Global Intelligence Summary

On 15 May, the UK FCDO released an advisory against all travel to the department of La Paz, including the administrative capital La Paz and the city of El Alto. The advisory followed an escalation in violent protests, which have intensified since the beginning of May. On 18-19 May, large-scale demonstrations were recorded in La Paz, leading to widespread vandalism, attacks on government buildings, and day-long clashes between protesters and police.

The protests coincided with the arrival in the capital of supporters of former President Evo Morales, who staged a six-day march from Oruro, in the Andes, and were reportedly equipped with dynamite and other weapons. Former president and leader of the  Movement for Socialism (MAS) party, Morales, has endorsed the protest. Morales also claimed on 15 May that President Rodrigo Paz’s right‑wing government had been instructed by the US to carry out a “military operation” aimed at capturing or killing him. Morales, furthermore, announced, on 20 May, a “90-day ultimatum” to Paz, calling on him to resign and organise new elections or face a coordinated escalation of the unrest.

Protesters have imposed a de facto blockade on La Paz, blocking key roadways leading to the capital and causing a localised shortage in fuel, some basic goods and medical supplies. Protesters also blocked all roads to El Alto, de facto blockading the airport that serves the capital. In addition to the protests in La Paz, unrest has been recorded in several regions. Cochabamba, Morales’ stronghold, has had several blockades, as did Oruro and Santa Cruz. “Indefinite” protests began on 19 May in Chuquisaca, and in Chapare, protesters occupied an airport, which led to a shutdown in operations.  The protests have so far resulted in at least four deaths, dozens of injuries, and more than 100 arrests.

Solace Global Assessment: 

As the protest movement continues to gain traction, it has also likely evolved in its scope and demands. The unrest started over grievances concerning policies implemented by the centre-right government, which was elected in October 2025, but has now evolved into broader calls for President Paz to be ousted from government. The administration has almost certainly struggled to deal with the scale of the unrest. While it managed to strike deals with some unions, these concessions have been insufficient to prevent the protest movement from continuing to escalate.

The Paz government almost certainly faces significant structural issues that make it unable to address the root causes of the unrest and provide a policymaking alternative that could restore order in the short term while preserving institutional integrity. In addition to the severe economic crisis Bolivia is facing, the government likely lacks the political legitimacy and required support to enact reforms without provoking a major backlash, with much of the electorate assessing its political victory in the 2025 Bolivian general election was only achieved due to the collapse of MAS.

In the immediate term, it is likely that violent unrest will continue in La Paz and in the rural parts of Bolivia, such as Chapare, where Morales has a strong base of support. Due to the use of explosives by protesters and the violent response by officers, there is a realistic possibility of the protests resulting in further fatalities, which would likely further exacerbate unrest.

There is a realistic possibility that the Paz government will increasingly deploy coercive measures to contain the protests, with the likelihood of this increasing if the blockade of La Paz continues. Such efforts would be primarily dedicated to securing the capital, but would almost certainly provoke a violent reaction, with attacks on security forces and police becoming likelier. In rural areas, these could take the form of ambushes on police units responding to blockades. Previous examples of this include an attack which occurred in June 2025 in the mining town of Llallahua in the Potosí region, where three officers were killed.