Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update

Travel to the Middle East is likely to remain at a high risk profile until there are clear indications of durable de-escalation, such as a US force withdrawal or reduction. As long as the current US force posture is maintained, and with multiple triggers for escalation remaining extant, renewed large-scale conflict could rapidly break out.

Iran’s principal leverage in the conflict has almost certainly derived from its ability to disrupt transit through the SoH, and this leverage has highly likely been substantially eroded. Rezaei’s comment that the US is successfully guiding vessels through the SoH is the first official acknowledgement by Iran that the US is successfully circumventing Iran’s intended SoH closure. Alongside the announced expansion of the restricted zone, this highly likely indicates that Tehran assesses that its existing campaign against shipping in the SoH is no longer providing the intended degree of leverage. The expansion of the declared threat area is likely intended to restore leverage by widening the area in which Iran can credibly threaten shipping, likely setting the conditions for escalated Iranian anti-shipping attacks against vessels conducting ship-to-ship transfers outside of the SoH. Attempted attacks against commercial vessels in the wider Persian Gulf, including in the approaches to Gulf state ports and loading terminals, and in the Gulf of Oman, are likely to increase, which in turn will likely threaten broader escalation.

Washington almost certainly retains a strong incentive to prevent Iran from restoring its leverage in the SoH. Further US strikes against Iranian maritime and shipping assets are likely following Iranian attacks against US Navy vessels or commercial shipping. The previously announced “tanker for tanker” policy has been sustained with further US attacks against Iranian tankers, and is highly likely to further increase the threat to commercial shipping by providing Iran with an additional incentive to retaliate directly against tankers and US Navy vessels. US strikes against Iranian tankers also likely serve as a potential trigger for Iranian retaliation against targets in regional states.

The Iranian targeting of US Navy vessels almost certainly represents a notable escalation, and highly likely increases the risk of miscalculation. A successful Iranian strike against a major US naval vessel, or any Iranian attack resulting in US casualties, would likely trigger a substantially larger US response, potentially including strikes against Iranian ports, export infrastructure, or leadership targets, which in turn would likely trigger retaliatory attacks against analogous targets in regional states.

Iranian retaliation has recently continued to be directed against US military and maritime targets rather than the broader target profile threatened under the disproportionate retaliation principle outlined in Iran’s new offensive doctrine on 26 August. This likely indicates that Tehran is continuing to calibrate its response to avoid provoking a broader and more sustained US response or a rupture with regional states. However, Ghalibaf’s statement that the era of proportionate responses is over, alongside the announced expanded restricted zone in the SoH, likely further sets the conditions for a broader targeting profile and Iran-initiated escalation. As economic pressure increases and Iran’s ability to threaten shipping is degraded, IRGC hardliners in Tehran will highly likely increasingly advocate for the initiation of further escalation to break the deadlock, potentially including an expansion of its targeting to include Gulf energy and export infrastructure, in order to impose greater costs, restore leverage, and bolster deterrence.

The Saudi-backed IRG counteroffensive in Yemen likely indicates that IRG forces have retained sufficient combat power to not only contest but counterattack against the Houthi advance, although reported territorial gains remain unverified. The tempo of air operations against the Houthis conducted between 4 and 8 September, across Taiz, Hodeidah, al-Jawf, Marib, and al-Bayda, highly likely exceeds the IRG’s capabilities, and many, if not all, of the air strikes were likely conducted by the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF). It is also almost certain that Saudi Arabia is providing other support, such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), to IRG forces. The developments almost certainly confirm that the Yemeni civil war has fully resumed, and that the de facto ceasefire between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis that had held since 2022 has collapsed.

The Houthi attack against southern Saudi Arabia overnight 7-8 September is almost certainly the most significant Houthi attack against the kingdom since the Houthis announced a maritime embargo in July, and the risk of further escalation is high. Riyadh is likely to not only sustain but intensify operations against the Houthis, and the Houthis have almost certainly calculated that cross-border attacks against Saudi economic and energy infrastructure represent their principal means of imposing costs on Riyadh and of deterring further Saudi intervention, and are therefore highly likely to continue these attacks in response.

Further Houthi attacks against airports, military bases, energy infrastructure, and population centres in Jazan, Asir, and Najran are therefore likely in the short term, with minimal warning time. Deeper strikes against Riyadh, Jeddah, and other major targets in Saudi Arabia are also likely in the event of sustained Saudi involvement, as are further attacks against Saudi-linked shipping in the Red Sea. Travellers and expatriates in southern Saudi Arabia should anticipate short-notice air raid siren activation, shelter-in-place instructions, temporary suspensions of operations at energy and industrial facilities, and the continued periodic closure of Jazan, Abha, and Najran airports.

Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity: