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Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update

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Gulf Security Remains Volatile Despite Ceasefire

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 15 May 2026 – 19 May 2026

  • On 17 May, Pakistani mediators shared with the US a revised Iranian proposal, which was again rejected as insufficient. US President Donald Trump stated on 18 May that the US had planned to conduct strikes against Iran on 19 May but that this was called off following calls with the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE.
  • The two parties are highly likely to remain at a diplomatically unresolvable impasse without either side moving on its red lines, particularly regarding the nuclear file. If the US resumes strikes against Iran to break the current deadlock, this would highly likely result in renewed full-scale Iranian attacks against targets across the Middle East.
  • Escalation in the maritime domain can quickly lead to Iranian strikes targeting the UAE. The UAE has been highly likely targeted over other Gulf States due to multiple factors, and it is likely that sporadic Iranian strikes will continue to prioritise the UAE unless there is a return to full-scale regional conflict.
  • On 17 May, the UAE’s Ministry of Defence announced that three attack drones had entered the UAE from the western direction, with one attack drone striking an electrical generator at the Barakah Nuclear Power Plant in the Al Dhafra Region. Authorities have stated that “the incident did not affect the safety of the Barakah Nuclear Power Plant” and no increase in radiation has been recorded.
  • On 17 May, the Saudi Ministry of Defence stated that “three drones were intercepted and destroyed after entering the Kingdom’s airspace coming from Iraqi airspace.” These are the first public claims of hostile projectiles over Saudi Arabia since 12 April, but it is unconfirmed where the drones were targeting, and the incursion may be linked to the attack targeting the UAE.
  • As of 19 May, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman are open. Flight restrictions were reactivated in the UAE following renewed Iranian attacks.

Middle East Conflict: Latest Intelligence & Travel Advice

To support planning, we are updating our Middle East travel advice daily with guidance from our intelligence team on airspace openings and closures, flight operations, and escalating risks impacting movement.

On 17 May, as the US awaited a revised proposal from Tehran, US President Donald Trump stated that the “clock is ticking for Iran” and that “they are going to get hit much harder” if demanded concessions are not made. This followed the 10 May conveyance of an Iranian counterproposal, which made several maximalist demands and omitted the nuclear file, which was swiftly rejected by the Trump administration.

Later on 17 May, Pakistani mediators shared the revised Iranian proposal with the US, which was again rejected as insufficient. The revised proposal reportedly included more content on a commitment not to pursue a nuclear weapon, but still lacked detailed commitments from Iran on suspending uranium enrichment or relinquishing its stockpile of highly enriched uranium (HEU).

On 18 May, following the rejection of the revised proposals, President Trump stated that the US had planned to conduct strikes against Iran on 19 May but that this was called off following calls with the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE. President Trump told the media that the Arab leaders had asked him to hold off on strikes “for two or three days”.

As of 19 May, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman are open. Flight restrictions were reactivated in the UAE following renewed Iranian attacks, but most scheduled flights continue to operate from Emirati airports.

On 17 May, the Saudi Ministry of Defence stated that “three drones were intercepted and destroyed after entering the Kingdom’s airspace coming from Iraqi airspace.” These are the first public claims of hostile projectiles targeting Saudi Arabia since 12 April, when Iraq’s ambassador to Riyadh was summoned due to accusations of continued attacks originating from Iraqi territory. The last major attacks targeting Saudi Arabia occurred on 8 April, prior to the implementation of the ceasefire.

It is unconfirmed where the drones were targeting. With the UAE having also been attacked from the “western border direction” on 17 May, the drones intercepted over Saudi Arabia may be linked to this attack, also targeting the UAE.

On 18 May, it was reported that Pakistan has deployed 8,000 troops, a fighter jet squadron, and an air defence system to Saudi Arabia as part of the Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement (SMDA). The SMDA, signed in 2025, commits both countries to treating any aggression against either as an aggression against both. Pakistan currently serves a key mediation role between the US and Iran, and the deployment of Pakistani forces will likely serve as a notable deterrence against significant Iranian attacks if there is a return to full-scale regional conflict.

At least three people have been killed and 29 injured in Saudi Arabia, as of 14:35 UTC on 5 May.

As of 19 May, Saudi Arabia’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in Kuwait between 15 and 19 May.

At least seven people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Kuwait, as of 14:35 UTC on 5 May.

As of 19 May, Kuwait’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in Bahrain between 15 and 19 May.

At least three people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Bahrain, as of 14:35 UTC on 5 May.

As of 19 May, Bahrain’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in Qatar between 15 and 19 May.

At least 20 people have been injured in Qatar, as of 14:35 UTC on 5 May.

As of 19 May, Qatar’s airspace is open.

On 17 May, the UAE’s Ministry of Defence announced that “air defence systems intercepted three [attack drones] that entered the country from the western border direction”, with one attack drone striking “an electrical generator outside the inner perimeter of the Barakah Nuclear Power Plant in the Al Dhafra Region.” The statement added that investigations into the source of the attacks are ongoing.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) stated that it had been informed that radiation levels at the plant remain normal, with “[e]mergency diesel generators… currently providing power to the NPP’s unit 3”. The UAE’s Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation (FANR) stated that “the incident did not affect the safety of the Barakah Nuclear Power Plant or the readiness of its essential systems. There has been no release of radioactive material, radiological safety levels remain within normal ranges, and there is no risk to the public or the environment. No injuries have been reported.”

The attack is almost certainly an escalation in targeting patterns, with it being the first attack targeting a nuclear power plant outside of Iran since the outbreak of the current conflict on 28 February. There is a realistic possibility that a return to full-scale conflict could be marked by increased targeting of nuclear energy, particularly if US and/or Israeli strikes are again conducted against Iranian nuclear power plants.

The origin of the attack remains unconfirmed, with no actor having claimed responsibility as of 19 May. With the attack drones entering the UAE from the west, the attack may have originated from Iran-backed proxy groups such as Iraq-based Shia militias or the Yemen-based Houthis. Also on 17 May, three drones were intercepted in Saudi Arabian airspace, which authorities stated originated from Iraqi territory. The incidents may be linked, which would support an assessment that the attack originated from Iran-backed groups in Iraq. However, an attack directly from Iran cannot be ruled out, with Iran having historically conducted attacks from the western axis using attack drones launched from Iran.

At least 13 people have been killed and 230 injured in the UAE, as of 11:45 UTC on 10 May.

As of 19 May, the UAE’s airspace is open, but with aircraft restricted to using only designated routes following renewed Iranian attacks.

No attacks have been reported in Oman between 15 and 19 May.

At least three people have been killed and 18 injured in Oman, as of 14:35 UTC on 5 May.

As of 19 May, Oman’s airspace is open.


US President Donald Trump has threatened on multiple occasions since the implementation of the ceasefire on 8 April to renew strikes against Iran if demanded concessions are not made in the diplomatic track. This has likely reduced the credibility of US threats to compel compliance in Tehran, although it is highly likely that Iranian forces have maintained the highest possible readiness under the assumption that full-scale war could restart on any given day.

The Iranian peace proposals have reportedly included demands for sanctions relief, an end to the US naval blockade, withdrawal of US forces from areas close to Iran, the full release of frozen assets, reparations, guarantees against further attacks, an end to the war on all fronts (including Lebanon), and recognition of Iran’s sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz. According to Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media reports, the US have rejected reparations, demanded a transfer of Iran’s stockpiled HEU to the US, and only agreed to release 25 per cent of Iran’s frozen assets. Furthermore, the reports claim that the US is providing no guarantee against further US or Israeli strikes in future if subsequent more comprehensive negotiations fail.

Fundamentally, the two parties are highly likely to remain at a diplomatically unresolvable impasse without either side moving on its red lines, particularly regarding the nuclear file. The Trump administration continues to make demands for meaningful concessions on Iran’s nuclear programme as part of an initial peace agreement, whereas Tehran continues to push for delaying nuclear negotiations until after a peace settlement is reached. However, the US blockade is almost certainly currently the main leverage imposed against Iran; it is unlikely that the Trump administration will be willing to relinquish its primary leverage without having gained meaningful concessions on the nuclear file.

US officials have briefed that the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE carried a unified message to President Trump that negotiations should be given more of a chance as the Gulf States would ‘pay the price’ for a return to conflict. Two Middle East officials additionally briefed that the US and Israel are engaged in the largest preparations since the 8 April ceasefire implementation for potential renewed strikes against Iran, claiming that they could be as “early as this week”.

If the US resumes strikes against Iran to break the current deadlock, this would highly likely result in renewed full-scale Iranian attacks against targets across the Middle East. Recent leaked classified assessments by US intelligence services indicate that, since the ceasefire, Iran has restored access to 30 of its 33 missile sites along the Strait of Hormuz and regained access to around 90 per cent of its underground missile storage and launch facilities. Furthermore, the assessments posit that Iran still fields 70 to 75 per cent of its transporter erector launchers (TELs) used for launching ballistic missiles, and retains 70 per cent of its prewar missile stockpile. If accurate, these assessments highly likely suggest that despite high-intensity US-Israeli strikes, Iran maintains the capability to conduct large-scale long-range strikes across the Middle East, likely for several more months, depending on the rate of expenditure.

Outside of renewed US-Israeli strikes against Iran, there remains a high risk of tactical miscalculation and/or escalation occurring as the US and Iranian blockades continue, with retaliatory strikes unlikely to be confined to the immediate area of engagement or the maritime domain. If the US resumes the previously paused Project Freedom initiative, which involves using US naval forces to escort commercial vessels through the Strait of Hormuz to counter Iran’s current de facto control over the strait, this would almost certainly further increase the risk of escalation from the maritime domain. As illustrated on 3-5 May and 7-8 May, escalation in the maritime domain can quickly lead to Iranian strikes targeting the UAE. The UAE has likely been targeted over other Gulf States due to multiple factors, and Iranian ‘retaliation’ strikes will likely continue to prioritise the UAE outside of a return to full-scale regional conflict.

Travellers are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:

  • Jordanian authorities have warned against publishing videos or information regarding Jordan’s defensive operations without authorisation.
  • Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Interior has stated that “[p]hotographing or publishing or circulating information related to countering missiles and drones and the locations of their falls exposes you to legal accountability.”
  • In the UAE, authorities have warned that publishing or circulating “rumours, false news, or news from unknown sources through social media platforms or other information technology” is illegal. Reports indicate that Dubai Police have used “electronic monitoring operations” to detect a photo shared within a private WhatsApp group
  • In Bahrain, several people have been confirmed as arrested for “filming, live streaming, clipping, and publishing events in a manner constituting a legal violation”.
  • Qatar’s Ministry of Interior warned that gathering at incident sites or photographing and sharing content related to field developments may result in legal accountability, and has arrested hundreds of people of various nationalities for “producing and sharing misleading information”.
  • Omani authorities have stated: “Beware of sharing or publishing any captured photos or videos. They should be shared only with the competent authorities”.