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US and Iran Exchange Strikes as Gulf Tensions Rise
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 28 August 2026 – 1 September 2026
- On 30 August, US Central Command (CENTCOM) claimed to have struck two Iranian rocket launchers on Larak Island in the Strait of Hormuz (SoH) after Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) forces were observed preparing to launch rockets carrying sea mines into the SoH.
- The IRGC retaliated hours later with ballistic missile and drone attacks against King Hussein Air Base near Mafraq and Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Azraq, Jordan. Jordanian air defences reported intercepting eight missiles, with no casualties or damage reported. On 31 August, Iranian forces claimed a drone attack against Al Minhad Air Base in the UAE, but Emirati authorities stated that the UAE engaged a drone over its territorial waters and denied that the base had been struck.
- US President Donald Trump stated on 31 August that there would be a response and that the US was “going to hit them hard”. Reporting the same day indicated that CENTCOM has developed a plan for limited, periodic strikes to prevent Iran from reconstituting its capabilities around the SoH.
- Iran’s principal leverage in the conflict, its ability to interdict transit through the SoH, has likely been notably eroded. Tehran almost certainly retains a strong incentive to restore its previously superior leverage over the SoH, despite the high risks of direct military confrontation with the US. Further Iranian attempts to mine the strait or to intensify attacks on commercial shipping are likely in the coming weeks, with these actions likely risking further strike exchanges.
- Reporting indicates that the targeting of the UAE was highly limited and likely performative, and it is likely that the attempted attack was intended as a warning to the UAE against implementing its announced financial embargo.
- As of 1 September, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman are open. However, the airspace over Jazan, Abha, and Najran airports in southern Saudi Arabia has recently been periodically closed due to the Houthi threat.
Middle East Conflict: Latest Intelligence & Travel Advice
To support planning, we are updating our Middle East travel advice daily with guidance from our intelligence team on airspace openings and closures, flight operations, and escalating risks impacting movement.
Situation Update: Iran Strikes Jordan After US Attack on Larak Island
On 30 August, US Central Command (CENTCOM) stated that US forces had struck two Iranian rocket launchers on Larak Island in the Strait of Hormuz (SoH) after Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) forces were observed preparing to launch rockets configured to deploy sea mines into the SoH. The strike was the first US military action against Iranian territory since late July.
Hours after the Larak Island strike, the IRGC conducted ballistic missile and drone attacks against King Hussein Air Base near Mafraq and Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Azraq, Jordan. The Jordanian military stated that eight missiles fired from Iran were intercepted by air defence systems. A US official stated that several missiles were launched, and that there was no impact on US bases and no reports of damage or casualties. President Donald Trump reportedly stated to US media that air defences had intercepted all but one of the missiles, which was allowed to pass due to a determination that it would not hit a significant location.
On 31 August, Iranian regime media reported that Iranian forces had launched dozens of drones against US forces at Al Minhad Air Base in the UAE, south of Dubai, and claimed multiple direct hits. The UAE’s Ministry of Defence stated that it had engaged one drone approaching from Iran over Emirati territorial waters and described reports of impacts against the base as false. The UAE’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs held Iran fully responsible, and stated that the UAE reserved the right to respond.
Trump stated on 31 August that there would be a response to the Iranian strikes and that the US was “going to hit them hard”. There have been no further US strikes against Iran as of 1400 UTC on 1 September.
Reporting on 31 August, citing three US officials, indicated that CENTCOM had developed a plan for limited, periodic strikes intended to prevent Iran from reconstituting the radar, air defence, and anti-ship missile capabilities required to interdict shipping in the SoH. The plan was reportedly supported by the US Secretary of Defence and forwarded to the White House, but had not been approved prior to the 30 August exchange, with the White House reportedly inclined against approval to avoid escalation. One US official characterised the concept as “mowing the lawn”. Officials briefed that concern had increased following the launch of an Iranian anti-aircraft missile towards a US F-35 providing cover to shipping in the strait, which did not come close enough to pose a danger but was assessed as an indicator that Iran was rebuilding its capabilities.
As of 1 September, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman are open. However, the airspace over Jazan, Abha, and Najran airports in southern Saudi Arabia has recently been periodically closed due to the Houthi threat.
Saudi Arabia
No attacks against targets in Saudi Arabia have been confirmed between 28 August and 1 September.
As of 1 September, Saudi Arabia’s airspace is open. However, Saudi Arabia’s Jazan, Abha, and Najran airports have been regularly closed due to Houthi attacks. On 1 September, authorities issued a notice closing the airspace for Abha, Jazan and Najran’s airports until 2 September.
Kuwait
No attacks have been reported in Kuwait between 28 August and 1 September.
On 27 August, Kuwait signed an agreement with Pakistan which expands military cooperation in multiple areas including training and border management. Pakistan’s defence ministry stated that the agreement significantly enhances the 2023 defence cooperation agreement between the two countries.
As of 1 September, Kuwait’s airspace is open.
Bahrain
No attacks have been reported in Bahrain between 28 August and 1 September.
As of 1 September, Bahrain’s airspace is open.
Qatar
No attacks have been reported in Qatar between 28 August and 1 September.
As of 1 September, Qatar’s airspace is open.
UAE
On 31 August, Iranian regime media claimed that dozens of drones had been launched against US forces at Al Minhad Air Base, south of Dubai, with multiple direct hits. The UAE’s Ministry of Defence stated that it had engaged one drone approaching from Iran over Emirati territorial waters and denied that the base had been struck. The UAE’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs held Iran fully responsible, and stated that the UAE reserved the right to respond.
As of 1 September, the UAE’s airspace is open.
Oman
Excluding attacks in Omani waters in the Strait of Hormuz, no attacks have been reported in Oman between 28 August and 1 September.
As of 1 September, Oman’s airspace is open.
Regional Advisory
Travel to the Middle East is likely to remain at a high risk profile until there are clear indications of durable de-escalation, such as a US force withdrawal or reduction. As long as the current US force posture is maintained, and with multiple triggers for escalation remaining extant, renewed large-scale conflict could rapidly break out.
Recent mutual exchanges between the US and Iran constitute the most significant kinetic escalation since late July. However, US strikes were limited and likely aimed at denying Iran the ability to mine the SoH, while Iranian retaliation remained focused on US military assets, indicating that both sides were seeking to contain the escalation.
The 30 August Iranian retaliation strikes likely do not constitute an application of the new Iranian offensive doctrine set out on 26 August. While the speed of the retaliation is consistent with the rapid response principle, the target set is more consistent with Iran’s previous targeting patterns than with the stated principle of disproportionate retaliation. This likely indicates that Tehran calibrated its response to avoid provoking a major US campaign or escalation with regional states.
Iran’s principal leverage in the conflict has almost certainly derived from its ability to disrupt transit through the SoH, and this leverage has likely been substantially eroded. CENTCOM’s announcement on 27 August that internationally recognised transit routes had been cleared of Iranian sea mines, alongside the establishment of a US-escorted corridor along the Omani coast and the rerouting of some Gulf exports away from the SoH entirely, has likely restored a notable proportion of regional export capacity. The claimed planned minelaying operation using rockets on 30 August almost certainly indicates that Tehran retains a strong incentive to restore its leverage over the SoH, despite the high risks of direct military confrontation with the US. Further Iranian attempts to mine the strait or to intensify attacks on commercial shipping transiting the SoH are highly likely in the coming weeks, with these actions likely risking further kinetic exchanges.
If President Trump approves the reported CENTCOM plan for limited and periodic strikes against reconstituted Iranian minelaying, radar, air defence, and anti-ship missile capabilities around the SoH, this would almost certainly lead to Iranian retaliation against US installations in regional states following any US strikes. Moreover, such escalation cycles would almost certainly increase the risk of miscalculation, potentially broadening the conflict beyond limited and calibrated exchanges. There is a realistic possibility that in an effort to impose greater costs, restore leverage and implement its newly stated offensive doctrine to bolster deterrence, Iranian forces may expand the targeting profile for retaliation strikes to include Gulf state energy infrastructure, ports and airports.
The targeting of the UAE by Iran likely marks a notable shift. Iran has likely refrained from targeting the UAE in recent months for economic reasons. However, the Emirati claims of suspending trade and financial transactions with Iran, alongside the US secondary sanctions campaign, almost certainly threaten this key incentive for that restraint. Despite this, early reporting indicates the attack against the UAE was highly limited and likely performative. Therefore, the attempted attack was likely intended as a warning to the UAE against enforcing US measures or implementing its announced financial embargo.
Warning time for further Iranian attacks against regional states would almost certainly be minimal, as demonstrated on 30 August, when Iranian strikes followed the US strikes within hours. Travellers and expatriates in Jordan, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE should anticipate short-notice air raid warnings, shelter-in-place instructions, and temporary airport or airspace closures, and should avoid proximity to military installations, which remain a key Iranian target priority.
Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:
- Jordanian authorities have warned against publishing videos or information regarding Jordan’s defensive operations without authorisation.
- Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Interior has stated that “[p]hotographing or publishing or circulating information related to countering missiles and drones and the locations of their falls exposes you to legal accountability.”
- In the UAE, authorities have warned that publishing or circulating “rumours, false news, or news from unknown sources through social media platforms or other information technology” is illegal. Reports indicate that Dubai Police have used “electronic monitoring operations” to detect a photo shared within a private WhatsApp group.
- In Bahrain, several people have been confirmed as arrested for “filming, live streaming, clipping, and publishing events in a manner constituting a legal violation”.
- Qatar’s Ministry of Interior warned that gathering at incident sites or photographing and sharing content related to field developments may result in legal accountability and has arrested hundreds of people of various nationalities for “producing and sharing misleading information”.
- Omani authorities have stated: “Beware of sharing or publishing any captured photos or videos. They should be shared only with the competent authorities”.
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