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Gulf Security Remains Volatile Despite Ceasefire
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 29 May 2026 – 02 June 2026
- Following reports that a draft memorandum of understanding (MOU) had been agreed by US and Iranian negotiators, President Donald Trump reportedly requested several amendments to the MOU regarding the nuclear file and the Strait of Hormuz.
- On 1 June, Israel’s Prime Minister publicly ordered strikes on Beirut’s southern suburbs (Dahieh). IRGC-affiliated media reported that due to the developments in Lebanon, “the Iranian negotiating team is suspending dialogues and exchange of texts through mediators”. President Trump announced a claimed fresh cessation of hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah and that talks with Iran were “continuing.”
- The risk of a return to full-scale conflict in the Middle East, which would likely be characterised by renewed daily Iranian strikes across the region, likely remains high. Furthermore, the continuing competing blockades of the Strait of Hormuz by the US and Iran continue to lead to conflict in the maritime domain, which has repeatedly escalated into broader ‘tit-for-tat’ strikes which have impacted the Gulf States.
- On 30 and 31 May, US Central Command (CENTCOM) stated that it conducted “self-defense strikes on Iranian radar and command and control sites for drones in Goruk, Iran and Qeshm Island”. These followed “aggressive Iranian actions that included the shootdown of a U.S. MQ-1 drone that was operating over international waters.” The IRGC subsequently announced attempted retaliation strikes against a US air base in Kuwait, with Kuwaiti air defences being activated early 1 June and CENTCOM claiming the interception of two Iranian ballistic missiles.
- As of 2 June, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman are open.
Middle East Conflict: Latest Intelligence & Travel Advice
To support planning, we are updating our Middle East travel advice daily with guidance from our intelligence team on airspace openings and closures, flight operations, and escalating risks impacting movement.
Situation Update: Gulf States Navigate Fragile Ceasefire and Ongoing Disruption
Following reports that a draft memorandum of understanding (MOU) had been agreed by US and Iranian negotiators, US President Donald Trump convened a Situation Room meeting on 29 May to review the proposal. President Trump reportedly requested several amendments to the MOU regarding the nuclear file and the Strait of Hormuz. In a subsequent statement on social media, President Trump claimed that the US naval blockade “will now be lifted”, the US will access Iran’s highly enriched uranium (HEU) stockpile in coordination with Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for its destruction, and that “[n]o money will be exchanged, until further notice”.
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media denied many of President Trump’s claims, instead claiming that no final decision has been made on the MOU, that Iran would reopen the strait following a lifting of the US blockade, but could continue “monitoring and inspection of ships, the provision of services, and security measures”, and that Iran would receive an “immediate payment of $12 billion in frozen assets” with no further negotiations until this is paid.
On 30 and 31 May, US Central Command (CENTCOM) stated that it conducted “self -defense strikes on Iranian radar and command and control sites for drones in Goruk, Iran and Qeshm Island”. These followed “aggressive Iranian actions that included the shootdown of a U.S. MQ-1 drone that was operating over international waters.” The IRGC subsequently announced attempted retaliation strikes against a US air base in Kuwait, with Kuwaiti air defences being activated early 1 June.
The conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon further escalated over 30-31 May, with the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) crossing the Litani River in the deepest incursions into Lebanon in over 25 years. On 1 June, Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu publicly ordered strikes on Beirut’s southern suburbs (Dahieh).
On 1 June, IRGC-affiliated media reported that due to the developments in Lebanon, “the Iranian negotiating team is suspending dialogues and exchange of texts through mediators”, and that “Iran and the Axis of Resistance have resolved to pursue the complete closure of the Strait of Hormuz and activate other fronts, including the Bab al-Mandab Strait”.
Hours later on 1 June, President Trump reportedly held an expletive-laden telephone call with Prime Minister Netanyahu, after which President Trump announced a claimed fresh cessation of hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah and that talks with Iran were “continuing, at a rapid pace.”
As of 2 June, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman are open.
Saudi Arabia
No attacks have been reported in Saudi Arabia between 29 May and 2 June.
At least three people have been killed and 29 injured in Saudi Arabia, as of 09:00 UTC on 1 June.
As of 2 June, Saudi Arabia’s airspace is open.
Kuwait
Early 1 June, the Kuwaiti military announced that air defences were “confronting hostile missile and drone attacks”. US CENTCOM stated that US forces intercepted two Iranian ballistic missiles targeting American forces based in Kuwait. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) stated that the missile launches targeting an “air base” in Kuwait were retaliation for the attack against a telecommunications tower in Sirik, Hormozgan Province, in Iran.
The 1 June attack against Kuwait follows another Iranian attack on 28 May against Ali Al Salem airbase in Kuwait, which also resulted from a cycle of escalatory but limited kinetic exchanges between the US and Iran in the Strait of Hormuz. These will likely continue to occur as long as the competing blockades of the strait by both the US and Iran are in place, with Iranian retaliation strikes currently prioritising targets in Kuwait.
At least seven people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Kuwait, as of 09:00 UTC on 1 June.
As of 2 June, Kuwait’s airspace is open.
Bahrain
No attacks have been reported in Bahrain between 29 May and 2 June.
At least three people have been killed, and dozens have been injured in Bahrain, as of 09:00 UTC on 1 June.
As of 2 June, Bahrain’s airspace is open.
Qatar
No attacks have been reported in Qatar between 29 May and 2 June.
At least 20 people have been injured in Qatar, as of 09:00 UTC on 1 June.
As of 2 June, Qatar’s airspace is open.
UAE
No attacks have been reported in the UAE between 29 May and 2 June.
At least 12 people have been killed and 224 injured in the UAE, as of 09:00 UTC on 1 June.
As of 2 June, the UAE’s airspace is open.
Oman
No attacks have been reported in Oman between 29 May and 2 June.
At least three people have been killed and 16 injured in Oman, as of 09:00 UTC on 1 June.
As of 2 June, Oman’s airspace is open.
Regional Advisory
The risk of a return to full-scale conflict in the Middle East, which would likely be characterised by renewed daily Iranian strikes across the region, remains high, with indirect negotiations on an MOU having faltered. Furthermore, the continuing competing blockades of the Strait of Hormuz by the US and Iran continue to lead to hostile incidents in the maritime domain, which have repeatedly escalated into broader ‘tit-for-tat’ strikes impacting the Gulf States.
It remains unconfirmed whether indirect US-Iran negotiations over the MOU are continuing following the announced suspension of negotiations by IRGC-affiliated media due to Lebanon, and subsequent claims by President Trump of a fresh truce between Israel and Hezbollah. Previously, Tehran had warned that strikes in Beirut “could derail the diplomatic track”, with Iranian officials consistently insisting that the broader ceasefire includes Lebanon. Continued conflict in Lebanon, particularly IDF strikes against Beirut, almost certainly risks jeopardising the wider US-Iran ceasefire.
However, the regime’s reported decision to suspend negotiations also followed President Trump’s request for several amendments to the MOU. It is highly likely that the regime in Tehran, which is almost certainly increasingly under the control of hardline IRGC commanders such as Major General Ahmad Vahidi, calculates that it is willing to accept the risk of a return to full-scale conflict or a continuation of the current status quo rather than be perceived as conceding to US demands.
A collapse in MOU negotiations would not necessarily mean a return to full-scale conflict. Instead, the US and Iran could maintain their competing blockades of the Strait of Hormuz with the aim of ultimately pressuring the opposing party to make concessions. Following the announced suspension of talks by IRGC-affiliated media, President Trump told US media that “going silent would be very good, and that could be for a long time”, adding that this would not mean a return to full-scale strikes, but the US blockade would be maintained.
As long as the competing blockades are maintained, there remains a high risk of a tactical miscalculation and/or escalation in the Strait of Hormuz, with retaliatory strikes unlikely to be confined to the immediate area of engagement or the maritime domain. In addition to endangering the broader negotiation process, the cycles of escalation have repeatedly led to renewed Iranian strikes against the Gulf States, first with the UAE and more recently against Kuwait, and are likely to continue doing so while competing blockades are in place.
Should a framework agreement/MOU be reached, the immediate risk of a return to full-scale US-Iran conflict would likely decrease. However, such a framework would likely only be an effective ceasefire extension and not a substantive and lasting peace agreement. Major issues like control of the Strait of Hormuz and Iran’s nuclear programme are unlikely to be fully resolved. Furthermore, reported provisions within the MOU, such as the US blockade being lifted in proportion to the restoration of commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, provide multiple triggers for the potential MOU to break down. Finally, if the MOU only delays detailed nuclear talks for another 60 days, the main disputes that blocked the pre-28 February negotiations would likely remain unresolved and resurface later.
If the US resumes strikes against Iran, this would highly likely result in renewed full-scale Iranian attacks against targets across the Middle East. This is further reinforced by the 26 May threats issued by Iran’s Supreme Leader against regional countries which host US military bases. Recent leaked classified assessments by US intelligence services indicate that, despite high-intensity US-Israeli strikes, Iran maintains the capability to conduct large-scale long-range strikes across the Middle East, likely for several months, depending on the rate of expenditure.
Travellers are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:
- Jordanian authorities have warned against publishing videos or information regarding Jordan’s defensive operations without authorisation.
- Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Interior has stated that “[p]hotographing or publishing or circulating information related to countering missiles and drones and the locations of their falls exposes you to legal accountability.”
- In the UAE, authorities have warned that publishing or circulating “rumours, false news, or news from unknown sources through social media platforms or other information technology” is illegal. Reports indicate that Dubai Police have used “electronic monitoring operations” to detect a photo shared within a private WhatsApp group
- In Bahrain, several people have been confirmed as arrested for “filming, live streaming, clipping, and publishing events in a manner constituting a legal violation”.
- Qatar’s Ministry of Interior warned that gathering at incident sites or photographing and sharing content related to field developments may result in legal accountability and has arrested hundreds of people of various nationalities for “producing and sharing misleading information”.
- Omani authorities have stated: “Beware of sharing or publishing any captured photos or videos. They should be shared only with the competent authorities”.
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