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US Military Preparations Accelerate Amid Stalled Iran Negotiations
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 3 November – 7 November 2026
- The US midterm elections concluded on 3 November, removing a likely key political source of political restraint on renewed US strikes against Iran for the Trump administration.
- Observed US military preparations for renewed operations have continued and likely further intensified.
- On 6 November, US forces conducted limited strikes against Iranian air-defence systems, with Iranian state media reporting two explosions in the Suza area of Qeshm Island. US President Donald Trump described the strikes as minor.
- Qatari-mediated US-Iran negotiations remain unresolved, with no confirmed agreement on sanctions relief, direct talks or reopening the Strait of Hormuz.
- Houthi missile and drone attacks against Saudi Arabia have continued, including a ballistic missile intercepted over the Medina region on 5 November.
- On 4 November, Saudi Arabia and Syria signed a defence cooperation agreement in Riyadh.
- As of 7 November, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman are open. King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh continues to operate limited domestic and international flights, although many foreign airlines continue to suspend services, and Saudi Arabia’s Jazan, Abha and Najran airports have been subject to repeated closures and significant disruption.
Middle East Conflict: Latest Intelligence & Travel Advice
To support planning, we are updating our Middle East travel advice daily with guidance from our intelligence team on airspace openings and closures, flight operations, and escalating risks impacting movement.
Situation Update: US Military Deployments Signal Preparations for Potential Wider Operations Against Iran
On 3 November, reports citing sources familiar with the matter indicated that Washington had approved a Qatari-presented draft memorandum of understanding to present to Tehran, reportedly involving an Iranian nuclear concession in exchange for the partial release of frozen Iranian assets, to take place simultaneously. However, Iranian officials described the US response as insufficient and reiterated Tehran’s seven conditions for reopening the SoH, with a senior Iranian official stating that the two sides remained far from an agreement. On 4 November, Iran’s chief negotiator, Parliamentary Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, urged Washington to pursue diplomacy following the US midterm elections, while the US Treasury imposed further sanctions on Iran’s shadow fleet and aviation sector.
Iran has sustained attacks against international shipping, with the UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reporting at least nine attacks against commercial vessels in the SoH and Arabian Gulf since 29 October. On 4 November, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) claimed an additional four tankers had been damaged by naval mines and two vessels had been detained for attempting to transit the southern shipping corridor; however, these claims remain unverified.
On 3 November, six C-17 military transport planes left the US and arrived at Ovda Air Base in southern Israel. Israel also warned that Iran is preparing to use chemical weapons. However, US and Gulf officials are reportedly divided over the assessment, with some asserting that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is seeking to draw the US back into major combat operations. Israel has also requested that the Lebanese government deploy troops to establish roadblocks in areas where Hezbollah operatives are based in order to prevent the militant group from participating in a coordinated Iranian response.
On 4 November, commercial satellite imagery reportedly showed the USS Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group (CSG) transiting the South China Sea. Although its precise location remains unconfirmed, the CSG is reportedly heading towards the Malacca Strait en route to the CENTCOM area of responsibility (AoR). Also on 4 November, a US Air Force (USAF) RC-135U Combat Sent electronic intelligence aircraft was tracked deploying from Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska to RAF Mildenhall in Suffolk, UK.
Houthi missile and drone attacks against Saudi Arabia have continued, with the Saudi-led coalition reporting intercepting drones over the Mecca region, the Eastern Province and southern Saudi Arabia on 3 November and a ballistic missile targeting the Medina region on 5 November. The Houthis claimed attacks against Abha International Airport, King Khalid Air Base in Khamis Mushait, King Fahd International Airport in Dammam, King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh and military installations in Jazan and Najran, none of which have been confirmed. On 4 November, the death toll from the 10 October attack against King Khalid International Airport rose to 14 following the death of a second Indian national, and Saudi Arabia and Syria signed a defence cooperation agreement in Riyadh.
In Yemen, a Houthi missile strike against a military training camp in Al-Dhale on 4 November reportedly killed at least 14 recruits and injured more than 30, while government forces claimed territorial gains in Al-Jawf and Lahj amid continued fighting around Taiz. An alleged Saudi airstrike reportedly killed seven civilians in Maqbanah, Taiz, on 4 November. Reports on 5 November indicated that the Houthis had demanded USD 51 billion in compensation and formal Saudi recognition of their authority over Yemen during negotiations with Riyadh, although this remains unconfirmed.
On 6 November, US forces conducted limited strikes against Iranian air-defence systems, with Iranian state media reporting two explosions in the Suza area of Qeshm Island. US President Donald Trump described the strikes as minor.
As of 7 November, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman are open. King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh continues to operate limited domestic and international flights, although many foreign airlines continue to suspend services, and Saudi Arabia’s Jazan, Abha and Najran airports have been subject to repeated closures and significant disruption.
Jordan
No attacks have been reported in Jordan between 3 and 7 November.
As of 7 November, Jordan’s airspace is open.
Saudi Arabia
On 3 November, the Saudi-led coalition reported intercepting drones over the Mecca region, the Eastern Province and southern Saudi Arabia, with an early warning alert issued for the Riyadh region. The Houthis claimed attacks against Abha International Airport and King Khalid Air Base in Khamis Mushait. On 4 November, the Houthis claimed a ballistic missile attack against King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh and three attacks against military installations in Jazan and Najran, none of which have been confirmed.
On 5 November, the coalition reported intercepting a ballistic missile targeting the Medina region and two drones over Riyadh region, with early warning alerts issued for Yanbu and Sharurah. Also on 5 November, the Houthis claimed an attack on King Fahd International Airport in Dammam, which was not confirmed by Saudi officials. On 6 November, Saudi forces claimed to have downed a drone over Mecca region, and two missiles over Najran province. Alerts were issued on 6 November for Najran province. On 7 November, a Saudi military spokesperson stated that air defences shot down a suspected Houthi missile fired at Riyadh province.
As of 7 November, Saudi Arabia’s airspace is open. King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh is operating domestic and some international flights by national carriers, with some flights normally serving Riyadh also operating from Prince Naif bin Abdulaziz International Airport in Qassim. King Abdulaziz International Airport in Jeddah and King Fahd International Airport in Dammam are operational with some delays and cancellations. Many foreign airlines continue to suspend services to Riyadh and Dammam, with some suspensions extending until late November, and Jazan, Abha and Najran airports have been subject to repeated closures and significant disruption.
Kuwait
No attacks have been reported in Kuwait between 3 and 7 November.
As of 7 November, Kuwait’s airspace is open.
Bahrain
No attacks have been reported in Bahrain between 3 and 7 November. However, on 4 November, a senior IRGC adviser threatened expanded retaliation against Gulf states hosting US military operations, specifically identifying Bahrain and the UAE.
On 6 November, protesters marched in residential neighbourhoods outside Manama, including Abu Saiba and Al Markh, ahead of a scheduled mass trial of Shiite clerics on 8 November.
As of 7 November, Bahrain’s airspace is open.
Qatar
No attacks have been reported in Qatar between 3 and 6 November.
As of 7 November, Qatar’s airspace is open.
UAE
Excluding attacks in Emirati waters, no attacks have been reported in the UAE between 3 and 6 November. However, on 4 November, a senior IRGC adviser threatened expanded retaliation against Gulf states hosting US military operations, specifically identifying the UAE and Bahrain.
As of 7 November, the UAE’s airspace is open.
Oman
Excluding attacks in Omani waters, no attacks have been reported in Oman between 3 and 6 November.
As of 7 November, Oman’s airspace is open.
Regional Advisory
The limited 6 November strikes were the first since the midterm elections, and US officials had previously assessed that Iran would attempt to rebuild its air-defence systems and other military infrastructure over time. The limited strikes follow a similar pattern to those of 2 November, which reportedly targeted surface-to-air missile batteries on Qeshm after an Iranian attack on a US military aircraft. The limited scale indicates calibrated pressure rather than a resumption of major combat operations. However, the degradation of Iranian air defences in the SoH area would also likely support preparations for any wider offensive.
Recent US military deployments likely indicate that plans for renewed offensive operations against Iran are at an advanced stage, with assets deployed to enhance US strike capabilities and protect US and allied forces against Iranian retaliation, although these preparations are also likely aimed at increasing pressure on Tehran to accept a negotiated settlement with terms favourable to Washington. The conclusion of the US midterms has likely removed a key political restraint on renewed strikes, although significant Republican losses, which Trump has publicly acknowledged were partly driven by the Iran war, may increase Washington’s preference for a negotiated settlement.
Indirect talks facilitated by Qatar are ongoing. However, substantial differences remain over sanctions relief, the US naval blockade and the sequencing of concessions, and Iran likely calculates that its leverage has increased following the midterms, making a negotiated settlement even further unlikely in the immediate term and likely increasing the probability of renewed US and Israeli military operations against Iran.
The continued deployment of US military transport aircraft to Israel, with at least 16 C-17 missions recorded since mid-October, alongside recent arrivals at Ali Al Salem Air Base in Kuwait, highly likely reflects preparations for Iranian retaliation, including the deployment of additional air defences. Israeli requests for the Lebanese government to restrict Hezbollah’s movements also support the assessment that Israel is preparing for direct involvement in renewed strikes. The RC-135U electronic intelligence (ELINT) aircraft deployed to RAF Mildenhall is reportedly supporting operations on NATO’s eastern flank, but any onward deployment to the CENTCOM AoR would represent a significant indicator and warning (I&W) of more imminent operations against Iran due to its highly advanced capabilities. There are only two active RC-135Us in the entire US Air Force, making it an ultra-rare and strategic asset.
The exact timing of any renewed strikes remains uncertain and will likely be conditioned by diplomatic progress and further military shaping activity. Once the Roosevelt CSG transits the Malacca Strait, it could reach its final assessed operating area in the Arabian Sea in as little as five days, although it is expected to make a port call in Singapore. The CSG would further enhance US strike capabilities, operational flexibility, and regional air and missile defences, and potentially facilitate simultaneous operations against the Houthis in Yemen. However, the US already has sufficient military assets in theatre to conduct offensive operations at short notice. Washington may also seek to delay strikes until after US-brokered Ukraine-Russia talks in Abu Dhabi in the UAE on 10-11 November, to avoid Iranian retaliation disrupting the talks or threatening participating delegations.
Iran has repeatedly warned that renewed strikes would result in an immediate response beyond previously established targeting patterns, including against US military installations, shipping, undersea cables, data centres and regional energy infrastructure. With fuel prices having almost certainly influenced the midterm results, Tehran likely calculates that further disruption to regional energy exports would increase pressure on the Trump administration and strengthen its negotiating leverage.
Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia have continued, with the ballistic missile intercepted over the Medina region on 5 November, following an alert in Yanbu, likely targeting the Yanbu area, the Red Sea terminus of the East-West Pipeline that provides Saudi Arabia’s primary oil export route bypassing the SoH. Repeated interceptions over the Medina and Mecca regions likely reflect Houthi targeting of energy infrastructure and other targets on the Red Sea coast and locations such as Taif, with the group maintaining public denial of targeting the holy cities themselves. Medina’s international airport likely remains at a lower risk profile for Houthi strikes than any other international airport in Saudi Arabia.
The Saudi-Syrian defence agreement, following Syria’s discussions on joining the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, likely reflects Riyadh’s continued efforts to expand its regional support network as the Houthi campaign persists. Reported Houthi demands for USD 51 billion in compensation and recognition of their authority over Yemen, if accurate, are highly likely unacceptable demands for Riyadh, indicating that a negotiated de-escalation remains unlikely in the short term. Houthi attacks against Saudi airports, energy infrastructure and population centres are therefore highly likely to continue.
Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:
- Jordanian authorities have warned against publishing videos or information regarding Jordan’s defensive operations without authorisation.
- Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Interior has stated that “[p]hotographing or publishing or circulating information related to countering missiles and drones and the locations of their falls exposes you to legal accountability.”
- In the UAE, authorities have warned that publishing or circulating “rumours, false news, or news from unknown sources through social media platforms or other information technology” is illegal. Reports indicate that Dubai Police have used “electronic monitoring operations” to detect a photo shared within a private WhatsApp group.
- In Bahrain, several people have been confirmed as arrested for “filming, live streaming, clipping, and publishing events in a manner constituting a legal violation”.
- Qatar’s Ministry of Interior warned that gathering at incident sites or photographing and sharing content related to field developments may result in legal accountability and has arrested hundreds of people of various nationalities for “producing and sharing misleading information”.
- Omani authorities have stated: “Beware of sharing or publishing any captured photos or videos. They should be shared only with the competent authorities”.
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