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Maritime Clashes Keep Gulf States at Risk of Renewed Strikes
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 25 – 29 September 2026
- Reports published on 28 September indicated that eight US Marines were injured in a previously undisclosed Iranian cruise missile attack against a vessel in the Strait of Hormuz (SoH) on 14 September.
- On 26 September, US President Donald Trump rejected Iran’s seven-day proposal to reopen the SoH and restart negotiations, and on 28 September denied reporting that he was willing to offer sanctions relief and frozen funds in return for concrete nuclear steps.
- The USS Theodore Roosevelt departed San Diego on 27 September for an extended deployment to the Middle East, reportedly to relieve the USS George Washington.
- On 26 September, Saudi air defences intercepted two Houthi drones launched towards the Riyadh region, the second attempted Houthi attack against the capital since 2022, and two ballistic missiles targeting Khamis Mushait. Early warning alerts were issued in Jazan and Najran on 28 September.
- On 25 September, Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council chairman called for a general mobilisation against the Houthis, and the military chiefs of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey agreed to deepen coordination under the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement.
- As of 29 September, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman are open. However, Jazan, Abha, and Najran airports in southern Saudi Arabia have recently been regularly closed due to the Houthi threat.
Middle East Conflict: Latest Intelligence & Travel Advice
To support planning, we are updating our Middle East travel advice daily with guidance from our intelligence team on airspace openings and closures, flight operations, and escalating risks impacting movement.
Situation Update: Iran-US Tensions Persist as Gulf Security Risks Continue
Reports published on 28 September indicate that eight US Marines were injured on 14 September when an Iranian anti-ship cruise missile struck a vessel they were operating on in the Strait of Hormuz (SoH). US officials briefed that the Marines sustained smoke inhalation and concussion symptoms and have since returned to duty. The vessel was not a US Navy ship, and the attack had not previously been disclosed by the Pentagon. A US official also briefed that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) continues to attempt to target vessels in the region almost daily.
On 25 September, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi presented a seven-day proposal at the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in New York to reopen the SoH and restart negotiations, which Iran stated had been conveyed to Washington through Qatari mediators. The proposal calls for the US to lift its naval blockade of Iranian ports, waive sanctions on Iranian oil sales, release an estimated USD 12 billion in frozen Iranian assets, and observe a wider regional ceasefire including in Lebanon and Yemen, after which Iran would reopen the SoH and begin negotiations on a final agreement. On 26 September, President Donald Trump stated that he had rejected the proposal, describing it as unacceptable.
Trump stated on 27 September that he expected talks with Iran to resume this week. However, Iranian state media reported on 28 September that the Iranian delegation at the UNGA had “no plans” for a further negotiating round with the US, stating that Iran’s positions had been conveyed through a Qatari mediator and that it was awaiting a formal US response. Araghchi had stated on 26 September that Tehran remained open to diplomacy but that no rejection had yet been conveyed through the mediators.
On 28 September, US media reported, citing US officials, that Trump was willing to provide sanctions relief and release frozen Iranian funds in return for concrete Iranian steps on its nuclear programme. A US official stated that Iran had indicated flexibility on nuclear issues, but that the two sides remained apart on the timing of commitments and which party would act first. Trump subsequently denied the report, describing it as a “HOAX” and stating that he had offered Iran “NOTHING”.
Also on 28 September, Saudi Arabian media, citing unnamed sources in Pakistan, reported that Iran had agreed to halt uranium enrichment in exchange for an easing of US sanctions. The claim has not been independently confirmed.
The USS Theodore Roosevelt carrier strike group (CSG) departed San Diego on 27 September for an extended deployment to the Middle East. The Roosevelt CSG is reportedly expected to relieve the USS George Washington, which entered the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AoR) in mid-August. The Roosevelt’s crew were reportedly advised in August to plan for a deployment of over seven months.
On 26 September, the Saudi-led coalition stated that Saudi air defences had intercepted two Houthi drones launched towards the Riyadh region and two ballistic missiles targeting Khamis Mushait, with no casualties or damage reported. Saudi Civil Defence later issued further alerts for Khamis Mushait, Abha and Jazan. Houthi Political Bureau member Hezam al-Asad described the operation as a “small-scale rehearsal for a full-scale escalation”. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Secretary-General condemned the attacks as a “perilous escalation”.
On 25 September, the military chiefs of staff of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey held their first meeting under the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, agreeing to deepen intelligence sharing, military coordination and capability integration. Saudi Defence Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman stated on 26 September that he had affirmed with Pakistan’s Chief of Defence Forces, Field Marshal Asim Munir, continued joint efforts to confront attacks against the kingdom under the agreement.
In Yemen, the internationally recognised government’s (IRG’s) Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) chairman Rashad al-Alimi called on 25 September for a general mobilisation against the Houthis, urging Yemenis to join the armed and security forces and offering a general amnesty to Houthi fighters who defect. Al-Alimi stated that the government’s objective was to restore state control over the entire country, including Sanaa. Houthi sources claimed that Saudi aircraft conducted 14 strikes across Taiz, Amran, Marib and Saada governorates on 25 September. On 26 September, the Houthis claimed that Saudi-led forces had conducted strikes against roads, bridges and other locations across several governorates, including Taiz, Marib, Saada and Ibb.
As of 29 September, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman are open. However, Jazan, Abha, and Najran airports in southern Saudi Arabia have recently been regularly closed due to the Houthi threat.
Saudi Arabia
On 26 September, Saudi air defences intercepted two Houthi attack drones launched towards the Riyadh region and two ballistic missiles targeting Khamis Mushait, according to the Saudi-led coalition. No casualties or damage were reported, and Saudi Civil Defence later issued further alerts for Khamis Mushait, Abha and Jazan, which were subsequently lifted. On 28 September, Saudi Civil Defence issued and then lifted early warning alerts for Jazan and Najran. Iranian media reported explosions in Yanbu, Jazan and Najran, but these reports have not been confirmed by Saudi authorities.
Reporting on 28 September indicated that flows through the East-West pipeline had been restored to at least 3.5 million barrels per day, following a resumption of operations which had ceased after the 10 September drone attack. On the same day, Cathay Pacific extended its suspension of passenger flights to Riyadh until 31 January 2027. Saudi Civil Defence also warned on 27 September of severe weather in southwestern regions, including Mecca, Jazan and Asir.
As of 29 September, Saudi Arabia’s airspace is open. However, Saudi Arabia’s Jazan, Abha, and Najran airports have been regularly closed due to Houthi attacks.
Kuwait
No attacks have been reported in Kuwait between 25 and 29 September.
As of 29 September, Kuwait’s airspace is open.
Bahrain
No attacks have been reported in Bahrain between 25 and 29 September.
As of 29 September, Bahrain’s airspace is open.
Qatar
No attacks have been reported in Qatar between 25 and 29 September.
As of 29 September, Qatar’s airspace is open.
UAE
No attacks have been reported in the UAE between 25 and 29 September.
As of 29 September, the UAE’s airspace is open.
Oman
Excluding attacks in Omani waters, no attacks have been reported in Oman between 25 and 29 September.
As of 29 September, Oman’s airspace is open.
Regional Advisory
The injury of eight US Marines in the 14 September attack highlights the continued risk of escalation and miscalculation arising from sustained kinetic exchanges in the maritime domain. US fatalities in the attack would likely have triggered US strikes against Iranian territory, which in turn would likely have triggered Iranian retaliation against targets in regional states. The disclosure of the incident was likely deliberately delayed ahead of UNGA to avoid increasing tensions and preserve room for diplomatic engagement. There is currently no publicly available information indicating that Iran knew US service personnel were on the vessel or what the Marines were doing.
Iran’s seven-day proposal closely mirrors the terms of the June Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). Its rejection by Trump likely indicates that Washington assesses that the blockade and economic pressure against Iran, concurrent with elevated rates of regional hydrocarbon exports in recent weeks, has given the Trump administration greater leverage in compelling compliance from Iran. Contradictory US and Iranian statements on whether talks will resume indicate that indirect contact via Qatar is likely continuing, but a near-term agreement to reopen the SoH remains unlikely. With the status quo likely to persist, reciprocal attacks in the maritime domain are highly likely to continue, sustaining the risk of Iranian retaliation against targets in regional states.
The US is almost certainly in the stronger negotiating position. Iran’s principal leverage in the conflict, its ability to interdict transit through the SoH, has been substantially degraded by US military operations, mine clearance and the restoration of regional export capacity, while the blockade and sanctions continue to impose mounting economic costs on Tehran. Iran likely has increased incentives to compromise than before the signing of the June MoU. This may be reflected in reporting that Tehran has indicated flexibility on nuclear issues.
However, a breakthrough remains unlikely in the near term. The IRGC is likely to undermine any agreement perceived in Tehran as a capitulation, and mutual distrust will almost certainly continue to be an obstacle. Following the collapse of the June MoU, neither party is likely to trust the other to fulfil its obligations, with Iran seeking sanctions relief and the release of frozen funds upfront, and Washington seeking concrete nuclear steps upfront. The reported gap over the timing of commitments and which party acts first likely reflects this, which is unlikely to be resolved without a phased mechanism acceptable to both sides.
The USS Theodore Roosevelt’s deployment is reportedly intended to relieve the USS George Washington, which would sustain the current two-carrier posture in the region into 2027, consistent with the reported order to maintain US force levels until at least the end of 2026. However, there is a realistic possibility that the Roosevelt CSG will deploy in addition to the existing carrier presence, increasing the total to three CSGs. A three-carrier posture in the CENTCOM AoR would almost certainly increase US offensive and defensive capacity across the region, providing greater operational flexibility to sustain its maritime blockade, revert to high-intensity strikes against Iran and potentially join operations against the Houthis if required. The Roosevelt CSG is expected to arrive in theatre around mid-to-late October, and the Washington CSG is unlikely to withdraw prior to her arrival. Whether the Washington CSG departs on or soon after its arrival will likely be a key indicator of a relief in place or enhanced carrier posture.
The Houthi attack on the Riyadh region on 26 September is the second attempted Houthi attack against Riyadh since 2022, following the 19 September attack. The second attack on the capital region almost certainly indicates that the Houthis are prepared to sustain attacks on high-profile and more politically sensitive targets in Saudi Arabia to deter further Saudi intervention in Yemen. Houthi leadership figure al-Asad’s characterisation of the attack as a “rehearsal” likely indicates that further attacks on Riyadh are planned and could involve larger or more complex strike packages, with two attack drones likely intended to probe Saudi air defences and signal intent.
Houthi claims of Saudi strikes in Saada and Amran governorates on 25 September, if confirmed, would indicate a continued expansion of Saudi air operations beyond front-line areas into the Houthi heartland in northern Yemen. This would mark a continued shift from the more calibrated Saudi posture observed immediately following the Houthi offensive launched on 3 September, and likely triggered the 26 September limited attack against Riyadh. Further Houthi attacks on Riyadh are likely in response to the expansion of Saudi air operations into the Houthi heartland in northern Yemen, particularly Sanaa.
The Saudi-backed Yemeni IRG leader Al-Alimi’s call for a general mobilisation, combined with the stated objective of restoring state control over Sanaa, likely indicates that the IRG is preparing for a protracted campaign, with the amnesty offer likely intended to fracture Houthi cohesion.
The first chiefs of staff meeting under the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement likely reflects Riyadh’s effort to secure additional air defence and military support from Pakistan and Turkey amid reported interceptor shortfalls, although no deployment of Turkish or Pakistani forces has been confirmed. With no observable diplomatic off-ramp, the conflict in Yemen and its impact on Saudi Arabia are likely to intensify further in the coming weeks.
Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:
- Jordanian authorities have warned against publishing videos or information regarding Jordan’s defensive operations without authorisation.
- Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Interior has stated that “[p]hotographing or publishing or circulating information related to countering missiles and drones and the locations of their falls exposes you to legal accountability.”
- In the UAE, authorities have warned that publishing or circulating “rumours, false news, or news from unknown sources through social media platforms or other information technology” is illegal. Reports indicate that Dubai Police have used “electronic monitoring operations” to detect a photo shared within a private WhatsApp group.
- In Bahrain, several people have been confirmed as arrested for “filming, live streaming, clipping, and publishing events in a manner constituting a legal violation”.
- Qatar’s Ministry of Interior warned that gathering at incident sites or photographing and sharing content related to field developments may result in legal accountability and has arrested hundreds of people of various nationalities for “producing and sharing misleading information”.
- Omani authorities have stated: “Beware of sharing or publishing any captured photos or videos. They should be shared only with the competent authorities”.
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