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Gulf Security Remains Volatile Despite Ceasefire
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 5 June 2026 – 9 June 2026
- Israeli operations have continued in southern Lebanon, with an airstrike being conducted against the southern Lebanese city of Tyre on 9 June, resulting in at least eight deaths, which followed the issuance of an Israeli evacuation order for the entire city. There is a realistic possibility of this triggering further Iranian strikes against Israel, which could lead to further exchanges of tit-for-tat strikes and endanger the broader ceasefire.
- Should further Israel-Iran confrontation be triggered by developments in Lebanon, there is a realistic possibility that Iranian retaliation would again extend to the Gulf States. Senior Iranian officials have threatened that the Israeli strikes against Iran, in addition to the ongoing US naval blockade, have made US bases and assets in the region “legitimate targets”.
- Overnight 5-6 June, further Iranian strikes were conducted against Kuwait and Bahrain following confrontation in the maritime domain between the US and Iran. The Kuwaiti military announced the interception of seven ballistic missiles, with interceptions occurring over several residential areas, and authorities stated that debris caused material damage but no injuries. The Bahrain Defence Force announced the interception of three missiles and “several drones”.
- As of 9 June, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman are open. Overnight 5-6 June, Kuwait announced the temporary closure of its airspace, which was reopened on 6 June.
Middle East Conflict: Latest Intelligence & Travel Advice
To support planning, we are updating our Middle East travel advice daily with guidance from our intelligence team on airspace openings and closures, flight operations, and escalating risks impacting movement.
Situation Update: Gulf States Navigate Fragile Ceasefire and Ongoing Disruption
Following Israeli strikes in Beirut, Iran and Israel engaged in retaliatory tit-for-tat strikes on 7 and 8 June. The exchange of strikes followed a rocket attack on northern Israel launched by Hezbollah in Lebanon on 7 June, which the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) responded to with strikes on Beirut’s southern suburbs (Dahieh).
Late 7 June, the IDF stated that it had intercepted a wave of Iranian missiles in northern Israel, Iran’s first direct attack against Israel since the implementation of the 8 April ceasefire. This was followed by Israeli strikes against Iran overnight into 8 June (including against a petrochemical complex). Missiles were subsequently fired from Yemen, alongside another Iranian salvo, with the Houthis claiming that they conducted a joint strike with Iran. The Houthis also reiterated their total ban on Israeli vessels transiting the Red Sea.
US President Donald Trump reportedly made significant efforts to “restrain” the Israeli response against Iran to allow more time for diplomacy. At approximately 11:30 UTC, 8 June, the IRGC issued a statement that “the cessation of armed forces operations is hereby announced”, but that if attacks continue, “including in southern Lebanon”, Iran will respond “more severe and forceful than before”. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated on 8 April that attacks against Iran will be halted “for now”, but that the fight with Tehran and Hezbollah is “not over”.
Overnight 5-6 June, further Iranian strikes were conducted against Kuwait and Bahrain following a confrontation in the Strait of Hormuz between the US and Iran. On 5 June, the IRGC claimed that four tankers under US military “guidance” attempted to bypass Iran’s imposed traffic separation scheme, with the IRGC attacking one of the vessels and claiming to have fired “warning shots” at US vessels. US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced that it shot down four Iranian attack drones and conducted strikes against radar sites on Iran’s Qeshm Island and in Goruk. Iran then conducted attacks against Kuwait and Bahrain in retaliation.
As of 9 June, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman are open. Overnight 5-6 June, Kuwait announced the temporary closure of its airspace, which was reopened on 6 June.
Saudi Arabia
The Al-Kharj governorate, southeast of Riyadh, issued a brief early warning in the early hours of 8 June “in anticipation of a possible danger”. The Prince Sultan Air Base, which hosts US personnel and was regularly attacked until the 8 April ceasefire, is located in Al-Kharj. Iranian officials denied reports that they launched an attack against Al-Kharj in Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia’s defence ministry later stated that the alert was triggered by a ballistic missile launched from Yemen targeting a “regional state”, which malfunctioned and fell in an uninhabited area near the Saudi-Yemen border. The missile was almost certainly launched by the Yemen-based Houthis and was highly likely targeting Israel.
At least three people have been killed and 29 injured in Saudi Arabia, as of 09:00 UTC on 1 June.
As of 9 June, Saudi Arabia’s airspace is open.
Kuwait
On 6 June, the Kuwaiti military announced the interception of seven ballistic missiles overnight 5-6 June. This followed further confrontation between Iran and the US due to their competing maritime blockades. The interceptions occurred over several residential areas, with authorities stating that debris caused material damage but no injuries. The Kuwait Fire Force stated that they responded to two fire incidents resulting from debris.
At least eight people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Kuwait, as of 09:00 UTC on 5 June.
As of 9 June, Kuwait’s airspace is open. During the overnight 5-6 June attack, the Kuwait Public Authority of Civil Aviation (PACA) announced the temporary closure of Kuwaiti airspace, which was reopened on 6 June.
Bahrain
On 6 June, the Bahrain Defence Force (BDF) announced the interception of three missiles and “several drones” launched from Iran overnight 5-6 June. This followed further confrontation between Iran and the US due to their competing maritime blockades. The IRGC claimed that it successfully struck the US Fifth Fleet headquarters in Manama, with CENTCOM claiming that this is false.
At least three people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Bahrain, as of 09:00 UTC on 1 June.
As of 9 June, Bahrain’s airspace is open.
Qatar
No attacks have been reported in Qatar between 5 and 9 June.
At least 20 people have been injured in Qatar, as of 09:00 UTC on 1 June.
As of 9 June, Qatar’s airspace is open. On 7 June, Qatar’s General Authority of Civil Aviation (GACA) issued a statement denying reports on social media regarding the closure of Qatari airspace.
UAE
No attacks have been reported in the UAE between 5 and 9 June.
At least 12 people have been killed and 224 injured in the UAE, as of 09:00 UTC on 1 June.
As of 9 June, the UAE’s airspace is open.
Oman
No attacks have been reported in Oman between 5 and 9 June.
At least three people have been killed and 16 injured in Oman, as of 09:00 UTC on 1 June.
As of 9 June, Oman’s airspace is open.
Regional Advisory
Tehran had previously warned that strikes in Beirut “could derail the diplomatic track” and result in retaliation, with Iranian officials consistently insisting that the wider ceasefire extends to Lebanon. The IDF has committed significant resources to a ground offensive in Lebanon and has continued to conduct high-intensity airstrikes in southern Lebanon. Sustained IDF offensives in Lebanon will almost certainly be leveraged by Iran to undermine ongoing diplomatic efforts and could provoke further escalation cycles between Iran and Israel. There is a realistic possibility that Iran-Israel exchanges will result in a collapse of the wider US-Iran ceasefire.
High-intensity IDF operations in southern Lebanon have continued since the 7–8 April ceasefire and the separate unilateral ceasefire with the Lebanese government. These operations likely remained below Iran’s threshold for direct escalation, with Tehran likely seeking to preserve capability for a major escalation. Several IDF strikes in Beirut also were not met with a direct Iranian response. However, Iran’s recent escalation highly likely indicates that IDF strikes in Beirut are a redline that Iran is willing to enforce. Moreover, the IRGC’s threat of retaliation for IDF operations in southern Lebanon may indicate that Tehran’s threshold has been reduced, broadening the range of Israeli actions that may trigger a direct Iranian response.
Israeli operations have continued in southern Lebanon, with an airstrike being conducted against the southern Lebanese city of Tyre on 9 June, following the issuance of an Israeli evacuation order for the entire city. There is a realistic possibility of this triggering further Iranian strikes against Israel, which could lead to further exchanges of tit-for-tat strikes that are likely to endanger the broader ceasefire.
Hezbollah have historically served as a key component of Iranian deterrence in the region, and its preservation is highly likely a strategic priority for Tehran. However, the regime’s focus on Lebanon and claimed suspension of negotiations also followed President Trump’s request for several amendments to the memorandum of understanding (MOU) being negotiated by the US and Iran.
It is highly likely that the Iranian regime, which is increasingly under the control of hardline IRGC commanders, calculates that it is willing to accept the risk of a return to full-scale conflict or a continuation of the current status quo rather than be perceived as conceding to US demands. By increasingly linking the status of the ceasefire to Lebanon, the regime likely also seeks to divert attention from and gain leverage over the two principal points of contention in negotiations: control of the Strait of Hormuz and the nuclear file.
Iran’s chief negotiator and parliamentary speaker, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, threatened that the Israeli strikes against Iran, in addition to the ongoing US naval blockade, have made US bases and assets in the region “legitimate targets”. Moreover, the IRGC-affiliated media outlet, Fars, citing a senior Iranian official, reported that if Iranian energy infrastructure is attacked again, Iran will carry out attacks against US oil and gas facilities in the region. There is a realistic possibility that further escalation between Iran and Israel will not be contained to a direct exchange between Iran and Israel, but could expand to renewed strikes targeting the Gulf States.
The involvement of the Yemen-based Houthis was almost certainly limited and primarily performative, but it highly likely serves as a key source of deterrence, given the militant group’s capacity to disrupt maritime traffic through the Bab al-Mandeb Strait and ability to target regional US allies from an additional axis. The Houthis’ limited involvement will likely increase pressure on Washington from its Gulf allies.
As long as the competing blockades are maintained, there remains a high risk of a tactical miscalculation and/or escalation in the Strait of Hormuz, with retaliatory strikes unlikely to be confined to the immediate area of engagement or the maritime domain. In addition to endangering the broader negotiation process, the cycles of escalation have repeatedly led to renewed Iranian strikes against the Gulf States, first with the UAE and more recently against Kuwait and Bahrain.
The 3 June attacks against Kuwait and Bahrain following maritime confrontation were the largest-scale Iranian attack since the implementation of the 8 April ceasefire, and the targeting of Kuwait International Airport was a notable escalation in the target profile of the sporadic Iranian strikes conducted since 8 April. The attacks against Kuwait and Bahrain overnight 5-6 June involved the launching of at least ten ballistic missiles, likely indicating a continuation of this escalated scale of strike packages against the Gulf States in response to US-Iran confrontation in the maritime domain which leads to strikes against Iran.
Travellers are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:
- Jordanian authorities have warned against publishing videos or information regarding Jordan’s defensive operations without authorisation.
- Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Interior has stated that “[p]hotographing or publishing or circulating information related to countering missiles and drones and the locations of their falls exposes you to legal accountability.”
- In the UAE, authorities have warned that publishing or circulating “rumours, false news, or news from unknown sources through social media platforms or other information technology” is illegal. Reports indicate that Dubai Police have used “electronic monitoring operations” to detect a photo shared within a private WhatsApp group
- In Bahrain, several people have been confirmed as arrested for “filming, live streaming, clipping, and publishing events in a manner constituting a legal violation”.
- Qatar’s Ministry of Interior warned that gathering at incident sites or photographing and sharing content related to field developments may result in legal accountability and has arrested hundreds of people of various nationalities for “producing and sharing misleading information”.
- Omani authorities have stated: “Beware of sharing or publishing any captured photos or videos. They should be shared only with the competent authorities”.
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