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US-Iran Tensions Persist Despite Trump’s Signals of De-escalation
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 7 November – 10 November 2026
- The US has conducted further limited strikes against Iranian air defences on Qeshm Island, US Central Command (CENTCOM) has established a task force to disrupt Iranian overland weapons transfers, and Washington requested that Iraq close most of its border crossings with Iran.
- On 8 November, US President Donald Trump stated that renewed major operations against Iran were highly unlikely and reportedly gave negotiators several days to reach an agreement, while Iran stated that mediator travel had stopped following the US midterm elections. On 9 November, Trump declared the war militarily “effectively over”, while maintaining the US naval blockade and the threat of further strikes.
- On 7 November, US diplomatic missions across the region issued coordinated security alerts warning of an increased threat of attacks by the Houthis and Iranian efforts to target US government officials.
- On 8 November, in Saudi Arabia, an Aramco office tower in Riyadh’s King Abdullah Financial District was damaged during a Houthi attack against the capital. On 9 November, the East-West Pipeline was attacked in the Medina region, and further missiles targeting Riyadh were intercepted on 10 November.
- The USS Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group is transiting the Strait of Malacca, with arrival in the Middle East estimated to be mid-November. US-mediated talks between Russia and Ukraine are ongoing in Abu Dhabi, UAE, and expected to run from 10 to 11 November.
- As of 10 November, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman are open. King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh continues to operate limited domestic and international flights, although many foreign airlines continue to suspend services, and Saudi Arabia’s Jazan, Abha and Najran airports have been subject to repeated closures and significant disruption.
Middle East Conflict: Latest Intelligence & Travel Advice
To support planning, we are updating our Middle East travel advice daily with guidance from our intelligence team on airspace openings and closures, flight operations, and escalating risks impacting movement.
Situation Update: US Maintains Military Pressure on Iran Despite Signals of De-escalation
On 6 November, Trump confirmed a further limited US strike against Iranian air defences on Qeshm Island. Iranian state media subsequently reported explosions in Bandar Abbas, Jask, Sirik, and on Qeshm Island on 7 November, and Iranian authorities accused US forces of conducting further overnight strikes against Qeshm Island on 8-9 November, although this remains unconfirmed. Attacks against commercial shipping have continued at a high intensity.
Indirect negotiations have continued without agreement. On 6 November, Vice President JD Vance reportedly led high-level indirect talks, and on 7 November, a Qatari-mediated proposal reportedly linked the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz (SoH) to renewed nuclear inspections and phased US concessions. However, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated on 8 November that mediator travel had stopped following the US midterm elections. The same day, Trump stated that renewed major US military operations against Iran were highly unlikely and reportedly gave negotiators several days to reach an agreement, while Secretary of State Marco Rubio warned that an agreement may not be achievable.
On 9 November, following talks with Qatar’s prime minister, Trump declared that Iran “militarily, is effectively over”, cited “positive momentum” towards ending the war and stated that new strikes were “quite unlikely”, although he maintained the naval blockade and stated that the US remained “locked and loaded”. Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) secretary Mohsen Rezaei dismissed reports of renewed negotiations and reiterated Tehran’s seven conditions.
On 7 November, US Central Command (CENTCOM) established Task Force Iron Gate to disrupt Iranian overland weapons transfers and sanctions evasion, and Washington requested that Iraq close all but two of its border crossings with Iran, although Baghdad has not agreed. The USS Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group (CSG) departed Singapore on 8 November and was transiting the Strait of Malacca on 9 November, with its arrival in the Middle East expected no earlier than mid-November.
On 7 November, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) announced the removal of Iran’s self-imposed 2,000km ballistic missile range restriction and signalled readiness for a potential revision of Iran’s nuclear doctrine. On 9 November, the US reportedly relocated military aircraft from RAF Mildenhall in the UK amid intelligence warnings of a potential Iranian-linked attack, with security reportedly heightened at RAF Mildenhall and RAF Lakenheath.
Houthi missile and drone attacks against Saudi Arabia have intensified, with the Saudi-led coalition reporting interceptions of ballistic and cruise missiles and drones targeting Riyadh, the Eastern Province, Najran, the Mecca region and southern Saudi Arabia between 6 and 10 November. On 8 November, an Aramco administrative building in Riyadh’s King Abdullah Financial District (KAFD) was damaged, with windows blown out across several floors, which the Saudi Energy Ministry attributed to debris from an attempted attack. The Houthis claimed six operations on 7 November against Saudi energy infrastructure, King Khalid International Airport and military positions. Syrian military advisers have also reportedly deployed to Saudi Arabia, with further deployments of Syrian special forces reportedly planned. On 9 November, the East-West Pipeline was attacked in the Medina region, causing a limited fire, although pipeline operations were unaffected and the Energy Ministry did not attribute the attack.
In Yemen, Houthi authorities claimed that Saudi airstrikes against Al-Shariya village in Sanaa Governorate killed 44 people, while at least 30 people were reportedly killed in a disputed attack on a market in Al-Waziyah, Taiz, on 6 November. Saudi-backed forces have reportedly continued offensive operations in Al-Jawf and Lahj. On 10 November, Houthi authorities reported Saudi airstrikes against fuel infrastructure in Sanaa, including the Al-Mufazir gas facility.
On 7 November, US diplomatic missions across the region issued coordinated security alerts, stating: “Americans currently in the Middle East should exercise heightened vigilance due to the increased threat of armed attacks by Iranian-supported Houthis and Iranian efforts to target U.S. government officials in the region. Be aware of potential flight cancellations, airspace closures, and travel disruptions.” The alerts also warned that “the hostilities have the potential to escalate rapidly” and that “Iran and groups supportive of Iran may target other U.S. interests overseas or at locations associated with the United States and Americans throughout the world, including U.S. businesses and other institutions”.
Jordan
No attacks have been reported in Jordan between 6 and 10 November.
As of 10 November, Jordan’s airspace is open.
Saudi Arabia
On 6 November, the Saudi-led coalition reported intercepting two ballistic missiles targeting Najran and a drone over the Mecca region. On 7 November, the coalition reported intercepting a cruise missile targeting Riyadh. On 8 November, the coalition reported intercepting two ballistic missiles targeting Riyadh, a ballistic missile targeting the Eastern Province, two cruise missiles targeting the Riyadh region and southern Saudi Arabia, and a drone over southern Saudi Arabia, with early warning alerts issued for Riyadh, Dammam, Dhahran, Abqaiq, and Al-Ahsa. An Aramco administrative building in King Abdullah Financial District (KAFD) was damaged during the attack on Riyadh, which the Energy Ministry attributed to falling debris, with no injuries reported.
On 9 November, an early warning alert was issued for Riyadh. The Houthis claimed attacks against Aramco facilities in Riyadh and Khurais, King Khalid International Airport and a National Guard camp in Najran. On 9 November, the East-West Pipeline was attacked in the Medina region, causing a limited fire, with no injuries reported and pipeline operations unaffected, according to the Energy Ministry. On 10 November, the coalition reported intercepting a ballistic missile and a cruise missile targeting Riyadh, a ballistic missile targeting southern Saudi Arabia and a drone over the Eastern Province.
As of 10 November, Saudi Arabia’s airspace is open. King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh continues to operate domestic and some international flights, with some flights normally serving Riyadh operating via Prince Naif bin Abdulaziz International Airport in Qassim or Dammam. King Abdulaziz International Airport in Jeddah and King Fahd International Airport in Dammam are operational with some delays and cancellations. Many foreign airlines continue to suspend services to Riyadh and Dammam, with Emirates reportedly cancelling its planned 8 November resumption, and Jazan, Abha and Najran airports have been subject to repeated closures and significant disruption.
Kuwait
No attacks have been reported in Kuwait between 6 and 10 November.
As of 10 November, Kuwait’s airspace is open.
Bahrain
No attacks have been reported in Bahrain between 6 and 10 November.
On 6 November, protesters marched in residential neighbourhoods outside Manama, including Abu Saiba and Al Markh, ahead of a scheduled mass trial of Shiite clerics on 8 November. No verdict was issued and Bahrain’s High Criminal Court postponed its ruling and set 22 November as the new date.
As of 10 November, Bahrain’s airspace is open.
Qatar
No attacks have been reported in Qatar between 6 and 10 November.
As of 10 November, Qatar’s airspace is open.
UAE
Excluding attacks in Emirati waters, no attacks have been reported in the UAE between 6 and 10 November.
As of 10 November, the UAE’s airspace is open.
Oman
Excluding attacks in Omani waters, no attacks have been reported in Oman between 6 and 10 November.
As of 10 November, Oman’s airspace is open.
Regional Advisory
The continuation of limited US strikes against Iranian air defence infrastructure on Qeshm Island, alongside unconfirmed reports of explosions along Iran’s southern coastline, likely indicates that the US is conducting shaping operations to degrade Iranian air defences and anti-ship capabilities around the SoH. This is potentially in preparation for more intensive strikes, but also to diminish Iran’s capabilities to continue high-intensity vessel attacks in and around the SoH.
These limited strikes almost certainly increase the risk of a broader escalation being initiated sooner than desired by military planners in Washington or Israel. There is a realistic possibility that Iran conducts pre-emptive strikes should it assess that limited strikes represent the opening phase of a wider campaign, or retaliate against limited strikes with attacks against US military facilities in regional states, potentially triggering an escalatory cycle.
CENTCOM’s establishment of Task Force Iron Gate and the US request for Iraq to close most of its border crossings with Iran likely indicate an effort to extend the blockade to Iran’s overland routes, restricting sanctions evasion, including oil exports, and weapons transfers to Iran-backed groups in Iraq. These measures likely reflect preparations for a sustained campaign of economic pressure, consistent with Trump’s stated preference to maintain the blockade, although restricting overland supply routes would also likely limit Iran’s ability to resupply regional partners in the event of renewed strikes. The coordinated US State Department alerts, and their explicit reference to Iranian efforts to target US government officials, almost certainly highlight an elevated threat of asymmetric attacks against US-linked individuals and facilities across the region.
Once it exits the Strait of Malacca, the Roosevelt CSG could reach the Arabian Sea in approximately five to eight days, depending on its speed and course, indicating a likely arrival in the region around mid-November. Although its arrival is not a prerequisite for renewed operations, the CSG would further enhance US strike capabilities and regional air and missile defences, and potentially enable the US to conduct simultaneous operations against both Iran and the Houthis.
The US-brokered Ukraine-Russia talks in Abu Dhabi on 10–11 November likely reduce the probability of renewed major US operations against Iran in the immediate term while the talks are ongoing. Washington would likely seek to avoid Iranian retaliation disrupting the talks or threatening participating delegations in the UAE, a host state for US forces that Iran has explicitly identified as a potential target. With the talks concluding shortly before the Roosevelt CSG’s expected arrival in the region around mid-November, the period following both is assessed as a more likely window for renewed operations, should diplomatic efforts with Tehran continue to fail to produce meaningful movement from either party.
Trump’s statement that renewed major operations are highly unlikely, and his reported decision to give negotiators several days to reach an agreement, likely do not fundamentally impact the risk of renewed major operations. Trump has previously made comparable statements ahead of strikes, and they should not be interpreted as ruling out renewed operations. Araghchi’s statement that mediator travel has stopped likely indicates that negotiations have slowed, and with Rubio warning that an agreement may not be achievable, the window for diplomacy is likely to be short, with renewed US strikes likely should negotiations fail. The fundamental disputes over Iran’s nuclear programme and the SoH remain unresolved, and the two sides are unlikely to move on their red lines. Rezaei’s reiteration of Tehran’s seven conditions the same day highlights this continued gap between the two sides.
The IRGC’s removal of Iran’s self-imposed 2,000km missile range restriction and its signalling of a potential revision of Iran’s nuclear doctrine are likely intended to deter renewed strikes, while indicating that Iranian retaliation could extend significantly beyond the Middle East.
The damage to the Aramco Tower in Riyadh’s KAFD expands the demonstrated set of claimed Houthi high-value targets (HVTs) in Riyadh to four: King Khalid International Airport, the Ministry of Defence headquarters, the Aramco refinery south of the city and now the Aramco Tower. Although the Energy Ministry attributed the damage to falling debris, footage of blown-out windows across several floors and witness reports are potentially more consistent with a direct impact from a one-way attack unmanned aerial vehicle (OWA-UAV) or another projectile, although this is unconfirmed. The attack follows the 13 October strike against Aramco’s headquarters in Dhahran, almost certainly indicating that the Houthis are deliberately targeting Aramco’s corporate and administrative offices in addition to its production infrastructure, and that office buildings associated with the Houthi target set are generally at risk, including in dense commercial districts.
The concentration of ballistic and cruise missile attacks against Riyadh and the Eastern Province on 8 November, alongside alerts for Abqaiq and Al-Ahsa, likely indicates an intensification of Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia’s energy sector and capital. The reported deployment of Syrian advisers, and potentially special forces, to Saudi Arabia almost certainly reflects Riyadh’s continued efforts to expand external support, with the Syrians in particular more likely to be willing to conduct ground operations. Houthi attacks against Saudi airports, energy infrastructure and population centres are highly likely to continue, with interception debris and potential direct impacts posing a significant risk in Riyadh.
Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:
- Jordanian authorities have warned against publishing videos or information regarding Jordan’s defensive operations without authorisation.
- Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Interior has stated that “[p]hotographing or publishing or circulating information related to countering missiles and drones and the locations of their falls exposes you to legal accountability.”
- In the UAE, authorities have warned that publishing or circulating “rumours, false news, or news from unknown sources through social media platforms or other information technology” is illegal. Reports indicate that Dubai Police have used “electronic monitoring operations” to detect a photo shared within a private WhatsApp group.
- In Bahrain, several people have been confirmed as arrested for “filming, live streaming, clipping, and publishing events in a manner constituting a legal violation”.
- Qatar’s Ministry of Interior warned that gathering at incident sites or photographing and sharing content related to field developments may result in legal accountability and has arrested hundreds of people of various nationalities for “producing and sharing misleading information”.
- Omani authorities have stated: “Beware of sharing or publishing any captured photos or videos. They should be shared only with the competent authorities”.
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