Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update

The two parties are highly likely to remain at a diplomatically unresolvable impasse without either side moving on its red lines. The Trump administration continues to make demands for meaningful concessions on Iran’s nuclear programme, particularly the removal of Iran’s HEU, and stated it will not accept Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz.

However, Tehran reportedly continues to refuse the removal of its HEU out of the country and has pushed for delaying comprehensive nuclear negotiations until after the US blockade is lifted, in addition to continuing its claim over the Strait of Hormuz with its newly formed “Persian Gulf Strait Authority”.

There is a realistic possibility that both Washington and Tehran will finalise the draft agreement being mediated by Pakistan and progress to a further round of negotiations. The likelihood of a resumption of US strikes on Iran, followed by retaliatory strikes across the Middle East, will almost certainly increase if the draft agreement fails to proceed.

Should a framework agreement be reached, the immediate risk of a return to full-scale US-Iran conflict would likely decrease. However, such a framework would likely only be an effective ceasefire extension and not a substantive and lasting peace agreement. Major issues like control of the Strait of Hormuz and Iran’s nuclear programme are unlikely to be fully resolved.

Moreover, Iranian adherence to any interim framework is likely to be undermined by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which has increasingly consolidated power in Tehran, acted independently of the civilian government, and signalled total opposition to US demands. The lack of a fully coherent regime in Tehran with a unified negotiating position, as exemplified by the competing briefings from senior Iranian officials regarding the Supreme Leader’s directive on Iran’s HEU stockpile, almost certainly complicates the negotiation process and increases the likelihood that the IRGC could fail to comply with any agreements made by Tehran’s civilian government.

Ultimately, with the IRGC having increasingly consolidated control in Iran, it is likely that the IRGC-controlled regime elements will be unwilling to make significant concessions, which can be perceived as giving in to the US, preferring instead a renewed full-scale conflict. However, there is a realistic possibility that the Trump administration may calculate that the economic and political costs of the war have become so great that it is willing to accept a compromised end state, which involves only marginal movement from Tehran compared to what was on the table prior to the conflict’s outbreak on 28 February.

If the US resumes strikes against Iran, this would highly likely result in renewed full-scale Iranian attacks against targets across the Middle East. Recent leaked classified assessments by US intelligence services indicate that, since the ceasefire, Iran has restored access to 30 of its 33 missile sites along the Strait of Hormuz and regained access to around 90 per cent of its underground missile storage and launch facilities. Furthermore, the assessments indicate that Iran still fields 70 to 75 per cent of its transporter erector launchers (TELs) used for launching ballistic missiles, and retains 70 per cent of its prewar missile stockpile. If accurate, these assessments highly likely suggest that despite high-intensity US-Israeli strikes, Iran maintains the capability to conduct large-scale long-range strikes across the Middle East, likely for several months, depending on the rate of expenditure.

Outside of renewed US-Israeli strikes against Iran, there remains a high risk of tactical miscalculation and/or escalation occurring as the US and Iranian blockades continue, with retaliatory strikes unlikely to be confined to the immediate area of engagement or the maritime domain. If the US resumes the previously paused Project Freedom initiative, which involves using US naval forces to escort commercial vessels through the Strait of Hormuz to counter Iran’s current de facto control over the strait, this would almost certainly further increase the risk of escalation from the maritime domain. As illustrated on 3-5 May and 7-8 May, escalation in the maritime domain can quickly lead to Iranian strikes targeting the UAE. The UAE has likely been targeted over other Gulf States due to multiple factors, and Iranian ‘retaliation’ strikes will likely continue to prioritise the UAE outside of a return to full-scale regional conflict.

Travellers are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity: