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Gulf Security Remains Volatile Despite Ceasefire
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 26 June 2026 – 30 June 2026
- Since 26 June, the fragile ceasefire formalised in the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed by the US and Iran on 17 June has come under serious strain, with the US and Iran trading direct fire for the first time since the MoU’s signing.
- On both 26 and 27 June, the US conducted strikes in Iran. These strikes followed Iranian attacks against two vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz (SoH).
- In retaliation, Iran launched attack drones and ballistic missiles against targets in Bahrain and Kuwait on 27 and 28 June, with the IRGC claiming to have targeted the Ali Al Salem airbase in Kuwait and the US Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain.
- During the 28 June attacks against Bahrain, a residential building near Bahrain International Airport (BAH / OBBI) was damaged, with no fatalities reported.
- Despite the first direct kinetic engagement between the US and Iran since the signing of the MoU, the strikes conducted by both Iran and the US were likely calibrated to remain sub-threshold for a return to full-scale conflict.
- Delegations from Iran and the US are in Qatar on 30 June, but it remains unconfirmed whether negotiations will go ahead and in what format.
- There remains a high risk of a tactical miscalculation and/or escalation in the SoH, with retaliatory strikes unlikely to be confined to the immediate area of engagement. These cycles of escalation have repeatedly led to strikes against regional countries, with targets in Bahrain and Kuwait being more recently prioritised by Iran.
- As of 30 June, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman are open.
Middle East Conflict: Latest Intelligence & Travel Advice
To support planning, we are updating our Middle East travel advice daily with guidance from our intelligence team on airspace openings and closures, flight operations, and escalating risks impacting movement.
Situation Update: Gulf States Navigate Fragile Ceasefire and Ongoing Disruption
On 26 June, the US launched strikes against targets in Iran. US Central Command (CENTCOM) stated that airstrikes were conducted against Iranian missile and drone storage locations, in addition to coastal radar sites, around the Strait of Hormuz (SoH), as a “powerful response” to “unwarranted aggression” by Iran. The strikes followed the earlier Iranian attack against the Singapore-flagged EVER LOVELY (IMO: 9629110) on 26 June, after the vessel exited the SoH along the Omani coast. US Vice President JD Vance said following the US strikes that “violence will be met with violence”.
On 27 June, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) launched an attack drone which hit the Panama-flagged oil tanker KIKU (IMO: 9329796) transiting the SoH. Subsequently, the US conducted further strikes with CENTCOM stating that ten Iranian military targets were struck in sites including Sirik, Bandar-e Lengeh and Qeshm. This was followed by Iranian attack drone and ballistic missile launches against targets in Bahrain and Kuwait on 27 and 28 June, with the IRGC claiming to have targeted the Ali Al Salem airbase in Kuwait and the US Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain. During the 28 June attacks against Bahrain, a residential building near Bahrain International Airport (BAH / OBBI) was damaged, with no fatalities reported.
On 28 June, a US official stated that the US and Iran had agreed to halt attacks and renew talks. US President Donald Trump claimed on 29 June that Iran had “requested a meeting” to take place in Doha, Qatar, on 30 June. An Iranian foreign ministry spokesperson stated that while Iran is sending its technical delegation to Qatar this week, this has no relation to a concurrent visit by US envoys and no US-Iran talks are scheduled. However, a separate senior Iranian official has claimed there will be a meeting in Doha with a focus on managing the SoH and de-escalating tensions, while another official briefed that technical teams will meet separately with Qatari and Pakistani mediators on 30 June. Delegations from Iran and the US are in Qatar as of 30 June, but it remains unconfirmed whether any negotiations will go ahead and in what format.
In Lebanon, on 26 June, US officials announced that the Israeli and Lebanese sides had signed a new “framework agreement”. The new agreement allows the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to replace the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) in two areas in southern Lebanon, commits Israel to withdraw from southern Lebanon, and calls for the disarmament of all non-state groups in Lebanon. However, Israel’s Defence Minister, Israel Katz, later stated that Israel would maintain the security zone in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah rejected the agreement, and indicated that it would respond to any LAF disarmament attempts.
As of 30 June, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman are open.
Saudi Arabia
No attacks have been reported in Saudi Arabia between 26 and 30 June.
On 28 June, a helicopter belonging to the Saudi Arabian state-owned oil company Aramco crashed in Ras Tanura, resulting in the death of 14 people on board who were all Saudi citizens. Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Energy stated that “authorities have launched a full investigation to determine the cause of the crash”. The helicopter crash coincided with elevated tensions following the first kinetic strikes by the US against Iran since the signing of the MoU, and the Ras Tanura terminal has been previously targeted by Iranian strikes in the earlier full-scale regional conflict phase of the war. However, there is currently no available evidence that indicates the crash resulted from hostile action.
At least three people have been killed and 29 injured in Saudi Arabia, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.
As of 30 June, Saudi Arabia’s airspace is open.
Kuwait
On 28 June, the Kuwaiti Ministry of Defence stated that two “hostile ballistic missiles” were detected and intercepted inside Kuwaiti airspace, with no material damage or casualties. The IRGC claimed that it launched an attack against “key US military installations” which included the “Ali Al Salem Airbase in Kuwait”, in retaliation for US strikes on Iranian territory.
At least seven people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Kuwait, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.
As of 30 June, Kuwait’s airspace is open.
Bahrain
On 27 June, Bahraini authorities stated that an unspecified “number of Iranian drones” targeted Bahraini territory. This followed the first US strikes conducted against Iranian territory since the signing of the MoU. A US official anonymously briefed that this attack consisted of two attack drones, with one being shot down and the other landing harmlessly in a remote airfield area.
On 28 June, another attack took place, with Bahrain’s Interior Ministry announcing the interception of an unspecified number of projectiles. During this attack, a residential building near Bahrain International Airport (BAH / OBBI) was damaged, with no fatalities reported. The IRGC claimed that it launched an attack against “key US military installations”, which included the “US Fifth Fleet headquarters at Salman Port in Bahrain”, in retaliation for US strikes on Iranian territory.
At least three people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Bahrain, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.
As of 30 June, Bahrain’s airspace is open.
Qatar
No attacks have been reported in Qatar between 26 and 30 June, excluding an incident involving a marine vessel which resulted in the death of one Qatari national. After a vessel with two individuals on board failed to return as scheduled on 27 June, search operations were conducted, which located the missing vessel. The Qatari national on board was killed by “shrapnel resulting from the military operations in the area”, and an “Arab resident was also injured” and transferred to hospital for medical treatment, according to the Qatari Ministry of Interior. It is likely that the incident resulted from the interception of Iranian attack drones during the attacks against targets Bahrain and Kuwait. Qatar’s Ministry of Transport subsequently announced a temporary suspension of marine activities involving recreational boats, fishing vessels, jet skis and other similar watercraft until further notice.
At least 20 people have been injured in Qatar, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.
As of 30 June, Qatar’s airspace is open.
UAE
No attacks have been reported in the UAE between 26 and 30 June. On 26 June, phone alerts were issued in the UAE warning of potential missile threats. However, authorities have stated that this resulted from a technical malfunction in the early warning system.
At least 12 people have been killed and 224 injured in the UAE, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.
As of 30 June, the UAE’s airspace is open.
Oman
No attacks have been reported in Oman between 26 and 30 June, excluding attacks against vessels within Omani territorial waters in the Strait of Hormuz.
At least three people have been killed and 16 injured in Oman, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.
As of 30 June, Oman’s airspace is open.
Regional Advisory
Despite the first direct kinetic engagement between the US and Iran since the signing of the MoU, the strikes conducted by both Iran and the US were likely calibrated to remain sub-threshold for a return to full-scale conflict. However, the escalation almost certainly highlights how the MoU is functioning primarily as an extension of the ceasefire, rather than as a substantive or durable peace agreement. The previous ceasefire was also marked by sporadic exchanges of strikes between the US and Iran following continued confrontation in the maritime domain, and there remains a high risk of a tactical miscalculation and/or escalation in the SoH, with retaliatory strikes unlikely to be confined to the immediate area of engagement.
In addition to endangering the broader MoU, cycles of escalation from the maritime domain since the implementation of the first ceasefire on 8 April have repeatedly led to renewed Iranian strikes against regional countries, first with the UAE and more recently against Jordan, Kuwait and Bahrain. During the 26-28 June escalation, Bahrain and Kuwait were targeted, in a likely continuation of this recently observed target prioritisation.
Currently, Iranian retaliation strikes are less likely to directly target Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar and Oman, although direct strikes against these countries cannot be ruled out in the event of a significant escalation and/or breakdown in the MoU. Senior Iranian officials and the IRGC have repeatedly threatened that strikes will be conducted against US military assets across the region in response to continued “aggression”.
Of the Gulf States, Saudi Arabia highly likely exerts the greatest deterrence against Iran, reinforced by the deployment of Pakistani forces to Saudi Arabia, and regular diplomatic engagement between Tehran and Riyadh continues. The UAE has notably not been attacked since mid-May, having previously been likely the highest priority target for Iranian strikes in the Gulf. This is likely related to increased diplomatic engagement between the UAE and Iran, which may have involved agreement by the UAE to unlock billions of dollars for Iran, although Emirati authorities have denied these reports.
Qatar and Oman were directly attacked the least of these countries during the full-scale phase of the conflict, and Qatar is actively serving as a mediator in the currently ongoing talks. Oman previously served as the mediator in the pre-28 February talks between the US and Iran, and Tehran has repeatedly indicated a desire to engage with Oman to set up a long-term framework for managing the SoH.
Continued IDF operations in Lebanon are likely to pose a significant threat to the MoU and have previously resulted in Iranian military claims of closing the SoH during the post-MoU period. While Iranian attacks against Israel are unlikely if operations are limited and contained to southern Lebanon, IDF strikes on Beirut could trigger a direct Iranian response against Israel. This, in turn, would likely lead to an escalation cycle with high risks of a broader ceasefire collapse. Opposition to the MoU from senior Israeli politicians almost certainly reflects concerns that the agreement does not satisfy Israel’s key objectives, with Iran’s ballistic missile programme and support for proxy forces omitted from negotiations. Israeli opposition and/or unilateral military action are likely to complicate the MoU’s implementation and undermine the agreement.
Iranian adherence to the ceasefire is likely to be undermined by the IRGC, which has increasingly consolidated power in Tehran, acted independently of the civilian government, and signalled total opposition to US demands. The lack of a fully coherent regime in Tehran with a unified negotiating position almost certainly complicates the negotiation process and increases the likelihood that elements within the IRGC could fail to comply with any agreements made by Tehran’s civilian government and negotiating team. Agreements made in the diplomatic track are almost certainly vulnerable to spoiling by more hardline elements in the regime, which have repeatedly indicated opposition to even minor perceived concessions to the US.
Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:
- Jordanian authorities have warned against publishing videos or information regarding Jordan’s defensive operations without authorisation.
- Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Interior has stated that “[p]hotographing or publishing or circulating information related to countering missiles and drones and the locations of their falls exposes you to legal accountability.”
- In the UAE, authorities have warned that publishing or circulating “rumours, false news, or news from unknown sources through social media platforms or other information technology” is illegal. Reports indicate that Dubai Police have used “electronic monitoring operations” to detect a photo shared within a private WhatsApp group.
- In Bahrain, several people have been confirmed as arrested for “filming, live streaming, clipping, and publishing events in a manner constituting a legal violation”.
- Qatar’s Ministry of Interior warned that gathering at incident sites or photographing and sharing content related to field developments may result in legal accountability and has arrested hundreds of people of various nationalities for “producing and sharing misleading information”.
- Omani authorities have stated: “Beware of sharing or publishing any captured photos or videos. They should be shared only with the competent authorities”.
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