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US Rules Out Pre-Election Strikes on Iran as Maritime Attacks Intensify and Houthi Strikes Disrupt Saudi Aviation
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 6 October – 9 October 2026
- On 8 October, US President Donald Trump stated that the US would not attack Iran before the 3 November midterm elections, following reports that the Pentagon had drawn up plans for an intense three-day campaign against Iran.
- The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported nine tankers attacked in the Strait of Hormuz (SoH) between 1 and 6 October, and a further tanker struck north of Qatar on 7 October, causing casualties.
- Houthi attacks against Abha and Riyadh international airports on 6 and 7 October killed three people and injured 36. On 8 October, a Saudia airliner was heavily damaged by fire at Riyadh airport during a Houthi-claimed missile attack, and three Saudi citizens were killed.
- On 8 October, the UK updated its Saudi Arabia travel advisory to advise against all but essential travel to Riyadh, Asir, Najran and Jazan provinces and Taif, while several international airlines suspended flights to Riyadh.
- In Yemen, reporting on 7 October indicated that the Saudi-backed counteroffensive had overall stalled, while the Saudi-led coalition announced strikes against 82 Houthi targets.
- As of 9 October, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman are open. However, Saudi Arabia’s Jazan, Abha, and Najran airports have been regularly closed, and operations at King Khalid International Airport were disrupted by Houthi strikes.
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Regional Escalation: Maritime Attacks Intensify as US-Israeli Strikes Loom and Houthi Attacks Disrupt Saudi Aviation
Iranian attacks against commercial shipping have further intensified. The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) stated on 6 October that nine tankers had been attacked in the Strait of Hormuz (SoH) since 1 October, equivalent to half the total recorded across the SoH and the wider Gulf in September. On 7 October, a tanker was struck by multiple projectiles approximately 51 nautical miles north of Madinat ash Shamal, Qatar, with casualties reported, the first attack against a tanker in the western Gulf in several weeks. Iranian state media also reported major explosions in the SoH on 8 October, potentially involving tankers striking naval mines, although these claims remain unverified.
Following the 2 October Camp David meeting in the US to discuss next steps in the conflict, reports published on 7 October indicated that the Pentagon has instructed US Central Command (CENTCOM) to conclude preparations for a resumption of major combat operations against Iran. US and Israeli officials briefed that strikes, potentially targeting nuclear, infrastructure and energy sites and conducted jointly with Israel, could take place before the 3 November US midterm elections and Israel’s elections a week earlier. An Israeli official briefed that the chances of this happening before the elections were “not high” but could not be ruled out, and would “increase significantly” after the midterms.
On 8 October, reporting indicated that the Pentagon had drawn up plans for an intense, three-day campaign targeting Iran’s missile and drone arsenals, and potentially also energy facilities and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) command sites. Trump also stated that the US would not attack Iran “at any time prior to the Midterm Elections”, citing “productive discussions” with Tehran. The Israel Defence Forces (IDF) chief of staff, Eyal Zamir, reportedly warned that a renewed joint US-Israeli campaign could postpone Israel’s 27 October elections, according to Israeli media reporting citing US officials.
Saudi Arabia’s General Authority of Civil Aviation (GACA) stated that an attack against Abha International Airport on 6 October killed two expatriates (Moroccan and Algerian) and injured 28 people, and that an attack against King Khalid International Airport on 7 October killed a Sudanese resident and injured eight people, including five Saudi nationals. On 8 October, the Houthis claimed a further ballistic missile attack against Riyadh’s international airport and reiterated warnings to international airlines against operating in Saudi airspace. On 8 October, a Saudia airliner was heavily damaged by fire while parked at Riyadh’s King Khalid International Airport during a Houthi-claimed missile attack, with two Houthi attacks resulting in the deaths of three Saudi citizens, and debris from an intercepted missile damaged a kindergarten and a medical clinic in Riyadh. Flights at the airport resumed early 9 October.
In Yemen, fighting around Dhubab continued on 6 October, and reporting on 7 October indicated that the internationally recognised government (IRG) counteroffensive had stalled. The Saudi-led coalition announced strikes against 82 Houthi targets on 7 October, and government forces claimed more than 2,100 targeting operations and gains in southern Marib between 6 and 8 October. Reports on 7 October also indicated that Riyadh and Damascus have discussed a potential deployment of 10,000-20,000 Syrian troops to Yemen, but Syrian authorities subsequently denied the reports.
As of 9 October, the US Department of State maintains Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman at “Level 3: Reconsider Travel”.
As of 9 October, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman are open. However, Saudi Arabia’s Jazan, Abha, and Najran airports have been regularly closed, and operations were disrupted at King Khalid International Airport due to the Houthi strikes.
Saudi Arabia
Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia intensified between 6 and 9 October, with international airports increasingly targeted. An attack against Abha International Airport on 6 October killed two foreign residents and injured 28 people, according to Saudi Arabia’s GACA. On 7 October, an attack against King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh killed a Sudanese resident and injured eight people, including five Saudi nationals.
On 8 October, the Houthis claimed a further wave of strikes against King Khalid International Airport, Najran Airport and Khamis Mushait air base, and reiterated warnings to international airlines against operating in Saudi airspace. A Saudia airliner was heavily damaged by fire while parked at King Khalid International Airport during the attack, with the airport suspending operations for several hours, and three Saudi citizens were killed. Debris from an intercepted missile also damaged a kindergarten and a medical clinic in Riyadh, according to Saudi Civil Defence. Hundreds of flights were cancelled or delayed, and Lufthansa and several Indian carriers suspended Riyadh flights.
On 8 October, the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) expanded its advice against all but essential travel to Riyadh, Asir, Najran and Jazan provinces, as well as Taif, while Norway, the Netherlands and India also strengthened their respective travel advisories. The US Mission stated that US government employees now require special authorisation to use King Khalid International Airport.
As of 9 October, Saudi Arabia’s airspace is open. However, Saudi Arabia’s Jazan, Abha, and Najran airports have been regularly closed, and operations at King Khalid International Airport were disrupted by Houthi strikes before resuming early 9 October.
Kuwait
No attacks have been reported in Kuwait between 6 and 9 October.
As of 9 October, Kuwait’s airspace is open.
Bahrain
No attacks have been reported in Bahrain between 6 and 9 October.
As of 9 October, Bahrain’s airspace is open.
Qatar
No attacks have been reported in Qatar between 6 and 9 October.
As of 9 October, Qatar’s airspace is open.
UAE
No attacks have been reported in the UAE between 6 and 9 October.
As of 9 October, the UAE’s airspace is open.
Oman
Excluding attacks in Omani waters, no attacks have been reported in Oman between 6 and 9 October.
As of 9 October, Oman’s airspace is open.
Regional Advisory
Intensified attacks in the maritime domain almost certainly increase the risk of confrontation and subsequent Iranian retaliation against regional states. The uptick in Iranian attacks against vessels since late September likely increases the probability of a further round of US strikes against reconstituted Iranian capabilities around the SoH, previously referred to by US officials as “mowing the lawn”. Such attacks would highly likely trigger Iranian retaliation against regional states hosting US military facilities. Iranian retaliation is likely to be larger in scale than in previous exchanges, following the reported use of cluster munition warheads against Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan in September and public Iranian threats that future retaliation against US strikes will be more severe.
Trump’s statement that the US will not attack Iran before the midterms is likely to be of limited value in assessing the risk of renewed strikes. Trump has previously leveraged deception and strategic ambiguity around potential military action. Strikes ahead of the midterms could help achieve an element of surprise and demonstrate to Tehran that Trump is prepared to prioritise its Iran objectives over domestic political considerations. CENTCOM’s preparations for renewed full-scale operations are highly likely to be genuine, with the deployment of an additional carrier strike group (CSG), additional amphibious forces and thousands of personnel indicating that US military pressure on Iran will be sustained.
A resumption of full-scale US combat operations remains more likely after the 3 November US midterms, due to the political costs of such a campaign. However, more limited operations could be ordered ahead of the elections, with recent comments made by Israeli officials lending greater credibility to the possibility of an earlier escalation.
A short, intensive three-day campaign of the type reportedly under consideration would be unlikely to remain contained. Iranian retaliation would likely be substantial and would likely involve a greater focus on regional energy infrastructure than in previous exchanges, particularly if Iranian oil, gas or other energy facilities were targeted.
Targeting Iran’s reconstituted missile and drone stockpiles, manufacturing facilities, associated support infrastructure, and nuclear facilities, much of which is held in hardened underground sites, would also likely require strategic bomber support. With B-1 bombers withdrawn from RAF Fairford, any renewed deployment of strategic bombers to RAF Fairford, Diego Garcia, or other forward operating locations would likely represent a notable indicator and warning of preparations for major operations against Iran. However, strikes limited to exposed missile launchers, air defence systems, command-and-control facilities and other above-ground military infrastructure would not necessarily require strategic bomber support and could be conducted by assets already in theatre.
The deployment of the USS Theodore Roosevelt carrier strike group (CSG) and Makin Island amphibious ready group (ARG), which are expected to reach the CENTCOM area of responsibility (AoR) from late October, will bolster US capability in the region, particularly if the Roosevelt CSG deploys in addition to, rather than in place of, an existing CSG.
A three-carrier posture would almost certainly increase US capacity to sustain its blockade, conduct high-intensity strikes against Iran and potentially also support offensive operations against the Houthis. The arrival of these forces from late October, and whether the USS George Washington withdraws from theatre, will likely be key indicators and warnings of the timing and scale of any renewed campaign. There is a realistic possibility that a temporary overlap of three CSGs could be used to support the short, high-intensity three-day strike campaign reportedly under consideration ahead of the US midterms, placing late October to early November as the most likely period for any such operation to be initiated, based on the assessed arrival of the Roosevelt CSG.
Houthi attacks against Saudi international airports are now causing civilian fatalities, including in Riyadh, marking a notable increase in the risk posed to travellers, aviation personnel and other passengers across the kingdom. Reiterated Houthi threats against international airlines highly likely indicate that further attacks against King Khalid International Airport and airports in southern Saudi Arabia will occur in the coming days. Further airline suspensions and short-notice disruption to civil aviation across Saudi Arabia are highly likely, with Abha, Jazan, Najran and Riyadh airports at the highest risk.
The Saudi-backed IRG counteroffensive in Yemen has so far failed to deliver verified major territorial gains, excluding a push along the coast up to Dhubab and potentially the Jabal Kahbub mountain area. Initial IRG claims regarding the recapture of Mocha were highly likely inaccurate. The offensive has reportedly stalled with heavy fighting ongoing on the southwestern Dhubab axis, while the Houthis continue efforts to isolate Taiz through a pincer movement.
IRG ground forces appear to have made limited territorial progress relative to the scale of their reported operations, likely reflecting their continued dependence on Saudi air support and difficulties in capturing and consolidating control over Houthi-held territory. Saudi air support will almost certainly remain critical to sustaining IRG offensive and defensive operations.
A stalled counteroffensive is likely to prolong high-intensity conflict rather than compel Houthi concessions, while incentivising Riyadh to deepen its involvement and activate further external support. This is likely to sustain the Houthi cross-border strike campaign against Saudi territory, with the Houthis highly likely to continue escalating attacks against Riyadh and high-value targets deeper into the kingdom, as previous escalation thresholds have almost certainly already been met.
Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:
- Jordanian authorities have warned against publishing videos or information regarding Jordan’s defensive operations without authorisation.
- Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Interior has stated that “[p]hotographing or publishing or circulating information related to countering missiles and drones and the locations of their falls exposes you to legal accountability.”
- In the UAE, authorities have warned that publishing or circulating “rumours, false news, or news from unknown sources through social media platforms or other information technology” is illegal. Reports indicate that Dubai Police have used “electronic monitoring operations” to detect a photo shared within a private WhatsApp group.
- In Bahrain, several people have been confirmed as arrested for “filming, live streaming, clipping, and publishing events in a manner constituting a legal violation”.
- Qatar’s Ministry of Interior warned that gathering at incident sites or photographing and sharing content related to field developments may result in legal accountability and has arrested hundreds of people of various nationalities for “producing and sharing misleading information”.
- Omani authorities have stated: “Beware of sharing or publishing any captured photos or videos. They should be shared only with the competent authorities”.
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