SITREP
Evacuations from High-Risk Locations Call +44 (0)1202 308810 or Contact Us →
Trump Signals End to Iran Negotiations Amid Threats of Renewed Strikes
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 10 November – 13 November 2026
- On 12 November, US President Donald Trump declared that the US no longer needs an agreement with Iran and redirected Vice President JD Vance away from negotiations. Trump also threatened renewed strikes “right now” with “no hesitation” if Iran threatens the US or its allies.
- On 11 November, Israel’s security cabinet reportedly ordered the IDF to increase readiness for a possible attack on Iran, and the USS Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group could arrive in the Arabian Sea around 14-15 November.
- On 13 November, the IRGC claimed a strike against a US early-warning radar in Bahrain in retaliation for an alleged attack on Sirik in southern Iran, although this remains unconfirmed.
- Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia have continued at a high intensity, including three cruise missiles targeting Riyadh on 11 November and ballistic missiles intercepted over western Saudi Arabia, with debris falling near Mecca. The Houthis have also launched a significant ground offensive in Yemen.
- As of 13 November, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman are open. King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh continues to operate limited domestic and international flights, although many foreign airlines continue to suspend services, and Saudi Arabia’s Jazan, Abha and Najran airports have been subject to repeated closures and significant disruption.
Middle East Conflict: Latest Intelligence & Travel Advice
To support planning, we are updating our Middle East travel advice daily with guidance from our intelligence team on airspace openings and closures, flight operations, and escalating risks impacting movement.
Situation Update: US-Iran Diplomatic Deadlock Raises Prospect of Renewed Military Conflict
On 10 November, Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated that US President Donald Trump had concluded there was “no need for major combat operations” as Washington was “achieving the same objective by economic means”, and on 11 November, G7 foreign ministers pledged to maintain economic pressure on Iran and condemned alleged Iranian-linked plots abroad. The same day, reports indicated that Trump had authorised Vice President JD Vance to lead negotiations, including potential face-to-face talks with Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) secretary Mohsen Rezaei, likely in Doha. However, Rezaei denied that negotiations were taking place, reiterated Tehran’s seven conditions and rejected the removal of enriched uranium from Iran.
Moreover, on 12 November, Trump declared that the US no longer needed an agreement with Iran, citing continued coercion via US control of frozen Iranian assets and the blockade, and redirected Vance away from negotiations. Trump also threatened renewed strikes “right now” with “no hesitation” if Iran threatens the US or its allies. The same day, Trump stated that five Gulf states had urged restraint against Iran, while reiterating threats against Iranian infrastructure.
On 11 November, Israel’s security cabinet reportedly ordered the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to increase readiness for a possible attack on Iran, following a reportedly tense call between Trump and caretaker Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
The USS Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group (CSG) is en route to the Middle East, reportedly transiting the Strait of Malacca on 8-9 November and subsequently being reported in the Andaman Sea.
On 12 November, Iranian state media reported a hostile strike against a telecommunications tower in Sirik, southern Iran, and on 13 November, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) claimed to have struck and destroyed a US early-warning radar in Bahrain in retaliation, describing the strike as a “serious warning”. The claim, which would be the first Iranian attack against US military assets in a Gulf state since early September, has not yet been confirmed by Bahraini or US authorities.
Iran has expanded its threats beyond the region. On 11 November, Rezaei warned that every military base involved in an attack on Iran, “from West Asia to Europe”, would be a legitimate target, and on 12 November, an Iranian military spokesperson threatened retaliation ten times more severe than previous attacks should the US resume strikes. On 10 November, the US Justice Department indicted three alleged Iranian-backed operatives over plots including against RAF Fairford, and US officials confirmed the precautionary relocation of military aircraft from RAF Mildenhall following a reported Iranian-linked threat. On 12 November, Iran’s Assembly of Experts called for consideration of withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and a revision of Iran’s defence doctrine.
Attacks against commercial shipping have continued at a high intensity. On 10 November, the ADNOC tanker Fujairah Energy was attacked in UAE territorial waters, injuring four crew members, and on 11 November, a merchant vessel was struck by an unidentified projectile off Ras Al Khaimah, causing an engine-room fire. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has continued to claim unverified mine strikes against tankers in the Strait of Hormuz (SoH).
Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia have continued at a high intensity, with the Saudi-led coalition intercepting missiles targeting Riyadh on 10 and 11 November, and debris from intercepted ballistic missiles falling near Sabuhah, around 35km from Mecca, on 11 November. On 10 November, Egypt confirmed an existing military deployment to Saudi Arabia and announced reinforcements, while the Houthis again accused Pakistani aircraft of participating in Saudi airstrikes, although this remains unverified. On 13 November, the coalition reported intercepting three drones over Riyadh and the Eastern Province, while the Houthis claimed further attacks against the East-West Pipeline and military aviation facilities in Sharurah and Khamis Mushait.
In Yemen, on 10 November, the coalition reportedly struck fuel infrastructure in Sanaa, including the Al-Mufazir gas facility. The Houthis launched a major combined-arms offensive in south-eastern Lahj on 11 November, preceded by ballistic missile strikes against coalition command facilities in Al-Buraiqa, Aden. On 12 November, Houthi forces reportedly captured the town of al-Shatt and the al-Sarih junction, with further reports indicating advances towards Kharaz camp and Khor Amira, although these remain unverified. Fighting has also intensified across Taiz, Al-Jawf, and Marib.
As of 13 November, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman are open. King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh continues to operate limited domestic and international flights, although many foreign airlines continue to suspend services, and Saudi Arabia’s Jazan, Abha and Najran airports have been subject to repeated closures and significant disruption.
Jordan
No attacks have been reported in Jordan between 10 and 13 November.
As of 13 November, Jordan’s airspace is open.
Saudi Arabia
On 10 November, the Saudi-led coalition reported intercepting a ballistic missile and a cruise missile targeting Riyadh, a ballistic missile targeting southern Saudi Arabia and a drone over the Eastern Province, with early warning alerts issued for Riyadh, Abha and Khamis Mushait. The Houthis claimed attacks against King Khalid International Airport, Abqaiq, and the East-West Pipeline.
On 11 November, the coalition reported intercepting three cruise missiles targeting Riyadh, reportedly disrupting approaching flights, two drones over the Mecca region and southern Saudi Arabia, and two ballistic missiles over western Saudi Arabia, with debris falling near Sabuhah, around 35km from Mecca. Early warning alerts were issued for Taif, Yanbu and Khamis Mushait. The Houthis denied targeting Mecca, instead claiming attacks against a pumping station in Yanbu and King Khalid International Airport.
On 12 November, the coalition reported intercepting a drone over the Riyadh region and a drone over the Eastern Province. On 13 November, the coalition reported intercepting three drones over the Riyadh region and the Eastern Province. The Houthis also claimed attacks on 12 November against the East-West Pipeline and military aviation facilities in Sharurah and Khamis Mushait, which have not been confirmed.
As of 13 November, Saudi Arabia’s airspace is open. King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh continues to operate domestic and some international flights, with some flights normally serving Riyadh operating via Prince Naif bin Abdulaziz International Airport in Qassim or Dammam, although missile interceptions reportedly disrupted approaching flights on 11 November. King Abdulaziz International Airport in Jeddah and King Fahd International Airport in Dammam are operational with some delays and cancellations. Many foreign airlines continue to suspend services, with IndiGo extending suspensions to Riyadh, Dammam, Jeddah and Medina, and Jazan, Abha and Najran airports have been subject to repeated closures and significant disruption.
Kuwait
No attacks have been reported in Kuwait between 10 and 13 November. On 10-11 November, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) defence ministers approved the establishment of a forward headquarters for the GCC Unified Military Command in Kuwait.
As of 13 November, Kuwait’s airspace is open.
Bahrain
On 13 November, the IRGC claimed to have struck and destroyed a US early-warning radar in Bahrain in retaliation for an alleged attack on Sirik, southern Iran. The claim has not been confirmed by Bahraini or US authorities, and no damage or casualties have been reported.
As of 13 November, Bahrain’s airspace is open.
Qatar
No attacks have been reported in Qatar between 10 and 13 November.
As of 13 November, Qatar’s airspace is open.
UAE
Excluding attacks in Emirati waters, no attacks have been reported in the UAE between 10 and 13 November. However, on 10 November, the ADNOC tanker Fujairah Energy was attacked in UAE territorial waters, injuring four crew members.
As of 13 November, the UAE’s airspace is open.
Oman
Excluding attacks in Omani waters, no attacks have been reported in Oman between 10 and 13 November.
As of 13 November, Oman’s airspace is open.
Regional Advisory
The cumulative indicators and warnings (I&W) observed in recent weeks almost certainly indicate that a significant US military build-up is underway and that preparations for potential renewed major operations are at an advanced stage. These include the withdrawal of US personnel from exposed bases in Qatar, Jordan, and Kuwait; diplomatic drawdowns across the region; US briefings to Gulf governments to prepare for a short, intense campaign; more than 16 C-17 transport missions to Israel alongside deployments to Kuwait; the imminent arrival of a third CSG; limited strikes against Iranian air defences consistent with shaping operations; and Israeli moves to secure secondary fronts and intensify strike preparations. Few key I&W now remain unobserved, but include the forward deployment of US strategic bombers to staging bases such as RAF Fairford or Diego Garcia and a further significant surge in air-to-air refuelling aircraft, although these are not prerequisites for renewed major operations.
Based on the transit times of previous US carrier deployments, the Roosevelt CSG could reach the Arabian Sea around 14-15 November, although this could be delayed should it hold in the Indian Ocean or slow for replenishment. Although its arrival is not required for renewed operations, the CSG would almost certainly further enhance US strike capabilities and regional air and missile defences, and potentially better enable the US to also conduct a simultaneous campaign against the Houthis.
Trump’s statement that the US no longer needs an agreement, and his redirection of Vance away from negotiations, almost certainly reflects the deadlock in the negotiations and supports the assessment that a negotiated settlement is not a realistic near-term prospect. The midterm results have likely given Tehran further incentive to harden its maximalist demands; IRGC hardliners are highly unlikely to accept concessions that could be perceived as capitulation, and Washington is unlikely to accept Iran’s terms without conceding a deal that would be widely perceived as a major defeat for the Trump administration.
With a deal unlikely, two principal scenarios remain. The first is a continuation of the current campaign of maximum economic pressure, centred on the naval blockade and sanctions, which Gulf states are reportedly urging, with Trump stating on 13 November that five Gulf states had urged restraint. The second is a return to major US, and likely Israeli, strikes against Iran. Although Trump has publicly signalled a preference for economic pressure, he has made comparable statements ahead of previous strikes. Moreover, the cumulative I&W highly likely points towards advanced preparations for potential renewed major operations. Given its significantly greater implications for the safety of personnel and business continuity across the region, renewed major conflict should be treated as the primary planning scenario for risk management purposes.
The reported strike on Sirik and the IRGC’s claimed retaliatory strike against a US early-warning radar in Bahrain would, if confirmed, mark the first Iranian attack against US military assets in a Gulf state since early September. The speed of the claimed response, within hours of the Sirik strike, according to the IRGC, almost certainly highlights the danger of miscalculation arising from limited exchanges, with Tehran demonstrating that it is prepared to retaliate against limited US strikes by directly targeting US facilities in host states. The targeting of an early-warning radar, rather than personnel, likely indicates a calibrated sub-threshold response intended to signal resolve while limiting the risk of US casualties and a major US response. However, the IRGC’s threat of harsher responses to further US actions, alongside continued US limited strikes, increases the risk of a tit-for-tat cycle triggering broader conflict sooner than planned by either side, and places states hosting US forces at an elevated risk of direct attack.
The tempo of Houthi attacks against Riyadh is the most sustained since the campaign against King Khalid International Airport in October, with layered ballistic and cruise missile attacks likely intended to saturate air defences around the capital. Cruise missiles, which fly slower at lower altitudes and can be more difficult to detect, pose a particular threat to aviation, with the reported disruption to approaching flights on 11 November highlighting the continued vulnerability of the airport’s partial operations. Interception debris and potential direct impacts will almost certainly continue to pose a significant risk in Riyadh’s densely populated districts.
Repeated attacks and claimed attacks against the East-West Pipeline, Yanbu and Abqaiq likely indicate a deliberate Houthi effort to target Saudi Arabia’s primary oil export route bypassing the SoH, and further attacks against Red Sea export infrastructure are highly likely. Although the Houthis continue to deny targeting Mecca, debris falling near the city highlights the risk posed by interceptions over Mecca Province, most likely resulting from attacks against targets in locations such as Taif, Jeddah or Yanbu.
The Houthi offensive in Lahj likely seeks to capture the high ground around Jabal Kharaz, which would provide overwatch of the Mokha-Aden road and enable the Houthis to sever a key supply route for government-aligned forces on the Red Sea coast. Combined with the Houthis’ advance to within 80km of Aden in early November, the offensive almost certainly marks the most significant threat to Aden since 2015. Further Houthi advances would likely increase pressure on Riyadh to intensify airstrikes and potentially even commit additional external ground forces, which would in turn highly likely prompt intensified Houthi retaliation against Saudi Arabia.
Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:
- Jordanian authorities have warned against publishing videos or information regarding Jordan’s defensive operations without authorisation.
- Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Interior has stated that “[p]hotographing or publishing or circulating information related to countering missiles and drones and the locations of their falls exposes you to legal accountability.”
- In the UAE, authorities have warned that publishing or circulating “rumours, false news, or news from unknown sources through social media platforms or other information technology” is illegal. Reports indicate that Dubai Police have used “electronic monitoring operations” to detect a photo shared within a private WhatsApp group.
- In Bahrain, several people have been confirmed as arrested for “filming, live streaming, clipping, and publishing events in a manner constituting a legal violation”.
- Qatar’s Ministry of Interior warned that gathering at incident sites or photographing and sharing content related to field developments may result in legal accountability and has arrested hundreds of people of various nationalities for “producing and sharing misleading information”.
- Omani authorities have stated: “Beware of sharing or publishing any captured photos or videos. They should be shared only with the competent authorities”.

Request Evacuation Assistance
If you need secure, coordinated support to move personnel out of a high-risk location, our team is ready to help – quickly, calmly, and with care.
