On 28 February, Iran initiated ballistic missile and attack drone strikes targeting Israel and US military facilities and sites known to host US military personnel across the Middle East, in response to joint US and Israeli airstrikes inside Iran. The targeting pattern of Iranian strikes has evolved to increasingly include civilian-profile targets such as hotels, international airports, and critical national infrastructure. Iranian strikes have continued into 18 March.

On 18 March, Iranian state media reported the issuance of an evacuation warning for oil facilities across Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar, threatening that they would be targeted “in the coming hours”. The warning follows gas facilities at Iran’s South Pars field being reportedly struck by Israel a few hours earlier on 18 March, with the threatened attacks almost certainly intended to be retaliation. Specifically, the warning was directed towards: Saudi ​Arabia’s Samref Refinery and Jubail Petrochemical Complex, ​the UAE’s Al Hosn Gas Field, and Qatar’s Mesaieed Petrochemical Complex, Mesaieed Holding Company ​and Ras Laffan Refinery.

As of 18 March, there is a total closure of airspace in Kuwait. Bahrain is enabling a highly limited number of departures from Bahrain International Airport (BAH / OBBI) following a specific route, with prior permission. The UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones. In Qatar, the airspace remains restricted, although arrivals and departures via defined waypoints are now allowed after permission has been given. The airspace remains closed to overflights. Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf. Oman’s airspace remains open, with Muscat becoming the preferred airport among airlines in the region wishing to perform relief flights. Jordan’s airspace remains open, but aircraft are advised to carry extra fuel in case of delays.

Between 17 and 18 March, Saudi authorities reported the interception of around 12 attack drones in unspecified parts of Eastern Province during three waves of attacks, the interception of a ballistic missile near Al Kharj, and the falling of debris near Prince Sultan Air Base (next to Al Kharj) following another missile interception, with no damage reported. Saudi authorities furthermore stated that two attack drones were intercepted on approach to the Diplomatic Quarter in Riyadh on 18 March, with a third attack drone also announced as intercepted over Riyadh.

On 18 March, Iranian state media reported the issuance of an evacuation warning for Saudi Arabia’s Samref Refinery and Jubail Petrochemical Complex, threatening that they would be targeted “in the coming hours”.

At least two people have been killed and 12 injured in Saudi Arabia as of 16:00 UTC on 17 March.

As of 18 March, Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf; however, this does not affect commercial flights departing major Saudi airports.

Early 18 March, Kuwaiti authorities stated that air defences intercepted seven attack drones in unspecified areas. On 17 March, Kuwaiti authorities reported two people injured by debris over the previous 24 hours, following attacks involving two ballistic missiles and 13 attack drones. Air defences were subsequently activated against a new attack in an unspecified part of northern Kuwait. Interceptions continued overnight 17-18 March, with Kuwait’s Defence Ministry announcing that air defences were intercepting ballistic missiles and attack drones.

At least six people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Kuwait, as of 16:00 UTC on 17 March.

As of 18 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait.

Overnight 17-18 March, air raid sirens sounded multiple times across Bahrain, with the public asked to take shelter. On 18 March, the Supreme Council for Environment (SCE) affirmed that no abnormal radiation levels had been recorded in Bahrain’s airspace or territorial waters.

At least two people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Bahrain, as of 16:00 UTC on 17 March.

As of 18 March, the Bahraini airspace is heavily restricted. On 13 March, Bahrain amended its airspace closure, enabling a highly limited number of departures from Bahrain International Airport (BAH / OBBI) following a specific route, with prior permission.

Overnight 17-18 March, there were reports of interceptions over Doha. The Qatari Defence Ministry stated that its armed forces intercepted a ballistic missile attack targeting the country. On 17 March, military officials stated that air defence systems intercepted nine missiles and several attack drones.

On 18 March, Iranian state media reported the issuance of an evacuation warning for Qatar’s Mesaieed Petrochemical Complex, Mesaieed Holding Company, and Ras Laffan Refinery, threatening that they would be targeted “in the coming hours”.

At least 16 people have been injured in Qatar, as of 16:00 UTC on 17 March.

As of 18 March, the airspace remains heavily restricted in Qatar. Arrivals and departures via defined waypoints are allowed after permission has been given.

Emirati authorities stated that air defences responded to missile and attack drone threats overnight 17-18 March, with attacks continuing into the morning of 18 March. The UAE’s Ministry of Defence claimed that explosions heard in the UAE, including in Dubai, were the result of air defence activity. Australia’s Prime Minister, Anthony Albanese, stated that deployed Australian troops were safe after an Iranian projectile hit an area near Al Minhad Air Base on 18 March, which is around 24km south of Dubai.

On 18 March, Iranian state media reported the issuance of an evacuation warning for the UAE’s Al Hosn Gas Field, threatening that it would be targeted “in the coming hours”.

At least eight people have been killed and 157 injured in the UAE, as of 16:00 UTC on 17 March.

As of 18 March, the UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones.

Travel agents in Oman are reportedly recording a significant surge in interest for getaways for UAE residents during the upcoming Eid Al Fitr holidays, which will occur on either 19 or 20 March, depending on moon sightings. This has almost certainly been in part conditioned by the ongoing elevated security concerns in the UAE in comparison to Oman. Heavy traffic is expected at key crossings such as the Hatta border crossing.

Oman is currently assessed to have a lower conflict-related risk profile compared to the neighbouring UAE and the Omani airspace remains open. As a result, Oman is being used by airlines and international governments as a base for repatriation flights. There is considerably elevated demand for flights running from Oman.

At least three people have been killed and 15 injured in Oman, as of 16:00 UTC on 17 March.

As of 18 March, the airspace remains open in Oman.

On 28 February, Iran initiated ballistic missile and attack drone strikes targeting Israel and US military facilities and sites known to host US military personnel across the Middle East, in response to joint US and Israeli airstrikes inside Iran. The targeting pattern of Iranian strikes has evolved to increasingly include civilian-profile targets such as hotels, international airports, and critical national infrastructure. Iranian strikes have continued into 17 March.

On 17 March, Israel’s defence minister, Israel Katz, stated that Iran’s Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, Ali Larijani, had been killed in overnight strikes. Israel also claimed to have killed Gholamreza Soleimani,  the commander of the Basij, the internal security paramilitary militia of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). If confirmed, the killing of two senior leadership figures in Iran is likely to trigger an increased rate of Iranian strikes across the region in retaliation.

As of 17 March, there is a total closure of airspace in Kuwait. Bahrain is enabling some departures from Bahrain International Airport (BAH / OBBI) following a specific route, with prior permission. The UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones. In Qatar, the airspace remains restricted, although arrivals and departures via defined waypoints are now allowed after permission has been given. The airspace remains closed to overflights. Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf. Oman’s airspace remains open, with Muscat becoming the preferred airport among airlines in the region wishing to perform relief flights. Jordan’s airspace remains open, but aircraft are advised to carry extra fuel in case of delays.

On 17 March, Saudi Arabian defence officials stated that air defences had intercepted at least 15 drones in the country’s Eastern Province. The volume of Iranian attacks targeting Saudi Arabia has markedly increased since 12 March, with 16 March recording the highest daily number of combined missiles and drones, 72, fired at Saudi Arabia. The areas most targeted are Riyadh, Al-Kharj (where the Prince Sultan Air Base is located), and the Eastern Province (where key Saudi oil refineries are located).

At least two people have been killed and 12 injured in Saudi Arabia as of 01:30 UTC on 16 March.

As of 17 March, Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf; however, this does not affect commercial flights departing major Saudi airports.

Overnight 16-17 March, explosions were heard over Kuwait as air defences intercepted ballistic missiles and attack drones. Two medical personnel were reportedly injured after shrapnel from a ballistic missile fell on an ambulance centre. Late 16 March, Kuwaiti authorities claimed to have intercepted seven attack drones over the previous 24 hours.

On 17 March, the Kuwaiti Interior Ministry stated that a cell of alleged Hezbollah fighters involving 14 Kuwaiti nationals and two Lebanese nationals had been arrested in the country. The counterterrorism operation resulted in the seizure of weapons, communication devices, drones, maps, narcotics, cash and Hezbollah paraphernalia.

At least six people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Kuwait, as of 01:30 UTC on 16 March.

As of 17 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait.

On 17 March, the Chief of the Terrorism Crimes Prosecution announced that several suspects had been detained following the publishing on social media videos that “glorify, promote, and encourage terrorist acts carried out against Bahrain”.

At least two people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Bahrain, as of 01:30 UTC on 16 March.

As of 17 March, the Bahraini airspace is heavily restricted. On 13 March, Bahrain amended its airspace closure, enabling some departures from Bahrain International Airport (BAH / OBBI) following a specific route, with prior permission.

Early 17 March, Qatar’s Interior Ministry urged residents to remain indoors shortly before explosions were heard over Doha. The Defence Ministry subsequently announced that air defences had intercepted several ballistic missiles over the country’s airspace. A fire burned in Qatar’s industrial district from debris from an intercepted ballistic missile.

At least 16 people have been injured in Qatar, as of 01:30 UTC on 16 March.

As of 17 March, the airspace remains heavily restricted in Qatar. Arrivals and departures via defined waypoints are allowed after permission has been given. The airspace is still closed for overflights.

The UAE’s Ministry of Defence claimed that ten ballistic missiles and 45 attack drones had been intercepted so far on 17 March at 11:35 UTC. Authorities earlier issued multiple incoming threat alerts, urged residents to stay in safe locations, before later stating the situation was safe. At least three explosions were reportedly heard in Dubai; and authorities stated that a Pakistani national was killed by debris in the Bani Yas area of Abu Dhabi.

At least seven people have been killed and 145 injured in the UAE, as of 01:30 UTC on 16 March.

As of 17 March, the UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones.

Oman is currently assessed to have a lower conflict-related risk profile compared to the neighbouring United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the Omani airspace remains open. As a result, Oman is being used by airlines and international governments as a base for repatriation flights. There is considerably elevated demand for flights running from Oman.

At least three people have been killed and 15 injured in Oman, as of 01:30 UTC on 16 March.

As of 17 March, the airspace remains open in Oman.

On 28 February, Iran initiated ballistic missile and attack drone strikes targeting Israel and US military facilities and sites known to host US military personnel across the Middle East, in response to joint US and Israeli airstrikes inside Iran. The targeting pattern of Iranian strikes has evolved to increasingly include civilian-profile targets such as hotels, international airports, and critical national infrastructure. Iranian strikes have continued into 16 March.

As of 16 March, there is a total closure of airspace in Kuwait. Bahrain is enabling some departures from Bahrain International Airport (BAH / OBBI) following a specific route, with prior permission. The UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones. In Qatar, the airspace remains restricted, although arrivals and departures via defined waypoints are now allowed after permission has been given. The airspace remains closed to overflights. Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf. Oman’s airspace remains open, with Muscat becoming the preferred airport among airlines in the region wishing to perform relief flights. Jordan’s airspace remains open, but aircraft are advised to carry extra fuel in case of delays.

On 16 March, Saudi Arabian defence officials stated that air defences had intercepted at least 64 attack drones in Riyadh and Eastern Province. These reportedly include a wave of at least 34 drones fired within one hour. The volume of Iranian attacks targeting Saudi Arabia has markedly increased since 12 March. The areas most targeted are Riyadh, Al-Kharj (where the Prince Sultan Air Base is located), and the Eastern Province (where key Saudi oil refineries are located).

On 15 March, US media reported allegations that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has privately encouraged the US administration to continue and intensify the attacks on Iran. Some Saudi officials have denied these claims on 16 March, speaking to regional media. There is a realistic possibility that the intensification of Iranian attacks targeting Saudi Arabia reflects Tehran’s view of Riyadh’s support for the US/Israeli attacks.

At least two people have been killed and 12 injured in Saudi Arabia as of 01:30 UTC on 16 March.

As of 16 March, Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf; however, this does not affect commercial flights departing major Saudi airports.

On 16 March, the Kuwait National Guard announced that its task force shot down two attack drones in the past 24 hours. On 15 March, Kuwait’s Ministry of Defence stated that three soldiers sustained light injuries caused by shrapnel from intercepted attack drones. According to the ministry, 14 attack drones were detected over the previous 24 hours; eight of them were destroyed.

At least six people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Kuwait, as of 01:30 UTC on 16 March.

As of 16 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait.

Overnight 15-16 March, Bahrain’s media reported interceptions over the country’s airspace, following the activation of air raid sirens.

At least two people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Bahrain, as of 01:30 UTC on 16 March.

As of 16 March, the Bahraini airspace is heavily restricted. On 13 March, Bahrain amended its airspace closure, enabling some departures from Bahrain International Airport (BAH / OBBI) following a specific route, with prior permission.

On 16 March, Qatar’s Defence Ministry stated that its armed forces intercepted a second wave of missiles, following an earlier wave intercepted over Doha. Before the attack, Iran warned residents to evacuate Lusail, Al Waab, and Ain Khaled. On 15 March, Qatar’s Defence Ministry stated that it intercepted several attack drones over the country’s airspace.

At least 16 people have been injured in Qatar, as of 01:30 UTC on 16 March.

As of 16 March, the airspace remains heavily restricted in Qatar. Arrivals and departures via defined waypoints are allowed after permission has been given. The airspace is still closed for overflights.

On 16 March, the UAE’s Ministry of Defence claimed that six ballistic missiles and 21 attack drones were intercepted. Early 16 March, an attack drone struck fuel tanks in the vicinity of Dubai International Airport (DXB), prompting a temporary suspension of operations at the airport. DXB resumed operations later on 16 March. Authorities in Abu Dhabi announced that a Palestinian national was killed after “a rocket” fell on a civilian vehicle in the Al Bahya area. Authorities in Fujairah stated that civil defence was responding to a fire in a petrochemical industrial area following a drone attack, with no injuries reported.

At least seven people have been killed and 145 injured in the UAE, as of 01:30 UTC on 16 March.

As of 16 March, the UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones. Following a drone attack against Dubai International Airport (DXB) early 16 March, flights running from DXB were temporarily suspended. DXB resumed operations later on 16 March.

Reflective of the lower number of attacks conducted against Oman in comparison to other Gulf States, Oman’s ministry of transport, communication and information technology (MTCIT) is building “regional food depots to establish a secure supply chain to its Gulf neighbours via land borders”. This is to bypass maritime transit through the Strait of Hormuz, which has become high risk to transit due to Iranian attacks.

Oman is currently assessed to have a lower conflict-related risk profile compared to the neighbouring United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the Omani airspace remains open. As a result, Oman is being used by airlines and international governments as a base for repatriation flights. There is considerably elevated demand for flights running from Oman.

At least three people have been killed and 15 injured in Oman, as of 01:30 UTC on 16 March.

As of 16 March, the airspace remains open in Oman.

On 28 February, Iran initiated ballistic missile and attack drone strikes targeting Israel and US military facilities and sites known to host US military personnel across the Middle East, in response to joint US and Israeli airstrikes inside Iran. The targeting pattern of Iranian strikes has evolved to increasingly include civilian-profile targets such as hotels, international airports, and critical national infrastructure. Iranian strikes have continued into 15 March.

Iranian officials have reiterated threats to target US and Israeli private companies across the region, characterising these attacks as “retaliatory” for potential future US-Israeli strikes on Iran’s oil infrastructure.

As of 15 March, there is a total closure of airspace in Kuwait. Bahrain is enabling some departures from Bahrain International Airport (BAH / OBBI) following a specific route, with prior permission. The UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones. In Qatar, the airspace remains restricted, although arrivals and departures via defined waypoints are now allowed after permission has been given. The airspace remains closed to overflights. Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf. Oman’s airspace remains open, with Muscat becoming the preferred airport among airlines in the region wishing to perform relief flights. Jordan’s airspace remains open, but aircraft are advised to carry extra fuel in case of delays.

On 15 March, Saudi Arabian defence officials stated that air defences had intercepted at least 34 attack drones and six missiles over Al-Kharj, Riyadh, and the Eastern Province. Following the Saudi announcement of the interception of a wave of ten drones, channels associated with the IRGC claimed that “this attack [had] no connection to the Islamic Republic of Iran.” However, these claims were not substantiated by any evidence.

Iranian attacks targeting Saudi Arabia have increased in intensity since 12 March, with the areas most targeted being Riyadh, Al-Kharj, where the Prince Sultan Air Base is located, and the Eastern Province, where key Saudi oil refineries are located.

At least two people have been killed and 12 injured in Saudi Arabia as of 06:00 UTC on 15 March.

As of 15 March, Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf; however, this does not affect commercial flights departing major Saudi airports.

Early 15 March, Kuwaiti state media stated that air defences intercepted five attack drones over the previous 24 hours. Overnight 14-15 March, Kuwait International Airport’s (KWI / OKKK) radar system was reportedly impacted by multiple attack drones. Earlier attack drone strikes injured three soldiers and caused structural damage near Ahmad al-Jaber Air Base. On 14 March, Kuwait’s cybersecurity agency stated that it is monitoring for possible attacks and will announce “transparently” if vulnerabilities or attacks are detected.

At least six people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Kuwait, as of 06:00 UTC on 15 March.

As of 15 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait.

Overnight 14-15 March, air raid sirens were activated, and air defences reportedly intercepted Iranian “projectiles” targeting a “facility” in southern Bahrain. Unverified videos show a large fire burning at the Isa Air Base used by US troops in southern Bahrain following an alleged Iranian strike.

Late 14 March, Bahrain reported six new arrests of people for sharing videos of Iranian attacks. Five people were also reportedly arrested on suspicion of passing sensitive information to the Iranian military.

At least two people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Bahrain, as of 06:00 UTC on 15 March.

As of 15 March, the Bahraini airspace is heavily restricted. On 13 March, Bahrain amended its airspace closure, enabling some departures from Bahrain International Airport (BAH / OBBI) following a specific route, with prior permission.

On 14 March, the Ministry of Defence stated that Qatar was targeted with four ballistic missiles and several drones, all of which were successfully intercepted.

At least 16 people have been injured in Qatar, as of 06:00 UTC on 15 March.

As of 15 March, the airspace remains heavily restricted in Qatar. Arrivals and departures via defined waypoints are now allowed after permission has been given. The airspace is still closed for overflights.

On 15 March, UAE officials stated that they had intercepted six missiles and four drones launched by Iranian forces towards the UAE. The UAE also assesses that, since the start of the conflict, Iran fired at least 298 ballistic missiles, 15 cruise missiles, and 1606 attack drones towards UAE territory, resulting in six deaths.

On 15 March, international media reported that oil loading operations had resumed at Fujairah port, following a fire caused by an attack drone impact on 14 March.

Iranian media linked to the IRGC has advised residents of the UAE to evacuate ports, labelling them “legitimate targets”, following US strikes in Kharg Island. In a follow-up statement, the same media outlet warned residents to “immediately move away” from Jebel Ali, Khalifa, and Fujairah port areas due to likely impending attacks.

At least 20 people, including a British tourist, have been charged under cybercrime laws for allegedly filming Iranian strikes over Dubai, according to the UK Foreign Office. On 14 March, Abu Dhabi police stated that they had arrested 45 people of various nationalities for filming and posting on social media.

At least six people have been killed and 141 injured in the UAE, as of 06:00 UTC on 15 March.

As of 15 March, the UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones.

At least three people have been killed and 15 injured in Oman, as of 06:00 UTC on 15 March.

Oman is currently assessed to have a lower conflict-related risk profile compared to the neighbouring United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the Omani airspace remains open. As a result, Oman is being used by airlines and international governments as a base for repatriation flights. There is considerably elevated demand for flights running from Oman.

As of 15 March, the airspace remains open in Oman.

On 28 February, Iran initiated ballistic missile and attack drone strikes targeting Israel and US military facilities and sites known to host US military personnel across the Middle East, in response to joint US and Israeli airstrikes inside Iran. The targeting pattern of Iranian strikes has evolved to increasingly include civilian-profile targets such as hotels, international airports, and critical national infrastructure. Iranian strikes have continued into 14 March.

On 11 March, a spokesman for the Khatam al-Anbiya Headquarters (KACHQ, the unified command HQ of the Iranian Armed Forces) declared that US and/or Israel-linked “economic centres and banks” will now be targeted, warning that “people of the region should not be within a one-kilometre radius of banks”. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media released a list of offices and infrastructure linked to the US and Israel, which included companies such as Google, Microsoft, Palantir, IBM, Nvidia, and Oracle.

On 12 March, Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-linked media stated that potential targets in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar include assets jointly owned by host governments and US companies, including Chevron, ExxonMobil, and Occidental Petroleum.

On the night of 13-14 March, US forces carried out large-scale airstrikes on military targets on Iran’s Kharg Island. On 14 March, IRGC-affiliated channels issued a threat to the UAE stating that it would target US “hideouts” in its territory, and warned UAE residents to stay away from ports, docks and US military installations. Moreover, IRGC-affiliated channels reiterated previous threats to strike private companies and civilian assets associated with the US.

As of 14 March, there is a total closure of airspace in Kuwait. Bahrain is enabling some departures from Bahrain International Airport (BAH / OBBI) following a specific route, with prior permission. The UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones. Qatar has suspended flights and closed its airspace to most commercial traffic, with only heavily limited repatriation flights permitted. Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf. Oman’s airspace remains open, with Muscat becoming the preferred airport among airlines in the region wishing to perform relief flights. Jordan’s airspace remains open, but aircraft are advised to carry extra fuel in case of delays.

On 14 March, Saudi Arabian defence officials stated that air defences had intercepted at least 15 drones and one ballistic missile overnight 13-14 March. Officials specified that some interceptions occurred near Al-Jowf and the Empty Quarter. The volume of Iranian strikes targeting Saudi Arabia has almost certainly increased since 12 March. On 13 March, international media reported that five US planes were damaged by Iranian strikes at Prince Sultan Airbase in Al-Kharj. The reports did not specify the day when the incident occurred and added that the attack caused no casualties.

On 12 March, IRGC-linked media asserted that potential targets in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar include assets jointly owned by host governments and US companies, including Chevron, ExxonMobil, and Occidental Petroleum.

At least two people have been killed and 12 injured in Saudi Arabia as of 11:45 UTC on 13 March.

As of 14 March, Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf; however, this does not affect commercial flights departing major Saudi airports.

Overnight 13-14 March, Kuwait’s military stated that they intercepted and destroyed an attack drone in an unspecified location. On 13 March, the Ministry of Defence stated that only one ballistic missile was detected over the previous 24 hours outside of the threat area, causing no damage. The Kuwait Ministry of Interior stated it had detected several individuals using drones for aerial photography in violation of previously announced regulations and that legal measures would be taken against them.

At least six people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Kuwait, as of 11:45 UTC on 13 March.

As of 14 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait.

On 14 March, the General Command of the Bahrain Defence Force stated that air defences had intercepted and destroyed 124 ballistic missiles and 203 drones targeting the Kingdom of Bahrain since the onset of the hostilities. The General Command also stated that the use of ballistic missiles and drones to target civilian areas and private property constitutes a flagrant violation of international humanitarian law and the United Nations Charter. The same day, Iranian media reported having damaged US “targets” in Bahrain in overnight strikes, including Isa Air Base. Iranian officials claimed to have struck a Citibank location in Manama with attack drones overnight, 13-14 March.

Overnight 13-14 March, anti-government groups staged a demonstration in Manama, Sitra, Abu Saiba, Musalla, Samahij, and other locations for “al Quds day”. No notable disruptions or damage to US assets have been reported in connection with the protests.

At least two people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Bahrain, as of 11:45 UTC on 13 March.

As of 14 March, the Bahraini airspace is heavily restricted, having previously been closed. On 13 March, Bahrain amended its airspace closure, enabling some departures from Bahrain International Airport (BAH / OBBI) following a specific route, with prior permission.

Overnight 13-14 March, the Qatari military twice intercepted ballistic missile attacks, shortly after public safety alerts were issued. Some of the interceptions were reported over Doha. Qatari authorities reportedly evacuated the Msheireb and Education City area of Doha late 13 March, shortly before the missile interceptions.

On 13 March, the Ministry of Interior released a statement maintaining the nationwide remote-work directive until further notice. The statement also declared that Qatar has food and water reserves to cover its needs for 18 months and four months, respectively, in addition to medicine stockpiles to last nine months, and medical supplies sufficient for 12 months. The statement added that Qatari authorities continued to monitor air and water pollution levels following a strike on a fuel depot in its industrial zone.

At least 16 people have been injured in Qatar, as of 11:45 UTC on 13 March.

As of 14 March, the airspace remains heavily restricted in Qatar. On 6 March, the Qatar Civil Aviation Authority announced flights would operate through “designated navigational contingency routes with limited operational capacity” in coordination with the Qatari armed forces. Qatar Airways stated that it will operate heavily limited repatriation flights from Doha Airport (DOH).

On 14 March, the Defence Ministry stated that, so far, nine missiles and 33 attack drones had targeted the UAE on 14 March. Overnight 13-14 March, debris from an intercepted attack drone struck a building in downtown Dubai, but caused no injuries or fire. Iranian officials also claimed to have struck a Citibank location in Dubai. On 14 March, it was reported that some oil loading operations at the Port of Fujairah have been suspended following an attack drone strike. A fire was also reported in Fujairah after intercepted attack drone fragments fell at an unspecified location; no injuries were reported.

Iranian media linked to the IRGC has advised residents of the UAE to evacuate ports, labelling them “legitimate targets”, following US strikes in Kharg Island. In a follow-up statement, the same media outlet warned residents to “immediately move away” from Jebel Ali, Khalifa, and Fujairah port areas due to likely impending attacks.

At least 20 people, including a British tourist, have been charged under cybercrime laws for allegedly filming Iranian strikes over Dubai, according to the UK Foreign Office. On 14 March, Abu Dhabi police stated that they had arrested 45 people of various nationalities for filming and posting on social media.

At least six people have been killed and 131 injured in the UAE, as of 11:45 UTC on 13 March.

As of 13 March, the UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones.

At least three people have been killed and five injured in Oman, as of 11:45 UTC on 13 March.

Oman is currently assessed to have a lower conflict-related risk profile compared to the neighbouring United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the Omani airspace remains open. As a result, Oman is being used by airlines and international governments as a base for repatriation flights. There is considerably elevated demand for flights running from Oman.

As of 14 March, the airspace remains open in Oman.

On 28 February, Iran initiated ballistic missile and attack drone strikes targeting Israel and US military facilities and sites known to host US military personnel across the Middle East, in response to joint US and Israeli airstrikes inside Iran. The targeting pattern of Iranian strikes has evolved to increasingly include civilian-profile targets such as hotels, international airports, and critical national infrastructure. Iranian strikes have continued into 13 March.

On 11 March, a spokesman for the Khatam al-Anbiya Headquarters (KACHQ, the unified command HQ of the Iranian Armed Forces) declared that US and/or Israel-linked “economic centres and banks” will now be targeted, warning that “people of the region should not be within a one-kilometre radius of banks”. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media released a list of offices and infrastructure linked to the US and Israel, which included companies such as Google, Microsoft, Palantir, IBM, Nvidia, and Oracle.

On 12 March, Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-linked media stated that potential targets in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar include assets jointly owned by host governments and US companies, including Chevron, ExxonMobil, and Occidental Petroleum.

As of 13 March, there is a total closure of airspace in Kuwait and Bahrain. The UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones. Qatar has suspended flights and closed its airspace to most commercial traffic, with only heavily limited repatriation flights permitted. Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf. Oman’s airspace remains open, with Muscat becoming the preferred airport among airlines in the region wishing to perform relief flights. Jordan’s airspace remains open, but aircraft are advised to carry extra fuel in case of delays.

On 13 March, Saudi Arabian defence officials stated that a drone approaching the international diplomatic area in the west of Riyadh was shot down by air defences. Additional drones were intercepted in Al-Kharj and the Eastern Provinces. Saudi Arabian defence officials reported that at least 50 Iranian drones were shot down over the country overnight on 12-13 March during multiple waves of attacks.

On 12 March, IRGC-linked media asserted that potential targets in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar include assets jointly owned by host governments and US companies, including Chevron, ExxonMobil, and Occidental Petroleum.

At least two people have been killed and 12 injured in Saudi Arabia as of 11:45 UTC on 13 March.

As of 13 March, Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf; however, this does not affect commercial flights departing major Saudi airports.

Reporting from 12 March indicates that foreign nationals have found it difficult to leave the country due to a Kuwaiti law requiring foreign nationals to obtain exit permits from their employers. Many teachers have reportedly been denied permission to leave. The Kuwaiti immigration authority is reportedly urging employers to supply exit permits. Reports also emerged on 12 March that the Canadian section at Ali Al-Salem Air Base, which has repeatedly been targeted by Iranian strikes, was damaged by a ballistic missile strike on 1 March.

At least six people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Kuwait, as of 11:45 UTC on 13 March.

As of 13 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait.

On 12-13 March, air raid sirens were activated multiple times in Bahrain. On 13 March, IRGC-channels stated that they had targeted US bases in Manama. On 12 March, the General Command of the Bahrain Defence Force stated that air defences had intercepted and destroyed 114 ballistic missiles and 190 drones targeting the Kingdom of Bahrain since the onset of the hostilities. The General Command also stated that the use of ballistic missiles and drones to target civilian areas and private property constitutes a flagrant violation of international humanitarian law and the United Nations Charter.

At least two people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Bahrain, as of 11:45 UTC on 13 March.

As of 13 March, the airspace remains closed in Bahrain.

The Defence Ministry announced that Qatar was targeted by two ballistic missiles, one cruise missile, and several attack drones by Iran on 12 March. All were successfully intercepted.

On 12 March, IRGC-linked media asserted that potential targets in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar include assets jointly owned by host governments and US companies, including Chevron, ExxonMobil, and Occidental Petroleum.  Also on 12 March, French oil company TotalEnergies stated that it would suspend oil production in Qatar in response to the heightened threat environment.

At least 16 people have been injured in Qatar, as of 11:45 UTC on 13 March.

As of 13 March, the airspace remains heavily restricted in Qatar. On 6 March, the Qatar Civil Aviation Authority announced flights would operate through “designated navigational contingency routes with limited operational capacity” in coordination with the Qatari armed forces. Qatar Airways stated that it will operate heavily limited repatriation flights from Doha Airport (DOH).

On 13 March, Hamad International Airport (HIA) warned passengers about fraudulent accounts impersonating the airport and stressed that it will never request passport details via phone, email, SMS, or social media, urging travellers to rely only on official communication channels.

On 13 March, Dubai officials reported minor damage to a building in the Dubai International Financial Centre caused by debris from a successful interception. The incident follows a warning issued on 11 March from IRGC media channels that it will deliberately target financial institutions in the Middle East. According to the UAE’s Defence Ministry, its air defence intercepted seven ballistic missiles and 27 drones since early 13 January.

On 12 March, IRGC-linked media asserted that potential targets in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar include assets jointly owned by host governments and US companies, including Chevron, ExxonMobil, and Occidental Petroleum. On 12 March, French oil company TotalEnergies stated that it would suspend oil production in the UAE in response to the heightened threat environment.

At least six people have been killed and 131 injured in the UAE, as of 11:45 UTC on 13 March.

As of 13 March, the UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones.

On 13 March, the Omani authorities reported the downing of two drones in the Suhar Governorate. One of the drones fell in the Al-Awahi Industrial Area, resulting in the death of two expatriates and several injuries. The second drone fell in an open area and did not result in any casualties.

At least three people have been killed and five injured in Oman, as of 11:45 UTC on 13 March.

Oman is currently assessed to have a lower conflict-related risk profile compared to the neighbouring United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the Omani airspace remains open. As a result, Oman is being used by airlines and international governments as a base for repatriation flights. There is considerably elevated demand for flights running from Oman.

As of 13 March, the airspace remains open in Oman.

On 28 February, Iran initiated ballistic missile and attack drone strikes targeting Israel and US military facilities and sites known to host US military personnel across the Middle East, in response to joint US and Israeli airstrikes inside Iran. The targeting pattern of Iranian strikes has evolved to increasingly include civilian-profile targets such as hotels, international airports, and critical national infrastructure. Iranian strikes have continued into 12 March.

On 11 March, a spokesman for the Khatam al-Anbiya Headquarters (KACHQ, the unified command HQ of the Iranian Armed Forces) declared that US and/or Israel-linked “economic centres and banks” will now be targeted, warning that “people of the region should not be within a one-kilometre radius of banks”. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media released a list of offices and infrastructure linked to the US and Israel, which included companies such as Google, Microsoft, Palantir, IBM, Nvidia, and Oracle.

As of 12 March, there is a total closure of airspace in Kuwait and Bahrain. The UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones. Qatar has suspended flights and closed its airspace to most commercial traffic, with only heavily limited repatriation flights permitted. Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf. Oman’s airspace remains open, with Muscat becoming the preferred airport among airlines in the region wishing to perform relief flights. Jordan’s airspace remains open, but aircraft are advised to carry extra fuel in case of delays.

Overnight 11-12 March, Saudi Arabia reported interceptions of three ballistic missiles targeting Prince Sultan Air Base near Al-Kharj. Saudi air defences subsequently intercepted 18 attack drones over the country’s eastern region. Another drone was subsequently intercepted as it headed for the Shaybah oil field in the Empty Quarter; three more were intercepted in the eastern region; another was intercepted heading towards the Diplomatic Quarter in Riyadh; and two more were intercepted heading towards the Shaybah oil field. Iranian media have reported that the country targeted the US embassy in Riyadh.

There have been at least two deaths and 12 injuries in Saudi Arabia as of 12:30 UTC on 12 March.

As of 12 March, Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf; however, this does not affect commercial flights departing major Saudi airports.

Overnight 11-12 March, Kuwait activated air defences against another wave of Iranian attacks, later stating air defences intercepted an unspecified number of ballistic missiles and attack drones. According to Iranian state media, IRGC strikes targeted Ali al-Salem Air Base. Interceptions continued on the morning of 12 March, with one attack drone strike injuring at least two people after impacting a residential building in Mangaf, southern Kuwait. The building was subsequently evacuated, and the fire was extinguished. Drone debris damaged six overhead power transmission lines, causing a temporary power outage in parts of the country. Kuwait’s civil defence agency says it has prepared public shelters with essential supplies and services for long-term use if necessary.

At least six people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Kuwait, as of 12:30 UTC on 12 March.

As of 12 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait.

Air raid alerts were activated overnight 11-12 March, with explosions subsequently heard. Several Iranian attack drones were reportedly intercepted over the country’s airspace. Iranian strikes reportedly targeted fuel tanks in Muharraq Governorate, starting a large fire. According to Bahrain’s Interior Ministry, the strikes led to the closure of Rayya Road next to Bahrain International Airport (BAH / OBBI), with authorities urging residents in Al Hidd, Arad, Galali and Samaheej in the Muharraq region to remain in their homes and to close windows and ventilation openings. The fire has subsequently been brought under control. Bahraini authorities have reportedly brought in security forces from Jordan to quell pro-Iranian protests; the first time since the Arab Spring that Bahrain has called in foreign forces to deal with unrest.

Bahrain reports arrests of six more people for allegedly posting videos showing the aftermath of Iranian strikes. Another four nationals were arrested after they allegedly sent information to Iran.

At least two people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Bahrain, as of 12:30 UTC on 12 March.

As of 12 March, the airspace remains closed in Bahrain.

On 12 March, Qatar’s government issued a shelter-in-place order, before its armed forces intercepted a ballistic missile attack. On 11 March, following the threats issued by Iran against US and Israeli-linked banks and other economic centres, HSBC stated that it would close its Qatar branches until further notice.

At least 16 people have been injured in Qatar, as of 12:30 UTC on 12 March.

As of 12 March, the airspace remains heavily restricted in Qatar. On 6 March, the Qatar Civil Aviation Authority announced flights would operate through “designated navigational contingency routes with limited operational capacity” in coordination with the Qatari armed forces. Qatar Airways stated that it will operate heavily limited repatriation flights from Doha Airport (DOH).

The UAE came under particularly heavy attack overnight 11-12 March, with authorities stating that explosions heard were caused by interceptions. In Dubai, attack drone impacts were recorded in the Al Bada’a area and onto the façade of a building on Sheikh Zayed Road, causing no injuries. An attack drone also hit the Address Creek Harbour hotel, sparking a fire that was brought under control and causing no injuries.

Following the threats issued by Iran against US and Israeli-linked banks and other economic centres, Citibank has said it would close its UAE branches and financial centres through 14 March as a precaution. Moreover, major firms including Citi, Deloitte, PwC and Standard Chartered have reportedly evacuated or shut their Dubai offices.

At least six people have been killed and 131 injured in the UAE, as of 12:30 UTC on 12 March.

On 12 March, the Australian government announced an order for the departure of non-essential Australian officials posted to the UAE due to the deteriorating security situation.   

As of 12 March, the UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones.

On 11 March, Iranian drone strikes hit fuel tanks in Salalah, setting off a large blaze. Omani authorities said there were no injuries, but firefighting teams, the military and private companies were still working to contain the fire hours later. Authorities have advised people near the site to wear masks and close windows, but have said that the air quality across the rest of Salalah remains within safe limits. The transportation minister said operations at Salalah seaport were expected to return to normal within two or three days. Oman has reportedly evacuated all vessels from the Mina Al Fahal oil export terminal in Muscat as a precaution.

At least one person has been killed and five injured in Oman, as of 12:30 UTC on 12 March.

Oman is currently assessed to have a lower conflict-related risk profile compared to the neighbouring United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the Omani airspace remains open. As a result, Oman is being used by airlines and international governments as a base for repatriation flights. There is considerably elevated demand for flights running from Oman.

As of 12 March, the airspace remains open in Oman.

On 28 February, Iran initiated ballistic missile and attack drone strikes targeting Israel and US military facilities and sites known to host US military personnel across the Middle East, in response to joint US and Israeli airstrikes inside Iran. The targeting pattern of Iranian strikes has evolved to increasingly include civilian-profile targets such as hotels, international airports, and critical national infrastructure. Iranian strikes have continued into 11 March.

On 11 March, a spokesman for the Khatam al-Anbiya Headquarters (KACHQ, the unified command HQ of the Iranian Armed Forces) declared that US and/or Israel-linked “economic centres and banks” will now be targeted, warning that “people of the region should not be within a one-kilometre radius of banks”. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media released a list of offices and infrastructure linked to the US and Israel, which included companies such as Google, Microsoft, Palantir, IBM, Nvidia and Oracle. Moreover, the KACHQ stated that Iran will now move from a claimed policy of “reciprocal hits” after attacks to continuous strikes on its adversaries.

As of 11 March, there is a total closure of airspace in Kuwait and Bahrain. The UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones. Qatar has suspended flights and closed its airspace to most commercial traffic, with only heavily limited repatriation flights permitted. Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf. Oman’s airspace remains open, with Muscat becoming the preferred airport among airlines in the region wishing to perform relief flights. Jordan’s airspace remains open, but aircraft are advised to carry extra fuel in case of delays.

Overnight 10-11 March, Saudi Arabia’s military stated that it shot down two Iranian attack drones targeting an oil field near Shaybah in the country’s Eastern Province, and a further five east of Al Kharj. Six ballistic missiles targeting Prince Sultan Air Base in Al Kharj were also reportedly shot down. According to Iranian state media, the overnight attack drone and ballistic missile barrage targeted US bases in multiple countries, including Saudi Arabia.

There have been at least two deaths and 12 injuries from Iranian strikes in Saudi Arabia as of 05:30 UTC on 11 March 2026.

As of 11 March, Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf; however, this does not affect commercial flights departing major Saudi airports.

Overnight 10-11 March, air defence systems intercepted eight attack drones, according to the Kuwaiti National Guard. According to the Iranian military, the most recent wave of attacks targeted the US base at Camp Arfijan with two ballistic missiles. Kuwait stated that it shot down four out of five Iranian attack drones on 10 March, with one striking “outside the threat area”.

At least six people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Kuwait, as of 05:30 UTC on 11 March.

As of 11 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait.

On 11 March, explosions were heard following an air raid warning, with authorities urging citizens to seek shelter. According to Iranian state media, the recent wave of attacks targeted a “secret house affiliated with the U.S. base in the Saar area west of the capital Manama.” Air raid sirens also activated overnight 10-11 March. Bahrain’s Civil Aviation Affairs (CAA) said that several Gulf Air aircraft, operating without passengers, alongside cargo aircraft from a number of operators, have been repositioned away from Bahrain International Airport (BAH / OBBI) to Saudi Arabia to “enhance operational readiness”. This is highly likely to protect the aircraft from strikes targeting the airport.

At least two people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Bahrain, as of 05:30 UTC on 11 March.

As of 11 March, the airspace remains closed in Bahrain.

On 11 March, Qatar issued an emergency alert, with the Defence Ministry stating that it intercepted a missile attack. Another attack was repelled in the morning, with explosions heard over Doha. Overnight on 10-11 March, another ballistic missile attack was intercepted. Qatar Airways announced a limited flight schedule to and from Doha on 13 and 14 March, dependent on the airspace reopening.

At least 16 people have been injured in Qatar, as of 05:30 UTC on 11 March.

As of 11 March, the airspace remains heavily restricted in Qatar. On 6 March, the Qatar Civil Aviation Authority announced flights would operate through “designated navigational contingency routes with limited operational capacity” in coordination with the Qatari armed forces. Qatar Airways stated that it will operate heavily limited repatriation flights from Doha Airport (DOH).

The UAE faced repeated threats from missiles and attack drones between 10 and 11 March, with authorities stating on several occasions that air defences were activated, explosions heard were from interceptions, and urging residents to shelter-in-place. In Dubai, four people were injured on the morning of 11 March, after “two drones fell in the vicinity of Dubai International Airport (DXB)”. The Dubai Media Office added that air traffic is operating as normal.

At least six people have been killed and 122 injured in the UAE, as of 05:30 UTC on 11 March.

As of 11 March, the UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones.

Early 11 March, the UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) centre reported that a cargo vessel was hit by an unknown projectile in the Straits of Hormuz, 11NM north of Oman, resulting in a fire onboard. The crew evacuated the vessel, and injured crew members are receiving treatment in Oman. The Strait of Hormuz is a critical maritime chokepoint which Iran is able to threaten to cause a global impact on trade. Furthermore, local Omani media reported on 11 March that an attack drone was intercepted and another crashed into the sea north of Duqm. No casualties were reported.

At least one person has been killed and five injured in Oman, as of 05:30 UTC on 11 March.

Oman is currently assessed to have a lower conflict-related risk profile compared to the neighbouring United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the Omani airspace remains open. As a result, Oman is being used by airlines and international governments as a base for repatriation flights. There is considerably elevated demand for flights running from Oman.

As of 11 March, the airspace remains open in Oman. Oman Air has confirmed the suspension of all flights to nine destinations until 15 March: Copenhagen, Dubai, Doha, Dammam, Amman, Bahrain, Kuwait City, Baghdad and Khasab.

On 28 February, Iran initiated ballistic missile and attack drone strikes targeting Israel and US military facilities and sites known to host US military personnel across the Middle East, in response to joint US and Israeli airstrikes inside Iran. The targeting pattern of Iranian strikes has evolved to increasingly include civilian-profile targets such as hotels, international airports, and critical national infrastructure. Iranian strikes have continued into 10 March.

As of 10 March, there is a total closure of airspace in Kuwait and Bahrain. The UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones. Qatar has suspended flights and closed its airspace to most commercial traffic, with only limited repatriation flights permitted. Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf. Oman’s airspace remains open, with Muscat becoming the preferred airport among airlines in the region wishing to perform relief flights. Jordan’s airspace remains open, but aircraft are advised to carry extra fuel in case of delays.

Saudi Arabia’s Defence Ministry stated that it intercepted a ballistic missile headed for the Eastern Province late 9 March and destroyed multiple attack drones near Al Kharj and the Shaybah oil field. On 10 March, authorities said another attack drone was destroyed east of Al Kharj; two more were intercepted in the Eastern Province, and nine attack drones heading toward Shaybah were intercepted over Eastern Province. Saudi authorities also said a drone fell in a residential area in Al-Zulfi governorate on 10 March, causing some damage but with no injuries confirmed as of yet. The frequency of Iranian attacks against targets in Saudi Arabia is highly likely increasing, in comparison to the earlier phases of the conflict when Saudi Arabia was targeted significantly less than other countries in the Arabian Peninsula.

There have been at least two deaths and 12 injuries from Iranian strikes in Saudi Arabia as of 09:00 UTC on 9 March 2026.

As of 10 March, Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf; however, this does not affect commercial flights departing major Saudi airports. Air France on 9 March extended its suspension of flights to and from Riyadh through 13 March.

On 10 March, Kuwait’s air defence systems intercepted incoming ballistic missiles and attack drones. Air raid sirens also sounded overnight 9-10 March, with air defences intercepting two ballistic missiles and six attack drones, which were reportedly aimed at the country’s northern and southern areas. Air defences had previously intercepted 14 ballistic missiles and four attack drones earlier on 9 March. Additionally, on 9 March, Jordan’s Prime Minister Jafar Hassan and Kuwait’s Prime Minister Ahmad Abdullah Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah held a phone call, during which they reportedly exchanged views on the regional conflict, reiterated a firm rejection of the Iranian attacks, and stressed that stronger diplomatic engagement is needed to calm tensions.

At least six people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Kuwait, as of 09:00 UTC on 9 March.

As of 10 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait.

Early 10 March, explosions were heard over Bahrain as air raid sirens sounded. According to the Ministry of Interior, the fire that broke out at the Bapco oil refinery in Al-Mu’amirah, south of Manama has been brought under control, with limited material damage and no loss of life. Overnight 9-10 March, one person was killed and eight injured in an Iranian attack drone strike on a residential building in Manama. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) claimed that a fire was burning at Bahrain’s Isa Air Base which hosts US troops, following the overnight attacks.

At least one person has been killed, and 40 have been injured in Bahrain, as of  09:00 UTC on 9 March.

As of 10 March, the airspace remains closed in Bahrain.

On 10 March, multiple explosions were heard in Qatar, with the Ministry of Defence announcing that Qatar had been subjected to a “missile attack”. Qatar’s Interior Ministry issued an emergency alert calling on citizens to stay indoors and away from windows due to the high security threat level.

At least 16 people have been injured in Qatar, as of 09:00 UTC on 9 March.

As of 10 March, the airspace remains restricted in Qatar. On 6 March, the Qatar Civil Aviation Authority announced flights would operate through “designated navigational contingency routes with limited operational capacity” in coordination with the Qatari armed forces. Qatar Airways stated that they will operate limited flights from Doha Airport (DOH), with services to 15 destinations confirmed for 11 March. Aircraft depart with their transponders switched off as a safety precaution and may not appear on flight tracking platforms.

Emirati authorities stated that its air defences responded to a missile threat on 10 March, with the Defence Ministry saying sounds heard across the UAE were caused by the interception of missiles and drones. Civil aviation authorities have announced a complete ban on all drones and light sports aircraft, including suspended permits for drones, gliders, paragliders and sports aircraft. A drone strike on 10 March at the UAE’s state-run ADNOC’s Ruwais refinery resulted in a fire, leading to the closure of the facility. Iranian strikes against oil and gas infrastructure have likely escalated in retaliation for Israeli strikes against Iranian oil infrastructure.

At least six people have been killed and 122 injured as of 12:00 UTC on 10 March.

As of 10 March, the UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones. On 9 March, the airline Air France extended the suspension of flights running from Dubai until 13 March to the ongoing security situation.

Oman played a crucial role as a mediator in the negotiations between the US and Iran prior to the current conflict. Almost certainly reflective of this mediating role, Oman’s Foreign Minister Badr Albusaidi stated on 9 March that “[b]oth regional and US interests will truly be served by a ceasefire now and a return to diplomacy as soon as possible”. Moreover, Oman’s Sultan Haitham bin Tariq congratulated Iran’s new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, on his appointment on 9 March.

At least one person has been killed and five injured in Oman, as of 09:00 UTC on 9 March.

Oman is currently assessed to have a lower conflict-related risk profile compared to the neighbouring United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Omani airspace remains open. As a result, Oman is being used by airlines and international governments as a base for repatriation flights. There is considerably elevated demand for flights running from Oman.

As of 10 March, the airspace remains open in Oman.

On 28 February, Iran initiated ballistic missile and attack drone strikes targeting Israel and US military facilities and sites known to host US military personnel across the Middle East, in response to joint US and Israeli airstrikes inside Iran. The targeting pattern of Iranian strikes has evolved to increasingly include civilian-profile targets such as hotels, international airports, and critical national infrastructure. Iranian strikes have continued into 9 March.

As of 9 March, there is a total closure of airspace in Kuwait and Bahrain. The UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones. Qatar has suspended flights and closed its airspace to most commercial traffic, with only limited repatriation flights permitted. Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf. Oman’s airspace remains open, with Muscat becoming the preferred airport among airlines in the region wishing to perform relief flights. Jordan’s airspace remains open, but aircraft are advised to carry extra fuel in case of delays.

On 8 March, Saudi officials stated that two people died and twelve were injured after an unspecified “military projectile” fell in a residential location in Al-Kharj governorate. This is the first confirmed attack resulting in casualties in Saudi Arabia. Earlier, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) had stated that they targeted radar installations in Al-Kharj. The Prince Sultan Air Base is located approximately 20km southeast of Al-Kharj and is regularly used by US forces.

As of 9 March, Saudi Arabia’s airspace has a partial closure affecting the area bordering Iraq and the Persian Gulf; however, this does not affect commercial flights departing major Saudi airports.

On 9 March, Iran’s IRGC stated that its navy targeted Al-Adiri helicopter airbase with attack drones and cruise missiles. The IRGC claims to have destroyed the base’s fuel and gas tanks, US helicopter ramps, and logistics and support facilities. Overnight 8-9 March, the Kuwait Defence Ministry stated that air defences were activated in response to the missile and drone threat.

The Kuwait Electricity Ministry stated that a small fire in one fuel tank was extinguished after breaking out at Subiya Power and Water Distillation Plant; drone fragments were discovered at the fire’s origin. Another fire was recorded at Shuwaikh Power and Water Distillation Station on 9 March. The two facilities are located on opposite sides of Kuwait Bay. The plants are critical in supplying both electricity and desalinated water to Kuwait’s population and industry. The Kuwaiti military stated that three ballistic missiles were shot down in total on 8 March.

At least six people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Kuwait, as of 15:00 UTC on 9 March.

As of 9 March, the airspace remains closed in Kuwait.

Air raid sirens sounded in Bahrain on 9 March, with the public urged to seek shelter. A fire was reported at the Bapco oil refinery in Al-Mu’amirah, south of Manama, after Iranian strikes. No casualties were reported; however, Bapco Energies declared force majeure on the group’s operations.

Overnight 8-9 March, at least 32 people were injured (four in critical condition) in the Sitra area south of Manama, following an alleged drone strike on a residential area. All those injured were Bahraini citizens. Contrary to initial reports, unverified footage shared on social media potentially indicates an interceptor missile mistakenly striking the area. The exact cause of the injuries remains unconfirmed.

At least one person has been killed, and 40 have been injured in Bahrain, as of 15:00 UTC on 9 March.

As of 9 March, the airspace remains closed in Bahrain.

On 9 March, Qatar’s military stated that it intercepted 17 ballistic missiles and six attack drones in the latest Iranian attack. Qatar’s Ministry of Defence also stated that its air defences intercepted a “missile attack” overnight, without specifying the number of missiles. Local media reported that explosions, likely from missile interceptions, were heard in Doha.

On 9 March, the Qatari Ministry of Interior stated that the General Directorate of Criminal Investigations had arrested over 300 individuals of various nationalities in connection with the filming, dissemination, and publication of misleading information. The arrests are highly likely associated with the filming of Iranian missile and drone attacks.

At least 16 people have been injured in Qatar, as of 15:00 UTC on 9 March.

As of 9 March, the airspace remains restricted in Qatar. On 6 March, the Qatar Civil Aviation Authority announced flights would operate through “designated navigational contingency routes with limited operational capacity” in coordination with the Qatari armed forces. Qatar Airways stated that they will operate limited flights from Doha Airport (DOH), with services to airports including Seoul (ICN), London Heathrow (LHR), Delhi (DEL), Madrid (MAD), Islamabad (ISB), and Beijing (PKX) scheduled on 9 and 10 March. Aircraft depart with their transponders switched off as a safety precaution and may not appear on flight tracking platforms.

On 9 March, the UAE Ministry of Defence stated that two soldiers had died after a helicopter suffered a technical malfunction and crashed at an undisclosed location.

On 9 March, UAE officials stated that they had detected 15 ballistic missiles and 18 drones. UAE air defences intercepted 15 missiles, with three falling into the sea, and 17 drones, the last falling in the country’s territory. At least two people were injured in Abu Dhabi in two separate incidents caused by falling debris following successful interceptions. Authorities also reported that falling debris caused a fire in Fujairah near oil sector infrastructure.

At least four people have been killed and 112 injured as of 15:00 UTC on 9 March.

As of 9 March, the UAE’s airspace has restricted access by way of Emergency Security Control of Air Traffic (ESCAT) zones.

Oman is currently assessed to have a lower conflict-related risk profile compared to the neighbouring United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Omani airspace remains open. As a result, Oman is increasingly being used by airlines and international governments as a base for repatriation flights. There is considerably elevated demand for flights running from Oman.

At least one person has been killed and five injured in Oman, as of 15:00 UTC on 9 March.

As of 9 March, the airspace remains open in Oman.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Iran’s shift to the targeting of critical infrastructure and other civilian profile targets is likely reflective of an attempt to increase economic disruption across the Gulf, pressure regional governments that host US military bases and support operations, and demonstrate Iran’s capacity to impose widespread costs across the region despite being under sustained pressure from US and Israeli joint strikes. Iran may have also calculated that attacks of this magnitude may undermine the long-term presence of the US military in the Middle East by increasing the political and security costs for host nations and raising domestic pressure within Gulf states to distance themselves from US military operations.

Iran is also likely attempting to pressure Washington and Tel Aviv by provoking international condemnation and economic pressures on a global scale. Attacks on oil and gas infrastructure, followed by the suspension of operations at these sites, combined with a de facto Iranian blockade in the Strait of Hormuz, will almost certainly trigger economic shocks and volatility in global energy markets, as well as disruptions to maritime trade and energy supply chains. This strategy is likely to increase international pressure and could help to isolate Washington.

Before the US and Israeli offensive operations in Iran, the US conducted hundreds of cargo flights to the region to enhance its force posture and defensive capabilities. This involved the rapid deployment and reallocation of air defence systems and munitions to the Gulf. Large-scale and layered Iranian ballistic missile and UAV attacks have largely been contained by regional air defence systems, although casualties and damage have resulted from interceptions. Moreover, joint strikes and high rates of expenditure have rapidly degraded Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities, resulting in marked decreases in the volume of missiles it is firing in just a matter of days.

However, Iran was assessed to have 2000-2500 ballistic missiles before the start of the war, and as many as 100,000 long-range attack UAVs. Iran will likely be able to sustain long-range attacks across the Gulf for weeks, even if its ballistic missile capabilities are completely destroyed or exhausted. Previous Iranian attacks have likely probed for weaknesses and vulnerabilities in regional air defence systems, which could be exploited in future attacks. Moreover, the expenditure rates of regional air defence munitions have been extremely high and in many cases, very cost-ineffective, with expensive interceptor missiles used to counter low-cost UAVs and relatively-low cost missile systems.

Iran’s initial tactics may have been to force the Gulf States into rapidly expending large volumes of air defence interceptors to degrade regional air defence capacity. If the Gulf States run critically low on interceptors, Iran will likely exploit this by targeting the affected countries with increased attacks, especially with low-cost UAVs, as its ballistic missile capabilities are either spent or held in reserve. This would likely place Iran in a position to maintain small-scale attacks against the Gulf, with increased penetration rates and sustained economic disruption.

Kuwait, which lies just dozens of kilometres from mainland Iran and borders southern Iraq, is likely the most vulnerable to Iranian attacks, and hosts several US bases. Projectiles can be launched from Iran within close range of Kuwait, providing limited reaction and interception time. Furthermore, Iranian-backed Shia militia groups are highly active in southern Iraq and maintain a large arsenal of rocket, drone, and missile capabilities. However, other Gulf States, especially the UAE, are likely to present more strategically attractive targets for Iran due to their concentration of high-value economic infrastructure and scale of US investment. This has likely been reflected by the number of missiles and UAVs that have been launched against the UAE, which remains the most targeted country in the Gulf. Dubai is located approximately 150 kilometres from Iran, where UAVs can be launched and approach targets, using slow and low-altitude flight profiles, which will likely complicate detection, positive identification and interception and provide air defences with limited time to react.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Current US and Israeli military operations mark a significant escalation from Operation Midnight Hammer, which involved preliminary strikes on Iranian conventional military capabilities to enable a US bombing run on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Furthermore, the scale of the US’s current force posture and forward positioning of military assets is the largest buildup in the region since the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

US and Israeli strikes follow three rounds of talks between the US and Iran aimed at constraining Iran’s nuclear programme and preventing Tehran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, as well as imposing limits on Iran’s ballistic missile programme. Despite diplomatic engagement, Washington likely assessed that Tehran’s commitment to talks and a potential new nuclear deal lacked credibility. Iran failed to commit to any substantive concessions, maintained its own red lines, and was likely using the negotiation process to delay, test US resolve and potentially to buy time to prepare for conflict. As further negotiations had been scheduled in Vienna for 2 March, there is a realistic possibility that Iranian senior leadership assessed the risk of imminent military action was temporarily reduced, relaxed operational security and provided the US and Israel with a rare window of opportunity to target senior regime figures.

Iran had likely expected limited strikes aimed at coercing substantive nuclear concessions as part of a broader pressure strategy tied to the ongoing negotiations, rather than an immediate transition from aggressive military posturing to large-scale and sustained strikes. However, Iranian officials had previously warned that even “limited strikes” would be met with a significant response. The scale, duration and depth of US-Israeli combined strikes and the immediate decapitation of Iranian senior leadership likely exceeded Tehran’s expectations, resulting in a significant escalation in Iran’s retaliatory strategy.

Iran’s current strategy is likely aimed not only at striking Israel and US military forces but also at generating widespread economic disruption, undermining US regional security guarantees and restoring deterrence by positioning itself as a resilient power capable of inflicting widespread damage and costs despite suffering major losses, evidenced by its attacks on Arab nations and attempts to blockade the Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s objective is likely to drag the US into a prolonged and costly war that drains US resources, provokes domestic and international condemnation, disrupts global energy supply and strains US relations with regional partners. Tehran has also likely calculated that if the US only commits to a military campaign defined by the use of stand-off capabilities like air and naval power, it remains unlikely that the current operations will be able to dislodge the regime. For this objective to be achieved, the US will likely need to deploy ground forces unless the regime is toppled by internal unrest. However, a ground invasion will likely require congressional approval and would likely be detrimental to the Trump administration, which has condemned previous administrations for protracted and costly wars.

Joint US-Israeli strikes have almost certainly been calibrated to degrade Iranian command and control (C2) structures, integrated air defence systems, long-range strike capabilities and Iranian intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. In the opening stages of the conflict, strikes will likely prioritise high-value targets (HVTs), including Iranian senior leadership, to disrupt national‑level decision‑making and Iran’s ability to coordinate a sustained and coherent military response.

Conventional military HVTs will include systems such as Iranian radars, combat air power and air defences to achieve complete air superiority as quickly as possible, as well as Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities, including transporter erector launchers (TELs), missile stockpiles, production sites, logistic networks and other supportive elements. Iran was estimated to have approximately 2,000-2,500 ballistic missiles remaining in its inventory before the start of the current conflict, and approximately 200 TELs, Iran’s primary delivery system for ballistic missiles, which constitute the greatest threat to Israel, US bases, critical infrastructure and civilian populations in the region.

Initial estimates suggest that joint strikes have rapidly degraded Iran’s TELs and missile stockpiles. However, TELs are highly mobile systems, and it is unlikely that all of Iran’s TELs will be destroyed in the opening stages. With some TELs remaining operational and Iran still likely capable of manufacturing some ballistic missiles under conflict conditions, it is unlikely that Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities will be completely neutralised in the immediate term, despite high rates of degradation and interceptions. Smaller, less concentrated and less frequent Iranian ballistic missile attacks are likely to continue in the near term.

In addition to its ballistic missile capabilities, Iran was estimated to possess an arsenal of 80,000 operational one-way attack unmanned aerial vehicles (OWA-UAVs). These combined capabilities will likely enable Iran to target Israel, US military installations, economic interests, civilian centres and critical infrastructure, including oil and gas infrastructure, ports, and airports, especially in the Gulf States, that remain in range of even Iran’s shortest range ballistic missile systems, which constitute the largest proportion of Iran’s ballistic arsenal.

Failure to rapidly degrade Iran’s ballistic missile threat will almost certainly place enormous strain on regional air defence systems, with hundreds of expensive Patriot and Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) missile interceptors already being expended to counter sustained Iranian ballistic missile salvos and also used to intercept low-cost UAVs. Iran’s ballistic missile salvos have decreased in volume, which is likely reflective of launcher attrition, stockpile conservation and Iranian dispersal tactics. However, even lower-volume salvos, especially when layered with UAVs and designed to exploit air defence vulnerabilities or gaps in coverage, can pose a credible threat, especially to the Gulf States, which are rapidly exhausting interceptor stocks and are located much closer to Iran, providing significantly reduced warning times and compressed engagement windows for air defence systems.

In addition to Iran’s long-range strike capabilities, Tehran may increasingly resort to asymmetric tactics to project strength, reach and resolve if the war is sustained for weeks, particularly if its ballistic missile and long-range strike capabilities are significantly degraded by sustained US and Israeli operations. Such tactics could include proxy attacks by Iran-aligned groups across the region, IRGC-backed terrorism against Israeli and Western diplomatic missions or the international Jewish community, and cyber operations targeting financial systems and critical infrastructure.

Recovery efforts are ongoing in Mayotte and the death toll is almost certain to rise. France has mobilised rescue teams and supplies from mainland France and the French territory of Reunion, with 160 firefighters and soldiers being sent to Mayotte to bolster the 110 French military personnel currently undertaking rescue operations. The immediate effort of French rescue teams is to establish an air and sea bridge to Mayotte to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid.

There are severe transport disruptions in Mayotte, including mass flight cancellations at Dzaoudzi Pamandzi International Airport (DZA), which has been subjected to significant levels of damage. The French interior ministry is set to host a crisis meeting on the situation to determine response. Travellers to the area should expect mass disruption to healthcare provision and significantly slowed emergency response times.

Due to the intense rainfall in northern Mozambique, there is a high risk of landfalls. Furthermore, authorities have indicated that communities may be cut off from schools and health facilities for weeks due to damaged infrastructure. Mozambique’s meteorological agency has issued warnings for multiple provinces due to strong and dangerous winds until midnight on 17 December.

The storm weakened into a moderate tropical storm then a remnant low on 16 December as it tracked into Malawi. As of 16 December, sustained windspeeds have reduced to approximately 50 km/h (31 mph). Malawi is unlikely to be significantly impacted by the storm, but transport-related disruptions cannot be ruled out.

SOLACE GLOBAL ANALYSIS

Areas that Tropical Cyclone Chido has affected will almost certainly experience transport disruptions.  Mayotte’s only international airport has experienced major damage, making it difficult for authorities to restart operations. Damage to infrastructure in areas affected by the storm may affect recovery efforts and will almost certainly exacerbate health and poverty issues in the coming weeks. Death tolls will almost certainly continue to rise as authorities confirm casualties from the storm.

Mayotte, a French overseas department, has experienced significant political tensions driven by illegal migration and economic frustrations. Its high levels of poverty and crime alongside overwhelmed infrastructure from the high numbers of migrants make it France’s poorest department. The French government has recently attempted to revoke birthright citizenship, changing Mayotte’s constitution and conducting mass deportations, a highly controversial move.

The damage from the tropical cyclone is highly likely to exacerbate tensions by further straining Mayotte’s infrastructure, damaging its crops, and pushing more residents below the poverty line. As such, Mayotte’s population may direct its anger against the ruling authorities and conduct significant social unrest to express their frustration.

In Comoros, resources are generally strained. Deforestation and coastal erosion have caused significant damage to local communities and approximately 40 per cent of the population lives below the poverty line. The cyclone has caused significant damage, which will almost certainly further disrupt local communities and strain government resources, displacing many. Agriculture, which accounts for over 35 per cent of employment, will likely be affected by damaging winds and flooding, pushing more residents below the poverty line. Parliamentary elections are set to take place in Comoros on 12 January 2025. The damage inflicted by the storm is highly likely to exacerbate tensions, which are already high and may contribute to unrest in the country.

In Mozambique, the cyclone has affected the Cabo Delgado region, an area experiencing an ongoing insurgency. Moreover, significant unrest regarding the October election has been ongoing in the region. As such, the government’s ability to commit resources to the areas affected by the cyclone will highly likely be significantly hindered. While the coming days may see reduced unrest as communities seek immediate safety in the aftermath of the cyclone, unrest in Pemba will likely increase in the coming weeks.

The ground operations follows weeks of asymmetric warfare, cross-border exchanges and airstrikes in Lebanon. On 17-18 September, the simultaneous explosion of thousands of pagers and other communication devices, highly likely orchestrated by Mossad, injured or killed at least 3,500 Hezbollah members and was likely shaping activity prior to a wider offensive. ​

From 23 September, the IAF targeted thousands of Hezbollah facilities, assets and units throughout Lebanon, including in Beirut and in the group’s northern stronghold, the Bekaa Valley. On 27 September, a massive IAF strike in the Dahieh area of south Beirut killed Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, Ali Karaki, the commander of Hezbollah’s southern front, other members of Hezbollah’s senior leadership, and Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commander Abbas Nilforoshan.​​

Before the invasion, Israeli officials rejected a 21-day ceasefire deal proposed by the US, France, and other regional powers. The operations in Lebanon have been accompanied by further statements concerning the Netanyahu administration’s commitment to continuing operations until its strategic goals are reached.​

The Iranian strike also follows a period of escalation. The large missile and drone barrage in April was carried out in response to highly likely Israeli strikes on Iranian diplomatic assets in Damascus, which resulted in the death of senior IRGC officials. Tehran vowed to retaliate after the wave of decapitation attacks carried out by Israel in the late summer, which killed key “Axis of Resistance” leaders, among them Hamas political bureau chairman Ismail Haniyeh, who was killed in a likely Mossad operation in Tehran. However, newly elected Iranian President Pezeshkian initially stated that Iran would refrain from attacking Israel while ceasefire negotiations continued.​

Israeli officials have threatened to retaliate for the Iranian strikes. IDF forces at the Lebanon border have increased since the strikes, with elements of the 36th division also being deployed, likely in support of future operations.​

SOLACE GLOBAL ANALYSIS

The IDF’s ground offensive has likely been timed to exploit the current lack of command and control (C2) within Hezbollah which has been achieved through a series of high-profile strikes on the group’s senior leadership.

In September, the Netanyahu administration added the return of Israeli citizens to settlements near the Israel-Lebanon border to their list of stated war aims. The significant degradation of Hamas forces in the Gaza Strip following a year of conflict has also almost certainly allowed Tel Aviv to shift its focus to the north. Israeli officials almost certainly assess that a reduced ground force, combined with a constant threat of airstrikes, will be sufficient to prevent Hamas from reforming units capable of significantly threatening IDF forces in Gaza.

IDF operations are highly likely aimed at destroying Hezbollah assets in the south of Lebanon and preventing the group from targeting north Israel. While Hezbollah maintains some long-range weapons systems, much of the group’s arsenal has a maximum range of ~40km. IDF operations will likely seek to force Hezbollah to retreat north of the Litani River, as per the 2006 UN Security Council Resolution 1701. On 1 October, the IDF announced that it had destroyed at least 700 Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon as part of a previously undisclosed series of covert operations. The latest operations are highly likely meant to expand these efforts, by employing conventional assets.

It is unlikely that the IDF will commit to a long-term occupation of southern Lebanon, which would entail high political and economic costs as well as a high rate of casualties. The IDF’s main objective is likely to clear Hezbollah forces and weapons from areas immediately adjacent to the border. However, deeper raids and strikes aimed at high-value targets like ammo depots, C2 posts,  logistic nodes and launch sites are highly likely.

There is a realistic possibility that part of the Israeli efforts will be aimed at arming and supporting Lebanese militias – particularly Christian ones – that are opposed to Hezbollah. Over the past year, sectarian tensions between Shias, Sunnis, and Maronite Christians have increased in Beirut, and Israeli special operations may seek to leverage these to decrease Hezbollah’s political influence in Lebanon.

The latest attack by Tehran is likely to allow Israeli forces the political justification to increase strikes and ground operations targeting Hezbollah in Lebanon, as well as strikes on other regional Axis of Resistance members. Israeli forces may seek to capitalise on the  recent decapitation strikes to significantly degrade Hezbollah’s manpower and, especially, weapons stocks as a prelude to a UN-mediated deal on its northern border. An Israel-Hamas ceasefire deal, remains, as of now, extremely unlikely, especially due to the approaching 7 October anniversary, whose political significance likely makes such a deal unthinkable for the Israeli leadership.

Israeli forces will almost certainly retaliate for Iran’s attack. However, it is highly likely that retaliatory strikes targeting Iranian assets or territory will be limited to avoid further escalation and meant at re-establishing deterrence. There is a realistic possibility that Israeli forces will opt to strike Iranian officials and assets in Iraq or Syria, including IRGC members. Moreover, Israeli strikes could also target military targets, including missile launch sites and air defence stations, in Iranian territory, as well as strategic objectives like oil extraction facilities and refineries.

Finally, there is a realistic possibility of Israeli strikes targeting Iranian nuclear programme facilities. While such a course of action has been advocated by “hawkish” elements of the Israeli government, as well as some allied political figures, such a move would highly likely be opposed by London, Washington, and Brussels, as it poses an obvious threat to the possible resumption of nuclear negotiations, which Pezeshkian has repeatedly called for in his recent speech at the UN General Assembly.

On 1 October, at approximately 10:00 (BST), Israeli officials reported that IDF forces have intensified raids in the West Bank, and especially Hebron, in response to the Jaffa terror attack. While the dynamic of the attack still remains partly unclear, there is a high likelihood that it will result in spontaneous retaliatory violence in the West Bank, including in violence involving Israeli settler groups.