SITREP

Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update

Maritime Clashes Keep Gulf States at Risk of Renewed Strikes

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 18 September 2026 – 22 September 2026

No Iranian ballistic missile or drone attack against a regional state has been reported since 8-9 September, the longest such interval since attacks resumed on 28 August.
President Trump stated on 20 September that Iran faced a choice between reaching an agreement, continued economic deterioration, or destruction.
Iran’s Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters claimed on 20 September to have intelligence indicating that the US, supported by regional states, was preparing renewed large-scale military operations. Iran has vowed wider retaliation against US and regional targets in response.
The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) is scheduled to convene in New York on 22 September. President Trump has stated he is willing to meet Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian during the UNGA and is also expected to meet with leaders from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).
High-intensity fighting has continued in Yemen, with the Houthis consolidating recently seized positions and intensifying offensive operations towards Marib. Following sustained Saudi air support for opposing forces, the Houthis have conducted an attack in Riyadh, the first confirmed Houthi attack on the capital during the current escalation.
Iran has sustained its attacks on vessels attempting to enter or exit the Strait of Hormuz (SoH). However, US military sources have stated that the SoH is now clear of mines and that energy exports have risen to their highest level since the conflict began.
As of 22 September, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman are open. However, Jazan, Abha, and Najran airports in southern Saudi Arabia have recently been regularly closed due to the Houthi threat.

Middle East Conflict: Latest Intelligence & Travel Advice

To support planning, we are updating our Middle East travel advice daily with guidance from our intelligence team on airspace openings and closures, flight operations, and escalating risks impacting movement.

ACCESS THE LATEST UPDATES

Situation Update: Iran-US Tensions Persist as Gulf Security Risks Continue

On 19 September, Saudi Arabia confirmed that its air defences had intercepted a Houthi ballistic missile targeting Riyadh, the first confirmed Houthi attack against the Saudi capital during the current escalation. Emergency alerts were issued across Riyadh and Al-Kharj. Explosions were also reported at King Khalid International Airport, with a large fire and plume of black smoke observed near fuel-storage infrastructure at the facility. Houthi attacks on Riyadh followed reports of uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs) operating over Sanaa in Yemen.

Following the attack on Riyadh, senior Houthi leadership stated that Saudi F-15 and Typhoon aircraft operating from Khamis Mushait and Taif conducted 28 strikes against targets in Taiz, Al-Jawf, and Marib during the preceding 24 hours. The Houthis also stated that attacks on Saudi Arabia and attempts to isolate Saudi shipping will continue until Riyadh ends its blockade of Houthi-held areas and permits vessels to access Houthi-controlled Red Sea ports. The Houthis have sustained offensive operations in Yemen and, as of 22 September, are continuing to pressure internationally recognised government (IRG)-held positions around Marib, Taiz, and Lahj. However, the Houthis have yet to secure a major breakthrough, and IRG sources claim to have conducted local counterattacks and recaptured several front-line positions, supported by Saudi airstrikes. On 21 September, the UK agreed to deploy an RAF Voyager tanker to provide limited, time-bound air-to-air refuelling support for Saudi aircraft conducting defensive operations against Houthi attacks.

Kinetic action has also been sustained in the Strait of Hormuz (SoH), with Iran claiming to have shot down multiple uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs), including one US MQ-9 Reaper, an MQ-1, and an Orbiter reconnaissance UAV, from 18-22 September. UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) has reported multiple tanker attacks, including at least one vessel struck by an unknown projectile on 18 September and another inbound tanker hit on 21 September.

US military activity around the waterway has remained elevated, including continued aerial refuelling and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) activity over the Gulf and Gulf of Oman. US Navy P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft and an MQ-4C Triton have conducted surveillance sorties around the SoH, while KC-135 and KC-46 tankers have supported sustained regional air operations.

On 19 September, CENTCOM commander Admiral Brad Cooper stated that US forces facilitated the transit of more than 2,000 commercial vessels and more than one billion barrels of crude oil through the SoH during the previous two months. Admiral Cooper stated that the principal transit lanes had been cleared of mines and that the volume of crude oil, liquefied natural gas and other cargo passing through the Strait during the preceding two weeks was the highest since the conflict began.

On 20 September, Iran conveyed to the US via mediators its conditions for reopening the SoH and ending the wider conflict. These reportedly included an end to fighting on all regional fronts, including Lebanon, the release of frozen Iranian assets, and an end to the US naval blockade of Iranian ports.

On 20 September, President Trump stated that Iran’s leadership faced a choice between reaching an agreement, continued economic deterioration or being destroyed, with Trump stating that he is prepared to “blow up the entire nation.” The US virtual embassy in Iran also issued an alert urging all US citizens to leave Iran immediately. However, President Trump separately indicated that he remained open to meeting Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian during the UN General Assembly scheduled for 22 September. President Trump is also expected to meet with leaders or foreign ministers from the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly to discuss the next phase of the conflict with Iran.

On 20 September, Iran’s Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters stated that it had received information indicating that the US, supported by unspecified regional states, was preparing to resume large-scale military operations against Iran. The command warned that any renewed US attack would trigger sustained strikes against US bases and interests across the Middle East and stated that regional countries facilitating US operations would be considered parties to the conflict and potentially targeted. Iran’s parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf also stated that Tehran should pursue military action and negotiations in parallel, arguing that the two approaches were not mutually exclusive.

On 20 September, unconfirmed reports stated that Iran had activated “Code 100”, described as the country’s highest military alert level, placing the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), regular armed forces (Artesh) and security services on maximum readiness amid concern over possible renewed US strikes. The IRGC also warned that Iran’s defensive and offensive operations would change significantly if attacked again, stating that the weapons and geography of war would change.

On 21 September, US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent stated that Iranian airlines would effectively be shut out of international operations from 23 September, warning that airports, fuel suppliers, and ticketing companies servicing them could lose access to the US dollar system.

On 18 September, the security advisor to Iraq’s prime minister stated that the government has yet to impose a deadline for bringing militia weapons under state control, denying reports that Iran-backed armed factions would be required to disarm by 30 September. He clarified that the 30 September date relates to the withdrawal of remaining US-led coalition forces and stated that negotiations over bringing weapons under state control would continue beyond this date.

On 20 September, the US Mission in Saudi Arabia introduced a requirement for US government personnel to obtain special authorisation for all official and personal travel to Taif and Yanbu, citing the ongoing security situation.

As of 22 September, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman are open. However, Jazan, Abha, and Najran airports in southern Saudi Arabia have recently been regularly closed due to the Houthi threat.

Saudi Arabia

Overnight 18-19 September, Saudi Arabia issued attack alerts across its western region, including Jeddah, Yanbu, Taif, Abha, Khamis Mushait, and Jazan; it also activated alerts for Riyadh and al-Kharj. All alerts were subsequently cancelled. Heavy smoke rose from a fuel tank close to King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh on 19 September. The Houthis confirmed that they carried out attack drone and ballistic missile strikes targeting multiple locations in Riyadh and an Aramco facility in Yanbu, with a Saudi spokesperson stating that air defences prevented “hostile attempts to target civilians” in Bish, Taif, Farasan, and Yanbu. This was the first attack targeting Riyadh since July. On 22 September, a brief alert was issued and rescinded for Najran province.

Following reports on 16 September that Saudi Arabia is running low on missile interceptors, UK Prime Minister Andy Burnham stated that the UK has agreed to support Saudi Arabia with “defensive” air-to-air refuelling.

As of 22 September, Saudi Arabia’s airspace is open. However, Saudi Arabia’s Jazan, Abha, and Najran airports have been regularly closed due to Houthi attacks. High levels of flight delays were observed at Riyadh King Khalid International Airport (RUH / OERK) on 19 September following Houthi strike on an Aramco fuel tank close to the airport.

Kuwait

No attacks have been reported in Kuwait between 18 and 22 September.

As of 22 September, Kuwait’s airspace is open.

Bahrain

No attacks have been reported in Bahrain between 18 and 22 September.

As of 22 September, Bahrain’s airspace is open.

Qatar

No attacks have been reported in Qatar between 18 and 22 September.

As of 22 September, Qatar’s airspace is open.

UAE

No attacks have been reported in the UAE between 18 and 22 September.

As of 22 September, the UAE’s airspace is open.

Oman

Excluding attacks in Omani waters, no attacks have been reported in Oman between 18 and 22 September.

As of 22 September, Oman’s airspace is open.

Regional Advisory

The absence of Iranian ballistic missile or drone attacks against targets in a regional state since 8-9 September is the longest such interval since attacks resumed on 28 August. This likely reflects deliberate Iranian calibration rather than a shift towards de-escalation, with Iran sustaining attacks in the maritime domain. Iranian strikes against US military facilities in Jordan, Kuwait, and Bahrain in particular are likely to resume with minimal warning following US strikes against Iranian territory or tankers.

Attacks in the maritime domain are likely to continue triggering further strike exchanges, with neither side likely to de-escalate without surrendering a key source of leverage. The IRGC’s attempt to seize a US Navy USV on 14 September and its claimed disabling of a Togo-flagged tanker on 17 September indicate that Tehran is continuing to contest control of the SoH through both interdiction of commercial shipping and direct attacks against US assets. The IRGC’s claimed downing of two MQ-9 Reaper drones on 16 and 17 September indicates a sustained Iranian effort to degrade US intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) operations over the SoH. Kinetic exchanges in the maritime domain have repeatedly led to Iranian strikes against targets in regional states, and there are currently no indications that Tehran has abandoned this strategy.

Trump’s statement that he faces a decision over whether to “annihilate” the Iranian regime, alongside the reported order to maintain US force levels in the region until the end of the year, likely indicates that Washington is preserving the option to return to large-scale military operations and sustain pressure on Tehran, rather than signalling an immediate intent to resume major combat operations. The planned 22 September meeting with GCC leaders is likely to be an indicator of the conflict’s next phase. Gulf states almost certainly remain opposed to a return to full-scale conflict given their exposure to Iranian retaliation, and are likely to press for a renewed diplomatic effort.

Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia are highly likely to continue, with the attempted attack against targets in Yanbu and Taif indicating a continued broadening of the Houthi target set beyond southern Saudi Arabia. The highest priority targets for the Houthis likely remain energy infrastructure, military facilities and international airports. The death of one person and the injury of two others from falling debris in the Taif region on 17 September highly likely indicates that the risk to civilians from intercepted munitions and debris is increasing as attacks continue and extend into western Saudi Arabia. Further early warning alerts across western and southern Saudi Arabia are highly likely over the coming days, and short-notice airspace restrictions and flight disruption at Jeddah and other international airports are a realistic possibility.

Saudi airstrikes have not yet targeted Sanaa, the port city of Hodeidah or senior Houthi leadership in the current phase of conflict triggered by the Houthi 3 September offensive, in a likely calibrated attempt to avoid a major escalation in Houthi long-range fires. The conducting of such strikes is likely a key indicator and warning of further escalated Houthi attacks against targets in locations such as Riyadh or Jeddah, and the claimed interception near Mecca is likely to expand the political latitude available to Riyadh to escalate against the Houthis.

The US-Houthi Muscat meeting likely prioritised US attempts to decouple American interests from the Saudi-Houthi conflict rather than a push for mediation, and the reported exclusion of Saudi-linked vessels indicates Houthi intent to maintain the blockade while trying to avoid US retaliation. A Houthi attack against a US-linked vessel or interest would likely be a key indicator of future US involvement.

Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:

Jordanian authorities have warned against publishing videos or information regarding Jordan’s defensive operations without authorisation.
Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Interior has stated that “[p]hotographing or publishing or circulating information related to countering missiles and drones and the locations of their falls exposes you to legal accountability.”
In the UAE, authorities have warned that publishing or circulating “rumours, false news, or news from unknown sources through social media platforms or other information technology” is illegal. Reports indicate that Dubai Police have used “electronic monitoring operations” to detect a photo shared within a private WhatsApp group.
In Bahrain, several people have been confirmed as arrested for “filming, live streaming, clipping, and publishing events in a manner constituting a legal violation”.
Qatar’s Ministry of Interior warned that gathering at incident sites or photographing and sharing content related to field developments may result in legal accountability and has arrested hundreds of people of various nationalities for “producing and sharing misleadinThe absence of Iranian missile or UAV attacks against regional targets since 8-9 September is the longest pause in attacks since they resumed on 28 August. This likely reflects deliberate Iranian calibration rather than a shift towards de-escalation. Iran has sustained attacks in the maritime domain and is likely exploiting this lull to regroup and reconstitute its offensive military capabilities. Recent Iranian rhetoric almost certainly indicates that Iran remains on high alert and is prepared for immediate escalation.
The recent re-issuing by the US State Department of Level 3: Reconsider Travel advisories and associated embassy security messaging across Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman has not materially changed the existing security posture. Saudi Arabia is a notable exception, with the most recent update introducing additional restrictions on US government personnel travelling to Taif and Yanbu, alongside the 15 September prohibition on travel to Jizan, Asir, Najran, and Qatif and the existing prohibition on travel within 20 miles of the Yemen border. Most of these advisories and restrictions were already in place and continue to reflect the elevated risk of Iranian and proxy attacks across the region. However, there is a realistic possibility that the timing of the renewed messaging also reflects heightened US concern over a near-term escalation, including potential renewed US military action against Iran.
US rhetoric and actions have ranged from explicit threats of renewed military action to a significant expansion of economic pressure, including threatened secondary sanctions intended to severely restrict the international operations of Iranian airlines. US military activity has also remained elevated, likely to give credence to the threat of renewed strikes. US strategy is likely deliberately ambiguous to increase pressure on Iran ahead of the UNGA on 22 September. Iranian rhetoric and military signalling are likely intended to deter renewed US military escalation by emphasising Tehran’s readiness and willingness to rapidly respond and expand retaliation across the region.
President Trump is willing to meet with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, who has arrived in New York for the assembly, where he is scheduled to address the member states. However, Iran has maintained its existing negotiating position, while President Pezeshkian is expected to firmly defend Tehran’s conditions and broader position during his address. Moreover, President Pezeshkian has been increasingly isolated by the IRGC, which has consolidated power in Tehran since the outbreak of conflict and remains opposed to significant concessions to the US.
Failure by Iran to moderate its position would likely elevate the risk of increased US economic and military pressure. There is increasing evidence that US direct and secondary sanctions are constraining Iran’s access to international financial, aviation, and logistics networks, although they have yet to produce a substantive shift in Tehran’s negotiating position. Washington may assess that increased economic pressure is the most suitable course of action to sustain pressure on Tehran, while avoiding the political and operational costs of renewed large-scale military action ahead of the US midterm elections.
However, the US force posture in the region remains enhanced, with two carrier strike groups still deployed to the CENTCOM AoR. US forces could pivot rapidly to renewed high-intensity offensive operations against Iran with limited advanced warning. Renewed high-intensity US strikes would highly likely trigger a broader Iranian retaliation beyond US military assets, likely including attacks against regional infrastructure, energy facilities, ports, and aviation hubs. Recent Iranian retaliation has largely been concentrated against targets in Jordan, Kuwait, and Bahrain, but a renewed major US campaign would almost certainly increase the risk of attacks expanding to other Gulf states hosting US forces or supporting US operations.
Iran’s primary leverage has almost certainly been achieved via its ability to restrict energy exports through the SoH. Admiral Cooper’s statement that principal transit lanes are now clear of mines and that commercial traffic has risen to its highest level since the conflict began indicates that this leverage has weakened. Iran is likely to sustain or increase attacks against international shipping and could increasingly target either directly or indirectly through the use of proxy attacks on regional export infrastructure. However, an expansion of attacks is likely to significantly increase the risk of miscalculation and/or escalation.
The Houthis are likely to continue consolidating their recently seized positions in parts of Yemen and continue attacking IRG positions in Marib, Taiz and Lahj, while IRG forces, backed by Saudi airstrikes, try to hold or retake ground. Continued Saudi support is likely to prompt further Houthi missile and UAV attacks on Saudi Arabia. Most attacks will likely remain focused on southern Saudi Arabia, particularly Jazan, Abha, Najran and Khamis Mushait. However, sustained Saudi air support is likely to increase the risk of further long-range Houthi attacks on military bases, airports, and energy infrastructure deeper inside the Kingdom, including in Riyadh and Jeddah. Saudi strikes on Sanaa, the port city of Hodeidah, senior Houthi leadership, or other high-value targets (HVTs) are likely to serve as key indicators of further long-range Houthi attacks outside of southern Saudi Arabia.
Baghdad’s confirmation that there is no fixed deadline for bringing militia weapons under state control likely means Iran-backed Shia armed groups in Iraq will retain significant missile and UAV capabilities beyond the 30 September US-led coalition withdrawal. Several major factions continue to resist disarmament, increasing the likelihood that they remain capable of supporting Iranian regional retaliation, including attacks against Saudi Arabia or other US partners, after US forces leave Iraq.
Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:
Jordanian authorities have warned against publishing videos or information regarding Jordan’s defensive operations without authorisation.
Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Interior has stated that “[p]hotographing or publishing or circulating information related to countering missiles and drones and the locations of their falls exposes you to legal accountability.”
In the UAE, authorities have warned that publishing or circulating “rumours, false news, or news from unknown sources through social media platforms or other information technology” is illegal. Reports indicate that Dubai Police have used “electronic monitoring operations” to detect a photo shared within a private WhatsApp group.
In Bahrain, several people have been confirmed as arrested for “filming, live streaming, clipping, and publishing events in a manner constituting a legal violation”.
Qatar’s Ministry of Interior warned that gathering at incident sites or photographing and sharing content related to field developments may result in legal accountability and has arrested hundreds of people of various nationalities for “producing and sharing misleading information”.
Omani authorities have stated: “Beware of sharing or publishing any captured photos or videos. They should be shared only with the competent authorities”

Request Evacuation Assistance

If you need secure, coordinated support to move personnel out of a high-risk location, our team is ready to help – quickly, calmly, and with care.