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Gulf Security Risks Persist Amid Strait of Hormuz Talks
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 31 July 2026 – 4 August 2026
- On 1 August, US President Donald Trump announced on social media that he had cancelled what he characterised as a highly significant planned attack against Iran. There is almost certainly significant concern among regional states, particularly Saudi Arabia and Qatar, that US strikes against Iranian infrastructure will trigger considerable Iranian retaliation against regional oil and gas infrastructure, as repeatedly threatened.
- President Trump later claimed that US-Iran talks would resume on 3 August, but Iran’s Foreign Ministry denied this, stating that Iran’s only talks were being conducted with Oman over management of the Strait of Hormuz (SoH).
- The Iran-Oman talks are reportedly close to agreeing a proposal which would give Iran considerable control over the SoH long-term, which has been strongly opposed by the US and regional allies through the conflict. However, indications from reports on 4 August suggest that the Trump administration may now be willing to grant this concession.
- Kinetic activity in the period 31 July to 4 August has consisted of: at least three attempted attacks against vessels in the SoH transiting near Oman; two limited attempted attack drone strikes in Kuwait; and the Houthis in Yemen claiming to have hit a “sensitive site” with a drone strike at Najran Airport in Saudi Arabia.
- Previously, the US has conducted limited strikes against Iran following Iranian attacks against vessels. If further such strikes are conducted, these would highly likely be followed by Iranian retaliation strikes against targets in regional states, most likely US military targets in Jordan, Kuwait, and Bahrain.
- As of 4 August, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman are open.
Middle East Conflict: Latest Intelligence & Travel Advice
To support planning, we are updating our Middle East travel advice daily with guidance from our intelligence team on airspace openings and closures, flight operations, and escalating risks impacting movement.
Situation Update: Maritime Security Remains the Region’s Primary Vulnerability
There have been no strikes conducted by US Central Command (CENTCOM) against Iran since the 29 July strikes. On 1 August, US President Donald Trump announced on social media that he had cancelled what he characterised as a highly significant planned attack against Iran. President Trump claimed this was due to Iran and regional countries requesting the attack be called off as “the perimeters of a deal has been agreed to”, which allegedly includes a total opening of the Strait of Hormuz (SoH) and “an end to Iran’s nuclear threat”.
President Trump later claimed that US-Iran talks would resume on 3 August. The spokesperson for Iran’s Foreign Ministry, Esmail Baghaei, denied this, stated that there were neither ongoing nor planned talks with the US, that no delegations are scheduled to be hosted or dispatched in the coming days, and that Iran’s entire negotiating team remained in-country, excluding the Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, who is on an Arbaeen pilgrimage in Iraq. Baghaei stated that Iran’s only active talks were being conducted with Oman over management of the SoH. President Trump responded by branding Iran’s leadership as “duplicitous”, claimed that talks were ongoing, and that Iran faced “decapitation” if it did not agree a deal.
Israeli and US media reported on 2 and 3 August that the Iran-Oman negotiations on managing the SoH were close to a deal. The proposal reportedly entails vessels entering the Persian Gulf by transiting an Iran-controlled channel and exiting via an Oman-controlled channel, although a senior Iranian official briefed that Oman would be required to notify Iran of clearing outbound vessels, which would ensure Tehran would retain an option to intervene. Vessels would also pay a service fee, with revenues split between Iran and Oman.
Baghaei stated that regardless of a deal with Oman, the strait will remain closed until the US ceases aggression. Furthermore, a spokesperson for Iran’s parliamentary National Security Committee, Hassan Qashqavi, stated that the agreement with Oman was close, and that mediators were seeking to revive the collapsed Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the US.
Kinetic activity in the period 31 July to 4 August has consisted of: at least three attempted attacks against vessels in the SoH transiting near Oman outside of the Iran-enforced route on 2-3 August, with two near misses and one instance of a cargo vessel reporting being hit by an unknown projectile; limited attempted attack drone strikes in Kuwait on 1 August and overnight 3-4 August; and the Houthis in Yemen claiming to have hit a “sensitive site” with a drone strike at Najran Airport in Saudi Arabia.
As of 4 August, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman are open.
Saudi Arabia
On 4 August, the Houthis in Yemen announced that they had “successfully targeted a sensitive Saudi enemy target at Najran Airport with a drone”. The Houthi spokesman claimed that the attack was retaliation for an incursion into Yemeni airspace by Saudi drones. International media was briefed by a regional source that Najran Airport’s main radar was hit, affecting operations.
As of 4 August, Saudi Arabia’s airspace is open.
Kuwait
On 1 August, Kuwaiti air defences were activated in response to Iranian attack drones. Authorities stated that the attack caused some material damage in a government facility in the country’s north and hit vehicles on Bubiyan Island, but no injuries.
Overnight 3-4 August, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) reportedly carried out an attack using at least three drones against a US military facility in Kuwait, with Iranian state media claiming that a large fire had broken out in Kuwait on the morning of 4 August.
As of 4 August, Kuwait’s airspace is open.
Bahrain
No attacks have been reported in Bahrain between 31 July and 4 August.
As of 4 August, Bahrain’s airspace is open.
Qatar
No attacks have been reported in Qatar between 31 July and 4 August.
As of 4 August, Qatar’s airspace is open.
UAE
No attacks have been reported in the UAE between 31 July and 4 August.
As of 4 August, the UAE’s airspace is open.
Oman
Excluding attacks in Omani waters in the Strait of Hormuz, no attacks have been reported in Oman between 31 July and 4 August.
As of 4 August, Oman’s airspace is open.
Regional Advisory
Despite a relative reduction in US strikes against Iran and concurrent reduction in direct Iranian retaliation strikes against regional targets, the situation almost certainly remains highly fragile and susceptible to rapid breakdown, with minimal indicators and warnings.
Greater control over the SoH has almost certainly been a long-term objective for Tehran. Control would not only give the regime a potential source of funds by extracting fees, but bolsters its deterrence, with Iran’s closures of the SoH having almost certainly been its most important source of leverage in the conflict. If accurate, the Iran-Oman proposal being reported as close to agreement would essentially give Tehran the ability to leverage passage through the SoH to advance its objectives in perpetuity. This has been strongly opposed throughout the conflict by the US and several regional states, with this dispute having likely been the key trigger for the collapse of the MoU. However, indications from reports on 4 August suggest that the Trump administration may now be willing to grant this concession.
The competing renewed blockades from both the US and Iran remain in place as of 4 August, with Iranian forces continuing to conduct attacks against vessels attempting to transit the SoH outside of Iran’s enforced routes on 2-3 August. Previously, US CENTCOM has conducted limited strikes against Iran following Iranian attacks against vessels. If further such strikes are conducted, these would highly likely be followed by Iranian retaliation strikes against targets in regional states, most likely US military targets in Jordan, Kuwait and Bahrain given recent target prioritisation by Iranian forces. However, Washington is likely incentivised to refrain from such strikes if the Trump administration is confirmed as having backed the Iran-Oman SoH management deal.
Military constraints deriving from the depletion of a considerable percentage of both US offensive and defensive munitions in the war thus far have likely limited US freedom of action against Iran, but regional pressure also reportedly played a critical role in convincing President Trump to allegedly cancel a planned “massive attack” against Iran. Notably, Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman reportedly personally urged President Trump on 1 August to de-escalate. However, according to senior Gulf officials briefing US media, some Gulf states such as the UAE have lobbied President Trump in recent days to instead take more decisive action against Iran.
There is almost certainly significant concern among regional states, particularly Saudi Arabia and Qatar, that US strikes against Iranian infrastructure will trigger considerable Iranian retaliation against regional oil and gas infrastructure, as repeatedly threatened by the IRGC and Iranian officials. Growing air defence shortages will also likely degrade the ability of regional countries to sustain continued Iranian attacks, and would likely improve the penetration rates of further attacks from Iran, its proxies in Iraq, and the Houthis.
As demonstrated since the end of the 13 consecutive nights of US strikes against Iran on 24 July, with numerous subsequent attacks originating from Iraq being conducted against regional targets, the IRGC is likely to continue leveraging regional proxies to inflict sustained pressure on the Gulf states while remaining below the calculated threshold for significant escalation directly against Iran.
Moreover, the Houthi attack against Najran Airport almost certainly demonstrates the continued high risk of kinetic exchanges between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis, which will highly likely remain as long as the Houthi “maritime embargo” against Saudi Arabia is enforced. Saudi Arabian retaliation for the Najran Airport strike would highly likely trigger further Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia, with Houthi attacks most likely to target international airports, military bases, and energy infrastructure, particularly in Jazan, Asir, and Najran.
Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:
- Jordanian authorities have warned against publishing videos or information regarding Jordan’s defensive operations without authorisation.
- Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Interior has stated that “[p]hotographing or publishing or circulating information related to countering missiles and drones and the locations of their falls exposes you to legal accountability.”
- In the UAE, authorities have warned that publishing or circulating “rumours, false news, or news from unknown sources through social media platforms or other information technology” is illegal. Reports indicate that Dubai Police have used “electronic monitoring operations” to detect a photo shared within a private WhatsApp group.
- In Bahrain, several people have been confirmed as arrested for “filming, live streaming, clipping, and publishing events in a manner constituting a legal violation”.
- Qatar’s Ministry of Interior warned that gathering at incident sites or photographing and sharing content related to field developments may result in legal accountability and has arrested hundreds of people of various nationalities for “producing and sharing misleading information”.
- Omani authorities have stated: “Beware of sharing or publishing any captured photos or videos. They should be shared only with the competent authorities”.
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