Global Intelligence Summary

On 4 October, more than 150 million Brazilian nationals will be eligible to vote in the country’s general election. The elections are to nominate the president, vice-president, all 513 members of the Chamber of Deputies, 54 out of 81 Federal Senate members, and the governors, vice-governors, and parliamentarians of all federative units. As the president and governors need an absolute majority to win, a potential run-off vote will be held on 25 October.

At the federal level, the elections are a highly polarised contest between incumbent President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, of the left-wing Workers’ Party (PT), and challenger Flávio Bolsonaro, of the right-wing Liberal Party (PL). Flávio Bolsonaro is the son of former President Jair Bolsonaro, who held office between 2019 and 2023. The transition between the presidencies of Jair Bolsonaro and Lula was marked by the former’s allegation of a rigged vote, with his supporters storming the Supreme Court of Brazil, National Congress, and Planalto Presidential Palace on 8 January 2023 in an unsuccessful attempt to instigate a coup and reinstate him as president. Bolsonaro was subsequently convicted of several offences including “attempted violent abolition of the democratic rule of law”, “attempted coup d’etat”, and “armed criminal conspiracy”, and was sentenced to 27 years.

Lula currently holds a narrow lead over Bolsonaro, but the vote will likely go to the runoff stage where Bolsonaro is likely to receive some votes from the supporters of less prominent right-wing candidates. While the presidential contest is a clear two-man race, the parliamentary vote is more complex. Seats in Brazil’s Chamber of Deputies are allocated proportionally within individual states, contributing to significant fragmentation across multiple parties nationwide.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The final weeks before the vote have been marked by growing disinformation and challenges to electoral integrity and to candidates’ security. Authorities have identified and publicly denounced several online misinformation campaigns reporting widespread rigging to doctor the election results. Authorities have also noted a growing threat from foreign interference. In late August, the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (ABIN) reportedly raised the risk of US influence or interference in the 2026 election to a ‘criticality level’ and assessed that pressure on Brazil was intensifying. Organised criminal groups (OCGs) have also intimidated and used violence against voters and candidates. One media outlet has even refused to cover the election due to threats against its journalists.

There is a realistic possibility that both the final day of campaigning and election day itself will be marked by civil unrest. However, the threat is likely to be higher following the publication of the results. In 2022, protests erupted almost immediately after Lula was declared the winner of the runoff vote. Pro-Bolsonaro supporters erected more than 300 barricades across the country using trucks and other heavy vehicles, and staged hundreds of protest gatherings. Protesters also attempted to invade the perimeter of Guarulhos International Airport in São Paulo. The unrest ultimately culminated in the 8 January attack on the main government buildings in Brasília. There is also a realistic possibility of targeted political violence and clashes between supporters of the various candidates, particularly if allegations of rigged voting gain traction. However, the severity of any unrest is unlikely to reach the levels seen following the 2022 election, with the authorities almost certainly more prepared following the 2023 attacks, while the prosecution and conviction of hundreds of participants and organisers is likely to have increased the deterrent effect.

OCGs may seek to influence voting through threats against candidates, intimidation of voters, restrictions on access to polling stations or other measures designed to shape turnout in areas where they exercise territorial control. Groups such as the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) and Comando Vermelho (CV) likely have a strong interest in influencing political outcomes, particularly at state and local levels, where elected officials have greater influence over policing, prisons and public-security policy. Brazil’s civil and military police forces are subordinated to state governors, giving gubernatorial and state-level elections particular relevance to criminal groups seeking to protect their operations, reduce law-enforcement pressure or expand political influence.