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Iranian Drone Attacks Target US Military Assets as Regional Tensions Rise
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 13 November – 17 November 2026
- On 15 November, the USS Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group entered the US Central Command area of responsibility, establishing a three-carrier US naval presence in the region.
- Indicators of advanced US-Israeli planning for renewed potential major operations against Iran have continued, with reports on 15 November that the US and Israel had drawn up plans for strikes targeting Iran’s economic infrastructure, and Mossad Director Roman Gofman meeting US officials in Washington, D.C., on 13 November.
- Iran launched drone attacks against US military assets in Bahrain on 13, 15 and 17 November, which authorities stated were intercepted, prompting shelter alerts in Bahrain and a US Embassy security alert.
- On 16 November, US media reported that US intelligence indicates Iran is developing plans that could potentially target senior US officials in Washington with a radiological or chemical device, although US officials are reportedly divided over the credibility of the intelligence.
- Houthi missile and drone attacks against Saudi Arabia have continued, including two ballistic missiles targeting Riyadh on 15 November. In Yemen, Houthi forces have advanced to within approximately 60km of Aden.
- As of 17 November, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman are open. King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh continues to operate limited domestic and international flights, although many foreign airlines continue to suspend services, and Saudi Arabia’s Jazan, Abha and Najran airports have been subject to repeated closures and significant disruption.
Middle East Conflict: Latest Intelligence & Travel Advice
To support planning, we are updating our Middle East travel advice daily with guidance from our intelligence team on airspace openings and closures, flight operations, and escalating risks impacting movement.
Situation Update: Iran Launches Further Attacks on Bahrain as US-Israeli Military Preparations Continue
On 15 November, the USS Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group (CSG) entered the US Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AoR), joining the USS George Washington and USS George H.W. Bush CSGs. The same day, US media reported that the US and Israel had drawn up plans for renewed strikes likely targeting Iranian energy infrastructure and other facilities vital to its economy. On 13 November, Mossad Director Roman Gofman met CIA Director John Ratcliffe in Washington amid caretaker Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s push for the US to resume strikes, although US President Donald Trump has reportedly continued to favour economic pressure.
Iran has continued limited attacks against US-linked military assets in Bahrain. On 13 November, US forces intercepted two Iranian drones, after the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) claimed to have destroyed a US early-warning radar in retaliation for an alleged US strike on Sirik, southern Iran. On 15 November, the IRGC claimed to have launched six drones against a US air defence radar at Riffa Air Base, describing the attack as the “second phase” of its response. Bahrain stated that its air defences intercepted the attack, with sirens sounding and shelter alerts issued across the country, and Bahrain’s Foreign Ministry held Iran fully responsible. On 17 November, the IRGC claimed a further drone attack against a US radar system at Sheikh Isa Air Base, which Bahraini authorities stated was intercepted, after the Interior Ministry issued a further shelter alert and explosions were heard in Manama.
Iranian officials have stated that Tehran will not wait for a US attack before responding, and warned Gulf states against “reopening old wounds”, while maintaining that a path to an agreement with Washington remains open. No US-Iran negotiations have been announced following Trump’s public redirection of Vice President JD Vance away from talks on 12 November. On 16-17 November, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi held talks in Muscat on Strait of Hormuz (SoH) security and the resumption of negotiations, without a reported breakthrough, while on 16 November, Vance stated that Trump was considering further military and diplomatic pressure on Iran, but publicly ruled out a prolonged war.
On 16 November, US media reported, citing seven US officials, that US intelligence indicates Iran is developing plans to potentially target senior Trump administration officials in Washington with a radiological “dirty bomb” or chemical weapon. However, officials are reportedly divided over the credibility of the intelligence, and there is no evidence that Iran has decided to proceed with this course of action. Separate intelligence reportedly suggests that Iran could use chemical weapons against US forces in the Middle East, prompting preparations to protect US diplomatic and intelligence personnel in the region. Iran’s mission to the UN rejected the chemical weapons allegations as “false and fabricated”.
Houthi missile and drone attacks against Saudi Arabia have continued, with the Saudi-led coalition reporting the interception of drones over the Riyadh region and southern Saudi Arabia on 14 November, two ballistic missiles targeting Riyadh and drones over the Eastern Province and the Mecca and Medina regions on 15 November, and drones targeting the Mecca and Riyadh regions on 16 November. The Houthis claimed that ballistic missiles struck King Khalid International Airport on 15 November, which Saudi authorities have not confirmed. On 16 November, King Salman replaced the commander of the Saudi-led coalition, Lieutenant General Fahd al-Salman, with General Fayyad al-Ruwaili.
In Yemen, the Houthis seized the Kharaz military base in Lahj on 15 November, and on 16 November, government and military sources stated that the Houthis had captured the Al-Maqatirah and Al-Madaribah districts and were positioned approximately 60km from Aden. Yemen’s internationally recognised government (IRG) has redeployed forces from the Red Sea coast to defend Aden, reportedly enabling the Houthis to seize positions along more than 150km of the coast between Dhubab and Khor Amira. The Saudi-led coalition has continued airstrikes in Sanaa and other Houthi-held areas, including against ballistic missile production facilities. On 16 November, international media reported further Houthi gains along the southern coastline near Khor Omaira.
As of 17 November, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman are open. King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh continues to operate limited domestic and international flights, although many foreign airlines continue to suspend services, and Saudi Arabia’s Jazan, Abha and Najran airports have been subject to repeated closures and significant disruption. On 16 November, the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) extended its conflict zone advisory covering Iran, the Gulf, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Iraq until January 2027.
Jordan
No attacks have been reported in Jordan between 13 and 17 November.
As of 17 November, Jordan’s airspace is open.
Saudi Arabia
On 14 November, the Saudi-led coalition reported intercepting two drones over the Riyadh region and southern Saudi Arabia. On 15 November, the coalition reported intercepting two ballistic missiles targeting Riyadh, with an early warning alert issued for Riyadh and explosions heard in the capital, and six drones over the Eastern Province and the Mecca, Medina and Riyadh regions. The Houthis claimed that the ballistic missiles struck King Khalid International Airport, which has not been confirmed, while denying targeting Mecca and Medina. On 16 November, the coalition reported intercepting two drones targeting the Mecca and Riyadh regions.
As of 17 November, Saudi Arabia’s airspace is open. King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh continues to operate domestic and some international flights, with some flights normally serving Riyadh operating via Prince Naif bin Abdulaziz International Airport in Qassim, although missile interceptions reportedly disrupted approaching flights on 11 November. King Abdulaziz International Airport in Jeddah and King Fahd International Airport in Dammam are operational with some delays and cancellations. Many foreign airlines continue to suspend services, with IndiGo extending suspensions to Riyadh, Dammam, Jeddah and Medina, and Jazan, Abha and Najran airports have been subject to repeated closures and significant disruption.
Kuwait
No attacks have been reported in Kuwait between 13 and 17 November.
As of 17 November, Kuwait’s airspace is open.
Bahrain
On 13 November, US forces claimed to have intercepted two Iranian drones targeting US military assets in Bahrain, and on 15 November, authorities stated that Bahraini air defences intercepted several Iranian drones targeting a US air defence radar at Riffa Air Base, with sirens sounding and the Interior Ministry urging residents to seek shelter. No damage or casualties were reported. The attacks were the first against Bahrain since 2 September. On 17 November, Bahraini air defences intercepted a further Iranian drone attack targeting a US radar system at Sheikh Isa Air Base, after the Interior Ministry issued a shelter alert and explosions were heard in Manama.
As of 17 November, Bahrain’s airspace is open.
Qatar
No attacks have been reported in Qatar between 13 and 17 November.
As of 17 November, Qatar’s airspace is open.
UAE
Excluding attacks in Emirati waters, no attacks have been reported in the UAE between 13 and 17 November.
As of 17 November, the UAE’s airspace is open.
Oman
Excluding attacks in Omani waters, no attacks have been reported in Oman between 13 and 17 November.
As of 17 November, Oman’s airspace is open.
Regional Advisory
The arrival of the Roosevelt CSG establishes a temporary three-carrier US naval presence in the region, increasing US strike capacity, operational flexibility and air and missile defence capabilities that could support a sustained, high-intensity campaign against Iran, while potentially enabling simultaneous operations against the Houthis.
The reported US-Israeli planning for strikes against Iranian economic infrastructure, alongside the Mossad director’s visit to Washington and continued Israeli pressure for renewed operations, likely further supports the assessment that potential renewed major joint operations are at an advanced stage of planning. Although Trump has publicly favoured economic pressure, the cumulative indicators and warnings (I&W) indicate that renewed major conflict should continue to be treated as a primary planning scenario for risk management given its potential impact on the regional threat environment. A reported focus on Iranian energy and economic infrastructure would highly likely trigger reciprocal Iranian attacks against Gulf energy infrastructure and potentially US-linked commercial interests, both of which Tehran has publicly threatened.
Renewed major operations would almost certainly result in Iranian missile and drone attacks against US military facilities, and likely against energy infrastructure and other critical infrastructure across the Arabian Peninsula, particularly in Jordan, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and the UAE, alongside likely further intensified Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia. This would highly likely result in widespread, short-notice airspace closures across the Gulf, severely restricting commercial air travel and evacuation options. With Saudi airports already disrupted by Houthi attacks, the closure of Bahraini, Qatari and Emirati airspace, and the potential suspension of the King Fahd Causeway would remove key alternative routes into and out of Saudi Arabia, likely leaving long-distance overland routes, including to Oman, as the primary evacuation options. However, evacuation routes and planning would need to be reassessed according to the specific threat environment at the time.
Iran’s repeated drone attacks against US facilities in Bahrain, the first since 2 September, almost certainly indicate that Tehran has again adopted a posture of direct and rapid retaliation against limited US strikes, after a period in which Tehran did not retaliate against such strikes. Although the Iranian attacks have reportedly been intercepted without damage, they have triggered nationwide sirens and shelter alerts in Bahrain. Each exchange likely increases the risk of miscalculation, with any US casualties likely to provoke significant retaliation and potentially wider conflict. Bahrain, which hosted the US Fifth Fleet headquarters and lies within close range of Iran, is likely to remain a primary target of limited Iranian retaliation in this current phase of limited tit-for-tat strikes, increasing the risk to personnel and travellers in the kingdom.
The reported intelligence concerning potential Iranian planning for a radiological or chemical attack in Washington should be treated with caution, as US officials reportedly remain divided over its credibility, and there is no evidence that Tehran has authorised such an operation. However, it likely reflects the current high level of tension and Iran’s demonstrated willingness to consider asymmetric options, including plots against US officials and attacks on US territory. Reported preparations to protect US personnel against potential chemical attacks highlight growing concerns over threats to US-linked personnel and facilities across the Gulf. Any such attack would almost certainly provoke a US military response far exceeding the scale and intensity of previous operations against Iran.
The Houthi advance to within 60km of Aden, following the seizure of the Kharaz base, almost certainly represents the most significant threat to the IRG’s interim capital since 2015. The redeployment of government forces from the Red Sea coast to defend Aden has almost certainly enabled further Houthi gains along the coast, strengthening Houthi control of the approaches to the Bab al-Mandeb. A Houthi assault on Aden, or a credible threat to the city, would highly likely prompt escalatory Saudi intervention, including intensified airstrikes and potentially the deployment of Saudi or partner ground forces, which would in turn highly likely trigger intensified Houthi missile and drone attacks against Saudi cities, airports and energy infrastructure. The replacement of the coalition commander on 16 November likely reflects Riyadh’s dissatisfaction with the deteriorating military situation in Yemen, and may precede a shift towards a more aggressive Saudi campaign.
Houthi attacks against Riyadh and the Eastern Province have continued at a high tempo, and Houthi claims of strikes against King Khalid International Airport indicate that the airport remains a priority target. Further attacks against Saudi airports, energy infrastructure, office buildings associated with high-value targets (HVTs) like Aramco, and military sites, are highly likely, with interception debris posing a continued risk to civilians even outside the vicinity of assessed HVTs.
Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:
- Jordanian authorities have warned against publishing videos or information regarding Jordan’s defensive operations without authorisation.
- Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Interior has stated that “[p]hotographing or publishing or circulating information related to countering missiles and drones and the locations of their falls exposes you to legal accountability.”
- In the UAE, authorities have warned that publishing or circulating “rumours, false news, or news from unknown sources through social media platforms or other information technology” is illegal. Reports indicate that Dubai Police have used “electronic monitoring operations” to detect a photo shared within a private WhatsApp group.
- In Bahrain, several people have been confirmed as arrested for “filming, live streaming, clipping, and publishing events in a manner constituting a legal violation”.
- Qatar’s Ministry of Interior warned that gathering at incident sites or photographing and sharing content related to field developments may result in legal accountability and has arrested hundreds of people of various nationalities for “producing and sharing misleading information”.
- Omani authorities have stated: “Beware of sharing or publishing any captured photos or videos. They should be shared only with the competent authorities”.

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