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Gulf Security Risks Escalate Amid Shipping Attacks and Houthi Strikes
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 16 October – 20 October 2026
- On 16 October, reports indicated that the US has largely suspended strikes against Iranian anti-ship missile and drone launchers to avoid escalation before the 3 November midterm elections. However, US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth met Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu during an unannounced visit to Israel on 19 October, amid discussions on potentially resuming major combat operations against Iran.
- Attacks against commercial shipping continued, including against a tanker off Jubail in Saudi Arabia’s Gulf waters on 16-17 October and a tugboat off Khor Fakkan in the UAE on 18 October.
- On 18 October, a Houthi projectile struck a residential area in Najran, injuring six civilians. On 19 October, the Future Investment Initiative conference in Riyadh was postponed until 2027. The UK has advised against all but essential travel to the whole of Saudi Arabia since 16 October.
- On 18 October, Egypt’s National Defence Council pledged support to Saudi Arabia, although a parliamentary vote on deploying forces was postponed until 26 October. The UAE reportedly agreed to resume payments to anti-Houthi forces in Yemen.
- On 19 October, a Houthi ballistic missile attack on a government military camp in Shabwa, Yemen, killed at least 53 recruits and injured more than 200.
- As of 20 October, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman are open. However, operations at King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh remain mostly suspended following its closure on 10 October, and Saudi Arabia’s Jazan, Abha, and Najran airports have been regularly closed.
Middle East Conflict: Latest Intelligence & Travel Advice
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Situation Update: Gulf Security Risks Rise Amid Maritime and Houthi Attacks
Attacks against commercial shipping have continued. On 16 October, a crude tanker was struck by an unidentified projectile in the Strait of Hormuz (SoH), and the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported that a tanker was attacked northeast of Jubail, Saudi Arabia, on 16-17 October, reportedly using a rocket-propelled grenade fired from a small boat. On 18 October, a tugboat was struck by two projectiles northeast of Khor Fakkan in the UAE, injuring one person. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has claimed that several supertankers struck naval mines in the SoH between 17 and 19 October, although these claims remain unverified. On 18 October, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) collectively rejected Iranian restrictions on navigation through the SoH. On 19 October, the IRGC threatened undersea telecommunications cables in the SoH.
Reports on 16 October indicated that the US has largely suspended strikes against Iranian anti-ship missile and drone launchers to avoid escalation before the 3 November US midterm elections. However, US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth threatened “devastating” military action on 17 October should Iran not abandon its nuclear ambitions, and on 18 October US President Donald Trump endorsed Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ahead of Israel’s 27 October elections, warning that the US would “finish the job” if Iran did not change course. On 19 October, Hegseth met Netanyahu during an unannounced visit to Ovda Air Base in southern Israel, amid US-Israeli discussions on potentially resuming major combat operations against Iran. Iran’s newly appointed Defence Minister, Mehrdad Akhlaghi, threatened severe retaliation against the US and its regional allies, and a senior Iranian official threatened on 19 October to strike energy infrastructure in nine unnamed countries should Iranian facilities be attacked.
Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia have continued. On 16 October, Saudi forces announced the interception of a missile targeting Yanbu and two cruise missiles over the Red Sea. On 18 October, a Houthi projectile struck a residential area in Najran, injuring six civilians, and Saudi Civil Defence issued an early warning alert for As Sulayyil Governorate in southern Riyadh Province. A Saudi reconnaissance helicopter crashed in Najran the same day, killing two officers, which Saudi authorities attributed to a technical malfunction and the Houthis claimed to have downed. On 19 October, alerts were issued for Riyadh, al-Kharj and Najran, and the Houthis claimed six missile and drone operations against Saudi energy infrastructure, airports and military facilities.
On 18 October, Egypt’s National Defence Council pledged “all necessary and possible forms of support” to Saudi Arabia, with an Egyptian MP stating that it had approved the deployment of forces on a defensive mission, and an Egyptian military transport aircraft was reportedly observed entering Saudi airspace. However, the Egyptian parliament postponed a vote on authorising the deployment until 26 October. The UAE reportedly agreed on 17 October to resume payments to anti-Houthi forces, particularly the Southern Giants Brigades, and Saudi Defence Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman met UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed on 18 October. GCC foreign ministers meeting in Manama on 18 October reaffirmed that an attack against one member constitutes an attack against all, although no new collective military deployments were announced. On 16 October, Saudi deputy minister Rayed Krimly stated that Riyadh maintains direct channels with the Houthis, with Oman acting as a facilitator, and that Riyadh has not requested the offered Iranian mediation. On 20 October, US media reported that the UK’s Royal Air Force will deploy Typhoon fighter jets on defensive missions to Saudi Arabia.
In Yemen, a Houthi ballistic missile attack against the al-Alam military camp in Shabwa on 19 October killed at least 53 government recruits and injured more than 200, reportedly the largest single loss of life since the Yemeni civil war restarted. Houthi missiles also struck Aden International Airport on 16 October, with one impact approximately 500 metres from a Yemenia passenger aircraft, and targeted Marib on 19 and 20 October. Fighting has continued around Taiz and Marib, and the Saudi-led coalition reported intercepting a maritime weapons shipment destined for the Houthis off Yemen on 19 October.
As of 20 October, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman are open. However, operations at King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh remain mostly suspended following its closure on 10 October, and Saudi Arabia’s Jazan, Abha, and Najran airports have been regularly closed.
Jordan
No attacks have been reported in Jordan between 16 and 20 October.
As of 20 October, Jordan’s airspace is open.
Saudi Arabia
On 16 October, Saudi authorities reported intercepting a missile targeting Yanbu, two cruise missiles over the Red Sea and three UAVs over Saudi territory. Civil Defence issued warnings in Yanbu, Abha and Khamis Mushait, which were subsequently lifted. Further UAV interception activity was reported over the Eastern Province. Unconfirmed reports indicated an explosion near King Fahd International Airport in Dammam, although no significant flight disruption was identified. On 17 October, Saudi authorities reported intercepting two Houthi ballistic missiles targeting Khamis Mushait and four UAVs over Riyadh, the Eastern Province and southern Saudi Arabia. Civil Defence issued multiple warnings in Riyadh, Abha and Khamis Mushait.
On 18 October, a Houthi projectile struck a residential area in Najran, injuring six civilians, and Saudi Civil Defence issued early warning alerts for Riyadh, Najran, Abha, and As Sulayyil Governorate. A Saudi reconnaissance helicopter crashed in Najran the same day, killing two officers. On 19 October, alerts were issued for Riyadh, al-Kharj and Najran.
Most operations at King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh remain suspended as of 20 October, although a limited number of flights are running with special permission, with no official full reopening date announced. Several several international airlines, including KLM, Lufthansa and Air India, have extended suspensions of services to Saudi Arabia. Aviation data indicates that more than 45 per cent of scheduled departures from Saudi airports have been cancelled since 8 October. On 19 October, the Future Investment Initiative conference in Riyadh was postponed until 2027. Riyadh’s Kingdom Centre ordered indefinite remote working for office tenants on 18 October, and remote schooling in Riyadh has been extended until 22 October.
On 16 October, the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) expanded its advice against all but essential travel to the whole of Saudi Arabia, advising British nationals wishing to leave to consider travelling overland to a neighbouring country.
As of 20 October, Saudi Arabia’s airspace is open. However, operations at King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh remain mostly suspended following its closure on 10 October, and Saudi Arabia’s Jazan, Abha, and Najran airports have been regularly closed.
Kuwait
No attacks have been reported in Kuwait between 16 and 20 October.
As of 20 October, Kuwait’s airspace is open.
Bahrain
No attacks have been reported in Bahrain between 16 and 20 October.
As of 20 October, Bahrain’s airspace is open.
Qatar
No attacks have been reported in Qatar between 16 and 20 October.
As of 20 October, Qatar’s airspace is open.
UAE
Excluding attacks in Emirati waters, no attacks have been reported in the UAE between 16 and 20 October.
As of 20 October, the UAE’s airspace is open.
Oman
Excluding attacks in Omani waters, no attacks have been reported in Oman between 16 and 20 October.
As of 20 October, Oman’s airspace is open.
Regional Advisory
Continued attacks against commercial shipping, including off Jubail and Khor Fakkan, likely indicate that Iran is sustaining and continuing to geographically expand its maritime campaign beyond the SoH into the wider Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. The GCC’s collective rejection of Iranian navigation restrictions likely indicates that the Gulf states remain unwilling to legitimise Iranian control of the strait. The IRGC’s threat against undersea telecommunications cables in the SoH likely indicates a further broadening of the potential target set should full-scale conflict resume.
The reported suspension of US strikes against Iranian launchers ahead of the midterms, alongside the estimated earliest arrival of the USS Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group (CSG) in the CENTCOM area of responsibility (AoR) from mid-November if it continues to participate in exercises off Japan, likely supports the assessment that a resumption of large-scale US combat operations against Iran is more likely after the 3 November elections. However, Hegseth’s unannounced visit to Israel, Trump’s continued threats, and the Pentagon’s reported preparations for renewed major combat operations indicate that strikes ahead of the elections cannot be ruled out. While the Roosevelt CSG’s arrival would provide additional combat power and the capacity to sustain a prolonged campaign, forces already deployed in the region are likely sufficient to conduct major operations against Iran with limited advance warning. Any renewed US strikes would highly likely trigger Iranian retaliation against US military facilities and critical infrastructure in regional states, with Iranian threats against energy infrastructure in regional states and against US-linked technology facilities likely indicating an intent to further broaden its target set.
The Houthis are increasingly layering drones, cruise missiles and ballistic missiles into single strike packages, saturating air defence sensors and complicating target tracking and prioritisation, while also targeting areas of Saudi Arabia with limited air defence coverage. This is highly likely to increase the effectiveness of attacks against Saudi Arabia, particularly if air defence stocks are significantly depleted, and is likely to increase the risk posed by falling debris in populated areas where interceptions occur at shorter ranges and lower altitudes. Further Houthi attacks against Saudi airports, energy infrastructure and military bases are highly likely.
The postponement of the Future Investment Initiative, the cancellation of a significant proportion of scheduled flights and the indefinite remote working ordered at Riyadh’s Kingdom Centre highlight the growing impact of the Houthi campaign on business operations in Saudi Arabia. The Kingdom Centre closure was likely predicated on the increased risk posed by attacks against Riyadh rather than a specific threat, and there is a realistic possibility that other high-profile commercial buildings will introduce similar measures. King Khalid International Airport remains largely closed, excluding a limited number of flights given special permission, with no confirmed reopening date. Even once reopened, normal operations are unlikely to resume in the short term, with many international airlines maintaining suspensions and further closures likely following renewed attacks.
The widening of external support for Saudi Arabia, with Egypt pledging military support, the GCC reaffirming its collective defence commitments, and the deployment of agreed forces under the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, highly likely reflects Riyadh’s efforts to bolster its air defences and border security as Houthi attacks continue. However, external support remains largely defensive, and there is no indication that external partners are prepared to commit ground forces to offensive operations in Yemen.
The reported resumption of Emirati financial support for anti-Houthi forces would mark a significant shift. The UAE was previously one of the most critical members of the anti-Houthi coalition, deploying ground forces in 2015 that led the recapture of Aden, and subsequently building, funding and training multiple armed groups, including the Giants Brigades, the Security Belt and Tareq Saleh’s National Resistance Forces, which spearheaded the 2018 offensive towards Hodeidah. Although the UAE withdrew most of its ground forces in 2019, it retained significant influence through these partners, particularly the Southern Transitional Council (STC). However, Emirati influence in Yemen was largely curtailed following the failed STC offensive and its subsequent capitulation to Saudi-backed forces in January 2026.
Riyadh’s apparent willingness to allow renewed Emirati involvement, under a reported arrangement exchanging Emirati payments to the Southern Giants Brigades for Saudi air support for UAE-backed forces, likely reflects the severity of the pressure imposed by the Houthi campaign and the stalled counteroffensive, with Riyadh likely calculating that Emirati funding and influence over key ground forces are necessary to restore momentum on the Red Sea coast and around the Bab al-Mandab. However, renewed Emirati influence is likely to be limited and closely managed by Riyadh, and risks reviving Saudi-Emirati competition over southern Yemen in the medium term.
Renewed Emirati involvement is likely to increase the risk of Houthi retaliation against the UAE, particularly if it evolves into direct military intervention. In January 2022, the Houthis conducted missile and drone attacks against Abu Dhabi following advances by the UAE-backed Giants Brigades in Shabwa, demonstrating both the capability and the intent to target the UAE in response to Emirati support for anti-Houthi forces. The 19 October attack against the al-Alam camp in Shabwa, previously operated by UAE-aligned forces, likely also signals Houthi intent to impose costs on forces set to benefit from renewed Emirati funding. Houthi attacks against the UAE would almost certainly compound existing disruption to regional aviation, with Emirati airports increasingly used as alternatives to Saudi airports.
Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:
- Jordanian authorities have warned against publishing videos or information regarding Jordan’s defensive operations without authorisation.
- Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Interior has stated that “[p]hotographing or publishing or circulating information related to countering missiles and drones and the locations of their falls exposes you to legal accountability.”
- In the UAE, authorities have warned that publishing or circulating “rumours, false news, or news from unknown sources through social media platforms or other information technology” is illegal. Reports indicate that Dubai Police have used “electronic monitoring operations” to detect a photo shared within a private WhatsApp group.
- In Bahrain, several people have been confirmed as arrested for “filming, live streaming, clipping, and publishing events in a manner constituting a legal violation”.
- Qatar’s Ministry of Interior warned that gathering at incident sites or photographing and sharing content related to field developments may result in legal accountability and has arrested hundreds of people of various nationalities for “producing and sharing misleading information”.
- Omani authorities have stated: “Beware of sharing or publishing any captured photos or videos. They should be shared only with the competent authorities”.
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