Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update

Travel to the Middle East is likely to remain at a high risk profile until there are clear indications of durable de-escalation, such as a US force withdrawal or reduction. As long as the current US force posture is maintained, and with multiple triggers for escalation remaining extant, renewed large-scale conflict could rapidly break out.

The 30 August and 1 September strike exchanges between the US and Iran,  which were highly likely triggered by Iranian attempts to restore degraded leverage over the SoH, constitute the most significant kinetic escalation since late July. The 1 September US strikes likely represent the execution of an earlier reported CENTCOM plan, with reporting citing three US officials indicating that CENTCOM had developed a plan for limited, periodic strikes intended to prevent Iran from reconstituting the capabilities required to disrupt shipping in the SoH. The exchange highly likely does not represent a return to the large-scale operations conducted earlier in the conflict, with Washington’s primary intended instrument against Iran likely remaining economic pressure.

Despite this, the resulting deadlock likely imposes greater costs on Tehran than on Washington. Iran is therefore likely to become increasingly incentivised to initiate its own escalation to break it, which is likely to increase the risk that calibrated exchanges could develop into a major escalation or more sustained conflict.

Iran’s principal leverage in the conflict has almost certainly derived from its ability to disrupt transit through the SoH, and this leverage has likely been substantially eroded with the clearing of sea mines, the establishment of a US-escorted corridor along the Omani coast and the rerouting of some Gulf exports away from the SoH entirely. A planned minelaying operation using rockets on 30 August almost certainly highlights that Tehran retains a strong incentive to restore its leverage over the SoH, despite the high risks of direct military confrontation with the US. Further Iranian attempts to mine the Strait or to intensify attacks on commercial shipping transiting the SoH are highly likely in the coming weeks, with these actions likely risking further kinetic exchanges.

Washington concurrently almost certainly retains a strong incentive to prevent Iran from restoring this leverage. Further US strikes comparable to the 1 September strikes are likely if it is assessed that Iran is reconstituting its ability to disrupt shipping. Moreover, Washington’s newly announced “tanker for tanker” policy, if sustained, is likely to further increase the threat to commercial shipping by providing Iran with an additional incentive to retaliate directly against tankers. US strikes against Iranian tankers also likely serve as a potential trigger for Iranian retaliation against targets in regional states.

Competing efforts to establish control over the SoH are highly likely to periodically lead to further kinetic exchanges, with Iran’s current course of action prioritising attacks on US military bases. However, these attacks almost certainly increase the risk of miscalculation or escalation. An Iranian strike resulting in US casualties would likely trigger a substantially larger US response, and reported Iranian civilian casualties, including the alleged strike on a wedding party, likely increase domestic pressure on Tehran to pursue a more forceful response.

Iran’s recent retaliation has continued to be directed against US military targets rather than the broader target profile threatened with the disproportionate retaliation principle, outlined in Iran’s new offensive doctrine on 26 August. This likely indicates that Tehran is continuing to calibrate its response to avoid provoking a broader and more sustained US response or a rupture with regional states. However, as economic pressure on Iran gradually increases and its ability to threaten shipping in the SoH is degraded, there is a realistic possibility that Iran will expand its targeting to include Gulf energy and export infrastructure in line with its new offensive doctrine, in order to impose greater costs, restore leverage, and bolster deterrence.

The 3 September offensive in Yemen launched by the Houthis constitutes the first such ground offensive and the most intense fighting since 2022, likely marking a major escalation. The immediate objective is likely the severing of the road linking Taiz city to Mocha, degrading the sustainability of Saudi-backed IRG positions on the western coast. This likely forms part of a broader Houthi objective to expand territorial control around the Bab al-Mandab, consolidating leverage over the strait. Should the offensive threaten a significant territorial reversal, it is likely that Riyadh will assess air intervention as necessary to prevent IRG collapse on the western coast. Direct Saudi intervention with air strikes will highly likely trigger a substantial increase in Houthi cross-border missile and drone attacks against southern Saudi Arabia, particularly against airports, military bases, and energy infrastructure in Jazan, Asir and Najran. A major escalation with sustained Saudi involvement would also likely result in deeper strikes against Riyadh, Jeddah and other major targets in Saudi Arabia.

Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity: