Global Intelligence Summary

On 13 May, Cuban state-run media published an interview with Energy Minister Vicente de la O Levy, where he stated that the country had run out of diesel and fuel oil. Levy also stated that the energy system was in a “critical” condition due to the ongoing US oil blockade, which has been ongoing since early January 2026, when US forces captured Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and deprived Cuba of its main provider of fuel. Currently, large Cuban cities like Havana record up to 20 hours per day without power. Since late 2025, only one large tanker has reached Cuba. The fuel shortage has forced Cubans to rely on local oil, which is in limited supply and of inferior quality.

The interview’s release coincided with renewed US State Department offers to provide USD 100 million in aid in exchange for “meaningful reforms to Cuba’s communist system”, in coordination with the Catholic Church. The US has continued to increase pressure on Cuba’s government, imposing, in early May, a wave of sanctions on Cuban officials. US media have also reported an increase in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) flights off the coast of Cuba, a pattern also identified before the US operations to capture President Maduro.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The ongoing blockade has almost certainly severely weakened the Cuban government and is contributing to increased discontent, civil unrest and other forms of opposition. Protests, which have historically been rare due to the threat of violent police repression, have increased in both volume and frequency, with demonstrations reported in Havana as recently as 13 May. The Cuban government has refrained from quashing the unrest, likely assessing that such an approach would be counterproductive and could spark further protests.

US officials will almost certainly continue to apply maximum pressure on the Cuban government, likely aiming to extract concessions such as a leadership change and the implementation of political and economic reforms. US media have noted that the increase in ISR flights has been widely reported, with the aircraft involved generally broadcasting on their transponders. In addition to collecting intelligence on Cuban military assets and other potential high-value targets, the visibility of the operations is highly likely intended as strategic messaging to Cuba, as well as key allies like Russia and China.

US officials likely assess that protracted economic pressure, the threat of military action, and the increased sanctioning of Cuban political elites could help produce fractures within the Cuban leadership, potentially empowering figures more amenable to a negotiated settlement with Washington. However, the Cuban leadership has spent decades attempting to “coup-proof” itself by establishing deep ties between the Cuban Communist Party and the military, establishing parallel security structures, and providing economic incentives to elites to remain loyal.

With the blockade highly likely to continue in the short term, unless Havana agrees to significant concessions, it is likely that episodes of civil unrest will increase in Cuba in both frequency and scale, with Havana, Santiago de Cuba, and other large cities being the primary areas for large-scale protests. Due to the current instability of the Cuban political system and the severity of the economic pressures, there is a realistic possibility of protests becoming increasingly violent.