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Gulf Security Remains Volatile Despite Ceasefire
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 9 June 2026 – 12 June 2026
- Following the announced end of the Israel-Iran confrontation on 8 June, a US Apache helicopter crashed in the Strait of Hormuz following an incident with an Iranian attack drone. US forces subsequently conducted strikes against southern Iran on 10 and 11 June, with Iranian forces then launching retaliatory strikes against US military targets in Jordan, Kuwait and Bahrain.
- These mark the first Iranian attacks against targets in Jordan since the implementation of the ceasefire on 8 April, and almost certainly indicate an expansion of targeting patterns to include Muwaffaq Salti Air Base for retaliatory strikes following continued US operations against Iran.
- During the 11 June attack against Kuwait, authorities said that radar facilities and equipment linked to air traffic management were seriously damaged at Kuwait International Airport.
- Israeli operations have continued in southern Lebanon. There is a realistic possibility of this triggering further Iranian strikes against Israel, which could lead to further exchanges of tit-for-tat strikes and endanger the broader ceasefire.
- On 11 June, President Trump threatened on social media that the US “will be hitting Iran VERY HARD TONIGHT”. However, later on 11 June, President Trump announced that he had cancelled planned strikes against Iran and claimed that Iranian leadership had “approved” a draft memorandum of understanding (MOU). Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media denied that Iran has confirmed the agreement yet, but there was a “possibility” it will be approved as the US has accepted “Iran’s proposed text”.
- As of 12 June, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman are open. Early 11 June, Kuwait announced the temporary closure of its airspace, which was reopened shortly afterwards.
Middle East Conflict: Latest Intelligence & Travel Advice
To support planning, we are updating our Middle East travel advice daily with guidance from our intelligence team on airspace openings and closures, flight operations, and escalating risks impacting movement.
Situation Update: Gulf States Navigate Fragile Ceasefire and Ongoing Disruption
Following the announced end of the Israel-Iran confrontation on 8 June, a US AH-64 Apache helicopter crashed in the Strait of Hormuz following an incident with an Iranian attack drone, with two crew members being subsequently rescued. CENTCOM stated that the crash is under investigation, and some US officials have stated that it remains unclear whether the collision was intentional, but US President Donald Trump has stated that it was an intentional attack, with the attack drone failing to detonate.
US forces subsequently conducted strikes against around 20 targets in southern Iran, with Iranian forces then launching strikes against US military targets in Jordan, Kuwait and Bahrain. On 10 June, US forces conducted further strikes against southern Iran, which were reportedly “calibrated to avoid casualties and leave open the possibility of a deal”. Iranian forces then again conducted strikes against US military targets in Jordan, Kuwait and Bahrain.
On 11 June, President Trump threatened on social media that the US “will be hitting Iran VERY HARD TONIGHT”, and that “[a]t some point in the not too distant future, we will be taking Kharg Island”. However, later on 11 June, President Trump announced that he had cancelled planned strikes against Iran and claimed that Iranian leadership had “approved” a draft memorandum of understanding (MOU). Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media denied that Iran has confirmed the agreement yet, but there was a “possibility” it will be approved as the US has accepted “Iran’s proposed text”.
On 11 June, Israeli military officials stated that the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) had moved armour and troops into position in southern Lebanon in preparation for a potential offensive on Nabatieh. Nabatieh is one of the largest urban centres in southern Lebanon and a known Hezbollah stronghold.
As of 12 June, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman are open. Early 11 June, Kuwait announced the temporary closure of its airspace, which was reopened shortly afterwards.
Saudi Arabia
No attacks have been reported in Saudi Arabia between 9 and 12 June.
At least three people have been killed and 29 injured in Saudi Arabia, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.
As of 12 June, Saudi Arabia’s airspace is open.
Kuwait
On 10 June, Kuwait’s armed forces stated that air defence systems were “intercepting hostile aerial targets”. The IRGC stated that the attack was conducted in retaliation for the US strikes against southern Iran, targeting the Ali Al Salem and Ahmad Al-Jaber airbases. On 11 June, Kuwait’s air defences were again activated due to another Iranian attack. During this attack, Kuwait’s civil aviation authority said that radar facilities and equipment linked to air traffic management were seriously damaged at Kuwait International Airport, with injuries reported. Kuwait’s armed forces later announced on 11 June that in the previous 48 hours, 24 attack drones had been intercepted.
At least seven people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Kuwait, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.
As of 11 June, Kuwait’s airspace is open. During the 11 June attack, which involved an attack against Kuwait International Airport, Kuwait’s civil aviation authority announced the temporary closure of Kuwait’s airspace starting 04:50 local time. Around two hours later, authorities announced” the return of air traffic in Kuwaiti airspace to normal.”
Bahrain
On 10 June, the Bahraini air defences were activated due to incoming Iranian attacks. The IRGC stated that the attack was conducted in retaliation for the US strikes against southern Iran, targeting Sheikh Isa airbase. Bahrain’s Ministry of the Interior stated that the attacks resulted in a minor injury and damage to homes and vehicles in Hamad City and Manama due to debris from intercepted Iranian drones. On 11 June, Bahrain was attacked again, with the foreign minister stating that Bahrain was targeted by 36 attack drones. IRGC-affiliated media claimed to have struck the AR-327 early warning radar site located in Bahrain’s Mount Dukhan.
At least three people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Bahrain, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.
As of 12 June, Bahrain’s airspace is open.
Qatar
No attacks have been reported in Qatar between 9 and 12 June.
At least 20 people have been injured in Qatar, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.
As of 9 June, Qatar’s airspace is open.
UAE
No attacks have been reported in the UAE between 9 and 12 June.
Notably, Iranian retaliation strikes have not recently been conducted against the UAE, which is likely related to reportedly increasing backchannel diplomatic contacts between the UAE and Iran seeking to de-escalate.
At least 12 people have been killed and 224 injured in the UAE, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.
As of 12 June, the UAE’s airspace is open.
Oman
No attacks have been reported in Oman between 9 and 12 June, excluding US attacks in Omani waters against Iran-linked vessels as part of efforts to enforce the blockade.
At least three people have been killed and 16 injured in Oman, as of 09:00 UTC on 10 June.
As of 12 June, Oman’s airspace is open.
Regional Advisory
Overall, the ‘ceasefire’ has almost certainly come closer to collapse in the past week than at any point since its implementation on 8 April. Tehran has expanded its stated criteria for renewed attacks against Israel in response to continued conflict in Lebanon, with expanded IDF operations in southern Lebanon likely to be exploited by Iran to undermine the ceasefire. In addition, escalation cycles linked to US-Iran confrontation in the maritime domain have intensified to their highest level yet, reflected in the scale of Iranian retaliatory strikes targeting Kuwait and Bahrain, and the resumption of strikes on Jordan, which had not been attacked since the 8 April ceasefire.
The exchange of strikes between the US and Iran following the loss of an Apache helicopter is almost certainly the most significant resulting from confrontation in the maritime domain since 8 April. As long as the competing blockades are maintained, there remains a high risk of a tactical miscalculation and/or escalation in the Strait of Hormuz, with retaliatory strikes unlikely to be confined to the immediate area of engagement. In addition to endangering the broader negotiation process, the cycles of escalation have repeatedly led to renewed Iranian strikes against regional countries, first with the UAE and more recently against Jordan, Kuwait and Bahrain. The UAE has notably not been attacked since mid-May, which is likely related to the increased diplomatic engagement between the UAE and Iran.
Since 3 June, Iranian retaliatory attacks have likely shifted from sporadic post-ceasefire engagements to larger and more complex attacks. The targeting of Kuwait International Airport on 3 June was a notable escalation in the target profile of Iranian strikes since 8 April. This pattern has likely continued, evidenced by the 10-11 June attacks, whereby Kuwait International Airport was attacked again, and Iranian strikes expanded to Jordan.
Should an MOU be imminently reached, which President Trump claims could be as soon as this weekend, the immediate risk of a return to full-scale US-Iran conflict would likely decrease. However, such a framework would likely only be an effective ceasefire extension and not a substantive and lasting peace agreement. Major issues like control of the Strait of Hormuz and Iran’s nuclear programme are unlikely to be fully resolved. Moreover, reported provisions within the MOU, such as the US blockade being lifted in proportion to the restoration of commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, provide multiple triggers for the potential MOU to break down. Finally, if the MOU only delays detailed nuclear talks for another 60 days, the main disputes during the pre-28 February negotiations would likely continue to complicate talks.
If an MOU/framework agreement is not agreed, there is a realistic possibility of Iranian retaliation strikes against targets in Jordan and the Gulf States further escalating as a result of continued US and/or Israeli strikes on Iran. On 10 June, President Trump stated in an interview that he is considering ordering new strikes targeting Iran’s power plants and bridges if Tehran does not sign an agreement, and also threatened the seizure of Kharg Island on 11 June. Previous similar threats issued by President Trump led to IRGC-affiliated media publishing lists of desalination and power plants across the Gulf States as potential targets for retaliation. Furthermore, Iran’s chief negotiator and parliamentary speaker, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, threatened that the Israeli strikes against Iran, in addition to the ongoing US naval blockade, have made US bases and assets in the region “legitimate targets”. The IRGC-affiliated media outlet, Fars, citing a senior Iranian official, directly reported that if Iranian energy infrastructure is attacked again, Iran will carry out analogous attacks against oil and gas facilities in the region.
The MOU reportedly involves the Strait of Hormuz being reopened immediately without tolls, with a return to pre-war shipping volumes within 30 days. Iranian state-owned media reported on 12 June that the MOU will not make a commitment regarding any transfer of management of the strait. While softening the language from “tolls”, regime and IRGC-linked media have repeatedly indicated that payments could still be imposed for transit under the guise of “environmental protection” or “service charges”. These actions likely indicate that Tehran is seeking to preserve leverage over the strategic chokepoint while gradually normalising a greater long-term role in its administration; a development unlikely to be accepted by the US and the international community, as they directly challenge maritime law and the principles of freedom of navigation.
Travellers are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:
- Jordanian authorities have warned against publishing videos or information regarding Jordan’s defensive operations without authorisation.
- Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Interior has stated that “[p]hotographing or publishing or circulating information related to countering missiles and drones and the locations of their falls exposes you to legal accountability.”
- In the UAE, authorities have warned that publishing or circulating “rumours, false news, or news from unknown sources through social media platforms or other information technology” is illegal. Reports indicate that Dubai Police have used “electronic monitoring operations” to detect a photo shared within a private WhatsApp group.
- In Bahrain, several people have been confirmed as arrested for “filming, live streaming, clipping, and publishing events in a manner constituting a legal violation”.
- Qatar’s Ministry of Interior warned that gathering at incident sites or photographing and sharing content related to field developments may result in legal accountability and has arrested hundreds of people of various nationalities for “producing and sharing misleading information”.
- Omani authorities have stated: “Beware of sharing or publishing any captured photos or videos. They should be shared only with the competent authorities”.
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