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Saudi Airport Attacks Intensify as Gulf Security Risks Rise
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 9 October – 13 October 2026
- On 10 October, a Houthi ballistic missile attack on King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh killed 13 people and injured 309. The airport was struck again on 11 October, killing one further person, and is expected to remain closed until at least 17 October.
- On 11 October, Saudi authorities confirmed an attack against King Fahd International Airport in Dammam, and the Houthis claimed attacks against two Aramco facilities. The Houthis have warned airlines against using all Saudi airports except those serving Mecca and Medina.
- On 11 October, the UK expanded its advice against all but essential travel to Jeddah, Dammam and all Saudi airports except Medina, and the US Mission now requires US government employees to obtain authorisation to use the Riyadh, Jeddah and Dammam airports.
- On 10 October, US President Donald Trump stated that the US “may” join Saudi strikes against the Houthis, prompting a Houthi official to threaten a “swift and painful response” against US interests in the region. A Houthi official also claimed the group had rejected Saudi truce proposals conveyed via Iran.
- UKMTO reported six commercial vessels struck on 11 October, five in the Strait of Hormuz and one at Sohar Anchorage in Oman.
- As of 13 October, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman are open. However, King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh is expected to remain closed until at least 17 October, and Saudi Arabia’s Jazan, Abha, and Najran airports have been regularly closed.
Middle East Conflict: Latest Intelligence & Travel Advice
To support planning, we are updating our Middle East travel advice daily with guidance from our intelligence team on airspace openings and closures, flight operations, and escalating risks impacting movement.
Situation Update: Houthi Attacks and Maritime Strikes Intensify Gulf Tensions
Attacks against commercial shipping have further intensified. The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported six commercial vessels struck on 11 October, five in the Strait of Hormuz (SoH) and one at Sohar Anchorage in Oman. On 12 October, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) claimed to have struck a third supertanker within two days and threatened vessels cooperating with US forces. US forces also struck and disabled a commercial vessel in the Gulf of Oman on 10 October while enforcing the blockade of Iranian ports.
On 9 October, US President Donald Trump threatened Iran with destruction unless Tehran meets US demands, and the Kremlin stated on 10 October that Russian President Vladimir Putin had conveyed Iran’s position on ending the conflict directly to Trump. On 11 October, Iranian officials stated that the US response to Iran’s SoH proposal was insufficient, and Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) secretary Mohsen Rezaei warned that undersea cables, data centres and artificial intelligence facilities in the Gulf, including US-linked assets in the UAE, could be targeted should intense fighting resume. Rezaei also accused the UAE and Saudi Arabia of assisting US efforts to export oil around Iranian restrictions.
On 10 October, a Houthi ballistic missile struck a passenger terminal complex at King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh, killing 12 people and injuring 309, according to Saudi Arabia’s General Authority of Civil Aviation (GACA). The victims included four Saudi citizens and eight foreign nationals, including a US citizen, and the death toll subsequently rose to 13. The attack followed attacks against the airport on 7 and 8 October that killed four people. The Saudi-led coalition described the attack as a “full-fledged war crime” and vowed to respond decisively, and Saudi authorities ordered schools in Riyadh to move online for one week.
On 11 October, a further strike against King Khalid International Airport killed one person and injured 11, and Saudi authorities confirmed an attack against King Fahd International Airport in Dammam. The Houthis claimed attacks against both airports and two Aramco facilities, and warned airlines, travellers and airport workers against using all Saudi airports except those serving Mecca and Medina. Saudi forces intercepted further Houthi missiles and drones over al-Kharj and the Eastern Province on 11 October, and one ballistic missile over Riyadh and two over Khamis Mushait on 12 October. Saudi Arabia’s energy minister warned that the attacks required an “equally serious” Saudi response.
On 10 October, Trump stated that the US could join Saudi strikes against the Houthis, and on 12 October Houthi political bureau member Mohammed al-Bukhaiti threatened a “swift and painful response targeting the US and all its interests in the region” should it do so. On 10 October, the Saudi and Omani foreign ministers discussed “supporting diplomatic solutions to de-escalate tensions”, and on 11 October Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi called his Saudi counterpart, Prince Faisal bin Farhan, offering to help initiate dialogue between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis. Al-Bukhaiti subsequently claimed that Saudi Arabia had accepted Iranian mediation and proposed a one-month and then a two-week truce, both of which the Houthis rejected. Saudi Arabia has not confirmed this claim, and earlier reporting on 9 October citing an anonymous regional source claimed Riyadh has ruled out a ceasefire until Yemeni internationally recognised government (IRG) forces recover recently lost territory.
In Yemen, the Saudi-led coalition announced strikes against 136 Houthi military targets on 9 and 10 October, and further Saudi strikes reportedly targeted Sanaa International Airport and telecommunications infrastructure between 9 and 11 October. On 10 October, government sources acknowledged that IRG forces had not recaptured the Bab al-Mandab Strait or Mayyun Island, while government-aligned forces reported repelling a renewed Houthi attack near Dhubab. Fighting intensified around Taiz on 12 and 13 October, with more than 60 combatants reportedly killed and Houthi forces reportedly tightening their encirclement of the city.
As of 13 October, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman are open. However, King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh has been closed since 10 October and is expected to remain closed until at least 17 October, and Saudi Arabia’s Jazan, Abha, and Najran airports have been regularly closed.
Saudi Arabia
On 10 October, a Houthi ballistic missile strike on a passenger terminal complex at King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh killed 12 people and injured 309, according to GACA, with the death toll subsequently rising to 13. On 11 October, a further strike on the airport killed one person and injured 11, and Saudi authorities confirmed an attack on King Fahd International Airport in Dammam. The Houthis claimed attacks against both airports and two Aramco facilities, and warned against the use of all Saudi airports except those serving Mecca and Medina. Saudi forces intercepted further Houthi missiles and drones over al-Kharj and the Eastern Province on 11 October, and over Riyadh and Khamis Mushait on 12 October. King Khalid International Airport is expected to remain closed until at least 17 October, several airlines including Qatar Airways have suspended services to Riyadh and Dammam, and school teaching in Riyadh moved online for one week.
On 11 October, the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) expanded its advice against all but essential travel to the cities of Jeddah and Dammam and to all airports in Saudi Arabia except Medina International Airport, in addition to Riyadh, Asir, Najran and Jazan provinces and Taif, warning that further attacks against airports are “very likely”. The European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) expanded its Saudi airspace advisory on 9 October, and the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued a new safety warning for Saudi airspace on 11 October.
On 13 October, international media reported that Saudi Arabia had stopped issuing public missile and drone attack warnings after 29 September, despite increasing Houthi attacks, including approximately a dozen strikes against Riyadh, according to two Western officials. Public alerts resumed on 12 October, warning of threats to Riyadh and southern cities. Two Western officials stated that Saudi authorities had previously justified suspending alerts on the grounds that they were excessively disruptive and had prompted public complaints, although Riyadh has not officially explained the decision.
As of 13 October, Saudi Arabia’s airspace is open. However, King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh has been closed since 10 October and is expected to remain closed until at least 17 October, and Saudi Arabia’s Jazan, Abha, and Najran airports have been regularly closed.
Kuwait
No attacks have been reported in Kuwait between 9 and 13 October.
As of 13 October, Kuwait’s airspace is open.
Bahrain
No attacks have been reported in Bahrain between 9 and 13 October.
As of 13 October, Bahrain’s airspace is open.
Qatar
No attacks have been reported in Qatar between 9 and 13 October.
As of 13 October, Qatar’s airspace is open.
UAE
No attacks have been reported in the UAE between 9 and 13 October.
As of 13 October, the UAE’s airspace is open.
Oman
Excluding attacks in Omani waters, no attacks have been reported in Oman between 9 and 13 October.
As of 13 October, Oman’s airspace is open.
Regional Advisory
The UKMTO reporting six vessels struck on 11 October alone almost certainly reflects a further intensification of Iranian attacks against shipping. Continued maritime confrontation almost certainly sustains the risk of a wider escalation, with any further US strikes against reconstituted Iranian capabilities around the SoH highly likely to trigger Iranian retaliation against regional states hosting US military facilities. Rezaei’s warning regarding undersea cables, data centres and AI facilities likely indicates an intent to broaden Iran’s target set to include US-linked commercial and technology infrastructure in the Gulf, particularly in the UAE, which was directly threatened, should large-scale hostilities resume.
US Central Command (CENTCOM) is highly likely preparing for the option of renewed large-scale operations against Iran, potentially conducted jointly with Israel. The USS Theodore Roosevelt carrier strike group (CSG) is expected to arrive in theatre from late October, and will almost certainly be prepared to commence combat operations shortly after arrival. CENTCOM conducted strikes against Iran within days of the USS George Washington CSG arriving into theatre. The US may also maintain a temporary three-carrier posture in the CENTCOM area of responsibility (AoR), providing it with more strike capacity and operational flexibility to conduct high-intensity operations against Iran and potentially sustain simultaneous military operations against the Houthis in Yemen.
Renewed large-scale operations would almost certainly be less politically costly for the Trump administration following the 3 November midterms. However, strikes ahead of the elections would likely send a strategic message to Tehran that Washington is willing to prioritise its military and foreign policy objectives over domestic political considerations and would likely help achieve greater operational surprise.
Trump’s statement that the US may join Saudi strikes against the Houthis marks a notable shift in Washington’s position, following repeated US refusals of Saudi requests for direct military support. Washington may calculate that direct involvement will enable it to restore goodwill with Riyadh, while also indirectly weakening Iran by degrading the capabilities of one of its principal regional partners. Washington also likely calculates that operations against the Houthis will trigger a more limited Iranian response than direct strikes against Iran.
Direct US involvement would highly likely trigger Houthi attacks against US interests in the region. These would likely include US military facilities and diplomatic missions in Saudi Arabia and the wider region, and potentially US-linked commercial interests, alongside a likely resumption of Houthi attacks against US naval vessels and commercial shipping in the Red Sea.
The Houthi attack against King Fahd International Airport in Dammam and claimed attacks against Aramco facilities in the Eastern Province mark a further geographic expansion of Houthi targeting. Houthi attacks. The Houthi declaration that all Saudi airports except those serving Mecca and Medina are legitimate targets indicates that further airport attacks across all of Saudi Arabia are highly likely. The FCDO has revised its advice against all but essential travel to all Saudi airports except Medina.
The 10 October attack was almost certainly the most lethal Houthi attack against Saudi Arabia during the current conflict and the most deadly attack in the Kingdom in over a decade, with the strike on a passenger terminal causing mass casualties among travellers and airport staff. Repeated successful strikes against King Khalid International Airport on consecutive days highly likely indicate that Saudi air defences in the area have been unable to reliably intercept Houthi ballistic missiles, consistent with reported interceptor shortages and the possible concentration of air defence batteries to protect other high-value targets (HVTs) such as energy infrastructure and palaces.
The casualty rate was likely exacerbated by the reported absence of public early warning alerts. Due to public early warning alerts and air raid sirens in Saudi Arabia having been inconsistently activated in recent weeks, travellers should not rely on receiving advance warning of an attack, particularly at airports. Although public alerts reportedly resumed on 12 October, their future reliability remains uncertain. Alerts may be deliberately suspended to limit disruption and maintain a sense of normality.
The coalition’s vow to respond decisively likely indicates that Riyadh will intensify strikes in Yemen, potentially including against Sanaa International Airport and other HVTs in Sanaa, which would highly likely trigger further escalatory Houthi attacks. The Houthis directly threatened on 13 October that strikes on Sanaa will be met with a “harsh and painful response” against Riyadh.
Yemeni IRG acknowledgement that the Bab al-Mandeb and Mayyun Island have not been recaptured highly likely confirms that the counteroffensive in Yemen has stalled. Advances will almost certainly require significant Saudi air support, which will almost certainly sustain Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia.
The Saudi-Omani and Saudi-Iranian ministerial contacts are the first observable signs of diplomatic engagement on the Saudi-Houthi conflict since the escalation. The Houthi claim that Saudi Arabia accepted Iranian mediation and proposed one-month and two-week truces remains unconfirmed and is highly likely partly intended to portray Riyadh as weakened. If accurate, it would indicate that the attacks against Saudi airports and energy infrastructure are imposing considerable costs on Riyadh.
The publicly claimed Houthi rejection of the unverified proposals would almost certainly indicate that the group assesses it is able to fulfil its primary stated objective of reopening Houthi-controlled airspace while concurrently holding its recent territorial gains. However, conflicting claims that Riyadh is unwilling to accept a ceasefire until the territory lost to the Houthi offensive has been reclaimed likely indicate that neither side is willing to make significant concessions, and a near-term de-escalation remains unlikely.
Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:
- Jordanian authorities have warned against publishing videos or information regarding Jordan’s defensive operations without authorisation.
- Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Interior has stated that “[p]hotographing or publishing or circulating information related to countering missiles and drones and the locations of their falls exposes you to legal accountability.”
- In the UAE, authorities have warned that publishing or circulating “rumours, false news, or news from unknown sources through social media platforms or other information technology” is illegal. Reports indicate that Dubai Police have used “electronic monitoring operations” to detect a photo shared within a private WhatsApp group.
- In Bahrain, several people have been confirmed as arrested for “filming, live streaming, clipping, and publishing events in a manner constituting a legal violation”.
- Qatar’s Ministry of Interior warned that gathering at incident sites or photographing and sharing content related to field developments may result in legal accountability and has arrested hundreds of people of various nationalities for “producing and sharing misleading information”.
- Omani authorities have stated: “Beware of sharing or publishing any captured photos or videos. They should be shared only with the competent authorities”.
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