Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update

The absence of Iranian missile or UAV attacks against regional targets since 8-9 September is the longest pause in attacks since they resumed on 28 August. This likely reflects deliberate Iranian calibration rather than a shift towards de-escalation. Iran has sustained attacks in the maritime domain and is likely exploiting this lull to regroup and reconstitute its offensive military capabilities. Recent Iranian rhetoric almost certainly indicates that Iran remains on high alert and is prepared for immediate escalation.  

US President Donald Trump used his UNGA speech to renew threats to “annihilate” Iran, likely to increase pressure on Tehran to engage in negotiations to reach a settlement. President Trump also implied that Iran is deliberately stalling negotiations until the US midterm elections, expecting them to weaken the White House’s mandate to undertake further military action against Iran.

Iran’s submission of a seven-point peace framework, which reportedly largely matches the June Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), likely indicates that Tehran has not shifted from its maximalist demands. While its full text has not been publicly disclosed, the proposal reportedly includes demands for an immediate end to the conflict on all fronts, the preservation of Iran’s civilian nuclear programme, and the unfreezing of Iranian assets before the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. The main difference with the June MoU is that the new text reportedly has a much narrower timeline, with the reopening of the SoH possible within one week of the deal’s initial approval.

Rubio’s statement that the talks did not represent a major breakthrough likely indicates that Washington is unlikely to accept a long-term settlement that defers the nuclear issue. However, there is a realistic possibility that the US will pursue a limited, short-term arrangement to reopen the SoH and stabilise oil prices ahead of the midterm elections, while leaving core issues to subsequent negotiations.

Iran’s ability to restrict the SoH has been one of its primary sources of leverage. However, the US blockade combined with expanded sanctions has significantly damaged the Iranian economy. Iran has struggled to generate revenue from its illicit oil trade, has a shortage of foreign currency reserves, is struggling to access raw materials, and production costs have increased. Moreover, despite sustaining intermittent attacks on shipping in the SoH, Iran’s ability to interdict is increasingly constrained by sustained US military operations and mine-clearing, as demonstrated by recent CENTCOM reports of 60 vessels transiting the SoH on 23 September.

With its primary source of leverage degraded and its economy increasingly struggling to absorb the costs of US military and economic pressure, Tehran likely has a growing incentive to compromise on access through the SoH, while preserving its core demands. Enabling access in exchange for sanctions reprieve and a suspension of the US blockade would almost certainly allow Iran to increase oil exports, improve access to foreign currency and raw materials and reduce pressure on domestic production. Tehran likely assesses that the rapid reopening of the SoH envisioned by the seven-point plan would be desirable for the US administration, as it would likely cause a drop in fuel prices ahead of the upcoming midterms.

However, any negotiations to temporarily reopen the SoH and ease economic pressure are unlikely to address the fundamental issues that were used to justify the conflict. Moreover, any concessions agreed on by Iran’s civilian government are likely to be undermined by both Iranian proxy force actions and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which has consolidated power in Tehran and is effectively running the country.

US force posture in the region remains enhanced, with two carrier strike groups still deployed to the CENTCOM AoR. US forces could pivot rapidly to renewed high-intensity offensive operations against Iran with limited advanced warning. Renewed high-intensity US strikes would highly likely trigger a broader Iranian retaliation beyond US military assets, likely including attacks against regional infrastructure, energy facilities, ports, and aviation hubs. Recent Iranian retaliation has largely been concentrated against targets in Jordan, Kuwait, and Bahrain, but a renewed major US campaign would almost certainly increase the risk of attacks expanding to other Gulf states hosting US forces or supporting US operations. The threat to regional airports has likely increased following Iranian warnings and the prohibition on Iranian flights. Iranian flights to the UAE, Muscat and Baghdad have been suspended, and other nations are likely to follow.

In Yemen, current Houthi operations appear primarily focused on consolidating recent territorial gains on the Red Sea coast and securing the strategic high ground around Jabal Kahbub. Consolidating gains on the Red Sea coast would likely improve the Houthis’ ability to monitor and attack international shipping, provide greater defensive depth against IRG counter-offensives, and improve their bargaining position. Saudi Arabia will almost certainly sustain its air support in order to prevent further Houthi advances and to support IRG counter-offensives aimed at dislodging the Houthis from recently captured coastal positions.

The Houthi forces are almost certain to continue attacks in Saudi Arabia in the short term in response to Saudi air support. Most attacks will likely remain focused on southern Saudi Arabia, particularly Jazan, Abha, Najran and Khamis Mushait. However, sustained Saudi air support is likely to increase the risk of further long-range Houthi attacks on military bases, airports, and energy infrastructure deeper inside the Kingdom, including in Riyadh and Jeddah. The East-West Pipeline and the port of Yanbu have likely become priority targets following the pipeline’s partial restart and before French military support is deployed to protect energy infrastructure.

Saudi strikes on Sanaa, the port city of Hodeidah, senior Houthi leadership, or other high-value targets (HVTs) are likely to serve as key indicators of more intense or sustained long-range Houthi attacks outside of southern Saudi Arabia, especially Riyadh.

US forces are set to withdraw from Iraq on 30 September. Baghdad has confirmed that there is no fixed deadline for bringing militia weapons under state control, so Iran-backed armed groups will likely retain significant missile and UAV capabilities after the withdrawal. Iranian-backed groups will likely continue to conduct intermittent attacks against regional states, particularly Saudi energy infrastructure such as the East-West Pipeline.

Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity: