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Attacks on Saudi Arabia Broaden as Regional De-escalation Efforts Stall
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | INTELLIGENCE WINDOW: 11 September 2026 – 15 September 2026
- On 11 September, Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the East-West crude oil pipeline in the “Riyadh and Medina regions” hit 10 September was targeted by “several drones launched from Iraq”. The statement said that the kingdom would not respond at this stage and would support the efforts of the Iraqi government, while reserving the right to take necessary measures.
- The attack was likely directed or authorised by the IRGC and almost certainly reflects Tehran’s broader incentive to degrade regional export capacity that circumvents the Strait of Hormuz (SoH). The IRGC is likely to become increasingly incentivised to conduct deniable attacks against bypass infrastructure, with the UAE’s Fujairah and Khor Fakkan terminals also a potential target set.
- Reciprocal attacks against shipping have continued and are highly likely to continue triggering further strike exchanges. The Iran-GCC meeting scheduled for 14 September in Salalah was postponed indefinitely, likely removing the most viable near-term mechanism for de-escalation.
- The Houthis have conducted attacks against southern Saudi Arabia daily between 12 and 15 September, with early warning alerts also activated in Jeddah, Taif, AlUla, Mecca City, and Yanbu on 15 September. This indicates an escalatory broadening of the Houthi target set beyond southern Saudi Arabia, with further warnings in western Saudi Arabia likely in the coming days.
- Saudi airstrikes have not yet targeted Sanaa, Hodeidah city, or senior Houthi leadership, in a likely calibrated attempt to avoid a return to the full-scale conflict that existed prior to 2022. Such strikes are likely a key indicator and warning of further escalated Houthi attacks against targets such as Riyadh or Jeddah.
- As of 15 September, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman are open. However, Jazan, Abha, and Najran airports in southern Saudi Arabia have recently been regularly closed due to the Houthi threat.
Middle East Conflict: Latest Intelligence & Travel Advice
To support planning, we are updating our Middle East travel advice daily with guidance from our intelligence team on airspace openings and closures, flight operations, and escalating risks impacting movement.
Saudi Pipeline Strike and Continued Maritime Attacks Undermine De-escalation Efforts
On 11 September, Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the East-West crude oil pipeline in the “Riyadh and Medina regions” hit 10 September was targeted by “several drones launched from Iraq”. The statement said that the kingdom would not respond at this stage and would support the efforts of the Iraqi government, while reserving the right to take all necessary measures to protect its sovereignty and security.
Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi dismissed the commander of Maysan Operations Command and Maysan’s provincial police chief on 12 September after investigations indicated the drones had been launched from a site within the province, and ordered the formation of an investigative council. Iraq also temporarily closed three border crossings with Iran, which were reopened on 13 September. On 13 September, the head of Iraq’s Security Media Cell stated that Iraqi forces had located and seized a drone-launching platform, with the likely launch site reportedly identified in the al-Tayeb border district of north-eastern Maysan. Iraq’s commander-in-chief approved an Iranian request to participate in the investigation. No group has claimed responsibility, and the umbrella group for Iran-backed militias operating in Iraq, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI), stated that the attack was “an honour that we do not claim”.
Reciprocal attacks against shipping have continued. On 13 September, an Iranian commercial vessel was struck by an unidentified projectile near Hengam Island off Qeshm, killing one crew member and wounding four. UKMTO reported a further vessel struck while transiting the Strait of Hormuz (SoH) late on 12 September, with a fire onboard and crew evacuated. On 14 September, Iranian media claimed that two Iranian fishing boats were struck by a US drone off Hormozgan province, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) claimed that a Panama-flagged tanker exploded after striking a naval mine, which was disputed by US Central Command (CENTCOM), which said that the vessel was previously damaged by a missile and attacked again by a drone.
A meeting between Iran and the six-member Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) scheduled for 14 September in Salalah, Oman, to discuss an Iran-Oman negotiated roadmap for the safe passage of shipping through the SoH, was postponed indefinitely. Oman’s Foreign Minister, Sayyid Badr Albusaidi, stated that the meeting had been delayed “in the interests of consensus”, while Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the postponement had been requested by Saudi Arabia. Bahrain had separately stated that it would not participate in any collective meeting including Iran prior to the resumption of diplomatic relations. The US was not a participant in the planned meeting.
The Houthis have continued attacks against southern Saudi Arabia daily between 12 and 15 September, particularly Khamis Mushait, Abha, Jazan and Najran, with early warning alerts also activated in Jeddah, Taif, AlUla, Mecca and Yanbu on 15 September.
In Yemen, regular airstrikes by the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) have continued to target primarily front-line areas, with the Houthis claiming on 13 September that the RSAF had conducted over 50 strikes against their positions in the preceding 24 hours. Saudi-backed internationally recognised government (IRG) sources claimed on 14 September that Houthi forces were redeploying away from the coastline next to the Bab al-Mandeb Strait (BaM) in order to reduce their exposure to air strikes, but this remains unverified.
As of 15 September, the airspaces of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman are open. However, Jazan, Abha, and Najran airports in southern Saudi Arabia have recently been regularly closed due to the Houthi threat.
Saudi Arabia
On 11 September, Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the East-West crude oil pipeline in the “Riyadh and Medina regions” was targeted on 10 September by “several drones launched from Iraq”. The statement said that the kingdom would not respond at this stage and would support the efforts of the Iraqi government, while reserving the right to take all necessary measures to protect its sovereignty and security.
Saudi Civil Defence issued emergency alerts warning of potential danger daily between 12 and 15 September for areas in southern Saudi Arabia, including Najran, Khamis Mushait, Jazan, and Abha. Early warning alerts were also activated in Taif on 14 September and Jeddah, Taif, AlUla, Mecca City and Yanbu on 15 September.
Confirmed impacts by authorities from Houthi attacks include: at least two people injured after a mosque and several buildings were damaged by a falling projectile in Al-Tuwal, Jazan Province on 12 September, and 13 civilians injured and damage to seven homes and two vehicles following the 14 September attack against Khamis Mushait, Abha and Taif.
As of 15 September, Saudi Arabia’s airspace is open. However, Saudi Arabia’s Jazan, Abha, and Najran airports have been regularly closed due to Houthi attacks. High levels of flight delays were observed at Jeddah King Abdulaziz International (JED) on 15 September as a result of the early warning alerts.
Kuwait
No attacks have been reported in Kuwait between 11 and 15 September.
As of 15 September, Kuwait’s airspace is open.
Bahrain
No attacks have been reported in Bahrain between 11 and 15 September.
As of 15 September, Bahrain’s airspace is open.
Qatar
No attacks have been reported in Qatar between 11 and 15 September.
As of 15 September, Qatar’s airspace is open.
UAE
No attacks have been reported in the UAE between 11 and 15 September.
As of 15 September, the UAE’s airspace is open.
Oman
Excluding attacks in Omani waters, no attacks have been reported in Oman between 11 and 15 September.
As of 15 September, Oman’s airspace is open.
Regional Advisory
The attack against the East-West pipeline in Saudi Arabia, which has now been confirmed to have originated from Iraqi territory, was likely to have been directed or authorised by Iran’s IRGC. The 1,200km pipeline carries an estimated four to five per cent of global crude oil supply and has been Saudi Arabia’s principal means of bypassing the SoH, with Saudi exports through its Red Sea terminus having more than doubled since the outbreak of the conflict, according to the International Energy Agency.
The explicit denial by IRI, the umbrella group for Iran-backed militias in Iraq, is likely intended to preserve deniability for both Tehran and its Iraqi partners rather than indicating non-involvement. The attack likely does not serve any Iraqi factional interest, and the launch site in Maysan province lies in an area of long-standing Iran-aligned militia presence adjacent to the Iranian border.
The attack almost certainly reflects Tehran’s broader incentive to degrade regional export capacity that circumvents the SoH. While Iran’s ability to interdict transit through the strait has been degraded by US escorting and mine clearance, bypass routes have also become a key constraint on Iranian leverage. Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline has been used extensively to bypass the SoH. Attacks on the pipeline could also serve as a warning from Tehran to Riyadh that increased Saudi intervention in Yemen will incur higher costs, while forcing Saudi Arabia to disperse air defences to cover threats from the north at a time when the Houthi missile and UAV threat from the south is escalating.
As the US blockade remains in place and economic pressure on Tehran increases, the IRGC is likely to become increasingly incentivised to conduct deniable attacks against infrastructure used to bypass the Strait of Hormuz. The UAE’s Fujairah and Khor Fakkan export infrastructure could therefore constitute potential future targets.
The indefinite postponement of the 14 September Salalah meeting likely removes the most viable near-term mechanism for de-escalation in the SoH. The reported submission of Saudi amendments, alongside Bahrain’s refusal to attend, likely indicates that the GCC states are not unified in their approach to negotiating with Tehran on transit arrangements. Moreover, it is likely that Saudi withdrawal from the planned meeting was in part directly related to the East-West pipeline attack. Key Gulf states are also likely unwilling to legitimise long term Iranian regulation of the strait through fees or permits, and a negotiated reopening of the SoH remains unlikely in the near term.
Reciprocal attacks against shipping in the SoH, Persian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, and Arabian Sea are highly likely to continue triggering further strike exchanges, with neither side likely to de-escalate in the maritime domain without surrendering a key source of leverage. The sustained US “tanker for tanker” policy and Iranian expansion of its targeting zone for vessels have each almost certainly reinforced this cycle. Kinetic exchanges in the maritime domain have repeatedly led to Iranian strikes against targets in regional states, most recently prioritising US military facilities in Jordan.
The conflict in Yemen has continued to escalate with no current observable diplomatic off-ramps. Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia are highly likely to continue, with Houthi statements previously explicitly threatening to broaden attacks in response to further Saudi action. The activation of early warning systems in Taif on 14 September and Yanbu, Jeddah, Taif, Mecca City and AlUla on 15 September potentially indicate a broadening of the Houthi target set, with early warning alerts now being activated outside of southern Saudi Arabia. The highest priority targets for the Houthis likely remain energy infrastructure, military facilities and international airports. Further alerts across western Saudi Arabia are highly likely over the coming days, in addition to southern Saudi Arabia. Short-notice airspace restrictions and flight disruption at Jeddah and other international airports are a realistic possibility.
Saudi airstrikes have not yet targeted Sanaa, the port city of Hodeidah or senior Houthi leadership in Yemen, in a likely calibrated attempt to avoid a major escalation. The conducting of such strikes is likely a key indicator and warning of further escalated Houthi attacks against targets in locations such as Riyadh or Jeddah.
Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity:
- Jordanian authorities have warned against publishing videos or information regarding Jordan’s defensive operations without authorisation.
- Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Interior has stated that “[p]hotographing or publishing or circulating information related to countering missiles and drones and the locations of their falls exposes you to legal accountability.”
- In the UAE, authorities have warned that publishing or circulating “rumours, false news, or news from unknown sources through social media platforms or other information technology” is illegal. Reports indicate that Dubai Police have used “electronic monitoring operations” to detect a photo shared within a private WhatsApp group.
- In Bahrain, several people have been confirmed as arrested for “filming, live streaming, clipping, and publishing events in a manner constituting a legal violation”.
- Qatar’s Ministry of Interior warned that gathering at incident sites or photographing and sharing content related to field developments may result in legal accountability and has arrested hundreds of people of various nationalities for “producing and sharing misleading information”.
Omani authorities have stated: “Beware of sharing or publishing any captured photos or videos. They should be shared only with the competent authorities”.
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