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Gulf Security Risks Rise as Yemen Conflict Escalates
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 2 October – 6 October 2026
- On 2 October, US President Donald Trump’s senior national security officials met at Camp David to discuss next steps on Iran and Yemen. On 5 October, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian stated that negotiations with the US were “meaningless”.
- On 2 October, a Kuwait-flagged tanker was struck by a projectile in the Strait of Hormuz (SoH), with further tankers reportedly struck on 4 and 5 October.
- The Houthis claimed attacks against Aramco’s refinery south of Riyadh on 3 October and King Khalid International Airport on 5 October, and declared Saudi airspace unsafe for civil aviation. Saudi authorities confirmed attacks on Jazan and Najran airports on 5 October, injuring three people.
- On 5 October, the Saudi-led coalition stated that 100 fighter jets took part in the launch of “Operation Dawn of Yemen”, destroying 324 high-value targets, in support of a nationwide Yemeni government counteroffensive.
- On 5 October, Yemeni government forces claimed to have retaken Dhubab and Mocha and announced a “strategic offensive” on Sanaa. The Houthis denied that Mocha had fallen, and had cut the main Taiz-Aden road on 4 October.
- On 5 October, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey agreed to move immediately to practical implementation of the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement.
- As of 6 October, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman are open. However, Saudi Arabia’s Jazan, Abha, and Najran airports have been regularly closed, and operations were disrupted at King Khalid International Airport due to the Houthi strikes.
Middle East Conflict: Latest Intelligence & Travel Advice
To support planning, we are updating our Middle East travel advice daily with guidance from our intelligence team on airspace openings and closures, flight operations, and escalating risks impacting movement.
Situation Update: Houthi Attacks Threaten Saudi Aviation and Energy Infrastructure
On 2 October, a Kuwait-flagged tanker was struck by a projectile in the Strait of Hormuz (SoH), with five Indian crew members rescued and brought ashore with the assistance of Omani authorities. Further tankers were reportedly struck by unidentified projectiles in the SoH on 4 and 5 October.
On 2 October, US President Donald Trump’s senior national security officials, chaired by Vice President JD Vance, met for several hours at Camp David to discuss next steps in the Iran war and the Saudi-Houthi conflict in Yemen, according to US officials. A US official briefed that “things were decided or at least deeply discussed”.
On 4 October, the Pentagon confirmed that all US bombers deployed to RAF Fairford in the UK, approximately a dozen B-1s, had redeployed to the US. The move followed arrests near the base in an incident that UK Prime Minister Andy Burnham stated has “strong indications” of Iranian involvement, which Iran has denied.
Iranian officials have hardened their position on the SoH and warned of a stronger response should US strikes against Iran resume. Parliament Speaker and key negotiator Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf stated on 4 October that the SoH will remain closed “until our seven conditions based on the Islamabad Memorandum are met”, and President Masoud Pezeshkian stated on 5 October that negotiations with the US were “meaningless”. Reports on 2 October indicated that Tehran is preparing a broader retaliatory campaign involving allied groups in the event of renewed large-scale conflict, and a senior Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) adviser reportedly warned US warships against approaching the SoH on 4-5 October.
On 3 October, a major fire broke out at Saudi Aramco’s refinery south of Riyadh. Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Saree claimed a ballistic missile and drone attack against Aramco in Riyadh, which Saudi-led coalition spokesperson Major General Turki al-Maliki described as “misleading”. On 5 October, the Houthis claimed missile and drone attacks against King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh, the Petro Rabigh refinery in Mecca Province, Abha Airport and military sites in Khamis Mushait, Najran and Jazan, and declared Saudi airspace unsafe for civil aviation, excluding the airspace over Mecca and Medina. Saudi Arabia’s civil aviation authority stated on 6 October that attacks against Jazan and Najran airports on 5 October caused three injuries and material damage, but has not confirmed the other claimed strikes.
In Yemen, on 4 October, Houthi forces reportedly seized the al-Safiya area and cut the main road linking Taiz to Aden, effectively isolating Taiz from Aden. The same day, Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) chairman Rashad al-Alimi announced a nationwide counteroffensive to retake Houthi-held territory, including Sanaa, with the Saudi-led coalition pledging full operational support. US officials stated that the US is providing intelligence and targeting support, but the US has so far declined Saudi requests to strike the Houthis.
Reports on 2 October indicated that 30,000-40,000 Pakistani troops have been deployed to Saudi Arabia to support border protection and air defence, citing a Pakistani official. The same reporting indicated that Pakistan sent four cargo aircraft carrying air defence systems, light artillery, drones and counter-drone systems to Aden in September, and that Pakistani military advisers are working alongside Saudi counterparts in support of Yemeni government forces. On 5 October, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey agreed to move immediately to practical implementation of the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, agreeing to “activate collective deterrence measures”.
On 5 October, the Saudi-backed coalition stated that 100 fighter jets took part in the launch of “Operation Dawn of Yemen”, destroying 324 high-value targets (HVTs), and that it was providing round-the-clock air support to Yemeni government forces and air protection for the Bab al-Mandab Strait (BaM). Multiple explosions were reported in Sanaa. Government forces subsequently claimed to have taken Dhubab and recaptured Mocha, held by the Houthis since 10 September, and announced a “strategic offensive” on Sanaa. The Houthis denied that Mocha has been recaptured by the counteroffensive, and the claims remain unverified.
As of 6 October, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman are open. However, Saudi Arabia’s Jazan, Abha, and Najran airports have been regularly closed, and operations were disrupted at King Khalid International Airport due to the Houthi strikes.
Saudi Arabia
On 3 October, a major fire broke out at Saudi Aramco’s refinery south of Riyadh. The Houthis claimed a ballistic missile and drone attack against the facility, which the Saudi-led coalition described as “misleading”. Saudi authorities and Aramco have not stated the cause of the fire. On 2 October, a Houthi projectile reportedly struck a school in Najran and three ballistic missiles were intercepted over Khamis Mushait. On 3 October, debris from an intercepted Houthi missile injured one person and damaged property in Asir region.
On 5 October, the Houthis claimed attacks against King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh, the Petro Rabigh refinery, Abha Airport and military sites in Khamis Mushait, Najran and Jazan. Saudi Arabia’s civil aviation authority stated on 6 October that attacks against Jazan and Najran airports on 5 October caused three injuries and material damage.
As of 6 October, Saudi Arabia’s airspace is open. However, Saudi Arabia’s Jazan, Abha, and Najran airports have been regularly closed, and operations were disrupted at King Khalid International Airport due to the Houthi strikes.
Kuwait
No attacks have been reported in Kuwait between 2 and 6 October.
As of 6 October, Kuwait’s airspace is open.
Bahrain
No attacks have been reported in Bahrain between 2 and 6 October.
As of 6 October, Bahrain’s airspace is open.
Qatar
No attacks have been reported in Qatar between 2 and 6 October.
As of 6 October, Qatar’s airspace is open.
UAE
No attacks have been reported in the UAE between 2 and 6 October.
As of 6 October, the UAE’s airspace is open.
Oman
Excluding attacks in Omani waters, no attacks have been reported in Oman between 2 and 6 October.
As of 6 October, Oman’s airspace is open.
Regional Advisory
Continued reciprocal attacks in the maritime domain, including the 2 October strike against a Kuwait-flagged tanker, almost certainly sustain the risk of confrontation and subsequent Iranian retaliation against regional states. The uptick in Iranian attacks against vessels since late September likely increases the probability of a further round of US strikes against reconstituted Iranian capabilities around the SoH, previously referred to by US officials as “mowing the lawn”, which would highly likely trigger Iranian retaliation against US military facilities in regional states. Such retaliation is likely to remain limited in scope, but larger in scale than in previous exchanges, following the reported use of cluster munition warheads against Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan in September and the public warnings of a stronger response to US military operations.
The unannounced Camp David meeting, the last comparable instance of which preceded Israel’s war against Iran in June 2025, likely indicates that Washington is strongly weighing options for renewed military action against Iran and potential involvement in Yemen. However, a return to major sustained US combat operations remains most likely after the 3 November midterm elections, excluding more limited operations to degrade reconstituted Iranian capabilities that threaten transit through the SoH.
The withdrawal of US strategic bombers from RAF Fairford, publicly reported as reflecting force protection concerns, may also reflect a lack of intent by the Trump administration to imminently resume large-scale operations against Iran. The potential redeployment of strategic bombers to RAF Fairford or other key staging grounds for operations against Iran would likely serve as a key indicator and warning for a renewed and more sustained US air campaign.
Tehran’s hardened position and reported preparation of a broader retaliatory campaign involving allied groups likely indicate that any resumption of large-scale US strikes would be met with a multi-axis response, including from Iraqi militias and the Houthis. Such a response would highly likely include attacks against Gulf states hosting US forces and regional energy infrastructure. Pezeshkian’s public dismissal of negotiations likely indicates a further hardening of Tehran’s position, with Pezeshkian having broadly pursued a more open attitude to negotiations within the Iranian regime.
Operation Dawn of Yemen and the Yemeni internationally recognised government (IRG) counteroffensive almost certainly mark the most significant Saudi-backed military effort against the Houthis since 2022. The scale of the campaign highly likely indicates that Riyadh has calculated that a decisive escalation is less costly in the medium to long term than sustaining calibrated strikes while the Houthis hold the BaM coastline and continue limited attacks against Saudi territory, and that it is prepared to absorb significantly intensified Houthi strikes across the kingdom as a cost. Claimed gains around Dhubab and Mocha would, if confirmed, mark significant progress towards retaking the BaM coastline, although the seizure of Mocha remains unconfirmed. Any confirmed IRG successes, particularly around the BaM or towards Sanaa, would highly likely further increase the intensity of Houthi strikes against Saudi Arabia, as the Houthis seek to impose costs on Riyadh and deter further advances.
The claimed Houthi attack against Aramco’s refinery south of Riyadh on 3 October was almost certainly the most significant Houthi attack against the Riyadh region during the current conflict, and was followed on 5 October by a claimed attack against King Khalid International Airport. Both followed Saudi-backed strikes on Sanaa, which were previously a key indicator and warning of Houthi attacks against Riyadh. However, the broader escalation of the conflict in Yemen and intensification of strikes on Sanaa likely indicates that further Houthi attacks on Riyadh and other major targets deeper into Saudi Arabia are likely, as previous escalation thresholds have already been met.
The reissuing of Houthi threats against Saudi airspace, and the targeting of multiple airports and energy targets, highly likely indicate an intent to impose costs on Saudi civil aviation and energy infrastructure across the kingdom. Further escalatory Houthi attacks against Riyadh, Jeddah and other major targets, and short-notice disruption to civil aviation across Saudi Arabia are highly likely.
The agreement to rapidly deploy forces and capabilities under the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement likely reflects Riyadh’s effort to bolster its air defence and border security ahead of an anticipated intensification of Houthi attacks. Pakistan’s reported arms deliveries to Aden and deployment of military advisers in support of Yemeni forces indicate that Islamabad’s involvement already extends beyond the defence of Saudi territory, although the size and remit of any new deployment remain unclear and Pakistan has not yet committed troops to combat operations in Yemen.
Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:
- Jordanian authorities have warned against publishing videos or information regarding Jordan’s defensive operations without authorisation.
- Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Interior has stated that “[p]hotographing or publishing or circulating information related to countering missiles and drones and the locations of their falls exposes you to legal accountability.”
- In the UAE, authorities have warned that publishing or circulating “rumours, false news, or news from unknown sources through social media platforms or other information technology” is illegal. Reports indicate that Dubai Police have used “electronic monitoring operations” to detect a photo shared within a private WhatsApp group.
- In Bahrain, several people have been confirmed as arrested for “filming, live streaming, clipping, and publishing events in a manner constituting a legal violation”.
- Qatar’s Ministry of Interior warned that gathering at incident sites or photographing and sharing content related to field developments may result in legal accountability and has arrested hundreds of people of various nationalities for “producing and sharing misleading information”.
- Omani authorities have stated: “Beware of sharing or publishing any captured photos or videos. They should be shared only with the competent authorities”.
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