Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update

Travel to the Middle East is likely to remain at a high risk profile until there are clear indications of durable de-escalation, such as a US force withdrawal or reduction. As long as the current US force posture is maintained, and with multiple triggers for escalation remaining extant, renewed large-scale conflict could rapidly break out.

Iran’s previously announced expansion of the declared threat area for shipping was highly likely intended to restore leverage by widening the area in which Iran can credibly threaten shipping. This sets the conditions for an escalation in Iranian attacks against vessels at anchorage and those conducting ship-to-ship transfers outside of the SoH. The strikes overnight 8-9 September almost certainly demonstrate the execution of this, with Iranian anti-shipping attacks extending to vessels transiting and at anchor well outside the SoH, including off Dubai and in Iraqi waters. Attempted attacks against commercial vessels in the wider Persian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, and Arabian Sea, including in the approaches to Gulf state ports, loading terminals, and at port anchorages, are highly likely to increase, which in turn will likely threaten broader escalation.

Washington almost certainly retains a strong incentive to both maintain its blockade and prevent Iran from restoring its leverage over regional export routes, with the US likely to periodically conduct attacks against Iranian capabilities around the SoH when it is assessed they have been reconstituted. Moreover, the previously announced “tanker for tanker” policy has not only been sustained but intensified with the US attacks against Iranian tankers, and is highly likely to further increase the threat to commercial shipping by providing Iran with an additional incentive and justification to retaliate against tankers and US Navy vessels. Additionally, as demonstrated overnight 8-9 September, US strikes against Iranian tankers almost certainly serve as a potential trigger for Iranian retaliation against targets in regional states.

Both the Iranian targeting of US Navy vessels and use of cluster munitions in Jordan almost certainly represent a notable shift, highly likely increasing the risk of miscalculation and indicating Iranian intent to escalate. A successful Iranian strike against a major US Navy vessel, or any Iranian attack resulting in US casualties, would likely trigger a substantially larger US response, potentially including strikes against Iranian ports, export infrastructure, or leadership targets, which in turn would likely trigger retaliatory attacks against regional states. Iranian retaliation has continued to be directed against US military and maritime targets, but the geographic expansion of vessel targeting and the use of cluster munition warheads highly likely indicate that Tehran is becoming less constrained in how it calibrates its response. This likely reflects the initial application of the escalatory principles outlined in Iran’s new offensive doctrine on 26 August.

As economic pressure on the regime increases and Iran’s ability to threaten shipping continues to be degraded, IRGC hardliners who exercise considerable control in Tehran will highly likely continue to advocate for further escalation to break the deadlock. Further escalation pathways for Iran include the expansion of its targeting to include the Gulf energy and export infrastructure, which circumvent the SoH, such as Fujairah and Khor Fakkan in the UAE, in order to impose greater costs and restore leverage.

Riyadh is likely to sustain operations against the Houthis in Yemen, and the Houthis have almost certainly calculated that cross-border attacks against Saudi economic and energy infrastructure represent their principal means of imposing costs on Riyadh and of deterring further Saudi intervention. They are therefore highly likely to continue these attacks absent a negotiated ceasefire. Further Houthi attacks against airports, military bases, energy infrastructure, and population centres in Jazan, Asir, and Najran are likely in the short term, with deeper strikes against Riyadh, Jeddah, and other major targets also likely in the event of sustained Saudi involvement or further escalation.

Riyadh’s intervention has so far likely been deliberately calibrated to avoid a return to the full-scale conflict with the Houthis conducted prior to 2022, with air strikes conducted primarily in front-line areas such as Taiz and Marib in support of  Saudi-backed IRG ground forces rather than against Sanaa, the port city of Hodeidah, or Houthi leadership. However, the reported Houthi seizure of Mocha, Dhubab, and Perim Island almost certainly constitutes the most significant territorial change in Yemen since 2022 and, crucially, gives the Houthis significant capability to interdict traffic through the BaM directly, increasing the threat to Red Sea export routes.

The Houthi statement that navigation remains safe for all shipping other than Saudi vessels is likely intended to avoid provoking intervention from the US while concentrating pressure on Riyadh. An expansion of Saudi air strikes in Houthi-controlled Yemen, both geographically and in terms of target set, remains a key indicator and warning of further escalation characterised by Houthi attacks launched against targets beyond southern Saudi Arabia.  

If the potential incident along the East-West pipeline is confirmed as a Houthi attack, Saudi retaliation is likely. The pipeline is Saudi Arabia’s principal alternative export route while the SoH remains disrupted, and a successful strike against it would almost certainly be assessed by Riyadh as a strategic-level escalation warranting a response beyond current front-line air operations. This would in turn likely trigger intensified Houthi attacks against Saudi territory, energy infrastructure, and shipping.

Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity: