Gulf States: Situation & Travel Update

Travel to the Middle East is likely to remain at a high risk profile until there are clear indications of durable de-escalation, such as a US force withdrawal or reduction. As long as the current US force posture is maintained, and with multiple triggers for escalation remaining extant, renewed large-scale conflict could rapidly break out.

The combination of US Treasury messaging on economic coercion as a substitute for kinetic force, Rubio’s reported private assurances to allies, and the reported planning of returning diplomatic staff to regional posts indicate that the US is unlikely to initiate major offensive operations against Iran in the short term.

However, the risk that Iran now initiates offensive escalation has highly likely risen. Iran’s principal leverage in the conflict has almost certainly been derived from its ability to interdict transit through the SoH. This leverage has likely been recently degraded; the establishment of a US-escorted corridor along the Omani coast, the widespread adoption of night-time dark transits, and the rerouting of Gulf exports away from the SoH entirely have likely restored a notable proportion of regional export capacity. Moreover, reported transit and export volumes are likely higher than publicly tracked figures indicate, due to the use of dark transits and ship-to-ship transfers used to obfuscate export activity.

The combination of degraded maritime leverage and intensified economic pressure through Operation Economic Outcast and the US blockade likely increases Tehran’s incentive to escalate militarily, both to demonstrate that the SoH cannot be transited without its consent and to restore its negotiating position before its remaining leverage is further degraded. Iranian escalation aimed at reasserting control over the SoH, restoring Iranian leverage and imposing costs on the US and its allies is likely in the coming weeks. Iran’s most likely course of action is to increase attacks against commercial vessels using the southern transit corridor and may also involve further limited mining operations. However, these actions will likely increase the risk of direct military confrontation with the US, which has yet to conduct any meaningful force reductions in the region.

Attacks against Gulf state energy infrastructure, ports and airports, as well as US military installations, would represent a more significant escalation. The risk of this is highly likely to increase if Gulf states and other major trading partners comply with US sanctions and if Tehran fails to effectively circumnavigate the sanctions. Iran’s new SNSC head, Rezaei, has already made direct threats against regional energy infrastructure. Rezaei’s specific reference to export routes bypassing the SoH likely indicates that Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea infrastructure at Yanbu, alongside pipeline, port, and loading infrastructure in the UAE, particularly at Fujairah, is being framed by Tehran as legitimate targets if it assesses that the Gulf states are supporting the US economic campaign.

Moreover, the four principles outlined by the Iranian Artesh spokesperson, Akraminia, codify the lowering of Iran’s threshold for the first use of force and widen the scope of ‘legitimate’ targets. The pre-emptive action principle in particular almost certainly indicates an increased risk of Iran initiating an exchange. Akraminia cited the 28 July strike on Muwaffaq Salti Airbase in Azraq, Jordan, despite a lack of US offensive action, as evidence for the doctrinal shift. The stated trigger, an adversary assembling personnel and equipment, is broad enough that routine force rotations, air defence deployments, or naval movements could be interpreted by Iran as indicators and warnings of an imminent attack and used to justify a pre-emptive strike, highly likely increasing the risk of miscalculation.

Iran had previously pursued a strategy of analogous targeting, whereby it would respond to attacks by striking broadly comparable targets across the region. However, the disproportionate retaliation principle likely represents a shift from this approach. The new doctrine likely indicates that Iran is willing to rapidly escalate and broaden the criteria for both the scale and type of targets it considers legitimate in the event of renewed escalation. The geographic targeting expansion makes explicit threats to adversary interests across the region, including energy hubs, the Bab al-Mandeb Strait and undersea internet cables. However, this remains poorly defined and could extend to other targets.

Pakistani and Omani diplomatic activity in Tehran on 24 and 25 August highly likely reflects continued attempts by regional powers to prevent the collapse of the diplomatic track. However, with no direct US-Iran channel in place, Iranian preconditions highly likely unchanged, and Washington committed to escalating economic pressure to compel compliance, a near-term breakthrough is unlikely. The Iran-Oman track on the management of the SoH remains the most likely source of progress, although Iranian officials have consistently stated that an agreement with Oman would not open the SoH until the US meets Iran’s conditions in the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU).

Travellers and expatriates are strongly advised not to film or distribute footage of strikes, damage, or military activity: