Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update

US President Donald Trump again declared on 10 July that the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and its ceasefire with Iran were “over”. The Trump administration reportedly gave demands to Iran to publicly acknowledge that the Strait of Hormuz (SoH) is open and pledge to cease conducting attacks against commercial vessels.  

On 11 July, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) attacked the Cyprus-flagged container ship M/V GFS Galaxy transiting the SoH. The IRGC stated it had fired a warning shot at a vessel attempting to use an “unauthorised route” and declared the SoH closed “until further notice”. The US responded with strikes against approximately 140 Iranian targets, which US Central Command (CENTCOM) stated included missile and drone sites, naval capabilities, ammunition storage facilities, communication networks and coastal surveillance radars.

On 12 July, Iran launched retaliatory strikes across the region. Jordan, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and Oman all reported attempted Iranian attacks. Air defences were also activated in the UAE, although officials later claimed this was for Iranian projectiles outside of “UAE borders”.

The US conducted a further wave of strikes overnight 12-13 July, with CENTCOM stating it hit “dozens of targets”. In the Khuzestan province of Iran, a local official claimed that a US strike hit an agricultural water pumping station, according to Iranian media. However, this has not been confirmed. On 13 July, the IRGC conducted a further round of retaliation strikes against targets in Jordan, Kuwait and Bahrain.

On 13 July, President Trump announced that the US would reimpose a naval blockade on Iranian ports and levy a 20 per cent charge on all cargo transiting the SoH, to go into effect on 14 July. Also on 13 July, the UAE’s Defence Ministry reported that Iranian missiles hit two UAE tankers in the SoH. The IRGC claimed it had “struck and disabled” two “rogue supertankers” that had ignored warnings and attempted to pass through an unauthorised route.

Overnight 13-14 July, the US conducted a third consecutive night of strikes in a five-hour mission against targets including Bushehr, Chah Bahar, Jask, Konarak, Abu Musa and Bandar Abbas, according to CENTCOM, with Iran then launching further waves of retaliation strikes against targets in Bahrain and Kuwait.

As of 14 July, the US Department of State maintains Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman at “Level 3: Reconsider Travel”.

As of 14 July, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman are open.

However, on 14 July, the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) issued a Conflict Zone Information Bulletin (CZIB) which recommended that air operators should: “Not operate within the airspace of Bahrain (Bahrain FIR – OBBB), Kuwait (Kuwait FIR – OKAC), Qatar (Doha FIR – OTDF), the United Arab Emirates (Emirates FIR – OMAE), and the airspace over the waters of the Gulf of Oman within the FIR Muscat (OOMM)”.

Following an attempted Houthi attack against Abha International Airport, Saudi authorities issued a Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) which closed Abha, Jizan and Najran airports until 18:00 local time, 14 July.

On 13 July, strikes were conducted against Sanaa International Airport in Houthi-controlled Yemen. The Yemeni Armed Forces of the Saudi-backed internationally recognised government (IRG) have claimed that they conducted the strikes to prevent an Iranian aircraft from landing on Yemeni soil, while the Houthis have claimed that the strikes were conducted by Saudi Arabia. The attack was highly likely to have been conducted by Saudi Arabia, with Storm Shadow cruise missile (used by Saudi Arabia) fragments being reportedly found at the airport. Moreover, two US officials briefed the media that the Saudi Crown Prince, Mohammed Bin Salman, asked US President Donald Trump for his backing for military action against the Houthis and had secured his support.

Later on 13 July, the Houthis launched an unspecified number of ballistic missiles and attack drones against Saudi Arabia. A statement by the Houthis claimed that the attempted strikes were targeting Abha International Airport (AHB), with Iranian media reporting that King Khalid Air Base (KKAB) was also targeted. KKAB is located in Khamis Mushait, close to Abha. A spokesman for the Saudi-led coalition against the Houthis stated that the ballistic missile threat was successfully intercepted. However, unverified footage shows smoke rising from KKAB, which could indicate that at least one Houthi projectile successfully penetrated Saudi air defences and struck KKAB.

The Houthi statement said that they “warn all airlines against flying through Saudi Arabian airspace and urge them to take our warnings seriously until the blockade on Sana’a International Airport is lifted.” This highly likely indicates the current main target priority for Houthi strikes is airports, with the Houthi attack having followed the strikes against Houthi-controlled Sanaa International Airport.

At least three people have been killed and 29 injured in Saudi Arabia, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 14 July, Saudi Arabia’s airspace is open. However, following the attempted Houthi attack against Abha International Airport, Saudi authorities issued a Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) which closed Abha, Jizan and Najran airports until 18:00 local time, 14 July.

On 12 July, Kuwait’s Ministry of Defence issued a statement saying that three land border posts in the north of the country and one offshore drilling platform belonging to the Kuwait Oil Company (KOC) were attacked, resulting in material damage. Based on prior attacks, it is highly likely that the northern border posts were attacked by Iran-backed Shia militias in Iraq. Furthermore, the attack against an offshore platform likely indicates an expansion of Iranian targeting beyond US military targets to include energy infrastructure targets.

On 13 July, air defences were again activated in Kuwait with the IRGC claiming that it struck US military infrastructure at Ahmad al-Jaber and Ali Al Salem air bases, which are both close to Kuwait City.

At least seven people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Kuwait, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 14 July, Kuwait’s airspace is open. However, on 14 July, the EASA issued a CZIB which recommended that air operators should not operate in Kuwait’s airspace.

On 12 July, air defences were activated multiple times in Bahrain. Unconfirmed reports indicate that the US Navy’s 5^th Fleet Headquarters in Manama was struck during an Iranian attack.

Early on 13 July, the IRGC claimed to have struck US military infrastructure at the Isa Air Base in southern Bahrain, and air raid sirens were again activated multiple times throughout the day. Bahrain’s military claimed that an unspecified number of Iranian missiles and attack drones were intercepted.

On 14 July, air raid sirens were again activated multiple times, with Iranian state media claiming that several US military targets in the Jaffair area of Manama (where the US Navy’s 5^th Fleet Headquarters is located) were struck.

At least three people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Bahrain, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 14 July, Bahrain’s airspace is open. However, on 14 July, the EASA issued a CZIB which recommended that air operators should not operate in Bahrain’s airspace.

On 12 July, air defences were activated in Qatar, with explosions heard overhead in Doha. The IRGC claimed that it had targeted Al Udeid Air Base southwest of Doha, with Qatar’s Ministry of Defence claiming that the missile attack was intercepted. Qatar’s Ministry of Interior stated that three people, including a child, were injured by debris due to interception operations.

At least 20 people have been injured in Qatar, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 14 July, Qatar’s airspace is open. However, on 14 July, the EASA issued a CZIB which recommended that air operators should not operate in Qatar’s airspace.

Excluding attacks in the maritime domain, no confirmed attacks have been reported in the UAE between 10 and 14 July. However, on 12 July, the UAE’s National Emergency Crisis and Disaster Management Authority (NCEMA) announced that air defence systems were responding to a missile threat. The NCEMA later stated that the “missile threats detected this morning were outside UAE borders”.

At least 12 people have been killed and 224 injured in the UAE, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 14 July, the UAE’s airspace is open. However, on 14 July, the EASA issued a CZIB which recommended that air operators should not operate in the UAE’s airspace.

On 12 July, Iranian attack drones were launched at targets in the Musandam and Al Batinah Central Governorates, Oman. The IRGC claimed that an air radar and a vessel detection radar were targeted and destroyed in Oman. This is the first occasion the IRGC has publicly claimed to have conducted an attack against Omani territory since the start of the conflict on 28 February. Previously, Iranian officials either formally denied having conducted attacks or left them unattributed. The IRGC’s public acknowledgement of attacks in Oman likely indicates that Iran is increasingly willing to treat Omani territory as a legitimate target and is less constrained by the political costs of openly conducting strikes in Oman.

The IRGC also claimed to have attacked US-linked logistics and refuelling facilities at Duqm Port, Oman, on 12 July. The port is dual-purpose and is sometimes used to sustain US naval operations. However, the claim has not been independently verified, and Omani authorities have not publicly confirmed that any projectile reached or damaged the port.

At least three people have been killed and 16 injured in Oman, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.

As of 14 July, Oman’s airspace is open. However, on 14 July, the EASA issued a CZIB which recommended that air operators should not operate in the Gulf of Oman in Oman’s airspace.