Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update

Iran’s increased threat to commercial shipping, high-level security consultations, Israeli shaping activity, US diplomatic drawdowns and the reported withdrawal of US personnel from sites located within the core strike zone of Iranian ballistic missiles almost certainly indicate that joint US-Israeli preparations for renewed military operations against Iran are at an advanced stage.  These developments, particularly the measures taken to mitigate Iranian retaliation, suggest that renewed military operations against Iran are highly likely in the coming weeks.

The reported US-Israeli plans for renewed strikes following the midterms, alongside the reported suspension of US strikes against Iranian launchers despite continued maritime attacks, indicate that a resumption of large-scale US military operations against Iran remains more likely after the 3 November midterms.

With the Roosevelt CSG expected to arrive in theatre by late November, its deployment could temporarily establish a three-CSG posture alongside two MEUs, provided it reinforces rather than relieves an existing carrier. This would significantly increase CENTCOM’s available combat power, improve its ability to sustain a prolonged campaign, provide greater operational flexibility around the Strait of Hormuz and potentially enable simultaneous operations against the Houthis in Yemen.

However, the US already has sufficient combat power deployed to the CENTCOM AoR to conduct a major military campaign against Iran. The launching of operations ahead of the midterms to achieve strategic surprise and to demonstrate to Tehran that the White House is willing to concede domestic political considerations in pursuit of its military and foreign policy objectives cannot be ruled out. Furthermore, initial strikes conducted solely by Israel could enable Washington to distance itself from the operations, limiting the immediate domestic political consequences while Israel assumes the majority of the initial military risks.

The potential involvement of Israeli combat aircraft, supported by US aerial refuelling assets, would significantly increase the combined force’s available strike capacity, likely providing a greater contribution to offensive operations than an additional CSG. A reported 200 Israeli fighter jets were used during Operation Roaring Lion, with a CSG typically embarking approximately 40–50 strike fighters. Recent Israeli long-range sorties near Iran, potentially intended to test Iranian responses and probe air defences, also indicate that preparations for joint operations may already be underway.

Other potential indicators and warnings (I&W) of renewed US military action against Iran would likely include the forward deployment of strategic bombers to regional staging bases, an increased deployment of air-to-air refuellers, electronic warfare and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft, the dispersal of forward-deployed assets and increased diplomatic drawdowns.

Renewed major US-Israeli operations against Iran would almost certainly result in severe retaliation across the region. Reported strike options against Kharg and Qeshm islands and Iranian energy infrastructure would highly likely trigger reciprocal Iranian retaliation against regional energy infrastructure. However, Iran has also threatened US-linked technology facilities and internet cables, while US military installations, airports and other critical infrastructure would highly likely remain potential targets. Hossein Mohebbi, a senior spokesperson for the IRGC, has also indicated that Iran is shifting from retaliation alone towards a doctrine incorporating sustained offensive operations against its adversaries following an initial attack. This may indicate that Iranian retaliation could extend beyond retaliatory strikes to a more sustained military campaign.

The fatal attacks in Saudi Arabia against Dammam’s airport and the Shaybah oil field on 21 October highly likely demonstrate that the Houthis retain the capability to inflict casualties across the entirety of Saudi Arabia, including in the Eastern Province, the kingdom’s principal oil-producing region. The Houthis are increasingly layering drones, cruise missiles and ballistic missiles into single strike packages and targeting areas with limited air defence coverage, which is highly likely to increase the effectiveness of attacks, particularly if air defence stocks are depleted. The Shaybah fatalities, reportedly caused by debris following an interception, continue to highlight the risks posed by falling debris associated with interceptions. Further Houthi attacks against Saudi airports, energy infrastructure and military bases are highly likely and are likely to be increasingly geographically dispersed to exploit gaps in air defence coverage.

The Houthi claim to have struck the Ministry of Defence headquarters in Riyadh remains unverified, and it may relate to the ballistic missile that Saudi forces reported intercepting over Riyadh on 20 October. However, the claimed targeting of a central government and military command site marks a notable expansion of the declared Houthi target set in Riyadh beyond King Khalid International Airport and energy infrastructure. This highly likely increases the risk to central Riyadh, including government districts and surrounding commercial and residential areas, from both direct strikes and interception debris. Further attempted attacks against government and military sites in central Riyadh are likely, particularly in response to continued Saudi strikes in Houthi-controlled Yemen against targets in locations such as Sanaa.

Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity: