggressively, possibly tackling organised criminal groups in at-risk cities like Marseille, Nice, and Grenoble. However, such a development could result in tit-for-tat escalations on the part of the gangs. There is a realistic possibility of further coordinated attacks targeting security personnel and offices, which would pose a severe threat to bystanders.

On 13 April, two Russian ballistic missiles struck Sumy City during Palm Sunday, killing at least 35 people and wounding 117. The attack is the deadliest strike on Ukraine thus far in 2025. Moscow claims that the attack involved two Iskander ballistic missiles targeting a gathering of Ukrainian personnel, killing 60.

The US President Donald Trump called the attack “terrible”, but he had been told that Russia “made a mistake”. Trump furthermore restated his belief that Ukraine started the war. One of the missiles struck a road in Sumy’s busy city centre, which caused the most casualties.

Local media reports indicate that a medal ceremony for veterans was being held in Sumy on the day of the attack, with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky sacking Sumy’s regional chief on 15 April for hosting the event.

The attack occurred within the context of an assessed developing new spring offensive by Russian forces in northeastern Ukraine and ongoing attempts by Washington to engage in separate bilateral peace negotiations with both Ukraine and Russia. On 11 April, Trump’s Special Envoy to Ukraine, General Keith Kellogg, suggested that a ceasefire agreement could see partitioned areas of responsibility for Ukraine (as in post-WWII Germany) between an Anglo-French “reassurance force” alongside Ukrainian forces west of the Dnipro River, solely Ukrainian forces in Ukrainian-held eastern Ukraine, and Russian forces in Russian-occupied southern and eastern Ukraine, with a 29-kilometre-wide “demilitarised zone” across the current frontline.

The Kremlin and Kremlin-affiliated media channels rejected the proposal outright, and Russia’s head of the Foreign Intelligence Service and Foreign Minister both reiterated Moscow’s position that peace would require the fulfilment of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s stated war goals from his 14 June 2024 speech.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Despite Washington’s efforts to broker a peace agreement between Moscow and Kyiv, the Kremlin has not yet indicated willingness to make even marginal concessions on any of its maximalist war goals. Stated most clearly in Putin’s June 2024 speech, and reiterated this past week, these include: the demilitarisation and ‘denazification’ (regime change with imposed puppet government) of Ukraine, annexation of all southern and eastern Ukraine (including currently unoccupied areas), and enforced Ukrainian neutrality with a ban on joining any security arrangements (particularly NATO).

This has been reflected by Russian military action, with the developing northeastern spring offensive highly likely intended to gain further leverage to achieve these maximalist objectives. The ballistic missile strikes on Sumy City, which resulted in significant civilian casualties, likely reflect Russia’s growing focus on targeting both Sumy and Kharkiv, as the two urban centres present the primary axes for the potential new northeastern offensive.

It is highly likely that intensified Russian strikes against these locations will continue in the coming weeks, with glide bomb and one-way attack uncrewed aerial vehicle (OWA-UAV) attacks already occurring in the days following the 13 April Sumy strikes, posing significant risks to both civilians and foreign nationals operating in these areas.

While Moscow previously presented a more optimistic narrative of the US-Russia negotiations, Kremlin officials have been increasingly forthright about the inability of the talks to provide results. It is likely that Moscow will continue to leverage the talks as far as possible to gain immediate concessions, so that it may better pursue its maximalist war goals on the battlefield.

This assessment is reflected by the likely continued use of the moratorium on long-range strikes against energy infrastructure as a means to pressure Washington to punish Ukraine for violations. Since the ‘energy ceasefire’ was implemented, Russia has accused Ukrainian forces of violations on an almost daily basis, most of which have been unsubstantiated. With the moratorium set to last 30 days and expiring on either 16 April or 23 April (due to the different understandings of when it actually began), there have been no indications yet of an extension. It is likely that Moscow will leverage the unsubstantiated claims of Ukrainian violations to justify not extending the moratorium.

In this scenario, it is highly likely that mass Russian long-range strikes against Ukrainian critical national infrastructure (CNI) will follow. These strikes could further deplete Ukraine’s stockpile of advanced air interceptor munitions (particularly Patriot), a depletion that Moscow is likely motivated to achieve given the reduced likelihood of replenishment under the Trump administration. Previous interceptor shortages, caused by delays in US Congress approval, led to a drastic increase in Russian long-range strike efficacy rates. An increase in strikes against Ukrainian CNI would almost certainly pose considerable risks of collateral damage, with even successful interceptions posing dangers due to debris.

Lebanese President Joseph Aoun has stated that he hopes to achieve the disarmament of the Shia militant group, Hezbollah, by the end of 2025. President Aoun stated that his intent is for all of Hezbollah’s weapons to be withdrawn or that their possession will be restricted to the state. He also stated that Hezbollah was ultimately a Lebanese group and that members could join the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) if they participated in “absorption courses”. However, President Aoun stressed that Hezbollah would not be able to function as a distinct unit within the Lebanese Army.

A spokesperson for Hezbollah recently commented that the group would be willing to disarm if Israel fully withdraws from Lebanon, with the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) still holding five strategic locations in the south of the country. However, this statement has been denied by key figures within Hezbollah and by the group’s media office.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The majority of Hezbollah military sites in southern Lebanon are now under the control of the LAF, after Hezbollah agreed to withdraw from 190 out of 265 positions as part of the ceasefire agreement achieved with Israel in November 2024. While this withdrawal could be interpreted as an act of good faith and a move that is in alignment with the provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 170, it is unlikely to be reflective of a broader effort to disarm or demobilise.

The IDF still maintain key terrain in southern Lebanon, in violation of the same resolution, and Israel’s Defence Minister, Israel Katz, stated on 16 April that IDF units will remain in Lebanon indefinitely to guarantee the security of Israel. It is highly unlikely that Hezbollah would accept disarmament while these conditions are present.

In addition, recent intelligence has purportedly uncovered Hezbollah external attack plans, European drone smuggling networks, the resumption of arms production within Lebanon and Iranian attempts to facilitate lethal aid to the group, via both maritime smuggling networks and attempts to reestablish ground lines of communication through Syria. Moreover, Hezbollah senior leadership, including Secretary-General Naim Qassem, have reiterated their commitment to the principle of armed resistance against Israel, framing it as a non-negotiable component of Lebanese national defence and urging for patience among Hezbollah’s base.

After Israel’s campaign against Hezbollah, which has destroyed much of the group’s key equipment and degraded its leadership, Hezbollah is almost certainly not in a position to sustain major operations against Israel, especially after losing its main supply routes in Syria. Recent actions have likely been intended to alleviate both domestic and international pressure on Hezbollah and to create space for the group to reorganise and regroup.

Hezbollah has likely adapted its targets, seeking more covert methods to resupply and has dispersed its forces to minimise opportunities to be further degraded by Israel. Further reporting may indicate that the group is evolving its attack methodology, with evidence that it has been planning external attacks against Israel in coordination with Iran, and uncorroborated reports suggest that as many as 400 Hezbollah commanders have relocated to South American countries, where the group has an established network primarily involved in illicit finance, logistics, and transnational organised crime in support of the group’s wider objectives.

The Lebanese government’s approach to Hezbollah’s disarmament has consistently favoured dialogue and political negotiation over the use of force. An attempt to forcibly disarm Hezbollah is unlikely to be successful and could provoke a violent retaliation, which could ultimately threaten civil war in Lebanon. The LAF are unlikely to be in a condition to actively confront Hezbollah without risking a major escalation, as the militant group still maintains an assessed fighting force close to 100,000 and a credible arsenal of weapons.

Furthermore, Hezbollah’s rank and file remain ideologically committed to armed resistance and perceive the group to be a guarantor of national defence, not a destabilising force within Lebanon. Even if progress towards disarmament, demobilisation or integration were to be made, there is a high threat of factionalism, especially after Israel’s recent campaign. Splinter groups would likely emerge from more hardline factions, which would likely operate independently of a centralised command and potentially align with other external actors of transnational organisations, a development that could jeopardise Lebanon’s stability or provoke further Israeli intervention.

On 11 April 2025, the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) launched a coordinated attack across North Darfur, which involved attacks on the besieged state capital, El Fasher, and several targets within the wider area. As part of the offensive, RSF claimed control of Zamzam and Abu Shouk displacement camps, stating they had “liberated” them from the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). RSF personnel reportedly began burning buildings and shelters within the camps in an effort to identify and capture SAF personnel allegedly hiding among civilians.

A separate RSF attack was carried out in Um Kadadah, approximately 180 kilometres east of El Fasher. Reports from the area indicate multiple fatalities, with accounts suggesting the killings were based on ethnicity.

Current estimates indicate that the attack on Zamzam camp has resulted in the displacement of between 60,000 and 80,000 households or up to 400,000 people, according to the UN’s International Organisation for Migration. At least 400 civilians have been confirmed killed during the operations, with the actual number assessed to increase substantially, with reports of ongoing killings and heavy use of artillery. Aid workers from Relief International operating a clinic in Zamzam camp were also reportedly deliberately targeted during the assault.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The RSF attacks in the El Fasher area are highly likely reflective of a strategic effort by the group to consolidate control over the entire Darfur region. The RSF almost certainly views the capture of El Fasher, the last Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) stronghold in North Darfur, as integral to achieving this objective and will likely continue their offensive operations in the area.

The RSF likely attacked the displacement camps for several reasons. Zamzam camp is located on the intersection of multiple main supply routes, the A5, A43 and B26. Control of Zamzam would likely enable the RSF to severely disrupt SAF logistics and deny SAF units the opportunity to mutually support one another, especially in El Fasher. The attacks were also likely a form of retaliation for the RSF’s recent loss of Khartoum, with the withdrawal of forces from the capital likely enabling the redeployment of RSF personnel and resources to Darfur.

The RSF’s broader strategy likely includes forced displacement and the deliberate targeting of civilians perceived to support the government. The RSF’s objective is likely to punish communities supportive of the SAF, to instil fear among the civilian population, deny humanitarian access and to expropriate critical aid resources such as food and medicine.

This campaign may also aim to forcibly remove ethnic communities from parts of Sudan, contributing to patterns of ethnic cleansing. The reports of the deliberate targeting of humanitarian actors may be intended to deter aid groups from operating within RSF-controlled areas, a strategy that will reduce international oversight and help enable the group to commit acts of genocide with impunity.

The attacks and subsequent displacement of an estimated 400,000 people are almost certain to result in the deterioration of the humanitarian situation. It is estimated that 25 million people, approximately half of Sudan’s population, are already facing extreme hunger, a number that has likely increased since the cessation of USAID, which accounted for almost half of all aid to Sudan.

Deliberate RSF attacks on displacement camps, the killing of aid workers, the disruption of aid routes and the destruction of critical infrastructure will almost certainly increase internal displacement, increase mortality rates, overstretch humanitarian efforts and lead to increased cross-border refugee flows.

Protests likely in London over UK Supreme Court gender identity decision

On 16 April, the UK’s highest court ruled that the definition of “woman” under equality legislation will only apply to the category of “biological sex”. The ruling relates to a case regarding gender recognition certificates, documents that certify someone’s gender transition. While the court stated that trans people would not be discriminated against under the new ruling, the landmark decision will likely provoke a reaction from LGBTQ advocacy groups.

Protests are likely in London during the 17-21 April bank holiday weekend. While these protests are likely to be small and peaceful, there is a realistic possibility of limited public transport or road blockades, particularly in London’s Strand area, where the court is located.

Spanish anti-tourism protests likely to intensify over Easter

Several anti-tourism groups have called for unrest during the 18-20 April weekend in opposition to perceived overtourism at high-visibility destinations. Locations where protests are likely to occur include the main towns in the Canary Islands, Malaga, Barcelona, Valencia, and smaller centres that have highly popular Easter celebrations, like Valladolid, Leon, and Segovia.

Anti-tourist sentiment has increased in Spain since the COVID-19 pandemic, and particularly since 2023. As the high tourist season approaches, protests are highly likely to intensify. While most of the unrest is peaceful, there is a realistic possibility of isolated cases of harassment, vandalism or violence against tourists or their property.

Protests likely in Italy on 25 April

The commemoration of Italy’s liberation from the fascist regime is likely to coincide with protests in Rome, Bologna, Milan, and other large cities. In 2024, clashes between pro-Palestine and pro-Israel protesters were recorded in Rome, while, in Milan, protesters clashed with responding police in Piazza Duomo. Protests in 2025 are likely to be particularly large, as the commemoration marks the 80^th year since liberation (25 April 1945).

Hungary continues to repress LGBTQ+ community

On 14 April, the Hungarian parliament continued its repression of the LGBTQ community by passing an amendmentto the Hungarian constitution which permits the government to ban public events organised by the LGBTQ community. The amendment passed with 140 votes in favour and 21 against, easily surpassing the two-thirds majority that it required, despite opposition members and supporters attempting to block access to the parliament building.

The amendment is the most recent act of part of a broader campaign by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and his ruling Fidesz-KDNP coalition, who are highly likely attempting to appeal to their conservative base ahead of the 2026 election. However, opposition parties, civil rights organisations, and many members of the Hungarian public have condemned these measures, describing them as authoritarian, intentionally discriminatory towards minority groups, and designed to restrict civil liberties.

The government’s agenda has already sparked widespread unrest and periodic demonstrations, some of which have led to violent interactions with the police. This latest amendment is likely to provoke further protests, as opposition to Orbán’s increasingly illiberal policies continues to grow. The threat environment for LGBTQ travellers to Hungary has almost certainly deteriorated, with these travellers increasingly likely to be targeted by harassment or even assault.

Serbian anti-corruption protests continue

Anti-corruption protests have continued to be organised across Serbia and were likely rekindled after Serbian President Vučić held a large rally in Belgrade to show support for his leadership amid the ongoing protests. On 14 April, protestors blocked the city administration office in Vrsac, followed by a protest outside the state-owned broadcaster in Novi Sad on 15 April. The same day, another protest took place at the state broadcaster RTS in Belgrade, and a student protest occurred in Nis.

The EU stated on 15 April that it will ban Serbia from joining the bloc if President Vučić attends a Victory Day parade in Russia on 9 May, after being invited by President Putin. President Vučić’s attendance would likely be a catalyst for further protests, with approximately 40 per cent of the country supporting joining the EU, although this number is likely to be much higher among the sections of the population currently involved in the anti-corruption protests.

Algeria expels 12 French diplomats

The announcement followed the arrest of an Algerian consular official in France, suspected of having participated in the abduction of a French-based Algerian anti-government influencer in 2024. The development marks a further escalation in tensions between Algeria and France, which encompasses the areas of security, immigration, and domestic politics.

The latest expulsions are likely to prompt a reprisal from Paris. However, this is likely to result in a tit-for-tat escalation. In France, there is a realistic possibility that growing tensions with Algeria will drive protests and possibly political violence. In January 2025, France arrested several influencers who had allegedly used social media to call for violence against French citizens in response to Paris-Algiers tensions.

Malian authorities shut down Canadian mining company

The authorities in Mali have shut down the office of the Canadian mining company Barrick Gold in the capital, Bamako, over the alleged non-payment of taxes. The move follows multiple disputes between Barrick Gold and the Malian government, following the junta’s imposition of a new tax code, which demanded the payment of retroactive taxes. This development is indicative of a wider trend across the Sahel, where military-led governments are increasingly asserting control over natural resource sectors and taking punitive action against Western firms, while increasing cooperation with strategic rivals like Russia and China.

Junta easily wins elections in Gabon

Exit polls on 13 April indicated that approximately 90 per cent of the vote went to General Brice Oligui Nguema, the leader of the junta that carried out a successful coup in 2023, ousting the powerful Bongo family that had ruled the country since 1967. While some observers remarked that the elections were fair and transparent, several irregularities were noted, including some reports of ballots being tampered with. The vote is almost certainly an important political boost for the junta, which has pledged to prioritise economic reform and a bolder foreign policy in the medium term.

Main opposition party barred from contesting election in Tanzania

Tanzania’s main opposition party, Chadema, has been disqualified from participating in the October 2025 elections after failing to sign a mandatory code of conduct by the mandated 12 April 12 deadline. The exclusion of Chadema follows the arrest and treason charges filed against the party’s leader, Tundu Lissu, who was charged on 6 April after he called for electoral reforms at a political rally.

Lissu had been expected to challenge President Samia Suluhu Hassan in the upcoming elections, with her Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party maintaining its grip on power since 1977. These developments have been widely criticised by both internal and external observers, raising fears of a push towards authoritarianism, despite Hassan’s initial praise for her efforts to reverse some of the more repressive policies of her predecessor.

There is a realistic possibility of civil unrest in the country after the disqualification of Chadema, the ongoing repression of opposition figures and general pattern of democratic backsliding.

Anarchists bomb Hellenic Train offices in Athens, Greece

On the night of 11-12 April, an improvised explosive device (IED) detonated outside the offices of the Greek railway company in Athens. The attack damaged the office building but resulted in no casualties, and, according to local media, multiple anonymous calls were made to police warning them about the danger.

The attack was claimed by a local anarchist group, the Revolutionary Class Self-defence Group. In Greece, anarchists and other far-left activists often carry out bombings targeting state institutions or private companies. Most of these attacks happen at night to minimise the risk of civilian casualties. The bombing is almost certainly linked with the ongoing unrest related to the 2023 Tempi railway disaster, which killed 57 people, most of whom were students.

Kurdish-led SDF withdraw from Tishreen Dam in Syria after agreement with Damascus

On 14 April, the Kurdish-led and US-backed group Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which de facto autonomously controls northeastern Syria, withdrew from the strategically significant dam. The withdrawal follows an agreement made by the SDF with the transitional government led by President Ahmad al-Sharaa.

The issues of Kurdish rights, autonomy, and the aggression of Turkish-led Syrian National Army (SNA) militants, in addition to conventional Turkish forces, have been a key challenge to the stability of the new post-Assad Syria. With Tishreen Dam being the primary site of heavy fighting between the SDF and SNA (with Turkish air support) in the past few months, the deconfliction agreement will likely lessen tensions in the area and risks of further conflict escalation.

However, there remain key issues to be resolved despite agreement from the SDF to ultimately integrate into the national military, with the SDF commander-in-chief Mazloum Abdi stating that the SDF need both federalism and quasi-autonomy as a separate bloc within the national army, conditions that Damascus is unlikely to agree to.

Jordan arrests 16 involved in possible Hamas plot

Jordanian authorities stated, on 15 April, that they arrested a cell aiming to “threaten national security”, via improvised drones, rockets, and explosives. Local and international media quoted security sources’ allegations that the 16 were part of Hamas. It is highly likely that the cell was operating with Iran-sourced supplies, and to arm Palestinian militants in the West Bank.

Jordan remains the key country for Iranian smuggling routes towards the West Bank. The kingdom has likely aimed to remain ambivalent, seeking to both avoid a confrontation with Iran, which could drive protests among the largely pro-Palestinian public, and to reduce the destabilising impact of Iranian arms being present on its territory.

The latest arrests are likely either reflective of Jordanian security forces’ assessment that the cell constituted an unacceptable domestic security threat or, less likely, could be meant as a signal to Tel Aviv and, more broadly, Washington, at a moment where the situation in both Gaza and the West Bank is precarious.

Further briefings made regarding potential ground offensive against Houthis in Yemen

‘Yemeni and US officials’ briefed the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) in an article published on 15 April that Yemeni militias are planning a ground offensive against Houthi-controlled Hodeidah. This adds to previous briefings made to CNN in an article published on 6 April from ‘regional diplomatic sources’. Private American security contractors have reportedly advised the Yemeni factions on the potential offensive.

Riyadh is likely reluctant to return to open civil war in Yemen due to the reputational and economic costs associated, and the potential offensive would likely be mainly conducted using the United Arab Emirates (UAE)-backed Southern Transition Council’s (STC’s) forces with US air support. This assessment has been further supported by the WSJ report, which states that Saudi officials ‘have privately told American and Yemeni officials they won’t join or help a ground offensive in Yemen again’, although this position is likely to change if the Houthis directly attack Saudi Arabia.

Should the civil war be reignited with an STC-led ground offensive towards Hodeidah, it is likely that the Houthis will attempt long-range strikes with either or both ballistic missiles and long-range one-way attack uncrewed aerial vehicles (OWA-UAVs) against targets in the UAE. Previously, the Houthis primarily attempted to strike targets in the vicinity of Abu Dhabi, including oil refineries, the international airport and Al Dhafra airbase.

US and Iran begin talks in Muscat

On 12 April, delegations from Washington and Tehran met in Muscat, Oman, to begin negotiations regarding Iran’s nuclear program. Tehran previously refused the prospect of direct talks with the US; however, US President Donald Trump’s threats of a bombing campaign, in combination with increasing concerns of a planned Israeli attack later this year, likely compelled Tehran to concede to direct talks.

In the initial meeting, clear red lines were set by both delegations. The Iranian delegation, led by Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi, stated that Tehran requires guarantees on sanction relief, access to its frozen assets, and the end of the ‘maximum pressure’ campaign spearheaded by the Trump administration. The US delegation, led by US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff, has indicated that their fundamental demand is the abandonment of Iran’s nuclear weapons program.

With the Iranian regime likely in its most geopolitically vulnerable position in decades, Tehran is likely highly susceptible to US pressure. Nonetheless, the incentive for a nuclear deterrent has almost certainly increased, precisely because of their current vulnerability following the fall of the Assad regime, the degradation of their previously primary regional deterrent, Lebanon’s Hezbollah, and the weakening of their air defence capabilities by Israeli military operations.

Should the talks fail to achieve results, it is likely that the US, with the support of Israel, will pursue a military solution that risks broader escalation across the Middle East. There is a realistic possibility that even if Washington feels it is making progress in the talks (or even agrees to a deal), Israel’s government could still pursue a military escalation with Iran later in the year.

Eight Pakistani citizens killed in eastern Iran

Islamabad has demanded answers after eight Pakistani nationals were killed on 13 April by separatists in Iran’s Sistan-Baluchestan province, which shares a border with Pakistan’s restless southwestern Balochistan province. The Baloch Nationalist Army (BNA), a Pakistani separatist group, has claimed responsibility for the attack.

The victims were all from the Punjab areas of Pakistan and were attacked when working at a workshop in Mehrestan county, located roughly 230km (142 miles) from the Pakistan border. The attack is likely indicative of increased cross-border operations by Baloch separatist groups, who have increased attacks on Punjabis, who are viewed as an extension of Pakistan’s government and military.

Iran and Pakistan have repeatedly accused each other of harbouring militants in their respective territories. Moreover, both nations have conducted strikes inside each other’s territory in support of counter terrorism operations, most notably in January 2024, when Iranian missile and drone strikes in Pakistan were met with retaliatory strikes.

There is a realistic possibility that Pakistan may retaliate if it deems Iran’s response to separatists insufficient, increasing the risk of cross-border tensions in the coming weeks.

Medical services suspended after looting of hospital in Upper Nile State, South Sudan

On 14 April, dozens of armed men stormed a hospital in Ulang, Upper Nile State operated by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and stole vital medical supplies and equipment. The raid forced the hospital, which was the only functioning health facility in the area, to close. At least 100 patients were receiving treatment including trauma, maternity, and paediatric care at the time, and many were forced to flee.

Similar patterns of violence targeting healthcare in the region has taken place in recent months; in January 2025, armed men attacked two MSF boats on their way to Ulang. Violence has re-ignited in the White Nile State since early March 2025, when the White Army launched attacks targeting the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces in a conflict that has threatened to reignite the South Sudan civil war. Further targeting of healthcare facilities in the region is highly likely.

Al-Shabaab claim control of Adan Yabaal during the ongoing Somalia offensive

On 16 April, al-Shabaab militants released a statement claiming control of Adan Yabaal, a town in the Middle Shabelle region, northeast of Mogadishu. They also claimed to have overrun 10 military installations in the region. If true, this constitutes a major strategic loss for Somali forces, who have used the town as a launch pad for counterinsurgency operations in Middle Shabelle against the al-Qaeda-linked al-Shabaab.

The Somali military has denied the group’s capture of Adan Yabaal, claiming that government forces repelled an al-Shabaab attack. This is the latest in a series of government setbacks, with al-Shabaab recently seizing control of the Afgoye-Mogadishu and Mogadishu-Balcad corridors. Al-Shabaab will highly likely intensify attacks on the capital, Mogadishu, following their recent strategic gains.

Spate of attacks kills over 50 in Nigeria’s Plateau State

On 14 April, over 50 people were killed after villages were attacked in Nigeria’s Plateau State, with several others injured and over 2,000 displaced. The attackers, believed to be cattle herders belonging to the Muslim Fulani community, also looted and burned homes, with the majority of the victims reportedly Christian. This follows a series of deadly incidents in the region, including the killing of 52 people two weeks prior. Fighting between Fulani herders and Christian farmers is a regular occurrence in the region, but the attack has raised concerns that attacks are increasing in frequency, largely driven by resource competition resulting from the effects of climate change. There is a realistic possibility of increased attacks over the Easter holidays, with militants establishing a pattern of targeting Christian communities around significant religious dates.

Storm Olivier triggers flooding in Spain

Storm Olivier has continued to cause significant disruptions across Spain. Spanish weather services have issued alerts for rain, storms, and snow in Castile and León. On 14 April, orange and yellow warnings for wind and heavy rain were in effect in northern and northeast Spain, as well as the Balearic Islands.

The storm has caused severe flooding in the Canary Islands, particularly on Lanzarote, where a state of emergency was declared on 12 April due to heavy precipitation, leading to 150 emergency calls in just two hours. Recovery efforts are underway as officials have organised fire crews to assist with pumping efforts. Five people sustained minor injuries, and there were power interruptions reported in Costa Teguise.

Various regions of Spain have been placed under weather alerts. On April 11, Andalusia was on an orange alert due to significant risks posed by the storm, while other regions like Asturias, Castillas, Extremadura, Galicia, and Melilla were on yellow alerts. Madrid experienced rain and hail, and a landslide blocked a road on Tenerife.

Widespread protests have broken out across India following the passage of controversial amendments to the Waqf Act by the Lok Sabha, which was originally passed on 4 April. Opponents of the amendments have argued that they would dilute the rights of Muslims to manage religious-based endowments or “waqfs.”

In particular, the inclusion of non-Muslims in the management of waqfs has generated fears that the federal government, which is led by the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), is engaging in discriminatory practices, and opponents have stressed that other religious communities can continue to retain full control over their respective faith-based institutions.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s BJP has defended the amendments, stating that they are intended to enhance transparency and address corruption and mismanagement within the waqf administration.

Protests have occurred across multiple cities in India, but have been particularly intense in West Bengal. In Murshidabad, violent demonstrations involving stone throwing and Molotov cocktails broke out on 11 April and have resulted in the deaths of at least three people and the arrest of 118.

In response to the violence, the Kolkata High Court ordered the deployment of central forces to Murshidabad, and the West Bengal home secretary has imposed restrictions on public gatherings and suspended internet services in certain areas. On 14 April, protesters blocked the national highway outside Kolkata and set multiple vehicles on fire, as well as gathering in Bhangar, setting a barricade alight. On 15 April, the regional Andhra Pradesh party filed a petition challenging the bill with India’s Supreme Court.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Waqf, meaning “confinement and prohibition”, is a charitable endowment under Islamic law in which donated properties managed by waqf boards are used for schools, orphanages, hospitals, banks, and graveyards. Once established, these properties cannot be sold or transferred and are considered Allah’s property to be used for charitable purposes. Waqf properties have become a significant asset class in India, encompassing approximately 870,000 properties spread over 940,000 acres of land, making waqf India’s third-biggest property holder.

The waqf bill introduces significant changes to the management of waqf properties. Key provisions include restricting waqf creation to Muslims practising Islam for at least five years, the elimination of the “waqf by user” common law establishment of waqf properties, ensuring family waqf do not deny inheritance to female heirs, the inclusion of female Muslims, non-Muslims, and various Muslim sect representation in the Central Waqf Council and State Waqf Boards, and tightening the registration and procedures for waqfs.

These measures are controversial among India’s Muslim community, who view the amendments as eroding religious autonomy, breaking from tradition by giving non-Muslims, women, and other historically underrepresented Muslim sects more control over waqf administration, and potentially invalidating properties that are considered waqf but lack the formal documentation. While the act is framed as easing administration and introducing “progressive” measures, opponents argue that the bill will eliminate many existing waqf properties and expose waqf properties, including historic mosques, shrines, shops, graveyards, and vast tracts of land to legal disputes, state confiscation, or even demolition.

The bill is perceived as a deliberate repressive measure towards the Muslim community. Since gaining power in 2014, Modi, a Hindu nationalist, has employed anti-Muslim rhetoric and discriminatory acts towards the Muslim community. The act is highly likely designed to spark a backlash and inflame the Muslim community while appealing to the BJP’s Hindu nationalist base. The challenge to the Waqf Amendment Bill will almost certainly generate more publicity for opposition to the bill and drag out the public debate, which will highly likely inflame further protests.

Statistics from 16 April, six days into what is domestically known as the “seven dangerous days”, list over 1,000 extra road traffic accidents (RTAs) during the Songkran holiday period. The increase in RTAs has resulted in almost 200 deaths and over 1,000 injuries nationwide.

The leading causes of accidents are speeding (44 per cent) and drunk driving (25 per cent), with motorcycles involved in over 80 per cent of all incidents. The highest number of fatalities has been recorded in Bangkok, although accidents have been observed nationwide, with the southern province of Phatthalung recording the most overall accidents. Thai authorities have deployed additional trains and buses to reduce congestion and support safer travel.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Songkran, meaning “passage of the sun”, occurs from 13 to 15 April each year (although celebrations usually extend from 11 to 17 April) and celebrates the Thai/Buddhist New Year. It is one of Thailand’s most important holidays and is marked by nationwide celebrations including parades, religious festivities, and family gatherings. The festival attracts many tourists, stretching transportation networks and local infrastructure. In 2024, approximately 1.9 million foreign tourists visited Thailand during Songkran, which was a 37.54 per cent increase from the year before, something attributed to government measures to ease travel and post-COVID increases in tourism. Tourists typically cause an increased demand for public transport, including taxis and buses, further exacerbating the need for locals to use private transport.

Songkran causes a spike in road traffic accidents (RTAs). During this period, the RTA rate approximately doubles in a country already experiencing very high rates. From 11 to 17 April 2024, there were at least 480 RTA fatalities and over 2,000 injuries, equating to approximately 69 fatalities per day. This puts Thailand temporarily in the top 10 most dangerous countries in the world for RTAs during the Songkran period.

The slight reduction in deaths this year is highly likely due to the impact of the 28 March earthquake, which occurred in Myanmar, also impacting Bangkok. In the lead up to Songkran, the Thai Hotels Association (THA) predicted that tourism revenue would fall by approximately 10-15 per cent, with tourists cancelling their trips. Motorcycles account for most of the deaths, which are generally attributed to driving while intoxicated, speeding, cutting lanes, wet road surfaces, and inadequate safety wear.

While celebrations are widespread, travellers can face penalties for involving unwilling participants. Splashing water on people not involved in the celebrations can be considered causing a nuisance or damaging property, leading to potential prison sentences of up to one month or a 10,000-baht (228 GBP) fine. During the 2024 celebrations, for example, three tourists from Hong Kong were jailed for 28 days after splashing a police officer with water. Similarly, dumping powder on unwilling participants, an act which typically involves non-consensual contact, could result in a public indecency charge.

Around 60,000 Afghans deported from Pakistan in two weeks

The figure was announced on 15 April by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM). Pakistan has pledged to deport the approximately 800,000 Afghan nationals who have Afghan Citizen Cards (ACC), as part of larger efforts to repatriate the millions of individuals who have entered the country following the Taliban’s takeover in 2021.

Humanitarian organisations have noted that transiting through the poorly policed areas near the Durand Line poses a significant threat to returning migrants, and there have been several cases of extortion and violence carried out by Pakistani security forces. Moreover, the threat of terrorism in the area remains extremely high, with several Islamist groups likely attempting to recruit disenfranchised Afghans for radicalisation and potential attacks.

Hong Kong’s largest pro-democracy party set to disband

On 13 April, the Hong Kong Democratic Party, Hong Kong’s last remaining major opposition party, conducted a meeting approving arrangements to disband. The decision came after pressure from Beijing, which has allegedly warned the party in recent months to disband or face potential arrest.

There is currently no precise date for the dissolution of the party, but a final vote will be held in the coming months. A majority of 75 per cent will be required to pass the motion. It is highly likely that the motion will pass, marking the end of political opposition in Hong Kong. Pro-democracy movements in Hong Kong have been largely curtailed since Beijing imposed the National Security Law in 2020, which triggered major protests across the region.

Three police officers killed and 16 injured in Pakistan bombing attack

On 15 April, an improvised explosive device (IED) placed on a parked motorcycle detonated while a convoy carrying around 40 police officers transited past it in Mastung, Balochistan. The attack was claimed by the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) and marks the first notable attack conducted by ISKP in weeks and follows an unusual period of inactivity for the group, which is one of the Islamic State’s more active branches.

While it is difficult to definitively assess the cause of this decrease in attack volume, it is likely that it has been partly driven by an internal reshuffle of ISKP’s leadership and key roles, which was launched by the group’s leaders in February-March 2025.

The Maldives bans entry for Israeli passport-holders

On 14 April, the Maldives’ parliament passed an amendment to its immigration law, which was subsequently approved by President Mohamed Muizzu on 15 April. A Cabinet statement declared that ‘The ratification reflects the government’s firm stance in response to the continuing atrocities and ongoing acts of genocide committed by Israel against the Palestinian people.’

A similar ban was in place in the early 1990s but was rescinded in 2010 during renewed relations. Given the low Israeli visitor rates to the Maldives, with only 59 people with Israeli passports (out of a total 214,000 visitors) entering in February 2025, protests across the archipelago are unlikely.

However, there is a realistic possibility that small-scale protests will occur outside the Maldives’ embassies in other major cities, including London, following the decision.

Russia requests access to Indonesian air base

Australia has raised concerns in response to reports that Russia has requested permission to base Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) aircraft at an Indonesian air base in Biak, in the remote Papua region. Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese has stated that he considers Russia an authoritarian regime and reiterated Australia’s support for Ukraine.

A Russian military presence in Papua would almost certainly enhance its surveillance of the region, placing its aircraft within 1,400km of Darwin, home to an Australian air force and naval base that regularly hosts US military assets.

However, Indonesia has consistently pursued a policy of “independent and active” foreign policy doctrine, engaging with multiple global powers while maintaining strategic neutrality, and has persistently refused to host foreign militaries on its soil regardless of alignment.

Myanmar’s junta chief Min Aung Hlaing visited Bangkok, Thailand for a rare summit visit

On 3 April, Myanmar’s junta chief Min Aung Hlaing visited Thailand for a regional summit for a joint statement on the earthquake. The leaders from the seven Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) members attended: Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. The invitation of the junta leader marks a break from the regional policy of not inviting junta leaders to major events.

For the junta, the attendance at the summit is highly likely a symbolic act amid growing criticism regarding the Tatmadaw’s handling of the earthquake, having been accused of violating the ceasefire and blocking aid to rebel-held areas. Former Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim reportedly pushed for a continuation of the ceasefire imposed from 2-22 April as a humanitarian pause to support post-earthquake relief efforts.

There is a realistic possibility that they will extend the ceasefire, given that the earthquake primarily damaged junta-controlled regions of Mandalay and preventing a rebel offensive is almost certainly beneficial to the junta. However, given China’s ongoing economic and diplomatic support for the junta and the disunity of regional powers regarding intervention, it is unlikely that the Tatmadaw would cave to international pressure regarding a formal peace process.

Earthquake kills one in Tajikistan

The 6.4 magnitude tremor struck the Rasht district at a depth of 16 kilometres, destroying approximately 100 houses and killing one person in the village of Ushturpasta. Multiple aftershocks of between 3 and 5 magnitude also occurred in the area. Tremors were also recorded in Myanmar and India around the same time. All the affected locations are near the borders between the Indian and Eurasian plates. This area is undergoing a higher frequency of seismic activity, which included the 28 March 7.8 magnitude earthquake in Myanmar that killed more than 5,000.

New Zealand hit by Tropical Cyclone Tam

Tropical Cyclone Tam is impacting New Zealand’s North Island, particularly the Northland region, with significant disruptions. Flights at Whangārei Airport (WRE) were cancelled on 16 and 17 April. At Auckland Airport (AKL), some international flights have been delayed until 18 April.

Firefighters in Northland have so far responded to 120 weather-related calls on 17 April. State Highway 1 near Umawera has experienced flooding, and nearly 15,000 people remain without power in Northland. The New Zealand MetService has issued warnings for coastal flooding and erosion due to large waves, and a power outage is affecting several hundred residents in the Whangārei and Kaipara districts. Cyclone Tam is expected to weaken into a subtropical low but may re-intensify later in the week.

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