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Gulf Security Remains Volatile Despite Ceasefire
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 23 June 2026 – 26 June 2026
- Despite the ceasefire remaining formally in place, Israel and Hezbollah continue to engage in clashes in southern Lebanon.
- Iran reportedly carried out a strike on a vessel trying to exit the Strait of Hormuz. The strike followed the announcement of a UN-led effort to evacuate the personnel of vessels that have remained in the area. Following the strike, the evacuation effort was halted.
- On 25 June, the US and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) released a joint statement following a ministerial meeting in Bahrain, which reiterated US-GCC partnership commitments. Iran criticised the statement as “interventionist”.
- US Vice-President J.D. Vance stated on 25 June, that the United States and Iran had established a direct channel of communication in Doha to support deconfliction and reduce the chance of the conflict resuming.
- As of 26 June, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman are open.
Middle East Conflict: Latest Intelligence & Travel Advice
To support planning, we are updating our Middle East travel advice daily with guidance from our intelligence team on airspace openings and closures, flight operations, and escalating risks impacting movement.
Situation Update: Gulf States Navigate Fragile Ceasefire and Ongoing Disruption
The ceasefires between the US, Israel, and Iran, and between Israel and Lebanon, remain extant. However, the agreements remain unstable. US Vice-President J.D. Vance stated on 25 June, that the United States and Iran had established a direct channel of communication in Doha to favour deconfliction and reduce the chance of the conflict resuming.
On 23 June, US President Donald Trump stated that US forces would halt their blockade of the Strait of Hormuz (SoH). On the same day, the UN’s International Maritime Organisation (IMO) announced that it would, alongside Oman, begin coordinating the evacuation of approximately 11,000 personnel on board vessels that have remained within the SoH due to the conflict. On 25 June, the Islamic Security Guard Corps (IRGC) struck a vessel approximately 7.5 nautical miles southeast of Dahit, Oman. The attack followed IRGC statements that attempts to cross the SoH via the route designated by IMO would be “unacceptable”, and that all crossings would need to be coordinated with the newly-established Persian Gulf Strait Authority (PGSA), an Iranian government agency that is responsible for regulating traffic in the SoH. Following the strike, UN channels stated that they would pause evacuation efforts and noted that several vessels had already exited the waterway.
On 25 June, the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that it would hold talks with Oman to “define future administration and maritime services” in the SoH. US officials have reiterated their opposition to Iran’s plan to charge vessels transiting through the SoH.
On 24 June, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) stated that its inspectors would visit Iranian enrichment sites under the framework of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). On the following day, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi rejected the IAEA statement, claiming that there is “no plan” for future visits to Iranian nuclear sites.
On 25 June, the US and the Gulf Cooperation Council released a joint statement following a ministerial meeting in Bahrain. The statement reiterated “the enduring U.S. commitment to GCC security” and the “importance of reopening the Strait of Hormuz, noting that free, unconditional, and unrestricted navigation, including the right of transit passage as guaranteed under international law, remains essential to regional and global security”. The statement also condemned regional attacks by Iran and it proxies. On 26 June, Iranian diplomatic channels called the statement “provocative” and “interventionist”.
As of 26 June, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman are open.
Saudi Arabia
No attacks have been reported in Saudi Arabia between 23 and 26 June.
At least three people have been killed and 29 injured in Saudi Arabia, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.
As of 26 June, Saudi Arabia’s airspace is open.
Kuwait
No attacks have been reported in Kuwait between 23 and 26 June.
At least seven people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Kuwait, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.
As of 26 June, Kuwait’s airspace is open.
Bahrain
No attacks have been reported in Bahrain between 23 and 26 June.
At least three people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Bahrain, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.
As of 26 June, Bahrain’s airspace is open.
Qatar
No attacks have been reported in Qatar between 23 and 26 June.
At least 20 people have been injured in Qatar, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.
As of 26 June, Qatar’s airspace is open.
UAE
No attacks have been reported in the UAE between 23 and 26 June.
At least 12 people have been killed and 224 injured in the UAE, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.
As of 26 June, the UAE’s airspace is open.
Oman
On 25 June, IRGC forces carried out a strike that damaged a cargo vessel approximately 7.5 nautical miles from the coast of Dahit. MV EVER LOVELY (IMO: 9629110), a Singapore-flagged vessel, was reportedly struck by a projectile while transiting on the route designated by the IMO, with the impact causing limited damage to the bridge,
At least three people have been killed and 16 injured in Oman, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.
As of 26 June, Oman’s airspace is open.
Regional Advisory
The MoU and the holding of direct talks in Switzerland have likely reduced the immediate risk of a return to full-scale US-Iran conflict and strikes on the Gulf States. However, the MoU is highly likely functioning primarily as an extension of the ceasefire, rather than as a substantive or durable peace agreement. The agreement is likely vulnerable to multiple key triggers for ceasefire breakdown. The conflict in Lebanon, Iran’s nuclear programme and the long-term status of the SoH remain unresolved.
Continued IDF operations in Lebanon are likely the most immediate threat to the MoU and have resulted in Iranian claims of closing the SoH. The IRGC is likely to leverage tactical actions in the SoH to apply pressure on the US during negotiations, as evidenced by the recent attack on a vessel in Omani waters. As of 26 June, it appears this attack did not cross the threshold for US retaliation; however, sustained attacks on international shipping could trigger a kinetic response from the US. As during previous escalation cycles, incidents in the SoH are unlikely to be contained to the maritime domain and could result in Iranian attacks on terrestrial targets in the region, although sustained direct attacks on Gulf States remain unlikely outside of a major escalation and complete collapse of the negotiation process.
President Trump’s multiple stated threats since the MoU’s signing have likely challenged terms within the MoU which preclude the issuance of threats of military force, and the announcement by Iran’s military headquarters that it would close the SoH directly contravened key terms of the MoU. While neither side has acted in a manner that has likely crossed a threshold warranting renewed hostilities, these reciprocal violations almost certainly underscore the fragility of the MoU.
Iranian adherence to a ceasefire is likely to be undermined by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which has increasingly consolidated power in Tehran, acted independently of the civilian government, and signalled total opposition to US demands. The lack of a fully coherent regime in Tehran with a unified negotiating position almost certainly complicates the negotiation process and increases the likelihood that elements within the IRGC could fail to comply with any agreements made by Tehran’s civilian government and negotiating team.
Iranian Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, has also made statements aimed at characterising Tehran’s agreement to the MoU as the responsibility of Iran’s civilian President, Masoud Pezeshkian. This is likely intended to limit domestic criticism of any shift from the maximalist objectives of hardliners, but it also likely highlights the lack of a fully unified negotiating position in Iran. It should not be assumed that diplomatic breakthroughs in Switzerland will be uniformly accepted or implemented across Iran’s political and security establishment.
Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:
- Jordanian authorities have warned against publishing videos or information regarding Jordan’s defensive operations without authorisation.
- Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Interior has stated that “[p]hotographing or publishing or circulating information related to countering missiles and drones and the locations of their falls exposes you to legal accountability.”
- In the UAE, authorities have warned that publishing or circulating “rumours, false news, or news from unknown sources through social media platforms or other information technology” is illegal. Reports indicate that Dubai Police have used “electronic monitoring operations” to detect a photo shared within a private WhatsApp group.
- In Bahrain, several people have been confirmed as arrested for “filming, live streaming, clipping, and publishing events in a manner constituting a legal violation”.
- Qatar’s Ministry of Interior warned that gathering at incident sites or photographing and sharing content related to field developments may result in legal accountability and has arrested hundreds of people of various nationalities for “producing and sharing misleading information”.
- Omani authorities have stated: “Beware of sharing or publishing any captured photos or videos. They should be shared only with the competent authorities”.
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