Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update

Despite the absence of US strikes against Iran since late July and a concurrent reduction in direct Iranian retaliation strikes, the situation almost certainly remains highly fragile and susceptible to rapid breakdown. Travel to the Middle East is likely to remain at a high risk profile until there are clear indications of durable de-escalation, such as a US force withdrawal or reduction. As long as the current US force posture is maintained, and with multiple triggers for escalation remaining extant, renewed large-scale conflict could break out with minimal indicators or warnings.

However, the conflict will likely remain at a lower intensity in the short term, with neither side currently assessing that renewed large-scale operations are in its interests. The US is highly likely constrained by munitions shortages and is prioritising economic pressure through the blockade, while Tehran is almost certainly exploiting the pause to regenerate capability and retains the closure of the SoH as its principal source of leverage. The expiry of the 60-day truce period on 17 August without a resumption of major hostilities likely supports this assessment, and suggests that a de facto pause is likely to persist in the short term despite the absence of any publicly declared extension. The rotation of the USS Abraham Lincoln out of theatre without a corresponding increase in overall carrier presence is likely a further indicator that the US is not currently preparing for a major escalation.

US freedom of action against Iran has highly likely been constrained by the considerable depletion of US offensive and defensive munitions during the war. While unlikely to be willing to accept Iranian control of the SoH longer term, there is a realistic possibility that the Trump administration calculates that a reprieve on SoH transit through an Iran-Oman deal will enable US forces to replenish munitions for future renewed operations against Iran. The scale of recent US procurement supports this assessment, with the US Army awarding Lockheed Martin a contract worth up to USD 58.6 billion in late July for significantly increased Patriot interceptor production, and the US Navy awarding Raytheon USD 22.9 billion to increase Tomahawk production seventeen-fold over seven years. However, these contracts are unlikely to translate into meaningful capability in the near term, meaning Washington’s incentive to avoid a prolonged return to high-intensity operations will likely persist for months rather than weeks.

US CENTCOM has previously conducted limited strikes against Iran following Iranian attacks against vessels in the SoH. These were followed by Iranian retaliation strikes launched against targets in regional states, particularly US military targets in Jordan, Kuwait, and Bahrain. However, while attacks against vessels transiting the SoH near Oman outside of Iran’s enforced routes have continued, US strikes have not recently followed these attacks. This likely reflects a current prioritisation in the Trump administration to avoid a full return to conflict and instead attempt to maintain pressure against Iran and achieve an opening of the SoH through the blockade and ongoing Iran-Oman talks. However, vessel attacks such as that conducted on 18 August, which has resulted in a crew casualty, remain a key potential trigger for renewed US-Iran strike exchanges.

Iran’s declared shift from a defensive to an offensive posture is likely intended primarily to compel the US back into the MoU framework. The absence of a specified deadline date likely indicates that Tehran intends to preserve flexibility and to avoid a fixed commitment that would oblige it to act. However, the stated posture shift likely increases the risk that in the coming weeks Tehran will attempt to break the deadlock through escalation calibrated to raise costs to the US. Iranian options reported by US media include the sabotage of internet cables in the Persian Gulf, the fomenting of civil unrest in regional states with large Shia populations like Kuwait and Bahrain, and “potentially even ground operations in Kuwait”.

Iranian escalation conducted through Iraqi militia proxies and the Houthis is also likely to form a component of any escalation, as it imposes costs on regional states while providing Tehran with deniability. A reported drone attack against the office of Iraq’s Kurdistan Region prime minister on 17 August, which Iraqi counterterrorism authorities stated was launched from the border area with Iran, is likely indicative of a continued Iranian willingness to conduct deniable attacks during the de facto pause in the wider conflict.

Further claimed Houthi attacks against Aramco facilities in Jazan and Najran almost certainly reflect continuing Houthi prioritisation of attacks against Saudi energy infrastructure, with further such attacks highly likely in the coming week. This assessment is reinforced by warnings from Houthi media on 11 August that attacks against Saudi energy infrastructure would be expanded if Saudi Arabia continues to “stall” diplomatic efforts, with such attacks highly likely to be the primary form of leverage the Houthis can impose against Saudi Arabia. Further short-notice air raid siren activation, shelter-in-place instructions, and closures of Jazan, Abha, and Najran airports should be anticipated in southern Saudi Arabia at minimal notice.

Continued intensified conflict between Saudi-backed Yemeni internationally recognised government (IRG) forces and the Houthis, characterised by further exchanges of shelling, missile, and drone strikes between 14 and 18 August, almost certainly a continuation of the most significant escalation in the Yemeni civil war since the 2022 truce. Continued Houthi use of ballistic missiles and UAVs against Marib city and the port of Mocha likely indicates a continued intent to degrade Saudi-backed IRG command, logistics, and maritime resupply in preparation for potential full-scale fighting, while also likely seeking to deter a potential Saudi-backed ground offensive.

The most likely trigger for a major escalation remains a Saudi-backed IRG ground offensive against Houthi-controlled Yemen, although a Houthi pre-emptive offensive to seize Marib before IRG forces can be reconstituted is also a realistic possibility. Both of these scenarios would highly likely result in a substantial escalation in cross-border missile and drone attacks against southern Saudi Arabia, with the Houthis likely to target airports, military bases, energy infrastructure, and population centres in Jazan, Asir, and Najran. Deeper Houthi attacks against targets in Riyadh, Jeddah, and other parts of Saudi Arabia would also be highly likely.

Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity: