The risk of a return to full-scale conflict in the Middle East, which would likely be characterised by renewed daily Iranian strikes across the region, remains high despite the reported progress on a potentially imminent MOU. Moreover, the continuing competing blockades of the Strait of Hormuz by the US and Iran continue to lead to hostile incidents in the maritime domain, which has repeatedly escalated into broader ‘tit-for-tat’ strikes which have impacted the Gulf States.

Outside of renewed US-Israeli strikes against Iran triggering a return to full-scale conflict, there remains a high risk of a tactical miscalculation and/or escalation, with retaliatory strikes unlikely to be confined to the immediate area of engagement or the maritime domain. This was most recently demonstrated by the 24-26 May and 27-28 May exchanges, both of which resulted in United States strikes against Bandar Abbas.

Unlike the previous US strikes against Bandar Abbas, the 24-26 May escalation cycle extended over a period of days with multiple rounds of attack and retaliation. In addition to endangering the broader negotiation process, the cycles of escalation have repeatedly led to renewed Iranian strikes against the Gulf States, first with the UAE and more recently against Kuwait, and are likely to continue doing so while competing blockades are in place.  

Should a framework agreement/MOU be reached, the immediate risk of a return to full-scale US-Iran conflict would likely decrease. However, such a framework would likely only be an effective ceasefire extension and not a substantive and lasting peace agreement. Major issues like control of the Strait of Hormuz and Iran’s nuclear programme are unlikely to be fully resolved. Moreover, reported provisions within the MOU, such as the US blockade being lifted in proportion to the restoration of commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, provide multiple triggers for the potential MOU to break down. Finally, if the MOU only delays detailed nuclear talks for another 60 days, the main disputes that blocked the pre-28 February negotiations would likely remain unresolved and resurface later.

Iranian adherence to any interim framework is likely to be undermined by the IRGC, which has increasingly consolidated power in Tehran, acted independently of the civilian government, and signalled total opposition to US demands. The lack of a fully coherent regime in Tehran with a unified negotiating position almost certainly complicates the negotiation process and increases the likelihood that the IRGC could fail to comply with any agreements made by Tehran’s civilian government.

If the US resumes strikes against Iran, this would highly likely result in renewed full-scale Iranian attacks against targets across the Middle East. This is further reinforced by the 26 May threats issued by Iran’s Supreme Leader against regional countries which host US military bases. Recent leaked classified assessments by US intelligence services indicate that, despite high-intensity US-Israeli strikes, Iran maintains the capability to conduct large-scale long-range strikes across the Middle East, likely for several months, depending on the rate of expenditure.

Travellers are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:

On 1 June, general elections are set to take place in Ethiopia, the seventh held under the post-1995 constitutional order. Voters will elect 547 members of the House of Peoples’ Representatives (HPR), the lower house of Ethiopia’s parliament, for five-year terms. Members are elected in single-member constituencies through a first-past-the-post system. Voters do not directly elect the prime minister. Instead, the House of Peoples’ Representatives selects the prime minister, meaning the party or coalition that secures a parliamentary majority is expected to form the government. Council elections, electing 2,916 regional councillors, will also be held across 12 regions, as well as Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa, with those councils subsequently electing representatives to the House of Federation, Ethiopia’s upper house.

Incumbent Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed will lead the ruling Prosperity Party (PP) into the election, following its dominant victory in 2021, which resulted in the party securing 457 of the 547 seats in parliament. The National Movement of Amhara (NaMA), a right-wing Amhara ethnic nationalist party led by Belete Molla, is the most visible opposition party, but it currently holds only five parliamentary seats. Ethiopian Citizens for Social Justice (EZEMA), a liberal party led by Berhanu Nega, holds just four seats. Two Oromo nationalist parties, the Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC) and Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), led by Merera Gudina and Dawud Ibsa Ayana, respectively, boycotted the 2021 election. The OFC is fielding candidates in the 2026 election to preserve its legal registration, while the OLF has signalled readiness to contest the election.

Amid widespread instability due to ongoing civil wars in Amhara and Oromia, as well as heightened tensions in Tigray, election officials are implementing a three-tier security classification system nationwide. Red areas will be designated unfit for voting, yellow areas require mitigation, monitoring, or additional security measures, and green areas are stable enough for normal electoral operations. In previous elections, seats were left vacant in constituencies where voting could not take place, with polls postponed or cancelled in some areas because of insecurity, logistical constraints, or political disputes.

ASSESSMENT

While Prime Minister Ahmed has declared this is the “best” election to date, with 47 registered parties and nearly 11,000 candidates, several challenges remain. The legitimacy of the upcoming election has already been called into question, with tensions in multiple major regions, including Amhara, Oromia, and Tigray, where limited participation is likely to result in claims of election manipulation. This is exacerbated by the fact that most parties participating in the election broadly align with the PP, allowing the government to present the election as competitive without risking any real competition. Opposition parties are expected to remain largely sidelined, as they were in 2021, when the PP won 96.8 per cent of parliamentary seats. It is highly likely that PP will again secure an overwhelming victory. 

Furthermore, the National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) faces significant legitimacy challenges. In 2021, NEBE struggled to register internally displaced persons, a problem that is highly likely to continue in 2026, given Ethiopia’s continued displacement crisis and the absence of a recent census. Although the African Union (AU) assessed the 2021 election as broadly “peaceful” and “orderly”, the International Republican Institute/National Democratic Institute (IRI/NDI) observer mission concluded that the process “fell short of key standards concerning human and civil liberties, electoral campaigning, adequate security for all parties, and overall peace and security.” 

These shortcomings are likely to negatively influence perceptions of NEBE’s neutrality and capacity in the upcoming election. This is particularly since many areas are excluded from voting, and displacement and administrative gaps are likely to result in inaccurate voter rolls, under-registration, and contested results. As a result, even if NEBE can administer polling in secure areas, the election is likely to face renewed questions over inclusivity, competitiveness and national legitimacy.

Amhara

The designation of some areas in Amhara as “red”, which means unfit to vote, almost certainly threatens to exacerbate regional tensions. While Amhara and Oromia are two of Ethiopia’s most populous regions, the ongoing internal armed conflicts in both regions render accurate polling near impossible. In Amhara, conflict has been ongoing since the federal government’s 2023 decision to dismantle regional special forces. At least 12,000 people have been killed and 100,000 displaced. The fragmented Fano armed movement controls over 80 per cent of rural territory, with the Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF) largely restricted to major towns and highways. In March 2026, Fano issued a warning that any entity assisting the electoral process will be considered “enemies of the Amhara people equal to the government”. Voting will almost certainly be restricted to urban areas under government control, and many citizens are unlikely to vote due to the risk of polling stations or voters being targeted by Fano. 

Oromia

The situation is similar in Oromia, where the OLA has fought government forces since 2018/2019, with at least 5,000 people killed. The insurgency has seen civilian killings, mass kidnappings, and numerous transport strikes with enforced road closures. On 23 March, OLF-OLA issued a statement dismissing the election as a “performance staged for foreign consumption” and claiming that over 70 per cent of the country is inaccessible for voting.

The OFC and, despite its criticism of the election, OLF’s potential participation almost certainly gives the 2026 election more formal pluralism than a complete boycott would, with the government able to present the presence of Oromo nationalist parties as evidence of inclusion. However, OFC leader Gudina has argued that opposition parties cannot safely move, campaign, list candidates, organise observers, or mobilise supporters outside Addis Ababa. As with Amhara, the restrictions on polling in Oromia are highly likely to deepen the grievances of excluded populations. Even so, OFC and OLF participation highly likely lowers the risk of major electoral violence in Oromia, with armed groups unlikely to target polling infrastructure.

Tigray

During the general elections, the post-war Tigray Interim Administration (TIA) was expected to give way to a regular elected regional council. In May 2025, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) was deregistered by the National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE), meaning Tigray’s dominant political force is effectively unable to contest the 2026 elections. Additionally, the House of Federation has ruled that elections for the HPR will be held in five contested constituencies, but without corresponding elections for Tigray regional council seats under Tigray’s administration. This means that the vote has been perceived as politically illegitimate, with the Tigray Interim Administration (TIA) stating that “territorial integrity is non-negotiable”.

Tensions have escalated over the past year, with clashes between the Tigray Defence Force (TDF) and the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF) in early 2026. On 8 April 2026, the government unilaterally extended the mandate of the TIA, raising doubts over whether Tigray would transition from the interim administration to an elected regional council and regular constitutional governance through the 1 June electoral process. On 5 May, in response to the mandate extension, the TPLF replaced the government-backed leader, Tadesse Werede, with Debretsion Gebremichael, who had been Tigray’s leader during the 2020-2022 conflict. This was part of a reinstatement of the Tigray Government Assembly (parliament), which has displaced the TIA as the governing framework and revived the pre-war regional government structure. Tadesse warned that such a move would annul the 2022 Pretoria agreement, which ended the civil war which killed over 100,000 and displaced nearly three million.

The restoration of the pre-war parliament almost certainly increases the risk of a renewed confrontation in Tigray, particularly if either side attempts to militarily enforce its claimed authority. The 2020 conflict began after the TPLF rejected the government’s decision to postpone national elections and held its own regional election in Tigray, which the government declared illegal. The government’s handling of the elections in Tigray has been highly likely perceived as an attempt to retain control over the region and prevent its transition to self-governance. By declaring an end to the interim administration, the TPLF are almost certainly threatening the legal-political basis of the post-Pretoria Agreement transition. The election will highly likely reflect the ongoing fracture between the government and Tigray’s leadership and could serve as a flashpoint for either side to attempt to exert its control over the region, which almost certainly risks reigniting the conflict.

Because of the restricted participation in the conflict regions, limited civil unrest is highly likely. Demonstrations have taken place in Addis Ababa over tensions in Amhara, Oromia, and Tigray in recent years. The regions’ partial exclusion from the upcoming elections, combined with the escalating dispute over Tigray, almost certainly raises the risk of demonstrations during the election. Addis Ababa hosts an estimated 500,000 to one million Tigrayans, with the federal government perceived to be sidelining Tigrayan self-determination in favour of continuing the TIA led by the government-backed Tadesse.

However, any unauthorised pro-opposition rallies are highly likely to see a severe crackdown, while authorities will likely allow some smaller, less overtly anti-government demonstrations to take place under heavy monitoring. For example, in February 2025, Tigrayans living in Addis Ababa held a peaceful anti-war rally, but were forced to submit slogans to the Addis Ababa Administration for approval. Other planned pro-Tigray rallies in November 2024 were banned by the government, with the organisers placed under arrest. Should demonstrations proceed without permission, security forces are likely to respond forcefully, using tear gas and mass arrests to deter further demonstrations, imposing internet outages to disrupt mobilisation, and potentially using live ammunition if protests escalate and threaten key government sites or security forces.

On 31 May, up to 41 million Colombians will be eligible to vote in the country’s presidential elections, which will decide the successor to incumbent President Gustavo Petro, who is constitutionally barred from seeking immediate re-election. If no candidate secures 50 per cent of the vote on 31 May, a run-off between the two candidates that secured the most votes will be held on 21 June.

With Petro ineligible, polls have identified three candidates who have a realistic chance of winning. Senator Iván Cepeda Castro, the candidate of the Pacto Histórico (Historic Pact, PH), currently leads the polls. PH is a left-wing alliance formed in 2025 by Petro, consisting of four parties: Unión Patriótica (Patriotic Union), Polo Democrático Alternativo (Alternative Democratic Pole), the Partido Comunista Colombiano (Colombian Communist Party), and Humane Colombia (Humane Colombia). Cepeda has built a strong and diverse base and has intensified efforts to reach out to indigenous rights groups in regions such as Cauca.

Cepeda is widely expected to reach the second round. Consequently, two right-wing candidates are likely competing for the second runoff spot. Abelardo de la Espriella, of the Movimiento de Salvación Nacional (National Salvation Movement, MSN), has emerged as a populist right-wing figure with a platform and rhetoric similar to Latin American leaders like El Salvador’s Bukele or Argentina’s Milei, rooted in calls to dismantle the “establishment”, slash regulation, and crack down on organised crime. Senator Paloma Valencia of the Centro Democrático (Democratic Centre, CD) is a more centrist right-wing candidate, often categorised under the term “Uribismo”, after the policies of former President Álvaro Uribe Vélez, who also endorses more hardline security policies.

The presidential elections will take place only months after the latest parliamentary contest, in March. This vote was marked by very low turnout (just over 50 per cent) and returned a fragmented chamber. The parties of the three leading candidates all achieved positive results: PH increased its seat share by five, with both CD and MSN increasing their numbers.

The campaign has been dominated by security concerns amid a major increase in militant violence across Colombia. In the past year, there have been several high-profile assassinations of political candidates, most notably the June 2025 killing of Miguel Uribe Turbay, one of the early competitors to become CD’s presidential candidate, and multiple cases of intimidation. In April 2026, Valencia claimed that an armed group had planned an assassination attempt targeting her, while President Petro alleged the existence of a plot to assassinate Cepeda.

In April and May, there have been several cases of journalists and party activists being killed, with the murders being linked to organised crime and armed groups. On 16 May, gunmen assassinated two members of de la Esprella’s campaign staff in Cubarral, Meta Department, while a member of Valencia’s electoral staff had his armoured vehicle fired upon, also in Cubarral. On 22 May, gunmen opened fire on a PH office in Flandes, Tolima Department.

ASSESSMENT

The election is widely seen as a referendum on President Petro’s flagship Paz Total or “Total Peace” policy. Petro, a former guerrilla of the leftist M-19 group, has prioritised dialogue and negotiated settlements with Colombia’s armed groups over coercion or expanded security operations under the policy. Cepeda, who was one of the principal architects of Total Peace and has served as one of Petro’s main negotiators, advocates for the continuation of the policy, despite growing scepticism. Conversely, both leading right-wing candidates have promised to abandon Total Peace and adopt more aggressive measures to combat organised crime and militancy, likely partially inspired by El Salvador’s Mano Dura (“Iron Fist”) approach, which has spread throughout Latin America over the last three years.

Total Peace was implemented in 2022 and has achieved some limited successes. The policy has resulted in the creation of formal negotiation channels with several armed groups, temporary ceasefires, and the demobilisation of some smaller factions. However, it has almost certainly failed to deliver a sustained reduction in violence, curb illicit economies or dismantle the primary armed groups, with groups like the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Army, ELN), the FARC dissident group Estado Mayor Central (Central General Staff, EMC), and the Clan del Golfo (Gulf Clan, AGC) still highly active across multiple regions of the country. Critics have argued that armed groups, many of which have evolved from political movements into profit-driven criminal networks, have simply exploited Total Peace and its associated ceasefires to regroup, consolidate territorial control, expand recruitment and increase extortion and other illicit revenue streams.

According to NGO Ideas para la Paz, armed groups now have approximately 27,000 fighters (up from an estimated 15,000 in 2022). Armed groups are firmly embedded within local populations, have increasingly been able to operate freely in their respective areas of influence, and have expanded territories under their control, resulting in violent competition over strategically valuable areas for narcotics production, smuggling or other illicit enterprises, such as illegal mining. Currently, the only major group the government is in negotiations with is the AGC, a violent drug cartel that has doubled its territory under Petro and increased its ranks by almost 150 per cent.

Armed groups have also emulated global trends by increasingly adopting advanced weapon systems to carry out attacks, including unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which they have used to drop explosives on police and military positions, often posing a direct threat to civilians. In 2025, the Ministry of Defence recorded 333 drone attacks, up from 61 the year prior.

Total Peace came under increased scrutiny in 2025, in response to an escalation of the Colombian internal conflict. Several armed groups conducted high-profile “offensives” across the country or increased attacks, primarily to expand territorial control and expand illicit economies, but also likely to challenge state authority and strengthen their bargaining position ahead of the presidential election. This has resulted in the displacement of tens of thousands of civilians and likely the worst humanitarian situation in over a decade, with Colombia also currently hosting as many as 3.5 million Venezuelan refugees. Attacks on security forces and critical transport routes have increased, as has disruption to business operations in conflict-affected departments such as Catatumbo, Cauca, Valle del Cauca and parts of Antioquia. By some estimates, as many as ten million people now live under the influence of armed groups.

In January 2025, the ELN launched an offensive against FARC-dissident groups in the Catatumbo region, a key border area with Venezuela, which led to more than 100 deaths and the displacement of 50,000 people. In December, the ELN launched another series of attacks, which also affected the city of Cali, Colombia’s third-largest city and a major economic and transport hub, in the Valle del Cauca department.  

The EMC also escalated attacks in 2025 and has continued to do so in 2026. EMC’s first escalation cycle was in early 2025; however, the most significant shift was observed in June 2025, when the militant group launched a wave of coordinated attacks across the Cauca and Valle del Cauca departments, demonstrating a more organised capacity and intent to disrupt security forces, transport routes and urban centres.

Most militant attacks have concentrated on state security forces; there has been a major increase in civilian casualties. Reporting from the International Red Cross Committee (IRCC) indicates that there were 965 people injured or killed by explosives, most being civilians. The report also documented 282 cases of violence against health workers related to ​the armed conflict, and 308 new disappearances. While an increased civilian casualty toll is likely partly attributable to the indiscriminate nature of explosive devices, several high-profile attacks indicate that civilians have likely been deliberately targeted or that armed groups are increasingly willing to accept civilian casualties to achieve their objectives.

The most notable of these incidents was the 25 April 2026 detonation of a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED), near the town of Cajibio, in the department of Cauca in southwest Colombia. The explosion, which occurred approximately one month ahead of the election, killed at least 21 people and injured dozens, and resulted in major transport disruption on one of Colombia’s most important transit corridors. Reports indicate that the bomb was detonated after assailants stopped traffic by blocking the road with a bus and another vehicle, actions that likely indicate the intent to maximise civilian casualties. The attack, which was the most brutal against civilians in decades, coincided with a series of coordinated attacks in the Valle del Cauca and Cauca departments, that was immediately attributed to the EMC.  

Militant offensives and an escalation in attacks have significantly undermined Total Peace and increasingly forced the Petro administration to adopt a more coercive approach, characterised by increased military deployments, enhanced security measures, increased operations aimed at killing or capturing militant senior leadership, and closer security cooperation with international partners, particularly the US, despite the Washington’s sustained criticism of Petro and its own controversial operations against narcotics smuggling just outside of Colombian territorial waters.

Petro’s gradual shift has almost certainly influenced the actions of militant groups. Under increased pressure and facing the threat of expanded military operations and foreign involvement, attacks like the April VBIED and other high-profile attacks are likely aimed at undermining state control and influencing the future course of action of not just the current government, but also other presidential candidates. The strategic message being sent is that government operations attempting to contain the influence of armed groups or disrupt their operations will be met with significant and costly armed resistance.

With internal security assessments almost certainly determining there is a credible risk of increased militancy up to and during the election, the Colombian government has implemented heightened security measures. Measures include the planned closure of all borders with Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, Panama, and Venezuela between 30 May and 1 June. More than 248,000 uniformed personnel, roughly equally provided by the police and military, will be stationed at polling stations as part of “Project Democracy”. States more exposed to armed conflict, such as Cauca, will have a higher volume of personnel deployed.

The EMC and the ELN have announced unilateral “ceasefires” between 20 May and 10 June to coincide with the vote. However, these ceasefires are unlikely to be reliable indicators of reduced election-related risks and may be attempts to distance themselves from political violence. Moreover, ceasefires are unlikely to extend to intimidation, movement restrictions or “armed strikes”, vote tampering, or other non-violent measures designed to influence turnout and local voting behaviour. During the March 2026 Colombian parliamentary elections, local election observers reported potential irregularities at more than 1,000 polling stations.  Colombian armed groups are also very decentralised, and there is a realistic possibility that ceasefire declarations made by senior leadership will not be uniformly adhered to by local commanders of factions.

Most importantly, the self-declared ceasefires do not cover the potential second round on 21 June. Polling indicates that no candidate is likely to achieve more than 50 per cent of the vote, with the second round likely to feature Cepeda against one of the right-wing candidates that has promised a much tougher stance on armed groups. As it is likely that most of the supporters of the losing right-wing candidate will shift to the remaining right-wing contender, the second round is likely to be perceived as a direct contest between an attempt to restore Total Peace and a marked shift towards expanded security operations. This would likely increase the incentive for armed groups to influence the election and could increase the risk of high-profile attacks aimed at deterring the incoming administration from abandoning the negotiation process.

The 2026 presidential election will almost certainly be highly consequential for the future trajectory of Colombia’s internal armed conflict. A Cepeda government will likely remain committed to Total Peace and reopen dialogue with armed groups, assessing that a change in president could be interpreted as an opportunity to stabilise negotiations and reverse the recent path of President Petro. However, while such a course of action has the potential to reduce violence in Colombia, it is likely to play into the hands of the armed groups, which will likely continue to exploit the policy to consolidate territorial control, expand illicit economies, delay demobilisation and potentially increase their leverage in future negotiations.

A victory by a right-wing candidate would likely result in the rapid abandonment of Total Peace. Both de la Espriella and Valencia would likely expand security operations and deploy increased resources to Colombia’s most affected areas. Both would also likely explore options to expand security cooperation with the US, mirroring developments seen elsewhere in Latin America. This could potentially involve Colombia joining the “Shield of the Americas”, increased intelligence-sharing, and even a possible pathway for US kinetic operations on Colombian territory, a development that has recently been observed in Ecuador.

However, recent developments in Colombia likely illustrate limitations to a more hardline approach. Offensives and reprisal attacks likely indicate that armed groups have yet to be deterred by expanded government operations, and incidents like the April Pan-American Highway attack or attacks within major population centres likely indicate a continued willingness to escalate despite the threat of state retaliation. Moreover, Colombia’s armed groups are well-embedded within the civilian population, highly decentralised and are adept at exploiting Colombia’s mountainous, jungle and borderlands to evade security operations. The imposition of security strategies observed elsewhere in Latin America is likely to be of limited effectiveness, given the resources required to combat multiple armed groups operating in challenging terrain on several fronts, with expanded security operations likely to provoke retaliatory attacks aimed at undermining the state’s efforts to curb militancy and disrupt illicit economies.

The risk of a return to full-scale conflict in the Middle East, which would likely be characterised by renewed daily Iranian strikes against the Gulf States and Jordan, remains high despite reported progress on a potentially imminent MOU.

The two parties are likely to remain at a diplomatically unresolvable impasse without either side moving on its red lines. The Trump administration continues to make demands for meaningful concessions on Iran’s nuclear programme, particularly the removal of Iran’s HEU, and stated it will not accept Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz. However, a statement on social media written by President Trump on 25 May said that the HEU must be turned over to the US or “destroyed in place or, at another acceptable location” with the observance of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This likely represents a concession on US demands, with Tehran having previously indicated willingness to consider dilution of its HEU in Iran, although it is unclear whether this would fulfil President Trump’s continued demand for its ‘destruction’.

Iranian negotiators have reportedly indicated a willingness to open the Strait of Hormuz without tolls in exchange for an end to the US blockade. However, Iran’s foreign ministry stated on 25 May that it will instead charge fees for “environmental protection”. With control over the Strait of Hormuz having been a long-term strategic objective for the Iranian regime, it is highly likely that Tehran will continue to leverage the strait as far as possible for income.

Continuing conflict in Lebanon risks jeopardising the wider US-Iran ceasefire, with Iranian officials telling the media an Israeli attack on Beirut or its southern suburbs “could derail the diplomatic track”. Since Prime Minister Netanyahu recently announced an escalation in Israel’s campaign against Hezbollah, the IDF has not yet conducted any strikes in Beirut. However, strikes were conducted in Beirut’s southern suburbs (Dahiyeh) as recently as 7 May, and further such strikes would likely impact the fragile US-Iran negotiations.  

Outside of renewed US-Israeli strikes against Iran, there remains a high risk of tactical miscalculation and/or escalation occurring as the US and Iranian blockades continue, with retaliatory strikes unlikely to be confined to the immediate area of engagement or the maritime domain. This most recently manifested with the 24-26 May escalation, which resulted in US strikes against Bandar Abbas. Unlike the previous US strikes against Bandar Abbas during the de facto ceasefire on 7 May, which also resulted from continued conflict in the maritime domain, the currently ongoing escalation cycle has extended over a period of days with multiple rounds of attack and retaliation. In addition to endangering the negotiation process, there is a realistic possibility of further Iranian retaliation strikes being soon launched against regional targets, particularly the UAE, in response to the US strikes against Bandar Abbas.

Should a framework agreement be reached, the immediate risk of a return to full-scale US-Iran conflict would likely decrease. However, such a framework would likely only be an effective ceasefire extension and not a substantive and lasting peace agreement. Major issues like control of the Strait of Hormuz and Iran’s nuclear programme are likely to remain unresolved.

Moreover, Iranian adherence to any interim framework is likely to be undermined by the IRGC, which has increasingly consolidated power in Tehran, acted independently of the civilian government, and signalled total opposition to US demands. The lack of a fully coherent regime in Tehran with a unified negotiating position almost certainly complicates the negotiation process and increases the likelihood that the IRGC could fail to comply with any agreements made by Tehran’s civilian government.

If the US resumes strikes against Iran, this would highly likely result in renewed full-scale Iranian attacks against targets across the Middle East. The 26 May threats issued by Iran’s Supreme Leader against countries which host US military bases underscore that Iranian retaliation to a resumption of full-scale conflict would likely involve renewed strikes against Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman. Recent leaked classified assessments by US intelligence services indicate that, despite high-intensity US-Israeli strikes, Iran maintains the capability to conduct large-scale long-range strikes across the Middle East, likely for several months, depending on the rate of expenditure.

Travellers are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:

The two parties are highly likely to remain at a diplomatically unresolvable impasse without either side moving on its red lines. The Trump administration continues to make demands for meaningful concessions on Iran’s nuclear programme, particularly the removal of Iran’s HEU, and stated it will not accept Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz.

However, Tehran reportedly continues to refuse the removal of its HEU out of the country and has pushed for delaying comprehensive nuclear negotiations until after the US blockade is lifted, in addition to continuing its claim over the Strait of Hormuz with its newly formed “Persian Gulf Strait Authority”.

There is a realistic possibility that both Washington and Tehran will finalise the draft agreement being mediated by Pakistan and progress to a further round of negotiations. The likelihood of a resumption of US strikes on Iran, followed by retaliatory strikes across the Middle East, will almost certainly increase if the draft agreement fails to proceed.

Should a framework agreement be reached, the immediate risk of a return to full-scale US-Iran conflict would likely decrease. However, such a framework would likely only be an effective ceasefire extension and not a substantive and lasting peace agreement. Major issues like control of the Strait of Hormuz and Iran’s nuclear programme are unlikely to be fully resolved.

Moreover, Iranian adherence to any interim framework is likely to be undermined by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which has increasingly consolidated power in Tehran, acted independently of the civilian government, and signalled total opposition to US demands. The lack of a fully coherent regime in Tehran with a unified negotiating position, as exemplified by the competing briefings from senior Iranian officials regarding the Supreme Leader’s directive on Iran’s HEU stockpile, almost certainly complicates the negotiation process and increases the likelihood that the IRGC could fail to comply with any agreements made by Tehran’s civilian government.

Ultimately, with the IRGC having increasingly consolidated control in Iran, it is likely that the IRGC-controlled regime elements will be unwilling to make significant concessions, which can be perceived as giving in to the US, preferring instead a renewed full-scale conflict. However, there is a realistic possibility that the Trump administration may calculate that the economic and political costs of the war have become so great that it is willing to accept a compromised end state, which involves only marginal movement from Tehran compared to what was on the table prior to the conflict’s outbreak on 28 February.

If the US resumes strikes against Iran, this would highly likely result in renewed full-scale Iranian attacks against targets across the Middle East. Recent leaked classified assessments by US intelligence services indicate that, since the ceasefire, Iran has restored access to 30 of its 33 missile sites along the Strait of Hormuz and regained access to around 90 per cent of its underground missile storage and launch facilities. Furthermore, the assessments indicate that Iran still fields 70 to 75 per cent of its transporter erector launchers (TELs) used for launching ballistic missiles, and retains 70 per cent of its prewar missile stockpile. If accurate, these assessments highly likely suggest that despite high-intensity US-Israeli strikes, Iran maintains the capability to conduct large-scale long-range strikes across the Middle East, likely for several months, depending on the rate of expenditure.

Outside of renewed US-Israeli strikes against Iran, there remains a high risk of tactical miscalculation and/or escalation occurring as the US and Iranian blockades continue, with retaliatory strikes unlikely to be confined to the immediate area of engagement or the maritime domain. If the US resumes the previously paused Project Freedom initiative, which involves using US naval forces to escort commercial vessels through the Strait of Hormuz to counter Iran’s current de facto control over the strait, this would almost certainly further increase the risk of escalation from the maritime domain. As illustrated on 3-5 May and 7-8 May, escalation in the maritime domain can quickly lead to Iranian strikes targeting the UAE. The UAE has likely been targeted over other Gulf States due to multiple factors, and Iranian ‘retaliation’ strikes will likely continue to prioritise the UAE outside of a return to full-scale regional conflict.

Travellers are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:

US President Donald Trump has threatened on multiple occasions since the implementation of the ceasefire on 8 April to renew strikes against Iran if demanded concessions are not made in the diplomatic track. This has likely reduced the credibility of US threats to compel compliance in Tehran, although it is highly likely that Iranian forces have maintained the highest possible readiness under the assumption that full-scale war could restart on any given day.

The Iranian peace proposals have reportedly included demands for sanctions relief, an end to the US naval blockade, withdrawal of US forces from areas close to Iran, the full release of frozen assets, reparations, guarantees against further attacks, an end to the war on all fronts (including Lebanon), and recognition of Iran’s sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz. According to Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media reports, the US have rejected reparations, demanded a transfer of Iran’s stockpiled HEU to the US, and only agreed to release 25 per cent of Iran’s frozen assets. Furthermore, the reports claim that the US is providing no guarantee against further US or Israeli strikes in future if subsequent more comprehensive negotiations fail.

Fundamentally, the two parties are highly likely to remain at a diplomatically unresolvable impasse without either side moving on its red lines, particularly regarding the nuclear file. The Trump administration continues to make demands for meaningful concessions on Iran’s nuclear programme as part of an initial peace agreement, whereas Tehran continues to push for delaying nuclear negotiations until after a peace settlement is reached. However, the US blockade is almost certainly currently the main leverage imposed against Iran; it is unlikely that the Trump administration will be willing to relinquish its primary leverage without having gained meaningful concessions on the nuclear file.

US officials have briefed that the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE carried a unified message to President Trump that negotiations should be given more of a chance as the Gulf States would ‘pay the price’ for a return to conflict. Two Middle East officials additionally briefed that the US and Israel are engaged in the largest preparations since the 8 April ceasefire implementation for potential renewed strikes against Iran, claiming that they could be as “early as this week”.

If the US resumes strikes against Iran to break the current deadlock, this would highly likely result in renewed full-scale Iranian attacks against targets across the Middle East. Recent leaked classified assessments by US intelligence services indicate that, since the ceasefire, Iran has restored access to 30 of its 33 missile sites along the Strait of Hormuz and regained access to around 90 per cent of its underground missile storage and launch facilities. Furthermore, the assessments posit that Iran still fields 70 to 75 per cent of its transporter erector launchers (TELs) used for launching ballistic missiles, and retains 70 per cent of its prewar missile stockpile. If accurate, these assessments highly likely suggest that despite high-intensity US-Israeli strikes, Iran maintains the capability to conduct large-scale long-range strikes across the Middle East, likely for several more months, depending on the rate of expenditure.

Outside of renewed US-Israeli strikes against Iran, there remains a high risk of tactical miscalculation and/or escalation occurring as the US and Iranian blockades continue, with retaliatory strikes unlikely to be confined to the immediate area of engagement or the maritime domain. If the US resumes the previously paused Project Freedom initiative, which involves using US naval forces to escort commercial vessels through the Strait of Hormuz to counter Iran’s current de facto control over the strait, this would almost certainly further increase the risk of escalation from the maritime domain. As illustrated on 3-5 May and 7-8 May, escalation in the maritime domain can quickly lead to Iranian strikes targeting the UAE. The UAE has likely been targeted over other Gulf States due to multiple factors, and Iranian ‘retaliation’ strikes will likely continue to prioritise the UAE outside of a return to full-scale regional conflict.

Travellers are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:

The continuing disputes over the Strait of Hormuz, which escalated between 3 and 8 May, have almost certainly increased the risk of a return to full-scale conflict, with the US and Iran essentially in a stalemate. Washington almost certainly intends to pressure Iran to make concessions on the nuclear file via its blockade, due to an assessment that Iran only has a limited time remaining to store oil before it is forced to shut in its oil production. Tehran highly likely calculates that the US will be unable to tolerate a prolonged closure of the Strait of Hormuz due to the high economic and political costs.

There is a high risk of tactical miscalculation and/or escalation occurring as the US and Iranian blockades continue, with retaliatory strikes unlikely to be confined to the immediate area of engagement or the maritime domain. As illustrated on 3-5 May and 7-8 May, escalation in the maritime domain can quickly lead to Iranian strikes targeting the UAE.

The UAE has likely been targeted over other Gulf States due to multiple factors, and Iranian ‘retaliation’ strikes will likely continue to prioritise the UAE in the short term. The emerging reports of the UAE’s previous direct involvement in the conflict as an active combatant against Iran will likely further contribute towards the increased prioritisation of the UAE as a target.

Other contributing factors for the UAE’s prioritisation as a target by Iran include: Fujairah’s critical role as an oil export terminal which bypasses the Strait of Hormuz; the UAE’s increasingly close security partnership with Israel; and the likely increasing isolation of the UAE among the Gulf States and growing rivalry with Saudi Arabia which significantly increased following the failed UAE-backed Southern Transition Council (STC) offensive in Yemen and Saudi-backed counteroffensive in December 2025-January 2026, a rift which has likely culminated in the UAE’s recent withdrawal from OPEC.

Tehran likely seeks to further isolate the UAE, which is publicly the most hostile Gulf State against Iran, from the rest of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) with its prioritised targeting, widening the gap between the current de-escalatory approach in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi’s hawkishness.

The reports of Saudi strikes against Iran during the war likely resulted in an opposite effect to those conducted by the UAE, reducing rather than increasing Iran’s willingness to attack Saudi territory. Riyadh likely ordered limited, calibrated attacks to restore deterrence, and Tehran likely views an escalation with Saudi as higher risk,  given Saudi Arabia’s greater military capacity, strategic depth and regional influence.

Following the Saudi strikes against Iran, reports indicate that de-escalation took place in the week before the 8 April ceasefire implementation, with 105 projectiles being launched against Saudi Arabia between 25-31 March and just over 25 between 1-6 April. Moreover, the UAE has effectively completely cut diplomatic contact with Iran, unlike Saudi Arabia, which has maintained regular contact with Iran, and it is likely that the reported Saudi strikes led to diplomatic contacts and an informal agreement to de-escalate.  

With the current diplomatic track facing major difficulties, Washington may conclude that a return to conflict is the only means of forcing compliance from Tehran. If the US resumes strikes against Iran to break the current deadlock, this would highly likely result in renewed full-scale Iranian attacks against targets across the Middle East.

Recent leaked classified assessments by US intelligence services indicate that, since the ceasefire, Iran has restored access to 30 of its 33 missile sites along the Strait of Hormuz and regained access to around 90 per cent of its underground missile storage and launch facilities. Furthermore, the assessments posit that Iran still fields 70 to 75 per cent of its transporter erector launchers (TELs) used for launching ballistic missiles, and retains 70 per cent of its prewar missile stockpile. If accurate, these assessments highly likely suggest that despite high-intensity US-Israeli strikes, Iran maintains the capability to conduct large-scale long-range strikes across the Middle East, likely for several more months depending on the rate of expenditure.

Travellers are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:

The continuing disputes over the Strait of Hormuz, which escalated between 3 and 8 May, have almost certainly increased the risk of a return to full-scale conflict, with the US and Iran essentially in a stalemate. Washington almost certainly intends to pressure Iran to make concessions on the nuclear file via its blockade, due to an assessment that Iran only has a limited time remaining to store oil before it is forced to shut in its oil production. Tehran highly likely calculates that the US will be unable to tolerate a prolonged closure of the Strait of Hormuz due to the high economic and political costs.

There is a high risk of tactical miscalculation and/or escalation occurring as the US and Iranian blockades continue, with retaliatory strikes unlikely to be confined to the immediate area of engagement or the maritime domain. As illustrated on 3-5 May and 7-8 May, escalation in the maritime domain can quickly lead to Iranian strikes targeting the UAE. Moreover, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-linked media has directly threatened that any attack on Iranian vessels will “result in a heavy attack on one of the American centres in the region”.

The UAE has been highly likely targeted over other Gulf States due to multiple factors, and Iranian ‘retaliation’ strikes will likely continue to prioritise the UAE in the short term. The emerging reports of the UAE’s direct involvement in the conflict as an active combatant against Iran will likely result in the increased prioritisation of the UAE as a target. Other contributing factors for the increased targeting of the UAE include: Fujairah’s critical role as an oil export terminal which bypasses the Strait of Hormuz, therefore reducing Iranian leverage through the Strait’s closure; the UAE’s increasingly close security partnership with Israel; and the likely increasing isolation of the UAE among the Gulf States following its withdrawal from OPEC and rivalry with Saudi Arabia. It is likely also that Tehran seeks to further isolate the UAE, likely now the most hostile Gulf State against Iran, from the rest of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

With the current diplomatic track facing major difficulties, Washington may conclude that a return to conflict is the only means of forcing compliance from Tehran. If the US resumes strikes against Iran to break the current deadlock, this would highly likely result in renewed full-scale Iranian attacks against targets across the Middle East. Such attacks would likely involve Iran broadening its targeting to include assets and infrastructure that enable the Gulf States to export oil and gas by circumventing the Strait of Hormuz, such as oil pipelines to Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea port of Yanbu, and the Emirati port of Fujairah (as it did on 4 May).

Iran has repeatedly threatened that its forces are ready and prepared to resume full-scale attacks, with the military highly likely to have exploited the ceasefire to improve its offensive and defensive positions. Furthermore, Iranian forces have reportedly moved transporter erector launchers (TELs) out of range of some US long-range fires. The movement of TELs deeper into Iran may reduce the proportion of Iran’s ballistic missile force able to range Israeli territory, potentially increasing the likelihood that these systems are instead used against Gulf states if full-scale conflict resumes.

Travellers are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:

The continuing disputes over the Strait of Hormuz, which escalated between 3 and 8 May, have almost certainly increased the risk of a return to full-scale conflict, with the US and Iran essentially in a stalemate. Washington almost certainly intends to pressure Iran to make concessions on the nuclear file via its blockade, due to an assessment that Iran only has a limited time remaining to store oil before it is forced to shut in its oil production. Tehran highly likely calculates that the US will be unable to tolerate a prolonged closure of the Strait of Hormuz due to the high economic and political costs.

Washington has temporarily backed down on Project Freedom, the likely trigger of the initial renewed Iranian strikes against the UAE on 4-5 May, which almost certainly represented the most significant escalation since the ceasefire’s implementation on 8 April. In addition to the escalation risks, the US was highly likely operationally constrained by a lack of regional support, with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait suspending the use of their territory and airspace for US military operations. However, reporting on 7 May indicates that Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have now lifted these restrictions, potentially reenabling US operational capability to carry out Project Freedom. Should Project Freedom restart, this would likely lead to further Iranian strikes against the UAE.

There is a high risk of tactical miscalculation and/or escalation occurring as the US and Iranian blockades continue, with retaliatory strikes unlikely to be confined to the immediate area of engagement or the maritime domain. As illustrated on 3-5 May and 7-8 May, escalation in the maritime domain can quickly lead to Iranian strikes targeting the UAE.

The UAE has been highly likely targeted over other Gulf States due to multiple factors, and Iranian ‘retaliation’ strikes will likely continue to prioritise the UAE in the short term. These factors include: Fujairah’s critical role as an oil export terminal which bypasses the Strait of Hormuz, therefore reducing Iranian leverage through the Strait’s closure; the UAE’s increasingly close security partnership with Israel; and the likely increasing isolation of the UAE among the Gulf States following its withdrawal from OPEC and rivalry with Saudi Arabia. It is likely also that Tehran seeks to further isolate the UAE, likely now the most hostile Gulf State against Iran, from the rest of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

If the current diplomatic track collapses, Washington may conclude that a return to conflict is the only means of forcing compliance from Tehran. If the US resumes strikes against Iran to break the current deadlock, this would highly likely result in renewed full-scale Iranian attacks against targets across the Middle East. Such attacks would likely involve Iran broadening its targeting to include assets and infrastructure that enable the Gulf States to export oil and gas by circumventing the Strait of Hormuz, such as oil pipelines to Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea port of Yanbu, and the Emirati port of Fujairah (as it did on 4 May).

Iran has repeatedly threatened that its forces are ready and prepared to resume full-scale attacks, with the military highly likely to have exploited the ceasefire to improve its offensive and defensive positions. Furthermore, Iranian forces have reportedly moved transporter erector launchers (TELs) out of range of some US long-range fires. The movement of TELs deeper into Iran may reduce the proportion of Iran’s ballistic missile force able to range Israeli territory, potentially increasing the likelihood that these systems are instead used against Gulf states if full-scale conflict resumes.

Travellers are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:

Continuing disputes over the Strait of Hormuz, which have notably escalated, have almost certainly increased the risk of a return to full-scale conflict, with the US and Iran essentially in a stalemate. Washington almost certainly intends to pressure Iran to make concessions on the nuclear file via its blockade, due to an assessment that Iran only has a limited time remaining to store oil before it is forced to shut in its oil production. Tehran highly likely calculates that the US will not be able to tolerate a prolonged closure of the Strait of Hormuz.

The Iranian strikes on the UAE (and if confirmed, those targeting Oman) almost certainly represent the most significant escalation since the ceasefire’s implementation on 8 April. However, messaging from US President Donald Trump has so far refrained from stating that the ceasefire has been violated or is no longer in effect.

Iranian officials have not confirmed or denied responsibility for the attacks. However, Iranian state television broadcast a statement that blamed “US military adventurism” for the attacks, and the anti-regime media outlet Iran International has reported that Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian expressed strong anger over the actions of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), reportedly describing them as “completely irresponsible”.

The widely reported consolidation of power by IRGC hardliners, with multiple sources indicating that IRGC commander Major General Ahmed Vahidi is now effectively in control of regime decision-making, almost certainly increases the risk of further escalatory attacks by Iranian forces and reduces the likelihood that Tehran can be compelled to make significant concessions that could be perceived as conceding to the US.

There is a high risk of a tactical miscalculation and/or escalation occurring in the maritime domain, with retaliatory strikes unlikely to be contained to the immediate area of engagement or the maritime domain. Disruption in the Strait of Hormuz is Iran’s primary source of leverage, and US attempts to deprive Tehran of this are highly unlikely to go unanswered by the IRGC, increasing the potential for a renewed regional escalation as a result of Project Freedom.

The UAE was highly likely targeted due to multiple factors, including: Fujairah’s critical role as an oil export terminal which bypasses the Strait of Hormuz, therefore reducing Iranian leverage through the Strait’s closure; the UAE’s reported increasingly close security partnership with Israel; and potentially the increasing isolation of the UAE among the Gulf States following its withdrawal from OPEC and increasing rivalry with Saudi Arabia.

It is unlikely that the US blockade will be capable of compelling Iran to make immediate concessions, with revised timelines for remaining Iranian oil storage capacity extending into a period of months rather than days, due to factors such as Iran being able to use tankers as floating storage. Outside of the current stalemate, Washington may calculate that a return to conflict is the only means to force compliance from Tehran.

If the US resumes strikes against Iran in an effort to break the current deadlock, this would highly likely result in renewed full-scale Iranian attacks against targets across the Middle East. Such attacks would likely involve Iran broadening its targeting, in particular to include assets and infrastructure that enable the Gulf States to export oil and gas by circumventing the Strait of Hormuz, such as oil pipelines to Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea port of Yanbu, and the Emirati port of Fujairah (as it did on 4 April).

Iran has repeatedly threatened that its forces are ready and prepared to resume full-scale attacks, with the military highly likely to have exploited the ceasefire to improve its offensive and defensive positions. Furthermore, Iranian forces have reportedly moved transporter erector launchers (TELs) out of range of some US long-range fires. The movement of TELs deeper into Iran may reduce the proportion of Iran’s ballistic missile force able to range Israeli territory, potentially increasing the likelihood that these systems are instead used against Gulf states if full-scale conflict resumes.

Travellers are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:

Continuing disputes over the Strait of Hormuz and the current lack of US-Iran talks to formally extend the ceasefire have almost certainly increased the risk of a return to full-scale conflict, with the US and Iran essentially in a stalemate. Washington almost certainly intends to pressure Iran to make concessions on the nuclear file via its blockade, due to an assessment that Iran only has a limited time remaining to store oil before it is forced to ramp down its oil production. Tehran highly likely calculates that the US will not be able to tolerate a prolonged closure of the Strait of Hormuz.

The current status quo in the Strait of Hormuz is almost certainly untenable for both the US and Iran in the long term, and it is unlikely that either party will be willing to prolong the situation indefinitely. Some research estimates asses that Iran may only have enough storage capacity to last another 12 to 22 days for its domestic oil production, due to the US blockade limiting Iranian exports, but that the impact on Iranian revenues will not be felt for another three to four months.

Other analysts have noted that due to Iran’s experience in stockpiling oil during the COVID pandemic, the remaining space at its storage facilities, and efforts in the past ten years to expand alternative storage export facilities, Iran is unlikely to be in imminent danger of a “major crude oil shut-in”. Furthermore, some Iranian tankers have managed to continue navigating through the US blockade, Iran continues to export oil overland (in relatively small quantities), and Iran could use its crude carrier vessels as floating storage, which is estimated to provide an additional two months of production capacity. Overall, it is unlikely that the US blockade will be capable of compelling Iran to make immediate concessions.

Furthermore, it is unlikely that Tehran can be compelled to make significant concessions that could be perceived as conceding to the US due to the widely reported consolidation of power by Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) hardliners, with multiple sources indicating that IRGC commander Major General Ahmed Vahidi is now effectively in control of regime decision-making.

Outside of the current stalemate, Washington may calculate that a return to conflict is the only means to force compliance from Tehran if the blockade fails to exert the necessary pressure. The reported withdrawal of the USS Ford CSG, which will reduce the number of deployed CSGs in the CENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR) from three to two, may be in anticipation of a relief in place with an additional carrier such as the USS Dwight D Eisenhower, which recently completed its pre-deployment sea trials at the Norfolk Naval Shipyard on 24 April.

If the US resumes strikes against Iran in an effort to break the current deadlock, this would highly likely result in renewed Iranian attacks against targets across the Middle East. Such attacks would likely involve Iran broadening its targeting to include assets and infrastructure that enable the Gulf States to export oil and gas by circumventing the Strait of Hormuz, such as oil pipelines to Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea port of Yanbu, and the Emirati port of Fujairah.

Iran has repeatedly threatened that its forces are ready and prepared to resume attacks, with the military highly likely to have exploited the ceasefire to improve its offensive and defensive positions. Furthermore, Iranian forces have reportedly moved transporter erector launchers (TELs) out of range of some US long-range fires. The movement of TELs deeper into Iran may reduce the proportion of Iran’s ballistic missile force able to range Israeli territory, potentially increasing the likelihood that these systems are instead used against Gulf states if full-scale conflict resumes.

Travellers are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:

Continuing disputes over the Strait of Hormuz and the current lack of further US-Iran talks to formally extend the ceasefire have increased the risk of a return to full-scale conflict. A return to conflict would highly likely result in renewed Iranian attacks against targets in the Gulf States. Such attacks would likely involve Iran broadening its targeting to include assets and infrastructure that enable the Gulf States to export oil and gas by circumventing the Strait of Hormuz, such as oil pipelines to Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea port of Yanbu, and the Emirati city of Fujairah.

The current status quo in the Strait of Hormuz is almost certainly untenable for both the US and Iran in the long term, and it is unlikely that either party will be willing to prolong the situation indefinitely. Research estimates that Iran may only have enough storage capacity to last another 12 to 22 days for its domestic oil production, due to the US blockade limiting Iranian exports. However, it is also estimated that the impact on Iranian revenues will not be felt for another three to four months.

Despite the blockade, it is unlikely that Tehran can be compelled to make significant concessions that could be perceived as conceding to the US, in part due to the highly likely consolidation of power by IRGC hardliners over the regime. According to briefings by US officials to the media, some Trump administration officials believe that a continuation of the blockade for two more months could compel compliance from Tehran, while others believe this assessment to be flawed due to the hardening of Iran’s position.

Iran has repeatedly threatened that its forces are ready and prepared to resume attacks, with the military highly likely having exploited the ceasefire to improve its offensive and defensive positions. This has likely involved the excavation of ballistic missiles and ballistic missile launchers that were buried after the US-Israeli joint strikes and the restoration of damaged systems. Iranian military units have likely regrouped, dispersed remaining assets, and repositioned forces to enhance survivability against future strikes and to place Iran in a better position to conduct large-scale attacks against regional targets should active fighting resume.

Travellers are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:

Continuing disputes over the Strait of Hormuz and the current lack of further US-Iran talks to formally extend the ceasefire have increased the risk of an imminent return to full-scale conflict. Such a conflict would highly likely result in renewed Iranian attacks against targets in the Gulf States, and it is likely that such attacks would involve Iran broadening its target set, particularly against assets and infrastructure that enable the Gulf States to export oil and gas by circumventing the Strait of Hormuz, such as oil pipelines to Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea port of Yanbu.

The current status quo in the Strait of Hormuz is almost certainly untenable for both the US and Iran, and it is unlikely that either party will be willing to prolong the situation indefinitely. However, it is also unlikely that Tehran can be compelled to make significant concessions that could be perceived as conceding to the US, with the current level of pressure applied against it. This is further complicated by the almost certain lack of a coherent negotiating partner for the US, with the Iranian regime likely fragmented between different factions, although hardline IRGC commanders likely currently wield the most control over the regime.

There is a realistic possibility that President Trump’s extension of the current ceasefire was intended to buy time for the arrival of the USS Bush CSG, an assessment which is supported by the Bush CSG’s estimated arrival time corresponding with the 3–5-day ceasefire extension period briefed by US officials. 

Iran has repeatedly threatened that its forces are ready and prepared to resume attacks, with the military likely having exploited the ceasefire and cessation of attacks to improve its offensive and defensive positions. This has likely involved the excavation of ballistic missiles and ballistic missile launchers that were buried after the US-Israeli joint strikes and the restoration of damaged systems. Iranian military units have likely regrouped, dispersed remaining assets, and repositioned forces to enhance survivability against future strikes and to place Iran in a better position to conduct large-scale attacks against regional targets should active fighting resume.

Travellers are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity: