Global Intelligence Summary

On 12 August, US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth announced that Colombia had authorised joint US-Colombian military operations against designated armed groups within the country’s territory, including the National Liberation Army (ELN) and dissident factions of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The decision follows dozens of US strikes on vessels suspected of smuggling narcotics in the Caribbean Sea and Eastern Pacific, a campaign that was originally limited to international waters but has gradually evolved into a broader counter-narcotics initiative that has involved strikes on terrestrial targets with host nation consent.

Hegseth also stated that Colombia would join the US-led Shield of the Americas counter-narcotics initiative, making it the alliance’s 19^th member state. The coalition, which is formally known as the Americas Counter Cartel Coalition, was launched in March 2026 to coordinate regional efforts against transnational narcotic-trafficking organisations.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Colombia’s decision to authorise joint US military operations within its borders follows the 7 August inauguration of President Abelardo de la Espriella, who ran on a campaign promising to restore order in Colombia and adopt a far more assertive approach to his predecessor, Gustavo Petro. This strategy involves ending peace negotiations with armed groups in favour of a military-led security strategy. Upon his inauguration, Washington announced plans for approximately USD 1 billion in security assistance, including expanded cooperation on intelligence and technology.

Washington’s strategy in the Western Hemisphere has already resulted in strikes on ground targets in Venezuela and Ecuador, with both countries increasingly aligned with the US following the deposing of President Maduro in Venezuela and the re-election of President Daniel Noboa in Ecuador. In both cases, the targets were members of organisations that had already been designated as Foreign Terrorist Organisations (FTOs) by the US. In Colombia, several armed groups like the ELN have been designated as FTOs for years, and the drug cartel, the Gulf Clan, was designated an FTO in December 2025.

The FTO designations have increasingly been used as a mechanism to enable Washington to reframe major drug traffickers as national security threats, helping to expand the financial, intelligence and law‑enforcement tools available and helping lay the policy groundwork for more direct military action. However, to conduct strikes, Colombia will also need to provide a separate legal basis for US military activity on its territory. This could still be blocked by the Colombian Senate or face other legislative or judicial challenges, especially if operations involve US troops on Colombian soil- a development that is also likely to provoke significant public opposition.

Early joint military operations could alternatively involve no direct US presence in Colombia but instead rely on increased US intelligence, training, logistics, and targeting support for operations conducted by Colombian forces, which could then later be augmented by a more direct US military role if the necessary political and legal approvals are secured. However, even without a direct US personnel deployment, expanded US support would likely significantly enhance Colombia’s targeting capabilities by improving its access to advanced surveillance technologies, intelligence fusion and precision-targeting expertise. This is likely to improve the Colombian military’s ability to identify and strike senior commanders, camps, logistics nodes, trafficking routes, and other infrastructure, likely increasing pressure on Colombia’s armed groups.

Colombia’s armed groups have repeatedly warned that increased military pressure will result in retaliatory attacks against the state. Recent attacks have involved the detonation of vehicle-borne and roadside improvised explosive devices (IEDs), drone-dropped explosives, large-scale and coordinated attacks on police and military units, militant offensives in rural regions, assassinations of public figures, and attacks on transport, energy and other critical infrastructure. These attacks likely demonstrate that Colombia’s armed groups maintain the intent and capability to conduct high-profile attacks, including in major cities like Cali, and that expanded military operations are likely to provoke an increase in retaliatory violence as a form of deterrence.

In the long-term, strikes on senior commanders of already highly decentralised organisations will likely increase the risk of factionalism, which could make it more difficult for the Colombian government to monitor militant activity and negotiate with armed groups, while increasing the risk of inter-factional competition over territory, trafficking routes and illicit revenue streams, potentially increasing localised violence. Militant groups may also increasingly migrate from remote jungle and border areas into towns and cities, increasing the risk of militant activity in more densely populated areas.