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US Prepares for Potential Iran Strikes as Houthi Attacks Intensify
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 27 October – 30 October 2026
- On 28 October, Washington reportedly told several Gulf governments to prepare for a short, intense military campaign against Iran after the 3 November US midterm elections, and for potential Iranian retaliation against energy facilities and critical infrastructure.
- Diplomatic outreach has continued, with US Vice President JD Vance reportedly sending a letter to Iran’s Supreme National Security Council secretary outlining a possible negotiating framework, although US President Donald Trump denied directing renewed peace talks.
- On 27 October, a Houthi ballistic missile reportedly struck Saudi Aramco’s Ras Tanura refinery in the Eastern Province, causing a fire and damaging a processing unit.
- Saudi forces intercepted further Houthi ballistic missiles and drones targeting Riyadh, the Eastern Province, Taif and southern Saudi Arabia between 27 and 29 October, with interception debris damaging property in Riyadh on 27 October. On 29 October, debris from two ballistic missiles intercepted over Riyadh injured one person, and on 30 October Saudi forces intercepted a drone over the Mecca Region.
- As of 30 October, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman are open. King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh has resumed limited domestic and international operations since its partial reopening on 25 October, although many foreign airlines continue to suspend services, and Saudi Arabia’s Jazan, Abha, and Najran airports have been regularly closed.
Middle East Conflict: Latest Intelligence & Travel Advice
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Situation Update: US Signals Potential Iran Strikes as Houthi Attacks Target Saudi Oil Infrastructure
On 28 October, reports indicated that Washington had told several Gulf governments to prepare for a short, intense military campaign against Iran after the 3 November US midterm elections, and for potential Iranian retaliation against energy facilities and critical infrastructure. US President Donald Trump has continued to threaten renewed military action against Iran unless Tehran agrees to a deal. On 29 October, US Central Command (CENTCOM) commander Admiral Brad Cooper reportedly briefed Trump at the White House on options for renewed strikes against Iran, and ten US military transport aircraft reportedly arrived at Israeli airbases, with further deployments reported to Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Qatar.
On 27 October, the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) updated its travel advice for 16 countries across the Middle East and surrounding region, warning that the risk of sudden escalation is high and that British nationals should be prepared for flight cancellations, airspace closures and travel disruption.
On 27 October, the Qatari Emir met Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian in Moscow to discuss US-Iran negotiations and the Strait of Hormuz (SoH). On 28 October, reports indicated that US Vice President JD Vance had sent a letter to Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) secretary Mohsen Rezaei outlining a possible framework for negotiations. Trump confirmed that he had approved the contact, but stated that it concerned Iranian requests for medical supplies and denied directing renewed peace talks. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated that Iran was discussing with mediators ways to implement its seven-day plan to reopen the SoH “in even less than a week”, although Iranian officials have continued to reject nuclear concessions. On 29 October, US envoy Tom Barrack stated that diplomatic efforts could bring “dramatic steps forward” within two weeks, and Qatari mediators reportedly returned to Tehran on 30 October.
Attacks against commercial shipping have continued at a high intensity. On 29 October, the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported a vessel ablaze north of Khasab, Oman, while the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) claimed that several tankers had struck naval mines in the SoH, although these claims remain unverified. UKMTO also reported a tanker struck by an unidentified projectile while transiting outbound through the SoH on 29 October, and a tanker attacked with explosives attached to its hull by a small boat northeast of Khasab on 29-30 October. Iranian media reported air defence activity around Qeshm Island and Sirik on 29 October, claiming the interception of an unidentified fighter aircraft, although this remains unverified.
Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia have continued. On 27 October, the Houthis claimed a ballistic missile strike against Saudi Aramco’s Ras Tanura refinery in the Eastern Province, after Saudi forces reported intercepting three ballistic missiles and four one-way attack unmanned aerial vehicles (OWA-UAVs). A source briefed US media that the site had been hit and that a resulting fire had been contained, and satellite imagery indicated damage to a processing unit at the refinery. Saudi forces intercepted further ballistic missiles targeting Riyadh on 27 October, Taif on 28 October and the Eastern Province on 29 October, with interception debris damaging a building, a construction site and a vehicle in Riyadh.
On 29 October, debris from two ballistic missiles intercepted over Riyadh injured one person and damaged a house and a vehicle, and Saudi forces intercepted a cruise missile targeting western Saudi Arabia. The Houthis claimed six operations on 29 October against energy facilities, airports and military installations, including Ras Tanura, Abqaiq, Rabigh, Riyadh, Dammam and Najran, although impacts remain unverified.
On 27 October, an international media investigation reported evidence that Russian satellites had supported Houthi and Iraqi militia targeting of Saudi military and energy infrastructure. The same day, Turkey’s parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee reportedly approved the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement.
In Yemen, internationally recognised government (IRG)-aligned forces launched a major offensive near the Bab al-Mandeb on 27 October, supported by Saudi airstrikes, with at least 97 combatants reportedly killed. On 28 October, the Houthis struck Aden International Airport twice after ordering its evacuation, citing the presence of Saudi military aircraft, forcing the suspension of civilian flights. On 29 October, IRG authorities accused the Houthis of using artillery shells and rockets containing banned toxic substances in Taiz, although no evidence was provided and the nature of the substances remains unknown.
As of 30 October, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman are open. King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh has resumed limited domestic and international operations since its partial reopening on 25 October, although many foreign airlines continue to suspend services, and Saudi Arabia’s Jazan, Abha, and Najran airports have been regularly closed.
Jordan
No attacks have been reported in Jordan between 27 and 30 October.
As of 30 October, Jordan’s airspace is open.
Saudi Arabia
On 27 October, the Saudi-led coalition reported intercepting three ballistic missiles targeting the Eastern Province and four OWA-UAVs targeting southern Saudi Arabia, with early warning alerts issued for the Eastern Province, al-Kharj, Najran, Abha and Khamis Mushait. The Houthis claimed a strike against the Ras Tanura refinery, which a source confirmed had been hit, causing a fire which was visible on satellite-derived imagery. Later on 27 October, the coalition reported intercepting two ballistic missiles targeting Riyadh, with early warning alerts issued for Riyadh, al-Kharj and al-Hariq, and debris damaging a building, a construction site and a vehicle in Riyadh. The Houthis also claimed attacks on 27 October against the Ministry of Defence in Riyadh and military transport aircraft at Najran Airport and King Khalid Air Base in Khamis Mushait, which have not been confirmed.
On 28 October, the coalition reported intercepting a ballistic missile targeting Taif, with early warning alerts also issued for Jeddah and Yanbu. On 29 October, the coalition reported intercepting a ballistic missile targeting the Eastern Province, with early warning alerts issued for the Eastern Province and Najran. Later on 29 October, the coalition reported intercepting two ballistic missiles targeting Riyadh and a cruise missile targeting western Saudi Arabia, with early warning alerts issued for Riyadh, Najran and al-Kharj. Debris injured one person and damaged a house and a vehicle in Riyadh. On 30 October, the coalition reported intercepting a drone over the Mecca Region, which the Houthis reportedly denied launching. The Houthis claimed six operations on 29 October against targets including Ras Tanura, Abqaiq, Rabigh, Riyadh, Dammam and Najran, which have not been confirmed.
As of 30 October, Saudi Arabia’s airspace is open. King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh has resumed limited domestic and international operations since its partial reopening on 25 October, although many foreign airlines continue to suspend services and some of the flights are instead operating from Prince Naif bin Abdulaziz International Airport in Qassim. Saudi Arabia’s Jazan, Abha, and Najran airports have been regularly closed.
Kuwait
No attacks have been reported in Kuwait between 27 and 30 October. However, on 28 October, Kuwait summoned Iran’s ambassador over an alleged Iranian-linked assassination conspiracy, following the sentencing of three defendants to death by a Kuwaiti court on 26 October over an alleged Iranian espionage and assassination plot.
As of 30 October, Kuwait’s airspace is open.
Bahrain
No attacks have been reported in Bahrain between 27 and 30 October.
As of 30 October, Bahrain’s airspace is open.
Qatar
No attacks have been reported in Qatar between 27 and 30 October.
As of 30 October, Qatar’s airspace is open.
UAE
Excluding attacks in Emirati waters, no attacks have been reported in the UAE between 27 and 30 October.
As of 30 October, the UAE’s airspace is open.
Oman
Excluding attacks in Omani waters, no attacks have been reported in Oman between 27 and 30 October.
As of 30 October, Oman’s airspace is open.
Regional Advisory
The reported US warning to Gulf governments to prepare for a campaign after the midterms, reported arrival of US military transport aircraft in-region, the reductions of US diplomatic staffing across the region, continued withdrawals of US troops from regional installations exposed to Iranian strikes, and increased warnings from national travel advisories almost certainly continue to represent a significant increase in indicators and warnings (I&W) of renewed large-scale conflict. The force protection measures are consistent with previous actions undertaken by the US before launching operations against Iran, and military transport flights were used extensively to deliver air defences across the region. These developments indicate that renewed US strikes against Iran are highly likely in the coming weeks, with the USS Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group (CSG) also expected to arrive in the US Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AoR) by late November.
The increase in diplomatic outreach, including Vance’s letter to Rezaei and continued Qatari and regional mediation, is unlikely to achieve a lasting resolution. Tehran likely calculates that it is better placed to survive a further round of conflict than to make the concessions demanded by Washington, particularly regarding its nuclear programme and longer-term control over the SoH. Furthermore, IRGC hardliners now wield significant power in Tehran and are highly unlikely to accept concessions that could be perceived as surrender, despite the enormous economic costs being imposed by the US blockade and expanded sanctions regime.
Iran’s offer to reopen the SoH remains conditional on sanctions relief and the lifting of the US blockade, but does not address the nuclear file. Accepting these terms would require Washington to relinquish its primary leverage over Tehran without securing the demanded concessions it has used to justify its military campaign. A potential off-ramp to avoid renewed full-scale conflict would be the Trump administration reverting to the terms of the June Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), which were relatively favourable to Tehran. However, this is unlikely, as Washington almost certainly assesses that the blockade has given it greater leverage over Iran than it held in June.
Renewed operations against Iran would almost certainly result in severe Iranian retaliation across the region, including against US military installations, energy infrastructure and US-linked technology facilities, with Washington reportedly already warning Gulf governments to prepare for such attacks. Iranian threats against US diplomats and personnel, and intelligence warnings of advanced plots against US officials, likely indicate that the threat to US-linked individuals and facilities in the region extends beyond missile and drone attacks to asymmetric and deniable operations, with such threats likely to persist even in the absence of renewed military strikes.
The reported strike on Ras Tanura, one of the world’s largest oil export terminals and refining complexes, almost certainly marks one of the most significant Houthi attacks against Saudi energy infrastructure during the current conflict. It also highly likely demonstrates the Houthis’ ability to penetrate air defences in the Eastern Province, the kingdom’s principal oil-producing region, more than 1,000km from Houthi-controlled territory. The attack likely reflects a deliberate effort to impose economic costs on Riyadh, and further attacks against Saudi energy infrastructure, including in the Eastern Province and on the Red Sea coast, are highly likely.
If confirmed as accurate, reported Russian satellite support would almost certainly increase the effectiveness of Houthi strikes against Saudi high-value targets (HVTs), given the Houthis’ limited independent over-the-horizon intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. Access to Russian-derived intelligence is likely to improve the Houthis’ ability to identify and exploit vulnerabilities in Saudi and foreign-deployed air defence coverage, prioritise less well-defended targets and identify stationary HVTs such as aircraft on a runway, which could result in a further geographical expansion of attacks or broadening of the Houthis’ target selection.
The IRG offensive near the Bab al-Mandeb and Houthi strikes against Aden International Airport indicate a continued escalation of the conflict in Yemen, with no clear diplomatic pathway towards de-escalation. Further Saudi-backed territorial advances or airstrikes against Houthi HVTs in locations such as Sanaa and Hodeidah Port are highly likely to trigger an intensification of Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia, and short-notice airspace restrictions and flight disruption at Saudi airports are highly likely to continue.
Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:
- Omani authorities have stated: “Beware of sharing or publishing any captured photos or videos. They should be shared only with the competent authorities”.
- Jordanian authorities have warned against publishing videos or information regarding Jordan’s defensive operations without authorisation.
- Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Interior has stated that “[p]hotographing or publishing or circulating information related to countering missiles and drones and the locations of their falls exposes you to legal accountability.”
- In the UAE, authorities have warned that publishing or circulating “rumours, false news, or news from unknown sources through social media platforms or other information technology” is illegal. Reports indicate that Dubai Police have used “electronic monitoring operations” to detect a photo shared within a private WhatsApp group.
- In Bahrain, several people have been confirmed as arrested for “filming, live streaming, clipping, and publishing events in a manner constituting a legal violation”.
- Qatar’s Ministry of Interior warned that gathering at incident sites or photographing and sharing content related to field developments may result in legal accountability and has arrested hundreds of people of various nationalities for “producing and sharing misleading information”.
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