Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update

The continuing disputes over the Strait of Hormuz, which escalated between 3 and 8 May, have almost certainly increased the risk of a return to full-scale conflict, with the US and Iran essentially in a stalemate. Washington almost certainly intends to pressure Iran to make concessions on the nuclear file via its blockade, due to an assessment that Iran only has a limited time remaining to store oil before it is forced to shut in its oil production. Tehran highly likely calculates that the US will be unable to tolerate a prolonged closure of the Strait of Hormuz due to the high economic and political costs.

There is a high risk of tactical miscalculation and/or escalation occurring as the US and Iranian blockades continue, with retaliatory strikes unlikely to be confined to the immediate area of engagement or the maritime domain. As illustrated on 3-5 May and 7-8 May, escalation in the maritime domain can quickly lead to Iranian strikes targeting the UAE.

The UAE has likely been targeted over other Gulf States due to multiple factors, and Iranian ‘retaliation’ strikes will likely continue to prioritise the UAE in the short term. The emerging reports of the UAE’s previous direct involvement in the conflict as an active combatant against Iran will likely further contribute towards the increased prioritisation of the UAE as a target.

Other contributing factors for the UAE’s prioritisation as a target by Iran include: Fujairah’s critical role as an oil export terminal which bypasses the Strait of Hormuz; the UAE’s increasingly close security partnership with Israel; and the likely increasing isolation of the UAE among the Gulf States and growing rivalry with Saudi Arabia which significantly increased following the failed UAE-backed Southern Transition Council (STC) offensive in Yemen and Saudi-backed counteroffensive in December 2025-January 2026, a rift which has likely culminated in the UAE’s recent withdrawal from OPEC.

Tehran likely seeks to further isolate the UAE, which is publicly the most hostile Gulf State against Iran, from the rest of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) with its prioritised targeting, widening the gap between the current de-escalatory approach in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi’s hawkishness.

The reports of Saudi strikes against Iran during the war likely resulted in an opposite effect to those conducted by the UAE, reducing rather than increasing Iran’s willingness to attack Saudi territory. Riyadh likely ordered limited, calibrated attacks to restore deterrence, and Tehran likely views an escalation with Saudi as higher risk,  given Saudi Arabia’s greater military capacity, strategic depth and regional influence.

Following the Saudi strikes against Iran, reports indicate that de-escalation took place in the week before the 8 April ceasefire implementation, with 105 projectiles being launched against Saudi Arabia between 25-31 March and just over 25 between 1-6 April. Moreover, the UAE has effectively completely cut diplomatic contact with Iran, unlike Saudi Arabia, which has maintained regular contact with Iran, and it is likely that the reported Saudi strikes led to diplomatic contacts and an informal agreement to de-escalate.  

With the current diplomatic track facing major difficulties, Washington may conclude that a return to conflict is the only means of forcing compliance from Tehran. If the US resumes strikes against Iran to break the current deadlock, this would highly likely result in renewed full-scale Iranian attacks against targets across the Middle East.

Recent leaked classified assessments by US intelligence services indicate that, since the ceasefire, Iran has restored access to 30 of its 33 missile sites along the Strait of Hormuz and regained access to around 90 per cent of its underground missile storage and launch facilities. Furthermore, the assessments posit that Iran still fields 70 to 75 per cent of its transporter erector launchers (TELs) used for launching ballistic missiles, and retains 70 per cent of its prewar missile stockpile. If accurate, these assessments highly likely suggest that despite high-intensity US-Israeli strikes, Iran maintains the capability to conduct large-scale long-range strikes across the Middle East, likely for several more months depending on the rate of expenditure.

Travellers are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity: