SITREP
Evacuations from High-Risk Locations Call +44 (0)1202 308810 or Contact Us →
Gulf Tensions Rise Amid Tanker Sinkings and Houthi Attacks
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 13 October – 16 October 2026
- Iranian attacks against commercial shipping in and around the Strait of Hormuz (SoH) have continued at an escalated intensity, with two cargo vessels sinking on 14 October, the first confirmed sinkings since March. Iranian officials stated that Iran was using new tactics against shipping to increase pressure on the US ahead of the 3 November midterm elections.
- Reports on 15 October further indicated that the Pentagon is preparing strike options against Iran, while Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu publicly opposed a pre-emptive strike before Israel’s 27 October elections.
- On 13 October, the Saudi-led coalition struck Houthi oil facilities in Sanaa and Hodeidah, and a Houthi ballistic missile reportedly struck Aramco’s headquarters in Dhahran within hours. Debris from intercepted missiles injured four people in Riyadh.
- On 15 October, the Saudi-led coalition stated that King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh had been attacked 20 times since 1 October, killing a total of 17 people and injuring 333. Saudi Arabia accused Iran of encouraging the Houthi escalation, while the Houthis stated that Oman, Russia and China had sought a ceasefire.
- As of 16 October, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman are open. However, King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh is expected to remain closed until at least 21:00 UTC on 17 October, and Saudi Arabia’s Jazan, Abha, and Najran airports have been regularly closed.
Middle East Conflict: Latest Intelligence & Travel Advice
To support planning, we are updating our Middle East travel advice daily with guidance from our intelligence team on airspace openings and closures, flight operations, and escalating risks impacting movement.
Situation Update: Strait of Hormuz Attacks and Saudi Strikes Intensify
Iranian attacks against commercial shipping in and around the Strait of Hormuz (SoH) have continued to be significantly intensified. On 13 October, a Singapore-flagged container ship was struck by a projectile off Ras Markbut in Oman and sank on 14 October, with all 21 crew evacuated. An Antigua and Barbuda-flagged bulk which was earlier struck near Khasab in Oman on 23 September, sank on 14 October. These mark the first confirmed sinkings since March. Two senior Iranian officials briefed for an article published 14 October that Iran was employing new tactics against shipping to keep oil prices high and increase pressure on Washington ahead of the US midterm elections, warning that vessels would be “safe nowhere, even outside the [SoH]”.
Indirect US-Iran communication is claimed to have continued through Qatar and Pakistan, although negotiations reportedly remain stalled over sequencing, with Washington seeking to address Iran’s nuclear programme from the outset and Tehran prioritising maritime security and the reopening of the SoH. On 14 October, Oman’s foreign ministry stated that its negotiations with Iran over navigation in the SoH were nearing completion but remained dependent on wider US-Iran diplomacy.
Reports on 13 October indicated that Netanyahu had held several discussions with US President Donald Trump regarding renewed joint military operations against Iran, which White House officials have disputed. On 14 October, Netanyahu publicly opposed a pre-emptive strike against Iran before Israel’s 27 October Knesset elections, while leaving open retaliatory action. On 15 October, reports indicated that the Pentagon was preparing strike options against Iranian nuclear or energy infrastructure, while Trump ruled out nuclear strikes and US ground operations in Iran.
On 13 October, the Saudi-led coalition struck oil facilities across western Yemen, including a fuel facility in Sanaa and facilities at Ras Isa in Hodeidah. Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Saree had previously warned that strikes on Sanaa would be met with a “harsh and painful” response, naming Aramco’s headquarters in Dhahran and a Riyadh refinery as potential targets. Hours later, a Houthi ballistic missile reportedly struck an office tower at Aramco’s headquarters complex in Dhahran. The Saudi Ministry of Energy described a “limited fire” with no casualties, although reports indicate that several floors were damaged. Debris from intercepted missiles injured four people and damaged 15 residential properties in Riyadh, and Saudi forces intercepted further Houthi missiles targeting Riyadh on 14 October.
On 15 October, the Saudi-led coalition stated that King Khalid International Airport had been attacked 20 times since 1 October, in total killing 17 people and injuring 333, and that the Houthis had attempted to attack dozens of other Saudi airports, in addition to ports and oil facilities. The Houthis reiterated their warning that Saudi airspace and airports, excluding those serving Mecca and Medina, are unsafe. The same day, a senior Saudi official accused Iran of encouraging the Houthi escalation and stated that Riyadh maintains diplomatic channels with the Houthis, with Oman acting as a facilitator. Houthi political bureau member Mohammed al-Bukhaiti stated on 14 October that Oman, Russia and China had sought a ceasefire, while the Foreign Minister of Yemen’s internationally recognised government (IRG) stated that it was “not calling for a ceasefire” or negotiations.
In Yemen, fighting has continued around Taiz, where the UN warned on 14 October that intensified fighting had cut humanitarian assistance to around 800,000 people. On 15 October, a Houthi missile and drone attack against the presidential palace in Aden reportedly killed five people, including security personnel and civilian employees.
As of 16 October, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman are open. However, King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh has been closed since 10 October and is expected to remain closed until at least 21:00 UTC on 17 October, and Saudi Arabia’s Jazan, Abha, and Najran airports have been regularly closed.
Saudi Arabia
On 13 October, a Houthi ballistic missile struck an office tower at Aramco’s headquarters complex in Dhahran, causing a fire, and debris from intercepted missiles injured four people and damaged 15 residential properties in Riyadh. Saudi forces intercepted further Houthi missiles over Riyadh and al-Kharj on 14 October, and a cruise missile over Medina Province on 15 October, which the Houthis denied launching. On 15 October, the Saudi-led coalition stated that King Khalid International Airport had been attacked 20 times since 1 October, killing 17 people and injuring 333. The airport is expected to remain closed until at least 21:00 UTC on 17 October.
Several international airlines have extended suspensions of services to Saudi Arabia, including to Riyadh, Jeddah, Dammam and Medina, and Japan raised its travel advisory for the entire kingdom on 14 October. On 15 October, the EU-GCC summit scheduled to take place in Riyadh on 24 October was postponed indefinitely, and France confirmed the implementation of a military deployment to protect Saudi energy infrastructure.
As of 16 October, Saudi Arabia’s airspace is open. However, King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh has been closed since 10 October and is expected to remain closed until at least 17 October, and Saudi Arabia’s Jazan, Abha, and Najran airports have been regularly closed.
Kuwait
No attacks have been reported in Kuwait between 13 and 16 October.
As of 16 October, Kuwait’s airspace is open.
Bahrain
No attacks have been reported in Bahrain between 13 and 16 October.
As of 16 October, Bahrain’s airspace is open.
Qatar
No attacks have been reported in Qatar between 13 and 16 October.
As of 16 October, Qatar’s airspace is open.
UAE
No attacks have been reported in the UAE between 13 and 16 October.
As of 16 October, the UAE’s airspace is open.
Oman
Excluding attacks in Omani waters, no attacks have been reported in Oman between 13 and 16 October.
As of 16 October, Oman’s airspace is open.
Regional Advisory
The escalation of attacks against shipping in the SoH, including the first confirmed vessel sinkings since March, likely indicates that Iran has reconstituted some of its maritime strike capabilities or adapted its tactics to compensate for previously degraded capabilities, enabling Tehran to sustain disruption to commercial shipping and regional energy exports. This has almost certainly strengthened Tehran’s negotiating position, and with diplomatic efforts continuing to stall, the likelihood of high-intensity US strikes aimed at degrading Iran’s offensive capabilities and restoring freedom of navigation in the SoH is highly likely rapidly increasing.
The USS Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group (CSG) reportedly arrived at Yokosuka Naval Base in Japan on 16 October, where it will resupply before participating in the US-Japan Keen Sword exercise between 19 and 29 October, after which it is expected to deploy to the CENTCOM area of responsibility (AoR). The CSG is therefore unlikely to arrive in the region before mid-November, after the 3 November US midterm elections, unless it does not participate in the joint exercises with Japan. The USS George Washington and USS George H.W. Bush CSGs remain in the region, with the Bush having returned to the Arabian Sea following a brief port visit to Thailand. The Roosevelt’s arrival could temporarily increase the US presence to three CSGs, depending on whether an existing CSG withdraws.
The scheduling of the Roosevelt CSG’s deployment, which would align the temporary concentration of three CSGs with the period immediately following the midterms, likely supports the assessment that a resumption of full-scale US combat operations against Iran is more likely after the elections. However, there is a realistic possibility of US strikes ahead of the elections. The Pentagon has reportedly instructed CENTCOM to finalise preparations for renewed major combat operations against Iran, while the two CSGs currently in the region, supported by land-based aircraft, provide Washington with sufficient offensive capabilities to conduct limited strikes, particularly against Iranian maritime strike capabilities threatening shipping in the SoH. Long-range bombers could also deploy at short notice to target sites deeper within Iran. Alternatively, Washington could initiate strikes against the Houthis, aiming to degrade one of Iran’s most important regional allies while calculating that such strikes would be less likely to provoke direct Iranian retaliation against targets in regional states.
There are also emerging indications that Israel is preparing for potential renewed escalation, with the Israeli Air Force maintaining heightened readiness and the Military Intelligence Directorate reportedly developing an expanded target list within Iran. While the reported discussions between Trump and Netanyahu could reflect pre-election posturing, they could also indicate that Israel is actively preparing for potential renewed military escalation with Iran.
Iran has threatened to escalate beyond previously established targeting patterns in the event of renewed US strikes. This has included threats to escalate attacks on US military assets, potentially using cluster munitions as in the early-September attack against Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan, as well as strikes against regional energy infrastructure, explicitly naming Saudi oil facilities which the Houthis are currently attacking.
Tehran has also threatened to target US-linked digital infrastructure, including data centres, artificial intelligence facilities and undersea communications cables, particularly in the UAE. Additionally, Iranian officials have threatened the possibility of launching ground incursions into neighbouring countries, with Kuwait the most likely and most vulnerable country to an Iranian ground offensive.
With Saudi Arabia already engaged in an escalating conflict with the Houthis, and the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement strengthening its military cooperation with Pakistan and Turkey, there is a realistic possibility that Iran will seek to limit strikes against Saudi Arabia to reduce the risk of provoking a wider regional conflict, instead concentrating retaliation against Bahrain, Kuwait, the UAE and Jordan. With Saudi airports already compromised by Houthi strikes and regional airports increasingly used as alternatives, this would almost certainly compound disruption to regional aviation and restrict options for commercial travel and evacuation from the region.
The Saudi-led coalition strikes against Houthi oil facilities on 13 October, and the Houthi retaliation against Aramco’s headquarters in Dhahran within hours, demonstrate a rapid tit-for-tat escalation dynamic and a further geographic expansion of Houthi targeting to Saudi Arabia’s Gulf coast. The strike on Aramco’s headquarters, adjacent to King Abdulaziz Air Base, likely indicates that even high-value targets (HVTs) are not reliably protected by air defences. Further Saudi strikes on Sanaa will highly likely be met with further Houthi attacks against Riyadh, Aramco facilities and airports across Saudi Arabia, with King Khalid International Airport likely to remain a priority target.
Saudi Arabia’s accusation that Iran is encouraging the Houthi escalation likely indicates that Riyadh does not regard Tehran as a credible intermediary, with Oman highly likely remaining the preferred channel. Al-Bukhaiti’s stated preference for a comprehensive settlement over a temporary ceasefire likely indicates that the Houthis seek to leverage their attacks to secure broader concessions, including an end to the blockade. However, the Yemeni IRG’s public rejection of negotiations and the continued escalation of Saudi strikes indicate that neither side is willing to make significant concessions, and a near-term de-escalation remains unlikely.
Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:
- Jordanian authorities have warned against publishing videos or information regarding Jordan’s defensive operations without authorisation.
- Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Interior has stated that “[p]hotographing or publishing or circulating information related to countering missiles and drones and the locations of their falls exposes you to legal accountability.”
- In the UAE, authorities have warned that publishing or circulating “rumours, false news, or news from unknown sources through social media platforms or other information technology” is illegal. Reports indicate that Dubai Police have used “electronic monitoring operations” to detect a photo shared within a private WhatsApp group.
- In Bahrain, several people have been confirmed as arrested for “filming, live streaming, clipping, and publishing events in a manner constituting a legal violation”.
- Qatar’s Ministry of Interior warned that gathering at incident sites or photographing and sharing content related to field developments may result in legal accountability and has arrested hundreds of people of various nationalities for “producing and sharing misleading information”.
- Omani authorities have stated: “Beware of sharing or publishing any captured photos or videos. They should be shared only with the competent authorities”.
Request Evacuation Assistance
If you need secure, coordinated support to move personnel out of a high-risk location, our team is ready to help – quickly, calmly, and with care.