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Strait of Hormuz Tensions Keep Gulf Security Risks Elevated
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 7 July 2026 – 10 July 2026
- Following the earlier reported Iranian strikes against vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz (SoH) overnight 6-7 July, the US conducted strikes against Iran, which were followed by Iran launching attacks against targets in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and Jordan.
- The 7-9 July exchanges almost certainly represent the most severe escalation since the implementation of the MoU, exceeding the 26-28 June cycle in scale, duration and target selection.
- Speaking at the NATO summit in Ankara, Turkey, on 8 July, US President Trump stated that he believed the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Iran was “over”. However, a US official briefed after a meeting between President Trump and his national security team on 9 July that the US is “still committed to finding a resolution, and technical-level talks continue”.
- Iran almost certainly retains the capabilities to further escalate in response to US attacks. Escalation options publicly outlined on 8 July included Iran closing the Bab al-Mandeb Strait (BaM) and expanding strikes “to other American bases in the region”. Furthermore, a senior Iranian official stated on 10 July that attacks against infrastructure would be met with retaliation.
- A closure of the BaM would almost certainly require Houthi participation, and a recent deterioration in Houthi-Saudi relations almost certainly increases the credibility of this threat. On 7 July, the Houthis issued an ultimatum to Saudi Arabia threatening to close the BaM and the Red Sea to Saudi shipping if the naval and aerial blockades of the Houthis are not lifted.
- As of 10 July, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman are open.
Middle East Conflict: Latest Intelligence & Travel Advice
To support planning, we are updating our Middle East travel advice daily with guidance from our intelligence team on airspace openings and closures, flight operations, and escalating risks impacting movement.
Situation Update: Gulf States Remain Vulnerable to Renewed Retaliatory Strikes
Following the earlier reported Iranian strikes against vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz (SoH) overnight 6-7 July, the US conducted strikes against Iran, which were followed by Iran launching attacks against targets in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and Jordan.
Overnight on 7-8 July, US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted strikes against Iran, stating that it hit more than 80 targets, including Iranian air defence systems, command and control networks (C2), coastal radar sites, anti-ship missile capabilities, and more than 60 Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) fast attack craft in and near the Strait of Hormuz (SoH). Iranian media reported explosions in the southern port city of Sirik, on Qeshm Island and in areas near Bandar Abbas. A US official described the strikes as larger than previous US retaliatory strike packages against Iran. Concurrently, the US Treasury revoked the sanctions waiver that had permitted the open sale of Iranian oil on international markets under the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). In retaliation, Iran conducted strikes against targets in Bahrain and Kuwait on 8 July.
Speaking at the NATO summit in Ankara, Turkey, on 8 July, US President Donald Trump stated that he believed the MoU with Iran was “over” and that, while he might allow peace talks to continue, he considered them a “waste of time”, referring to the Iranian leadership as “scum”.
Overnight on 8-9 July, the US conducted a larger round of strikes. CENTCOM stated it hit approximately 90 targets across Iran. Preliminary reports indicate that US strikes also targeted Iranian bridges, with state media reporting a strike on a railway bridge in Golestan province, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) reporting two bridges struck on the route to Mashhad. Other reported targets in Iran have included Iranshahr Airport (IHR / OIZI) in the Sistan‑Baluchestan province and Iranian port infrastructure, including the Shahid Beheshti Port, Kalantari Port, and the maritime traffic control tower maritime traffic control tower at Chabahar, Iran’s only deepwater port and the most important port outside of the Persian Gulf. Iran responded on 9 July by conducting strikes against targets in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and Jordan.
Later on 9 July, Iranian media outlets claimed that further strikes were being conducted in southern Iran, including reported explosions heard in Bushehr, Bandar Abbas, and Sirik. However, US officials have stated that no further strikes were conducted on 9 July, with one official claiming this was the result of de-escalation efforts. Following a meeting by President Trump with his national security team on 9 July, a US official briefed that the US is “still committed to finding a resolution, and technical-level talks continue”.
On 10 July, the Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, stated that attacks on infrastructure will be met with retaliation and that Israel would not be excluded from potential retaliation strikes. IRGC-affiliated media also argued on 8 July that Iran should respond to US aggression by disrupting Gulf oil exports and damaging regional energy infrastructure.
As of 10 July, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman are open.
Saudi Arabia
No attacks have been reported in Saudi Arabia between 7 and 10 July.
Following the recent escalation in tensions between Saudi Arabia and the Yemen-based Houthis, further threats have been issued. On 7 July, the Houthi political bureau member Abdullah al-Nuaimi issued an ultimatum to Saudi Arabia. The ultimatum threatened to close the Bab al-Mandeb Strait (BaM) and the Red Sea to Saudi shipping if the naval and aerial blockades of the Houthis are not lifted. Al-Nuaimi added that Saudi Arabia “may decide to enter a new war against Yemen, but it will not be able to stop it, and the situation will spiral out of control.”
At least three people have been killed and 29 injured in Saudi Arabia, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.
As of 10 July, Saudi Arabia’s airspace is open.
Kuwait
Following escalation in the maritime domain and US strikes against Iran, air raid sirens sounded in Kuwait on 8 July. The IRGC claimed a joint missile and drone operation against Ali Al Salem Air Base in Kuwait, with Kuwaiti authorities stating that two ballistic missiles and 13 drones were intercepted. Authorities initially reported no material damage or injuries from the attack. However, the Ministry of Electricity, Water, and Renewable Energy announced that a number of overhead power transmission lines went out of service due to debris from interceptions.
Following further US strikes against Iran, air raid sirens sounded multiple times in Kuwait on 9 July. The Iranian military claimed that it conducted attacks against a “Patriot missile interceptor system”, Ali Al Salem Air Base, and Camp Arifjan in Kuwait. Kuwaiti authorities stated that three ballistic missiles, one cruise missile, and ten attack drones were detected in Kuwaiti airspace, and that all of the projectiles were successfully intercepted. Authorities stated that debris resulted in material damage in several locations and one injury.
At least seven people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Kuwait, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.
As of 10 July, Kuwait’s airspace is open.
Bahrain
Following escalation in the maritime domain and US strikes against Iran, air raid sirens sounded multiple times in Bahrain on 8 July. The IRGC claimed a joint missile and drone operation against the US Fifth Fleet headquarters in Manama, Bahrain, and Iranian state media claimed attack drones targeted the Isa Air Base in southern Bahrain. Bahraini authorities stated that air defence systems intercepted an unspecified number of projectiles.
Following further US strikes against Iran, air raid sirens sounded multiple times in Bahrain on 9 July. The IRGC claimed to have launched joint missile and drone operations targeting the US Fifth Fleet headquarters and Isa Air Base. Bahraini authorities stated that air defence systems intercepted an unspecified number of projectiles. Explosions were audible in Manama, and unverified footage indicates that at least one Iranian projectile may have directly hit the US Fifth Fleet headquarters in Manama, Bahrain.
At least three people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Bahrain, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.
As of 10 July, Bahrain’s airspace is open.
Qatar
In the early morning of 9 July, Qatar’s Interior Ministry issued an urgent security alert stating that the “[S]ecurity threat level is high and everyone must adhere to staying in homes and safe places.” This is the first time in nearly three months that Qatar residents have received an elevated security threat message. Less than an hour later, the Interior Ministry announced an end to the security threat and stated that the situation had returned to normal. The Iranian military claimed to have targeted an “early warning system” in Qatar with attack drones, following US strikes against Iran.
At least 20 people have been injured in Qatar, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.
As of 10 July, Qatar’s airspace is open.
UAE
No attacks have been reported in the UAE between 7 and 10 July.
At least 12 people have been killed and 224 injured in the UAE, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.
As of 10 July, the UAE’s airspace is open.
Oman
Excluding attacks in Omani waters in the Strait of Hormuz, no attacks have been reported in Oman between 7 and 10 July.
At least three people have been killed and 16 injured in Oman, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.
As of 10 July, Oman’s airspace is open.
Regional Advisory
The 7-9 July exchanges almost certainly represent the most severe escalation since the implementation of the MoU, exceeding the 26-28 June cycle in scale, duration and target selection. The US strike packages were larger in scale and reportedly were also conducted against Iranian civilian or dual-purpose infrastructure, which would be the first such strikes by the US since the implementation of a ceasefire on 8 April.
In the earlier stages of the conflict, before the 8 April ceasefire implementation, Iranian retaliation extended beyond direct attacks on US military assets to targets in the Gulf States and Jordan. Iranian retaliation has so far remained largely confined to US military assets. However, recent US strikes have also targeted Iranian energy, port, transport and logistics infrastructure. There is a realistic possibility that Iranian retaliation will extend to strikes on analogous targets in the region. Threats issued by IRGC-affiliated media on 8 July and by the Secretary of Iran’s SNSC on 10 July likely further indicate that sustained attacks on Iranian infrastructure could result in a broader retaliatory campaign against regional critical infrastructure.
While the majority of targets struck by US CENTCOM remained focused on degrading Iran’s military capabilities and denying Iranian freedom of access in the SoH (air defences, coastal radars, anti-ship missile launch sites and IRGCN fast attack craft), the inclusion of civilian and dual-purpose infrastructure indicates a likely shift from calibrated sub-threshold and limited strikes towards a broader cost-imposition campaign. The concurrent revocation of the oil sales waiver also likely removes the principal economic incentive Tehran derived from the MoU.
The combination of expanded strikes and economic pressure likely indicates an assessment from the Trump administration that Iran will only be deterred from further attacks on shipping through military escalation, rather than through the negotiation track alone. It is also likely a strategy aimed at increasing pressure on the IRGC, which has increasingly operated outside of the agreed parameters of the de-escalation framework, which is being negotiated with Iran’s civilian government. However, this approach likely increases the risk of a total collapse of the MoU and a return to full-scale regional conflict.
Iran almost certainly retains the capabilities to further escalate in response to US attacks. Iran continues to demonstrate the capacity to launch multi-axis missile and attack drone salvos against Gulf targets, and its principal form of leverage, disrupting SoH transits, almost certainly remains intact. Some escalation options were publicly outlined by a spokesman for the Iranian parliament’s National Security Commission on 8 July, including withdrawal from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), changing Iran’s nuclear doctrine and closing the Bab al-Mandeb Strait (BaM). Moreover, the IRGC statement on 9 July, following its retaliation strikes, stated that if US aggression is repeated, strikes will be “expanded to other American bases in the region”. A closure of the BaM would almost certainly require Houthi participation, and a recent deterioration in Houthi-Saudi relations almost certainly increases the credibility of this threat.
The current escalation in Saudi-Houthi tensions is likely driven by a Houthi attempt to challenge the Saudi naval and air blockade of Houthi-controlled Yemen, which has been enforced since 2015. The Houthis have likely been emboldened by an increasingly IRGC-dominated regime in Tehran, which is less risk-averse and likely seeking to weaponise the threat of a BaM closure to increase its leverage on the US and on its allies in the Gulf.
Senior Houthi leaders likely calculate that threats against the BaM are now significantly more likely to compel compliance from Saudi Arabia to limit or lift its blockade. Saudi Arabia’s economy is increasingly vulnerable to disruption due to the disruption of transit through the SoH and increasing reliance instead on the East-West crude pipeline to Yanbu and Red Sea export routes. This has likely placed Riyadh in an increasingly challenging position, characterised by managing the immediate risk in the BaM, while simultaneously avoiding concessions that would strengthen Iran and the Houthis in the long-term.
Riyadh is likely to prioritise containing the current escalation and avoiding a resumption of large-scale conflict in Yemen. A major escalation between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia would likely result in resumed attacks on critical infrastructure and military facilities in Saudi Arabia (potentially in addition to other Gulf States involved in the coalition against the Houthis), as observed during the previous conflict before the implementation of a ceasefire in 2022. Despite the strikes conducted against the Houthis in 2025 by the US, UK and Israel, the Houthis likely maintain greater capabilities to conduct long-range attacks in 2026 than in 2022.
In addition to threatening the broader MoU, cycles of escalation originating in the maritime domain since the implementation of the first ceasefire on 8 April have repeatedly led to renewed Iranian strikes against terrestrial targets in the Gulf and Jordan. This pattern was first observed with Iranian attacks on the UAE and more recently, against Jordan, Kuwait. Bahrain, and now, Qatar.
The targeting of Qatar on 9 July, if confirmed, would represent the first direct Iranian targeting of Qatari territory since the 8 April ceasefire and a significant departure from the target prioritisation pattern observed since June, under which Iranian retaliation was confined to Bahrain and Kuwait. However, early indications are that the strikes conducted against Qatar were limited. Such a strike would likely be intended to demonstrate the IRGC’s will and capability to expand attacks across the Gulf beyond just Bahrain, Kuwait, and Jordan, against targets in a state with which Tehran maintains close contact and calculates is unlikely to respond significantly.
Currently, Iranian retaliation strikes are less likely to directly target Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Oman, although direct strikes against these countries cannot be ruled out in the event of a return to full-scale regional conflict. Senior Iranian officials and the IRGC have repeatedly threatened that strikes will be conducted against US military assets across the region in response to continued “aggression”.
Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:
- Jordanian authorities have warned against publishing videos or information regarding Jordan’s defensive operations without authorisation.
- Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Interior has stated that “[p]hotographing or publishing or circulating information related to countering missiles and drones and the locations of their falls exposes you to legal accountability.”
- In the UAE, authorities have warned that publishing or circulating “rumours, false news, or news from unknown sources through social media platforms or other information technology” is illegal. Reports indicate that Dubai Police have used “electronic monitoring operations” to detect a photo shared within a private WhatsApp group.
- In Bahrain, several people have been confirmed as arrested for “filming, live streaming, clipping, and publishing events in a manner constituting a legal violation”.
- Qatar’s Ministry of Interior warned that gathering at incident sites or photographing and sharing content related to field developments may result in legal accountability and has arrested hundreds of people of various nationalities for “producing and sharing misleading information”.
- Omani authorities have stated: “Beware of sharing or publishing any captured photos or videos. They should be shared only with the competent authorities”.
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