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Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update

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US Military Preparations Against Iran Heighten Regional Security Concerns

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 23 October – 27 October 2026

  • Reporting has indicated further US preparations for renewed strikes against Iran, with US forces now reportedly able to launch major operations within 96 hours of presidential authorisation.
  • On 23 October, the US State Department reduced diplomatic staffing at its embassies in Jordan, Lebanon, Qatar and the UAE, per US officials. This followed intelligence warnings of Iranian plots targeting US officials, and the previously publicly ordered departure of non-emergency government personnel and family members from Saudi Arabia.
  • Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reportedly pressed for strikes against Iran before Israel’s 27 October elections, but Washington requested a delay. Netanyahu has denied a reported confrontation with Israel’s military leadership over potentially escalatory orders.
  • Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia have continued, including ten ballistic missiles reportedly intercepted over southern Saudi Arabia on 25 October. On 26 October, Saudi Arabia’s Defence Minister held security talks in Tehran alongside senior Pakistani and Turkish officials. On 27 October, Saudi forces intercepted three ballistic missiles targeting the Eastern Province.
  • On 23 October, a terrorist attack on a church in Karak, Jordan, killed seven people and injured 27.
  • As of 27 October, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman are open. King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh partially reopened on 25 October for domestic and some international flights, and Saudi Arabia’s Jazan, Abha, and Najran airports have been regularly closed.

Middle East Conflict: Latest Intelligence & Travel Advice

To support planning, we are updating our Middle East travel advice daily with guidance from our intelligence team on airspace openings and closures, flight operations, and escalating risks impacting movement.

On 23 October, US officials confirmed that the State Department was reducing staffing at its embassies in Jordan, Lebanon, Qatar and the UAE, following intelligence warnings that Iranian plots targeting US officials and diplomats had reached advanced stages. The State Department had previously announced on 21 October the ordered departure of non-emergency US government employees and family members from Saudi Arabia, which went into effect on 23 October. US officials denied that the regional staffing reductions were linked to preparations for renewed US-Israeli strikes against Iran.

US President Donald Trump has continued to threaten renewed military action against Iran unless Tehran agrees to a deal, including potentially seizing Iranian oil, and on 24 October suggested that strikes could begin on 25 October, before stating on 25 October that there would be no attack that night. Reports on 25-26 October indicated that US forces could conduct major strikes against Iran within 96 hours of presidential authorisation, with potential target lists reportedly expanded.

On 25-26 October, reports indicated that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had pressed for strikes against Iran before Israel’s 27 October Knesset elections, but that Washington requested a delay while signalling the possibility of later joint operations. Israeli media also reported disagreements between Netanyahu and Israel Defence Forces (IDF) Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir over potentially escalatory military orders. Netanyahu denied the dispute, while Defence Minister Israel Katz ruled out strikes before the Knesset elections.

Iran has reiterated its willingness to negotiate, while insisting that navigation arrangements in the Strait of Hormuz (SoH) will not return to pre-war conditions. Iranian security officials have identified US diplomats and personnel as potential targets in renewed hostilities, and reiterated threats to sever undersea telecommunications cables in the Gulf.

Qatari mediators visited Tehran on 25 October, and on 26 October, Saudi Defence Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman, Pakistani army chief Field Marshal Asim Munir and Turkish intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalin travelled to Tehran for regional security talks with Iranian officials, which Riyadh stated were intended to support Qatari and Pakistani mediation efforts. The parties agreed to continue regional security negotiations, although no substantive agreement was announced.

Attacks against commercial shipping have continued at a high intensity, with maritime security reporting identifying 28 confirmed and reported vessel attacks in October, a record monthly high.

Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia have continued, with Saudi forces intercepting ballistic missiles and drones targeting Riyadh, the Eastern Province, Taif, Yanbu and Khamis Mushait between 23 and 27 October, including ten ballistic missiles targeting southern Saudi Arabia on 25 Octoberand three ballistic missiles targeting the Eastern Province on 27 October. King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh partially reopened on 25 October, and the Houthis reiterated explicit threats against the airport. On 26 October, the Egyptian parliament approved defensive military assistance to Saudi Arabia, although no deployment has been announced.Saudi Arabia has also postponed two major international conferences scheduled for November until 2027, and the 2027 Dakar Rally has been relocated from Saudi Arabia.

In Yemen, the Houthis launched renewed ground offensives around Taiz and Lahj on 24 October and further ballistic missile attacks against Aden. Reporting on 25 October indicated that at least 75 people, including Saudi personnel, were killed in the 19 October Houthi attack against the al-Alam military camp in Shabwa.

On 23 October, the US State Department updated travel advisories for countries across the Middle East, warning that Houthi attacks against civilian airports and critical infrastructure in Saudi Arabia have caused civilian casualties and significant travel disruption, and that hostilities could rapidly escalate beyond the immediate conflict area.

As of 27 October, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman are open. King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh partially reopened on 25 October for domestic and some international flights, and Saudi Arabia’s Jazan, Abha, and Najran airports have been regularly closed.

No conflict-related attacks have been reported in Jordan between 23 and 27 October. However, on 23 October, a terrorist attack against a Greek Orthodox church in the village of Hammoud in Karak killed nine people and injured 34, according to Jordan’s Public Security Directorate. The attack was followed by Jordanian airstrikes in southern Syria on 26 October.

As of 27 October, Jordan’s airspace is open.

Between 23 and 27 October, Saudi forces intercepted Houthi ballistic missiles and drones targeting Riyadh, the Eastern Province, Taif, Yanbu and Khamis Mushait. On 23 October, early warning alerts were issued for Riyadh, Najran, Abha and Khamis Mushait, and on 24 October for Riyadh, Najran, Wadi Al-Dawasir, Mecca, Jeddah, Taif and Yanbu. On 25 October, the coalition reported intercepting ten ballistic missiles targeting southern Saudi Arabia, and debris from interceptions injured two people and damaged residential buildings in Khamis Mushait and Ahad Rafidah.

On 26 October, the coalition reported intercepting three drones over Riyadh and southern Saudi Arabia, and announced the destruction of four Houthi ballistic missile launchers, five storage tunnels and a missile depot. On 27 October, Saudi forces intercepted three ballistic missiles targeting the Eastern Province and four drones targeting southern Saudi Arabia, with emergency warnings issued for the Eastern Province and al-Kharj. The Houthis claimed further attacks against Saudi oil infrastructure and airports, including Yanbu, Rabigh, the East-West pipeline, Riyadh and Dammam, although impacts remain unconfirmed.

King Khalid International Airport reopened Terminals 1 and 2 on 25 October for domestic and some international flights operated by Saudi carriers, and the Houthis subsequently reiterated that the airport remains a target.

As of 27 October, Saudi Arabia’s airspace is open. King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh partially reopened on 25 October for domestic and some international flights, and Saudi Arabia’s Jazan, Abha, and Najran airports have been regularly closed.

No attacks have been reported in Kuwait between 23 and 27 October.

As of 27 October, Kuwait’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in Bahrain between 23 and 27 October.

As of 27 October, Bahrain’s airspace is open.

No attacks have been reported in Qatar between 23 and 27 October.

As of 27 October, Qatar’s airspace is open.

Excluding attacks in Emirati waters, no attacks have been reported in the UAE between 23 and 27 October.

As of 27 October, the UAE’s airspace is open.

Excluding attacks in Omani waters, no attacks have been reported in Oman between 23 and 27 October.

As of 27 October, Oman’s airspace is open.


The reported reduction of US diplomatic staffing in Jordan, Lebanon, Qatar and the UAE, alongside the previously publicly ordered departure from Saudi Arabia and the withdrawals of US troops from regional installations, almost certainly continue to represent a significant increase in indicators and warnings (I&W) of renewed large-scale conflict. Although US officials have publicly linked the reductions in part to Iranian plots against US personnel rather than strike preparations, such force protection measures would highly likely be expected to precede renewed operations, and are consistent with previous actions undertaken by the US before launching operations against Iran. These developments, particularly the measures taken to mitigate Iranian retaliation, suggest that renewed military operations against Iran are highly likely in the coming weeks.

A resumption of large-scale US operations remains more likely after the 3 November US midterms. Washington’s reported request for Israel to delay strikes until it is ready, Trump’s public stepping back from strikes on 25 October and the briefed US-Israeli planning for a post-midterms campaign support this assessed timeframe, while the expected arrival of the USS Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group (CSG) by late November would further increase US capacity to sustain a prolonged campaign and potentially also conduct simultaneous operations against the Houthis.

However, Israeli-initiated escalation before the midterms cannot be ruled out. The reported disagreement between Netanyahu and the IDF leadership over potentially escalatory orders, although denied, potentially indicates that elements of the current Israeli political leadership are willing to accept a higher risk of confrontation with Iran, likely driven in part by domestic political considerations.

The Saudi-led delegation to Tehran, alongside its Mecca Joint Defence Agreement partners Pakistan and Turkey, likely reflects Riyadh’s efforts to insulate itself from Iranian retaliation in the event of renewed US-Israeli strikes and to press Tehran to restrain the Houthis. The talks likely increase the probability that Iran will seek to limit direct strikes against Saudi Arabia in a renewed conflict, instead concentrating retaliation against US-linked targets in other regional states, particularly Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Jordan. However, there is no indication that the talks will halt Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia in the short term, and direct Iranian strikes against Saudi Arabia cannot be ruled out, alongside attacks originating from Iraq.

Renewed operations against Iran would almost certainly result in severe Iranian retaliation across the region, including against US military installations, energy infrastructure and US-linked technology facilities. Reports that Iran has identified US diplomats and personnel as potential targets, and intelligence warnings of advanced Iranian plots against US officials, likely indicate that the threat to US-linked individuals and facilities in the region extends beyond missile and drone attacks to asymmetric operations, which are likely to persist regardless of the timing of renewed strikes.

Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia have continued at a high tempo, including a reported salvo of ten ballistic missiles targeting southern Saudi Arabia on 25 October, highly likely intended to saturate and overstretch Saudi air defences. King Khalid International Airport is likely to remain vulnerable to disruption following its partial reopening, with the Houthis explicitly reiterating that the airport remains a target, and further attacks against Saudi airports, energy infrastructure and population centres are highly likely. The postponement of major international conferences and the relocation of the Dakar Rally likely reflect a growing assessment that the security environment in Saudi Arabia will not improve in the near term.

Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:

  • Jordanian authorities have warned against publishing videos or information regarding Jordan’s defensive operations without authorisation.
  • Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Interior has stated that “[p]hotographing or publishing or circulating information related to countering missiles and drones and the locations of their falls exposes you to legal accountability.”
  • In the UAE, authorities have warned that publishing or circulating “rumours, false news, or news from unknown sources through social media platforms or other information technology” is illegal. Reports indicate that Dubai Police have used “electronic monitoring operations” to detect a photo shared within a private WhatsApp group.
  • In Bahrain, several people have been confirmed as arrested for “filming, live streaming, clipping, and publishing events in a manner constituting a legal violation”.
  • Qatar’s Ministry of Interior warned that gathering at incident sites or photographing and sharing content related to field developments may result in legal accountability and has arrested hundreds of people of various nationalities for “producing and sharing misleading information”.

Omani authorities have stated: “Beware of sharing or publishing any captured photos or videos. They should be shared only with the competent authorities”.